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Abstract 
This constructivist grounded theory study explored the possibility that early socio-
cultural experience, in concert with innate cognitive mechanisms, are essential 
components of a dual process of decision-making. Each element may influence conflict 
actors toward predictable predispositional behaviors that manifest as bias. Specifically, 
we are concerned that these biases will influence the perceived and actual neutrality of 
the principle mediator thus compromising a mediation success. The presence of these 
predispositions in both mediators and conflict stakeholder challenges the validity of the 
conclusions in other research that does not consider the true impact of cultural dissonance 
on more than a superficial insinuation of social facts. This was accomplished through 
interrogating data yielded through content analysis of the actors’ use of language both 
spoken and written utilizing the techniques used in grounded theory studies.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Background 
The impetus for this study followed a theme observed consistently during my 
studies in conflict analysis that cheered the success of mediation in bringing resolution to 
many different types of disputes both large and small. These same authors were adherents 
to the traditional methodologies used in addressing the dynamics assumed to be inherent 
to any conflict. Initially, the methods seemed reasonable within my understanding of 
social interactions gained from more than a quarter of a century teaching social science, 
particularly as it regards social theory, the sociology of war and the sociology of 
deviance. I was certain that the study of resolution would serve the role as a dedicated 
servant to those disciplines.  
As a sociologist, I had always viewed ones’ cultural environment as an external 
interactive variable, a Durkheimian “social fact,” framed in the same way as did historic 
members of the Chicago School like Cooley and Meade. Culture was studied as some 
“thing” that could be detached from the individual, quantifiable and manipulable; 
something external to the social actor that played upon and defined our understanding of 
the social world. Reading the works of anthropologists like Franz Boas, A. L. Kroeber, 
Ruth Benedict, and Edward Sapir, who focused their attention on the uniqueness of 
different cultural groups throughout the world, or parsing the anthropological arena into 
material and non-material elements, each also treated their respective “culture” as a thing 
that impacted the individual from the outside. To them, it was this culture that contributed 
to how a human actor “defined” or “perceived” their world and, as we will see below, 
caused the actor to establish evolving semiotic principles for sociolinguistics. 
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In effect, these scientists remained on the outside looking in, prioritizing and 
anthropomorphizing externalities as a comprehensive explanation for observed behavior. 
While admittedly their experimental lens was ground during an era of minimal 
technology that may have served to clarify their theoretical positions, their work only 
paid scarce attention to evolved human capacities in terms of the actions they observed. 
Ironically, early cognitive scientists like Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, who 
described a stage-like evolution of cognitive development in their schema (Kohlberg, 
1969; Kohlberg, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001; Piaget, 1952), addressed those definitional 
variables again as externalities. Kohlberg and Piaget began to conceptualize the notion 
that outside influences were interacting with certain cognitive machinery inherent to the 
actor. In effect they were positing that these external influences have little to no value 
without the innate perceptions of the individual embedded within them. 
My own “abductive moment” (Peirce, 1931-5, 1958; Walton, 2005) occurred 
following the consecutive readings of three disciplines, done one day to pass the time 
sitting in a café in Annapolis, Maryland. I had been reading a text on critical theory by 
Held (1980) who promoted a notion similar to Rohner (1969). First, that a prerequisite to 
the acquisition and understanding of knowledge is tradition and history; second, that 
history cannot escape the burdens of tradition; third, since individuals are products of 
their resident history and tradition, and since history is a constantly changing context, that 
the act of understanding is also ever-changing; fourth, the act of an individual 
understanding history and tradition is the mechanism by which it moves forward; fifth, 
the act of understanding is therefore never complete, that is, we are always learning new 
things as we experience new things. Finally, understanding is not exclusively a method of 
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approaching a social subject, new or historic, but is a prerequisite to being in the world 
(Held, 1980).  
Prior to becoming a social scientist, my academic focus was biological science. I 
took great pleasure in reading about the physiology and mechanical mechanisms in 
humans, how they moved but most importantly, the systems that allowed them to think 
and process experiences neurologically that led to certain behaviors. This, in conjunction 
with a senior thesis on the dysfunctions evident of Alzheimer’s disease and subsequently 
reading the anthology of Phineas Gage (Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, & 
Damasio, 1994; Harlow, 1948) whose brain injury led to miraculous advances in the 
neurosciences, I was fascinated (and thankful) watching my own children and how they 
were able to take so few words and formulate massive amounts of abstractions in 
storytelling. Equally as fascinating was their capacity for considering the importance of 
certain words in the forming of weighted concepts that may serve to convince, fool or 
manipulate their father! How was it possible for such a small child with limited 
experience and exposure to the social environment already know the value of conceptual 
abstractions while having a grasp on so few linguistic elements? 
This played well when they had a desire for something they knew logically they 
could not have, or to transform a scenario to their advantage by “bending” their perceived 
truths. I was increasingly captivated by how they reacted in ways predicted by Piaget and 
Kohlberg decades before since my kids were growing up in the times of progressive 
childrearing of the 1970’s. But at the same time, they seemed to have an innate capacity, 
or a neurologically hardwired understanding of what was right and wrong. It was 
important that I understood how these things happened, what the process was beyond 
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what early researchers had theorized. Indeed, new methods of evaluation were availing 
themselves each day and it was incumbent upon me as a scientist to test the limits of 
traditional theory. 
 Indeed, how those little developing brains processed what they had heard, and 
what appeared to be an inherent sense of how to respond to certain people positively or 
negatively, but more importantly, how they expressed those thoughts and feelings 
through language became a great passion of observation. To satisfy my own curiosity, 
and perhaps in an academically nostalgic moment, I was also reading Noam Chomsky’s 
work on Universal Grammar (1965, 1975) and gleefully discovered that in fact, my 
children and by evolutionary design, all humans regardless of geography, were born with 
an evolved innate neural machinery that allows for the acquisition, interpretation and 
utilization of language; some neural capacity that is activated and edited through social 
interactions (West-Eberhard, 2003; Grice, 1989). 
Finally, in preparation for a class, I was reading a study by the late Jacob 
Bercovitch and his student Berend Beber (2010), now a professor at NYU. While 
examining various forms of mediation strategies, they made the off-handed comment that 
for all of its positive influences and historic utilization, mediation remained rather 
lackluster in its measurable long-term success in the international peace-making arena; 
something repeated in other mediation research findings (Beber, 2010; Grieg & Diehl, 
2012; Salem, 1993). This was a conclusion reached in more than only international 
mediation research but also in the organizational conflict literature (Bielby & Bielby, 
1999; Perrow, 1986). They reviewed the problems inherent to cross-cultural mediations 
as had Augsburger (1992) and others (Avruch & Black, 1993; Beber, 2012; Bercovitch & 
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Oishi, 2010; Cohen, 1997; Ting-Toomey, 2001), as well as the assumptions made by 
Allport (1954) in his classic study of contact theory. It was then that the “abductive 
moment” that Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-5, 1958) had discussed in his work in 
pragmatism availed itself.  
Knowing that there is an innate neurological machinery resident to all human 
beings that allows them to capture, process and assign some level of behavior mitigating 
value to external stimuli relative to their perception of the world (Bigler et al., 2007; 
Cáceda, James, Ely, Snarey, & Kilts, 2011; Grice, 1989; Laitin, 1977; West-Eberhard, 
2003), and having read that this machinery served to promote and prioritize social 
interaction (Churchland, 2011; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Robertson, et al., 2007; Tomasello, 
2008) and finally, that people, like my own children seemed to instinctually “react” to 
certain people and situations without thinking, I wondered if a combination of these 
factors could somehow impact the way in which mediations progress. In short, I 
wondered if there was something in a mediator’s or a conflict stakeholder’s experience 
that would preclude their constructive participation in a mediation leading to the 
Bercovitch observations. Further, is this “thing”: something that can be identified and 
acted upon reminiscent of early considerations of culture? 
Perhaps they simply did not like each other or like the schoolyard relationships in 
our past, liked one more than the other. But the question then followed, what is it about a 
person we have never met that causes us to like or dislike them immediately and how 
might this impact future interactions with that individual or someone who might remind 
us of that individual; a phenomenon we have all been subject to. Mediators today, often 
have not had previous experience with other conflict stakeholders, so is there something 
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that they inherently and unconsciously sense about the people across the table upon their 
first face-to-face meeting or perhaps acquired during their preparation for the mediation 
that triggers some unexplainable sense of moral judgement of the other stakeholders, and 
if so, how does that impact the proceedings and the outcome of the mediation event? A 
logical follow-up question is where does that feeling come from without the experience 
necessary to construct an experience-based opinion? 
This study applies these preliminary observations to the field of mediation. In 
order to make explicit the presumed interplay between evolved innate cognitive 
mechanisms and outside socio-cultural influences, I interrogated information that 
describes the interaction of world leaders in pursuit of a lasting peace between two 
Biblically historical disputants, Israel and Egypt. Specifically, this study examines the 
interactions between Jimmy Carter, the U.S. President and the Accord’s “neutral” 
mediator, Anwar al-Sadat, the President of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, the Prime 
Minister of Israel: the latter two serving as the conflict disputants during the 1978 Camp 
David Accords. The study pays close attention to the similarities and differences between 
the personal and social evolution of these three men, the situation they found themselves 
in and how these may have led to the innate cognitive processes of each, creating 
predispositional behaviors that subsequently impacted interpersonal dynamics and 
ultimately the mediation event.  
The study demonstrated a conceptual bridge between innate cognitive processes 
and the impact of external influences as manifest by certain behaviors or more 
importantly, behavioral predispositions as biases and how they are expressed, it then 
allowed for the construction of a procedure to select mediators in a ‘best-match’ scenario, 
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thus increasing mediation efficacy. Initially then, the study posed the following research 
questions that will guide its inquiry: 
1. Is there an observable difference in situational responses between conflict 
stakeholders that can be attributed to differences in their socio-cultural history? 
2. Are these differences in situational responses a result of individual perceptions 
whose value is grounded in socio-cultural experiences? 
3. Are these perceptions a result of the interplay between evolved cognitive 
mechanisms and the socio-cultural experiences unique to the individual? 
4. Is the result of this interplay manifest in particular situational preferences 
important to social interactions and therefore to mediation events? 
Context of the Study 
Earlier research efforts by conflict researchers have identified important 
operational elements that provide a foundation on which to build different strategies for 
mediation. However, even though these findings have been operationalized, significant 
improvements in outcome efficacy have not been shown through several significant 
meta-studies on mediation (Bercovitch & Diehl, 1997; Greig & Diehl, 2012). In some 
cases, results showing the positive effects of several strategies were regarded as spurious 
(Bercovitch & Houston, 2000; Bercovitch & Chafin, 2011; Bercovitch & Houston, 1993). 
What this grounded theory study provides is a theoretical framework that transcends 
traditional socio-cultural parameters currently limiting the application of acceptable 
strategies that often appear derivative (Rifkin, Millen, & Cobb, 1991) and misinformed. 
 The study focuses on the primary actors of the Camp David Accords that 
unsuccessfully sought to create a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
8 
 
during the Carter administration in 1978. Specifically, we examined the individual 
personalities and interactions between U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President 
Anwar al-Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. As a foundation for 
establishing similarities and differences in their perceptions of the world, early 
biographical data was examined in order to develop a socio-cultural profile of each actor. 
These profiles yield insight into the environmental influences that shaped what will later 
be referred to as a “symbolic use-value” that serves to shape individual sensitivities and 
eventual interactions. 
The data were interrogated within the framework of symbolic interactionism, and 
yielded clues to how those external socio-cultural stimuli impacted the perceptions of a 
conflict stakeholder; of himself and of his mediation constituents. Since past scientific 
research has established a common neuro-cognitive machinery shared by all human 
beings we can assert that the mechanics of cognition allow us to infer a certain level of 
universality and reliability to our findings. What was shown are the primary causes of 
interpersonal and intrapersonal influences on perceptions that can lead to conflict due to 
what might be regarded as predispositional behaviors that are manifestations of those 
influences, what Peirce might consider his best set of circumstances that explain the 
phenomenon observed (Peirce, 1931-5, 1958). 
However, instead of looking at these socio-cultural inputs as an independent 
external factor, or just regarded as a tool of strategy, this study examines the inherent 
forces in the individual stakeholders as an element of individual cognition and their being 
responsible for predispositional behaviors such as bias, acceptance and/or rejection of 
another actor operating inside of or as part of the resolution process. External 
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environmental elements in the context of the Camp David case serve as conscious or 
unconscious triggers in a complex decision-making process that Joseph Paxton and Josh 
Greene (2010) of Harvard refers to in his dual-process theory; the interaction between 
unconscious evolved predisposition and the conscious cognition toward external 
situations, in terms of manifest actions and the constant editing of those unconscious 
elements with the introduction of ongoing environmental variables.  
The cultural stimuli that serve to edit evolved cognitive capacities (Aquino & 
Reed, 2002; Dehaene et al., 1998; Gazzaniga, 2005; Paxton & Greene, 2010; Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004) also define and provide identity to the conflict stakeholders, manifesting 
themselves in their diplomatic behaviors. It is the impact that experiential history has on 
the shaping of the individual’s outlook translated into particular social interactions and 
the method through which the decision-making process proceeds that is found most 
intriguing and this was examined with an eye toward both innate and external 
characteristics; a priori knowledge versus a postiori knowledge, and how the interaction 
between these two elements serves as a source of symbolic use-value to environmental 
externalities. 
The human species is not without hope in recognizing its frequent inability to 
resolve conflicts between its members. It has often surrendered to the necessity of a third 
party to resolve the dispute by reshaping the dynamics of social interaction between 
parties and reframing the conflict in an effort to create a foundation of common 
understanding and encouraged cooperation (Avruch, 1998; Bercovitch, 2002a; Bush & 
Folger, 2005). The concept of a mediator is almost as old as human conflict and 
establishes itself in the vast realm of social interaction as a key component of conflict 
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management transforming it into a positive social development (Augsburger, 1992; 
Kleiboer, 1996).  
Studies surrounding mediation focus on two primary themes, the importance of 
the mediator’s neutrality (Beber, 2012; Bercovitch & Gartner, 2009) and how mediators 
determine which mediation format to engage (Touval, 1985; Zartman & Touval, 2007). 
Ancillary themes focus primarily on environmental characteristics of the conflict arena 
and the resources brought to the table by each party (Bercovitch & Chalfin, 2011). This 
grounded theory research examined both primary themes, being motivated by the 
observation that for all of its considerations and historical experiences, mediation remains 
at best a tool showing mediocre results (Bercovitch, 2002b; Beber, 2010) when 
comparing tangible and intangible causalities (Bercovitch & Chalfin, 2011; Hubbard, 
1999). It asks what the principle reason(s) is behind this historically consistent mediocrity 
in mediation success, given its ascribed importance both historically and practically. As 
yet, there seems to be little research that explains this disparity particularly in regards to 
human perceptions that mitigate action. 
The study began from the premise that perhaps this mediocrity is not in fact a 
procedural problem nor a problem of simple cultural dissonance, but perhaps it might be 
found in the characteristics and actions of the mediators themselves in more of an ego-
contextual frame. Perhaps at its core, the reason lies as a characteristic of all human 
beings. While we understand that dissonant culture can be a significant obstacle to 
understanding and success (Abu-Nimir, 1996; Lederach, 1995; Rouhana & Bar Tal, 
1998) as has been discussed in numerous works, we also note that “how” it impacts 
human interaction from a more basic cognitive level eludes researchers’ inquiries (Jervis, 
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1976; Volkan, Montville, & Julius, 1991) and could explain many of the disparities and 
failings of Allport’s (1954) contact hypotheses (Bercovitch & Chalfin, 2011; Gaertner, 
Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994; Tal-Or, Boninger, Glenicher, 2002). How 
this is important will be explained more thoroughly in the chapters that follow.  
Mediation as a Social Role 
A meta-study of interstate disputes occurring between 1816 and 1995 repeatedly 
demonstrate the modest success of mediation outcomes. Northedge and Donelan (1971) 
found a success rate of 23% in 50 major international conflicts between 1945 and 1970. 
Levine (1971) examined 388 disputes occurring between 1816 and 1960 and found a 
success rate for third party intervention of only 29% over that 145 year period. Zacher 
(1979), who concentrated on regional disputes with third party intervention found a 
success rate of 52.5%. Butterworth (1977) who provided the most comprehensive data on 
310 disputes between 1945 and 1974 prior to the Bercovitch International Conflict Data 
set, saw a success rate of only 23.1%. Finally, the Bercovitch and Regan (1999) data set 
that examined 268 interstate conflicts between 1945 and 1990 shows a modest 27% rate 
of success for mediation efforts.  
While these and other researchers have offered explanations for the modest 
performance afforded international peace mediations and have offered procedural 
strategies to improve the long-term outcomes of those efforts, the results always seem to 
remain operatively longitudinal, and less than comprehensively extraordinary (Gartner & 
Bercovitch, 2006). However, each study neglects to regard the mediator as a primary 
participant in a specific social interaction between conflicting parties as part of a dynamic 
cognitive calculus between disputants and mediator. 
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 The complex processes of human interaction that includes the innate capacities of 
the mediation participants and their individual culturally mitigated interactions with 
coercive social facts (Bendix, 1977; Bourdieu, 1977; Brubaker, 1985; Alpert, 1941) are 
generally addressed as a collapsed independent variable (Burt, 2000); a corollary that 
addresses discordant and unique cultural value systems and neglecting this basic but 
crucial interactional human dynamic. The studies appear to treat only superficially the 
notion that mediation is actually a battle to control the human mind, and how this is 
largely played out through encodements found within culturally specific systems of 
communication (Brewer, 2007; Burton, 1969; Castells, 2007; Cohen, 1990; Dik, 1989; 
Gilovich, Keltner, & Nisbett, 2010). Communication stands as the expression of a 
conflict stakeholder’s thoughts and personal history; the consciously calculative and 
emotionally qualifying unconscious amalgamation of efficient cognitive decision-making 
processes (Greene, 2004; Grenfell, 2011; Habermas, 1990; Harman, 2000; Hynes, 2007). 
It is also ego-contextual (Forbes & Grafman, 2010) and reflective of symbolic use-value 
constructs also mitigated by individually perceived cultural constructs. 
 Most researchers consider the neutrality of the mediator subjectively (Gent & 
Shannon, 2011; Kydd, 2003; Savun, 2008) without considering the deeper cognitive 
elements that create intrapersonal and interpersonal perceptions among and between 
stakeholders regarding not only there conflict counterparts, but about such things as the 
morality of the conflict itself. Researchers have not considered the mediator’s historic 
interface with the conflict elements either first hand or through public media as an aspect 
of a larger social performance. Here, the mediator enters with distinct interests that 
center, dramaturgically, on his or her successful performance and self-image framed by 
13 
 
self-interest (Gerring, 2007; Kleiboer, 1996) or the impact of prior knowledge on 
perception and predispositional judgements relative to his or her view of the conflict 
being morally just or unjust. A good example is Jimmy Carter’s preparation for his first 
meeting with Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, made possible by CIA dossiers of all 
Camp David participants (Carter, 1982).  
Carter’s first impression of Sadat following a review of written and media 
footage, was that he was a “warm and passionate leader, courageous and gregarious” 
(Carter, 1982). After viewing an interview on the news program Issues and Answers, and 
seeing the aggressive vitriolic responses by Menachem Begin to his interviewer, Carter 
described his first impression of the Israeli Prime Minister as being “Frightening,” and 
one that could “very well become and obstacle to peace” (Quandt, 1986b, p. 158). Later, 
we will investigate how this first impression shaded Carter’s future interaction with 
Begin, and how this predisposition was facilitated by evolved capacities in the 
President’s unconscious cognition that were stimulated by both Begin’s vitriol, his self-
identification as a victim and his seeming disregard for the human rights of Arab citizens, 
all traceable back to events in Carter’s early life. 
To assume that a mediator is completely neutral and objective when first entering 
the conflict resolution role would be to also assume their total lack of knowledge and 
emotional processing of the situation or its representatives that symbolize a particular 
pogrom (Leng & Regan, 2003). It also fails to assess how the innate predispositions 
toward such emotions as revulsion or a sense of injustice might manifest itself in the 
resolution proceedings on the part of the mediator and other stakeholders (Barash & 
Webel, 2009; Bechara, Damasio, H., Tranel, & Damasio, A. R., 1997; Brewer, 2007; 
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Casebeer & Churchland, 2003; Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003). In other words, 
by not considering the innate processes of these actors in any research makes its findings 
superficial at best and in its most severe iteration, spurious. 
Earlier work has established that the role of a mediator is to change the 
interactional dynamics between disputants by establishing communication through 
common definitions, reducing tensions by encouraging de-commitments and offering 
face-saving alternatives (Augsburger, 1992; Bush & Folger, 2005; Calvert, 1985; 
Lederach, 1995). This can only be accomplished if the mediator possesses the trust of 
each party involved in the mediation and the skill of serving as a semiotic translator 
between them or their representatives. The mediator must understand the value and 
meaning of the symbolism that is encoded within the language or other cultural 
representations and subsequently transmitted not only between the same sides but 
between each side either directly or indirectly through him/her (Favretto, 2009; 
Goldthorpe, 2007; Grenfell, 2011; Gurr, 2000). 
 We will see later that there are two specific uses of language in communicating 
between parties, and a misstep in either one of them could count as a prime reason for 
non-resolution or even the intensification of ill feelings resultant of the perception of 
distrust toward the mediator of between the disputants, “the dialog of the deaf” (Cohen, 
1990, 1997). The Quaker mediator Elmore Jackson (1952), in the 1947 Zionist/ 
Palestinian Arab dispute said, “It would be difficult if not impossible for a single 
mediator who was distrusted by one of the parties to carry out any useful function” (p. 
29). Indeed, trust is not necessarily a product of actions as much as one of clear 
understanding in communication and the ascribed trust of its sender. 
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The perception of mediator neutrality by disputants is a recurring theme in 
mediation research. Princen (1992) and Kaufman and Duncan (1992) have stressed the 
importance of the selection of a neutral mediator by disputants as has Bercovitch (2007) 
and Beber (2010, 2012). Another perspective by Zartman and Faure (2006) and others 
(Kressel & Pruitt, 1989; Smith, 1995; Touval, 1985; Zartman & Touval, 2007) examines 
a more political-economic perspective in the disputants’ consideration of mediator 
selection, that is, their perceived ability to influence, protect and extend the interests of 
each party and their possession of resources that either party sees as valuable (Brookmire 
& Sistrunk, 1980; Zartman & Touval, 2007). Kydd (2003) has contrasted this position 
suggesting that biased mediators tend to reflect higher success rates. Beber (2010; 2012) 
and others maintain that these “success rates” are based upon short-term outcomes and 
rest primarily on the mediator’s capacity to gather information relative to strategy. A 
comprehensive evaluation of the effect of bias has yet to be completed (Beber, 2010). 
 The ability of the mediator to provide valued resources or a way of giving a 
preferred “edge” to one or the other party appears to outweigh the importance of 
neutrality in these studies (Beber, 2012; Savun, 2008). However, whatever conclusions 
any of these research efforts reach appears by the data to be futile in their attempt at 
constructing a methodology that extends the success rates of the mediation process 
despite best intentions for the perception of neutrality. Indeed, it appears the efforts to 
increase the efficacy of mediation is stuck in 19
th
 century thinking and does not utilize 
tools offered in a post-modern era such as I am suggesting here. Finding the answer and 
constructing a useful tool that will facilitate greater success will not come from one 
discipline but from multidisciplinary and collaborative research like this. The creation of 
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a useful and comprehensive tool that can be used to increase mediation efficacy, can only 
be gotten by considering the predispositional behaviors of the human species inherent to 
their evolution, and the technology available to assess them. 
Certain clues to ending this methodological impasse are offered by the studies that 
provide what would be considered by other disciplines as a “scratch-the-surface” 
explanation. These studies show a higher rate of success in disputes where the mediator is 
from the same cultural bloc as are the disputants (Avruch & Black, 2001; Barash & 
Webel, 2009; Bercovitch, 2003; Fisher, 1997). It is suggested that cultural consonance 
provides for a deeper understanding of the value and process inherent to all mediation for 
the practitioner relative to the cultural frame in which the conflict occurred. But why is 
this so? Is there some evolved human capacity that provides for or is successful at 
explaining these conclusions? 
The chance that a mediator will appear neutral is greater if she shares some 
background characteristics with the conflict parties (Amir, 1998; Avruch, 1998; 
Lederach, 1995). While much of the research is anecdotal, it does provide a platform 
from which to center further inquiry. The question has now become one of combined 
perspectives, the neutrality of the mediator, the interpersonal and intrapersonal 
perceptions of the stakeholders and the explanation for the value of cultural consonance 
between stakeholders. This study asks which variables collectively impact these 
questions and how they are manifest in mediator behaviors toward and between the 
disputants and vice versa but also explores the genesis of these perceptions both innately 
and environmentally. To begin to establish a basis for examination we briefly turn to an 
aspect of the cognitive sciences. 
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Evolved Human Capacities: The Neuroscience of Perception and Morality 
The origin of the human paradox of cruelty and kindness lay at the intersection of 
innate human characteristics and environmental interaction. Work by Greene (Greene, 
2004; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Paxton & Greene, 2010) and others (Boehm, 1999; 
Bouchard, 2004; Casebeer & Churchland, 2003; Damasio et al., 1994; Forbes & 
Grafman, 2010; LeDoux, 1996; Lieberman, 2000; West-Eberhard, 2003) tell us that as a 
result of human evolution, our brain provides us with the genetically manufactured tools 
necessary to sense and interpret our environment, providing a methodology to 
immediately flee from danger and holding onto tools and behaviors that provide 
individual and group longevity. It provides a bridge between sensory input, the 
construction and evaluation of abstract symbols that will be interpreted consciously and 
unconsciously and the manifestation of appropriate or inappropriate responses (Gilovich 
et al., 2010; Trivers, 1971; Turiel, 1983). Examining how this genetic machinery creates 
or provides an evaluative system for these interpretations provided unique insight into 
how a mediator might form an impression of conflict stakeholders based on external 
inputs that are valued through an innate unconscious and later a participative conscious 
calculative process. How one’s first impression of someone is premised upon 
unconscious processes, influences subsequent mediator behavior  provides a key to the 
development of strategic theoretical principles and tools that apply to any conflict 
resolution strategy or conflict theater. 
The brain does not have the physical capacity to process the multitude of 
incoming environment stimuli all at once. Young, Cushman, Hauser, and Saxe (2007) tell 
us that the human brain can only process quantities of about 64 bytes of information per 
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second in its working memory while it is actually exposed to and passively records in 
excess of 1,500 bytes per second (Paxton & Greene, 2010; Rosen, 2005). Consider, for 
example, that as you are reading this research, you are focused on seeing and interpreting 
the writing on the page. However, all around you are colors, sounds and activity that you 
do not consciously process but is all the same observed and unconsciously evaluated by a 
lower, primal brain that has evolved to be ever vigilant in protecting its host from danger 
(Cáceda et al., 2011; Cahill, Babinsky, Markowitsch, & McGaugh, 1995).  
These observations are never simply discarded, but filed in logical, retrievable 
bundles for future comparison and use by higher “executive” functions. The bundles are 
attached to what Rosen (2005) refers to as “emotional flags” that serve as file folder 
markers, identified by a part of the brain called the amygdala in the process of 
constructing conscious thought. Sometimes we refer to this stimulation soup as “white 
noise.” Another example could serve an illustrative point as well. When we listen to 
music, we are processing within the brain’s working memory limit. We hear individual 
notes of harmony, able to focus upon and identify certain musical phrases, instruments or 
voices. However, as the frequency of that beautiful sound is increased beyond our 64 byte 
processor, we begin to hear only a single cacophonous tone.  
So our brain catalogs and groups this collection of external stimuli into similar 
subcategories to be retrieved later as a preferred response to unfamiliar situations (Rosen, 
2005), particularly those patterns of stimuli that appear familiar to the brain. In short, it 
needs to provide rapid access to important data and constructs innate, unconscious short-
cuts so we can survive potential life-threatening situations (de Waal, 1996; Flack & de 
Waal, 2000). These shortcuts allow us to respond without our conscious recognition such 
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as the “fight or flight” scenario. It does this by “chunking” data that are marked with 
what are known as emotional flags (Churchland, 2011; Damasio et al., 1994; Paxton & 
Greene, 2010; Rosen, 2005) so as not to require the analysis of each and every datum 
sequentially which would take too much time to formulate an appropriate solution in a 
situation demanding an instantaneous response (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & 
Cohen, 2004; Rosen, 2005). 
While this was of obvious benefit in the earlier days of human evolution, 
D’Andrade’s (1995) research in cognitive anthropology has made the point that this 
capacity has evolved from simple avoidance of predators to conscious and unconscious 
dread of post-modern environmental elements such as homelessness, war, terrorism or 
economic ruin. Rosen (2005) has referred to this as the all too familiar “gut feeling” or 
“de ja vous.” What is at play is the interface between what has been referred to in the 
cognitive sciences as the “lazy brain” that does not like to inefficiently use available 
energy, and the necessity for non-linear cognition in the act of escaping perceived or 
unrecognized threats (Kihlstrom, 1987; Lieberman, 2000; Marcus, 2004; Miller, 2011; 
Nakayama & Joseph, 1998). But this phenomenon of pattern recognition also begins to 
paint an interesting picture closer to our primary research question of a mediator’s 
predispositional preferences toward one person or another. It points to a notion of 
assigning some unconscious value to a person or situation that might predispose us to 
accepting more readily one thing over another, (i.e., a “use-value,” based on early 
evolutionary development, which has manifested itself as conscious choice). 
Humans do not, as determinists like Marcus Aurelius, Thomas Hobbes, Baruch 
Spinoza, Gottfried Leibniz, David Hume, and Arthur Schopenhauer would have us 
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believe, that humans innately possess every response necessary for any type of 
environmental interaction nor does every situation demanding a specific response exist in 
linear time (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Damasio et al., 1994; Wynn, 2008; Yamada et al., 
2012). This would certainly limit our ability for moving society in a positive and creative 
direction and certainly clutter our brain with significant amounts of unusable data that 
would at least prevent any level of spontaneity or creativity. 
Parenthetically, this would also stand to challenge the rigor of some religious 
dogma that assumes everything that could ever be said has already been said by God 
(Abu-Nimir, 1996). Greene (2007) and Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) take us further into 
the science of mind and reassure us by asserting we are not simply a collection of 
neurochemicals and synapses that offer preprogrammed responses to every situation. 
Rather they admit that there still remains the thread of metaphysics and mysticism in the 
field of neuroscience where new situations and the almost magical human responses to 
challenges are always arising.  
In his “dual process theory” Greene (2007) and others (Bouchard, 2004; Dehaene 
et al., 1998; Elman et al., 1996; Forbes & Grafman, 2010; Gazzaniga, 2005; Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) posit that in any new situation we possess an unconscious 
predisposition favoring evolved behavioral responses based on innate insights that have, 
over time, assured our species’ continuance. This is facilitated by not having to think 
about reacting to perceived or unrecognized threats (both conscious and unconscious). 
But, in a parallel operation he asserts that we also possess the neurological machinery to 
over-ride those unconscious (reactive) behavioral antecedents through a process of 
conscious linear cognition, weighing what might prove best, or most strategic, for us to 
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achieve a certain goal and overriding that initial motivation. We are, in effect, assigning a 
value to certain elements of those things experienced or simply, we learn. Interestingly, 
these two competing processes occur primarily in different parts of the human brain and 
come together in yet another, very specific neuroanatomical location, being transmitted to 
other parts that facilitate appropriate or inappropriate responses often mitigated by 
emotional influences, also often evolved as will be discussed in the work of Graham, 
Nosek, and Haidt (2012). 
He qualifies this in his research findings saying that although we can act 
independently of many of our hardwired responses to the environment, the “preferred” 
decision, the one our unconscious brain perceives to be the most obvious, will continue to 
overshadow our eventual manifest decision; this is the phenomenon of a dual process 
ideation, a combination of conscious and unconscious interactive processes coupled with 
currently observed and historically retained data (Bechara et al., 1997; Casebeer & 
Churchland, 2003; Dehaene et al., 1998; Rosen, 2005). Dual process ideation will 
become important in answering the primary research question that explores 
mediator/disputant behavior. But it also allows us to study the (human) symbolism that 
demonstrates these unconscious predispositions. 
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Figure 1. Elements of Greene’s (2010) Dual Process Theory 
Dual process cognition will have broad application in our exploration of 
mediator/disputant interaction. It insinuates a degree of scientific validity to discussions 
of cultural discordance between actors as will be evidenced in the later discussion of the 
Szalay model of structural linguistics and its role in the Arab/Israeli mediations and the 
Cohen (1997) discussion of “negotiation of the deaf.” It demonstrably played an 
important role in the construction and execution of mediation strategies during those 
Arab/Israeli talks that took place intermittently between 1947 and 1978 that sought a 
lasting peace, but again resulted in marginally successful and short-lived agreements. 
Two examples serve to demonstrate Greene’s theory. First, we have all had the 
experience of thinking we have been in a new place before, a feeling of familiarity with a 
situation or new environment, Re., déjà vous. Our conscious mind knows we have never 
been there before, but our unconscious, shortcut pattern searching brain tells us we have. 
In a more applied example, we have all met someone that we immediately have taken a 
liking or a disliking to. Something about the person just felt wrong or right and our 
consequent behavior toward that person reflects that initial impression. I hear these 
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feelings being expressed repeatedly by my own students after they have met someone at a 
college party or a new roommate. The phrase “love at first sight” or “something about 
them just didn’t feel right” are apt descriptors of a cognitive dual-process.  
In both of these scenarios we are experiencing our brain searching for and 
recognizing a pattern that is similar (albeit not exactly like) to something we have 
experienced in the past. The brain “fills in the blanks,” of what we certainly could not 
already have known; a familiarity with a new place or a new acquaintance. Significant 
research has been done in cognitive and abnormal psychology that describes how 
uncomfortable most people are with change. Given our brain’s inherent need to assign 
value to things quickly using a “closest match” method in identifying something 
unfamiliar and assigning appropriate actions, change to the completely unfamiliar and its 
associated discomfort is less difficult to understand. Fortunately our more recently 
evolved “higher executive” neuro-functioning can override that discomfort through 
conscious cognition, lest we still be reading by candlelight. 
 In clinical studies by Haidt et al. (1993), and supported by later work done by 
Greene and Haidt (2002), it was demonstrated that the reaction/decision-making times of 
subjects presented with examples of moral dilemmas that required their personal 
involvement was longer than the times shown where their involvement was either 
exclusively observational or indirect. Under close examination, D’Andrade (1995), Rosen 
(2005), and Haidt and Joseph (2004) showed that in the first example of personal 
investment in the dilemma, utilizing many more areas of the brain, specifically those 
dealing with emotion, were employed in the decision-making process. In non-invested 
examples, those emotional centers did not activate. Later, citing the work of the neuro-
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linguists Schaefer, Heinze, Rotte, and Denke (2013) the study shows how this same 
neurological, cognitive process is insinuated into the way we communicate with each 
other, something Jürgen Habermas (1984) called “communicative and strategic 
rationality” (p. 675 in his first instance reflecting an emotional investment by the speaker, 
and the non-emotional manipulation in the latter. 
 Although always a part of the behavioral calculus, the unconscious side of our 
ideations is not always predominant, we have the capability to modify or “edit” our 
reaction to what our evolved brain is telling us. Particularly in dealing with a direct social 
interaction, we can give a person whom we do not initially “like” a second chance to 
disprove our first impression or gut feeling, to give them the benefit of the doubt. This 
second chance is the second half of the dual process; linear cognition based on additional 
data received from or communicated by that person (Cahill et al., 1995; Gazzaniga, 2005; 
Sheppard & Young, 2007). This was a significant component of this study that examined 
personal interaction and communication between conflict stakeholders. It asked if the 
initial impression of the parties involved in mediation dominates future social interactions 
and which factors serve to “consciously modify” it or are those first impressions 
validated by actor behaviors. In effect, are they truly guided by the present environmental 
inputs or act on what their gut is telling them? However, we must keep in mind Greene 
and Rosen’s observations that even though the conscious side of cognition may be able to 
modify the behavioral outcome of the dual process, we tend to favor, or overshadow the 
eventual outcome more toward or initial unconscious directive. 
Since “trust” and “perception” are ideational (Emirbayer, 1997; Gazzaniga, 2005; 
Haidt & Graham, 2007), we can infer a direct interaction between the mediators’ genetic 
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cognitive machinery, and her interaction with environmental inputs that constitute 
experience over time that could serve to mitigate unconscious predispositions. This 
serves as the key to unlock the interactive influences and manifestations between 
mediators and conflict stakeholders. It begged the question as to whether or not a 
person’s experience, which is framed by the values placed on it by culturally based 
normative systems, significantly shaped how an individual will formulate a decision 
concerning interactions with another actor when interacting with innate mechanisms and 
predispositions. Can we truly teach an old evolutionary dog new tricks? 
One piece of the puzzle remains however. In order to make the “right” choice, 
either conscious or unconscious given our discussion of dual process decision-making, 
there needs to be some common “ideal” standard upon which to compare our decisions 
and how they might be manifest in behavior. Generally, our outward behaviors are 
equated against normative social rules, associated with an actor’s role or situation and are 
often culturally specific. Depending upon the outcome of those behaviors, we receive 
either reward or punishment and take away from that experience knowledge that will be 
employed in subsequent situations (Bashkow, 2004; Boehm, 1999; Bunzl, 2004; Elman et 
al., 1996; Flack & de Waal, 2000; Rosenblatt, 2004). Conscious choice is then weighed 
against consciously perceived environmental stimuli. But, how do we compare and 
contrast unconsciously those situations we encounter and against what are the variables 
compared in accordance with our evolutionary motivations toward survival? This 
question lies at the heart of the seminal work of Jon Haidt and Jesse Graham (2007) in 
their discussion of Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). 
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Moral Foundations Theory: Something is telling me I don’t like that 
MFT incorporates the necessities of individual and group survival. Discussed 
below, it considers a set of evolutionary behaviors that provide a set of primitive value 
scales that serve to facilitate particular themed behaviors. Haidt and Graham (2007) have 
divided these “moral foundations” into two groups, individualistic and collective each 
serving as antecedents to the behaviors providing for the survival of the individual and 
the social group respectively. A brief example will serve to help one’s understanding of 
the principle behind each grouping. The individualist foundation of “Harm/Care” has 
evolved from the need for a mother to care for and assure the survival of her child. It has 
evolved to include harm and care to others’ children as well as one’s self, the child being 
an expression of self (Gilligan, 1982; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt et al., 1993). This 
would explain why, when we see a commercial that focuses on the needs of an 
abandoned child, we get a feeling of sympathy and an innate need of having to do 
“something.” Harm/Care serves as the facilitator of gentleness, nurturance and kindness; 
a strong behavioral antecedent. 
A representative example of a “collective” foundation would be 
Authority/Subversion. This has evolved from our long primate history of hierarchical 
interactions. It serves as the antecedent of leadership and being a follower. These two 
things alone are essential to group harmony and survival and are precursors to the 
establishment of social roles and the rules that define them. Haidt and Graham (2007) go 
on to describe how adherence to one or the other group in the (unconscious) decision-
making context defines us as being more conservative or liberal. They contend that these 
moral foundations, the scale upon which behaviors are initiated or compared during the 
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dual-process, have been incorporated into our genetic machinery over the period of 
human development. Work by Paxton and Greene (2010), Hynes (2007) Lieberman 
(2000) and others have in fact identified specific brain regions in which these calculations 
occur in both adults and in pre-verbal infants, lending scientific validity to Haidt and 
Graham’s findings.  
In summary then, it is acceptable to look at the Paxton and Greene (2010) dual 
process of decision-making and consider the Haidt and Graham (2007) moral foundations 
as the comparative scale which the brain utilizes to arrive at a best or “most obvious” 
decision culminating in acceptable or unacceptable behaviors. In essence, this process 
allows for the assignment of a use-value to every stimulus experienced by the actor, both 
conscious and unconscious. It is essential to our discussion however, to remind the reader 
that humans do not, according to the proponents of the Chicago School, interact with an 
object or word per se, but with its symbolic representation, hence our label of symbolic 
use-value given to external stimuli perceived by ant actor’s sensory net. However, having 
observed that these “evolved capacities” can be edited through the experiential history of 
the actor, we must explore how this can impact conflict stakeholder behaviors. 
It is at this point that we leave the strictly neuro-scientific aspect of human 
behavior and subsume the dual process of cognitive decision-making as it relates to 
stakeholder interactions. This study recognized its importance, but concentrated more on 
what forms and modifies those underlying behavioral predispositions and how these are 
manifest in (mediation) behavior. We gave credit where credit is due, to a magnificent 
example of evolution that allows the human being to process sensory inputs, to place a 
value on each within a socio-cultural frame, and to provide the tools necessary to 
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formulate a response that is appropriate to his or her social environment albeit mitigated 
by evolved moral ascriptions. But we paid particularly close attention to how the 
conscious portion of this cognitive process that is grounded in experiential history 
(Damasio et al., 1994; Dehaene et al., 1998; Forbes & Grafman, 2010; Greene, 2007; 
Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) edits the 
unconscious element of cognition, manifesting itself in mediator behavior. In short, we 
already know through earlier research that discordant culture, both tangible and 
intangible aspects of it, impacts mediation in a negative way, but we need to answer 
“why” this is so. 
Culture and Language 
The cognitivists’ assertion of a dual process decision-making mechanism allows 
us to explore mediation outcomes from a different perspective. It allows us to examine 
the reasons why some mediation appears to be doomed to failure before they even begin 
and why others might have a higher probability of success. In his seminal study 
underlying contact theory, Allport (1954) posits that if disputants could come together in 
a neutral environment and ”see each other as people,” the probability of cooperative 
resolutions would increase. This is very similar to the methodology of Quaker mediation 
(Gallagher, 2002) that most often operates outside of the Westphalian System of 
Established States which focuses on the political, legal, military and territorial issues as 
opposed to the cultural aspects or the unmet human needs upon which many, including 
Lederach (1995) and Augsburger (1992), claim to be at the heart of most human 
conflicts. In the case under study, contact theory does not explain why, during the Camp 
David Accords between Egypt and Israel where the US President Jimmy Carter had to 
29 
 
keep Sadat and Begin away from each other because of their personal enmity (Quandt, 
1986a).  
While a neutral environment was provided as well as the engagement of 
constructive exercises toward a peace agreement as outlined in the Allport (1954) work 
was facilitated, the overwhelming distrust and hatred expressed between the Israeli and 
Egyptian leaders was not overcome. Personal accounts from Camp David attendees 
describe in detail the animosity between Begin and Sadat as well as between Begin and 
Carter, but also point out a budding and deep friendship between the American and the 
Egyptian presidents, which parenthetically added to the distrust of the principles by 
Begin and his lack of investment in the Camp David process as a whole. On more than 
one occasion, this dynamic of personal animosity and palpable friendship threated the 
collapse of the peace talks. While various commentaries have attempted to explain this 
perception, none have gone so far as to look at the innate human processes that might 
have first predicted such dysfunction and second provided a means by which to mitigate 
it (Quandt, 1986b). 
Bercovitch and Houston (2000) and others (Beber, 2012; Gaertner et al., 1994; 
Jervis, 1976; Kaufman and Duncan, 1992) disagree with Allport’s assertions of ‘contact 
theory’ and its position that bringing disputants together in a safe environment will lead 
to the development of personal and binding relationships; that the conflict partners will 
see each other not as opponents, but as people (Allport, 1954). Contradictory positions 
assert that direct contact between disputants to be more often than not detrimental to the 
process as it can reaffirm disputants’ feelings of asymmetry in power and status. The 
“feelings” perceived by disputants while in the presence of another provides us an 
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opportunity to begin to develop an understanding of this difficulty from the perspective 
of the current research. 
It has already been established through earlier studies that cultural dissonance can 
serve both as a significant cause to a conflict and as an important element of resolution 
through common understanding, particularly as regards mediation processes. Perhaps 
each side sees mediation differently (Fisher, 1997); perhaps each has their own traditions 
prior to a process such as prayer that is discordant to the traditions and normative systems 
of behavior to the other side (Hubbard, 1999; Irani, 2000; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). 
Perhaps the perceptions gleaned from the examination of third party information like the 
media are truly misperceptions but drive the overt animosity between conflict partners 
(Quandt, 1986b). What is important however is how these relationships are structured 
through the use of language which stands as both a symbol of an individuals’ inner self 
and as a representation of the cultural library accessed by each disputant. The power that 
language has over party dissonance cannot be simply written off as an intervening 
variable, but should be considered a major causal factor. We will discuss later how 
important different linguistic systems are in structuring relationships between cultural 
constituents, but a small example will serve to underlie its importance.  
In a former life, I had occasion to make many trips to the northern parts of Alaska 
and down the peninsula. There I met many of the local Inuit and Yupik people whose 
ancestors had come across the land-bridge from Russia millennia ago. On one particular 
trip, I was in Nome and was speaking to an older native fisherman. As is often the case, it 
was snowing. I made a simple comment, “it’s snowing!” The man looked at me oddly as 
if I had said something quite amusing and answered back, “What do you mean?” I 
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thought and said again, “it’s snowing.” Apparently, I had said something “only a naïve 
child would say.” In the Inuit language, prefixes are added to words, whose roots are 
often comparable to English words, to add a depth of meaning. Generalizations are not 
always considered important to a discussion, but in this case it became apparent how 
many misperceptions could result of such a simple misstep. Jon Owens (2001) and 
Barbara Johnstone (1983) described a similar phenomenon while studying Arab rhetoric 
as did David Laitin (1977) in his discussion of the meaning of rice among Americans and 
Koreans, each study being culturally specific. Imagine how misperceptions could arise in 
a mediation if languages had to go through several non-native speakers each the product 
of their own unique cultural environments. 
The case under study here, the Camp David Accords, demonstrates this difficulty 
of misperception clearly in the relationship between the Egyptian President Sadat and the 
Israeli Prime Minister Begin. In the ten days of carefully scripted proceedings 
reminiscent of Allport’s (1954) contact paradigm, the principle disputants had only very 
few personal contacts because of their mutual and visceral animosity toward each other; a 
fact that was made apparent in their first meeting (Carter, 1982; Perlmutter, 1987; 
Quandt, 1986a).  
Evidence suggests that mediating between disputants from a similar (group) 
block, has a greater likelihood of success than those from dissimilar ones (Bercovitch & 
Chalfin, 2011). Clearly, the delineating factors between these two groups is the cultural 
system from which they come and shapes their various perceptions of the world, 
consequently defining and conceptualizing the conflict in which they find themselves. 
The uniqueness of their respective historic experience that provides a certain use-value to 
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symbols shared and individual to each culture/disputant will subsequently define 
elements of the conflict; its causality, its costs and the elements of its resolution. Is the 
answer to assessing the compatibility of mediators and disputants purely one of group 
identity or does it lie at a deeper level of cognitive analysis? Perhaps it is the combination 
of experiences and interactions within respective cultural contexts that shape the course 
of a conflict and its mediation through contrasting belief systems and the language in 
which this belief system and use-value is encoded. It is imperative to understand the 
interplay between those experiences, how culture shapes them, the cognitive processes at 
play in the individual, and the way these experiences are communicated during a dual; 
cognitive process  that will allow us to develop a functional model of mediation and 
hopefully increasing the sustainability of successful outcomes.  
We begin by asserting that the tangible and intangible social forces influencing a 
social actor are embedded within the actions of other forces both local and universal 
(Augsburger, 1992; Avruch & Black, 2003; Leng & Regan, 2003). Further, these forces 
exist within the confines of relative social definitions of value, both local and in some 
instances universal that have been established through both historic individual and group 
experiences. Interaction with them is defined through a set of values and normative 
systems both local and universal. These rules stipulate what reaction to or interaction 
with these elements by the agent is acceptable and which are less than acceptable and are, 
over time, internalized by both the individual and the social collective (D’Andrade, 1995) 
as rules, laws and traditions, that is, they serve largely as the conscious portion of 
Greene’s (2004) theory and can “overwrite” unconscious predispositions. An important 
corollary to the system of norms and values are their serving as the basis for group and 
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individual identities relative to acceptance of and compliance with those parameters for 
acceptable behavior (Brewer, 2007; Gilovich et al., 2010; Kubota, Banaji, & Phelps, 
2012). 
The process by which the agent learns the value-scale or use-value inherent to her 
respective culture is socialization. The innate standard of comparison as discussed earlier 
are the five moral foundations described by Haidt, et al. (Graham et al., 2009). It is this 
lifelong process that takes the interactions with environmental stimuli embedded within a 
cultural context and streamlines her brain’s ability to recall them both consciously and 
unconsciously through a process of categorization and emotional “tagging” that allows 
the individual to react quickly to external inputs both historic and new (Patterson, Nestor, 
& Rogers, 2007; Rosen, 2005). However, as will be discussed, these recalled experiences 
play into a larger decision-making equation that incorporates innate capacities of 
individual and group survival facilitated by cognitive mechanisms of human evolution 
largely invisible to the individual and conscious calculations (Gilligan, 1982; Forbes & 
Grafman, 2010; Kohlberg, 1963). How well the agent is able to utilize this system to 
define, perceive, interact with and internalize these use-value scales serves as a basis for 
his or her social identity, which too exists within the frame of the larger group that 
recognizes the presence of both local and universal group identity. 
The existence of external stimuli militated by a set of collectively accepted rules 
within a social group that defines acceptable interaction comprising the essence of the 
150 definitions of culture (D’Andrade, 1995). The definitions of culture must take into 
account the post-modern influences that place them relative to other cultures in a global 
schema. There are few, if any, cultures that exist as isolates as was the case for the early 
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anthropologists. As well, the scale of use-value, historically seen as culturally specific, 
now must be taken with consideration given to larger global forces evidenced by digital 
communications and social media. Helferich (2004) has stated however, that even with 
these global influences, the probability of a “global culture” is small, as people retain an 
identity that incorporates the uniqueness of their respective group norms and values and 
traditions, and echo of earlier studies by Humboldt (1854) and Boaz (1997). 
The more in depth discussion of what constitutes a culture will be addressed 
below, gleaning from a collection of the current 150 definitions described by Kluckhohn 
(1951) and elaborated upon by Nanda and Warms (2011). Two general considerations 
were be raised. First, that culture is represented by commonly accepted definitions of 
substance and behaviors, and second that these definitions are perceived at both local and 
universal levels which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, that is, what might be 
commonly perceived and acceptable at a local cultural level may be contrary to the values 
of other societies. At the same time, there are commonly recognized cultural universals 
such as family, religion, governance, etc. (Bashkow, 2004; Bayart, 2005). Further, we can 
assert that the language inherent to any particular culture is a product and reflection of 
those unique social facts, but may not be “language equivalent” between cultural groups 
as seen in the work by Laitin (1977). 
We can also assert, based on the findings of Cahill et al. (1995), Gazzaniga (2005) 
and Rosen (2005), that certain human emotions can be impacted by these strong cultural 
forces in support of Greene’s (2004) dual process theory; they become incorporated as an 
important variable in the agent’s formulation of a response to a new or routine situation. 
This becomes evident in Augsburger’s (1992) discussion of anger where he shows the 
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impact of local norms governing responses to defined situations that in some social 
groups invokes antagonism and anxiety, where in others these emotions are minimized 
through devaluation.  
Clearly, anger and anxiety responses are somewhat governed by the use-value a 
group places upon a particular social fact or cultural artifact and serves as the conscious 
mitigator to unconscious cognitive reactions. However, according to research in the 
cognitive sciences, the underlying and initial disposition of individual ire cannot be 
completely erased and will avail itself at some level and in some direct or unrelated form 
less than if governing norms were not in play (Hynes, 2007; Kagan, 1984; Kihlstrom, 
1987). Research has shown for instance that although outward signs of anger can be 
suppressed in accordance with local norms, somatic responses will still be in evidence 
(Greene et al., 2004; Moll, de Oliveira Sousa, Bramati, & Grafman, 2002). The same 
results can be used to scale responses to tangible and intangible stimuli and will become 
important in our discussion of conflict stakeholder behavior. More specific to this study, 
the reaction to the “land” as a visceral and internal aspect of symbolic use-value 
internalized by Sadat, versus the motivation of victim entitlement demonstrated by Begin 
as an example of predispositional behavioral triggers. 
Language and the Importance of Communicating Culturally: What did you say 
versus what did you mean? 
In order for any group to remain interactive, members need to effectively 
communicate in some way with their constituents. Castells (2007) elaborates by adding 
that “communication, the one that exists in the public realm, provides support for the 
social production of meaning” (p. 289), a position first promoted by Sapir (1936) and 
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Whorf, Campbell, and Karttunen (1993), later supported by Bourdieu (1989), Habermas 
(1984) and others. This is accomplished through the employment of language; that 
intangible that allows the process of “psychology and culture to make each other up” 
(Bunzl, 2004: Shweder & Haidt, 1993).  
Culture becomes relevant to the agent through language which Sapir (1936) and 
Whorf et al. (1993) determined to be the manifestation of our ability to bridge sensory 
input and symbolic representation, that is, language determines how we perceive and 
describe our world and defines how the agent consequentially interacts with its elements. 
Language is the ego-contextual tool necessary to transmit abstract and complex ideas 
among and between social agents by labeling social and cultural phenomenon and 
providing a quantifiable element to their presence (D’Andrade, 1995), e.g., the value of a 
dollar, or how much do you like or dislike someone based on your knowledge of them. 
That “knowledge” is what insinuates individual use-values. How humans communicate is 
quite complex if we consider the endless abstract constructs we create and evaluate. For 
example, without communicating through speech or written language, how would it be 
possible to explain to an audience of children, the presence and function of a black hole, 
or its event horizon so popular in astrophysics? 
 Communication does however, rest on certain innate assumptions by both 
speaker and listener as described by Habermas (1984, 1990) and a genetically defined 
machinery necessary for its expression as described by Chomsky (1972, 1975) that if 
violated can serve as the primary source of conflict (Bouchard, 2004; Burton, 1969; 
Cohen, 1990; Dik, 1989). 
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The speaker labors under an assumption that each message she transmits will be 
unpacked and interpreted exactly as she had intended (Grenfell, 2011; Habermas, 1990; 
Laitin, 1977), a sort of communicative rationality. This presumes similar lexicon, 
semiotics and syntax. Without belaboring the point here, the probability of 
misinterpreting messages between members of a culturally similar group is low in 
comparison to communicators from dissimilar cultures (Cohen, 1997) that might assign 
perhaps a different or even competing use-value to the same lexiconic symbol. This 
would help to explain observations of low mediation success rates between discordant 
cultures (Van Valin, 2012), e.g., how does a “New Yorker” see the “city” and “traffic” as 
opposed to how someone from Appalachia might view the same things? Both are from a 
“western” culture but have different interpretations of the city as well as use-values 
ascribed to each of its components whose representations are mitigated by unique 
experiential histories.  
Two points are important in our discussion of language both spoken and written, 
as a method for social interaction. First, according to Chomsky’s (1965, 1975) theory of 
universal grammar, humans are endowed with an unfolding genetic program that allows 
them to construct a metaphorical bridge between sensory input and symbolic abstraction. 
While his earlier work focused exclusively upon spoken language, later research draws a 
strong parallel between Chomsky’s concepts as they apply to written communication as 
well. His point was that as humans we are equally capable of developing communicative 
capacities regardless of which (local) language we use and that this language serves to 
shape our perceptions of and interaction with our sensory world.  
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 Pairing this to the Sapir (1936) and Whorf et al. (1993) hypothesis, the 
symbolism in the equation is what is susceptible to cultural influence in terms of 
constructing definitions and perceptions, that is, the unpacking of the message which 
adds “noise” to the process as seen in Szalay’s (1981) model in figure two when 
addressing the dissonance between dissimilar cultures. It is the noise that this study 
focuses upon as a primary source of human conflict, predicated upon the influence of 
unconscious predispositions founded in learned and unlearned (or “instinctual”) use-
values, as a result of the editing of evolved programming.  
We would be remiss not to point out that this noise, while generally assumed to be 
an intercultural phenomenon, can also exist intra-culturally. For example, in my 
criminology classes I have many police officers as students. They often relate stories 
concerning how it is sometimes difficult to understand victims and offenders that come 
from different areas of the city, since a meaning or symbol in one part may not be 
applicable to another. They express misunderstanding and frustration that more often than 
not leads to an escalation of the situation at hand. Clearly, interpretive noise can be 
considered a volatile factor in human conflict. 
Second, and no less important, is recognizing that the theories describing the use 
of language and interpretation of environmental symbols were not developed in the post-
modern society of 24 hour international news cycles and Castells’ (2007) notion of 
socially horizontal, “self-constructed” media. Where many definitions of environmental 
phenomenon were limited to local nuance, they are now undergoing an epistemic 
communicative process that often challenges what was once regarded locally as an 
indisputable fact with its associated use-value. This could severely impact the process of 
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(socio-cultural) definition, perception and interaction with environmental elements and 
the consequent impact on mediators’ first impressions and strategic constructs. However, 
research in cognitive psychology and developmental anthropology informs us that 
regardless of the use-value assigned during the later stages of socialization, the 
unconscious behavioral predispositions acquired during the early stages of socialization 
have the overall greatest impact on the dual process of decision-making (D’Andrade, 
1995; Kohlberg, 1969; Paxton & Greene, 2010; Piaget, 1952; Purves, et al, 2008; Sinnot-
Armstrong, 2008). 
The potential for conflict increases significantly, as does the inverse probability 
for its resolution if we consider not only the misinterpretation inherent to two already 
discordant cultures and their respective linguistic structures but even more so on two 
other occasions. First, in many mediations, a common single non-native language is often 
utilized to facilitate a “common understanding.” This non-native language is typically 
necessary in third party mediations, sometimes referred to as the language of diplomacy 
which inherently desensitizes most culturally defined nuance (Colarosi, Rasler, & 
Thompson, 2008; Greig & Diehl, 2005; Zartman, 1994). 
 Second, where a common language is not possible, there will often be 
interpreters employed to convey the elements of negotiation. Finally, at times a third 
level of interpretation is employed to facilitate translations between speakers, translators 
and listeners. The basic assumption of speakers, translators and listeners or in the 
utilization of a common language between all conflict parties is one of communicative 
rationality. This presumes common definitions and more important, individual and group 
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use-values, obviously more elusive with each level of interpretation. This was the focus 
of Laitin (1977) in his work on “language equivalency.” 
Clearly then, conflicts can often be more ones of perceptual misunderstanding as 
opposed to other identified conflict elements or these misunderstandings could actually 
serve as the foundation for other non-related conflict elements. Important is the way in 
which these spoken or written symbols influence the innate mechanisms of cognition to 
each communicative party. For instance, if I know I am meeting a serial killer for the first 
time, and having read the media descriptions of this person as a monster, what are the 
chances I will give this person a fair chance at anything, or will I have already created an 
“image” of this person that prejudices my future and actual interactions. The same 
dissonant process explains the dynamic of the first Carter/Begin meeting following 
Carter’s declaration in his personal diary that he found Begin’s behavior and adherence to 
dogma “frightening” after seeing an interview on a news program (Carter, 1982, 2010; 
Perlmutter, 1987; Quandt, 1986a). Applying the research findings of Rosen (2005), 
Greene (2004) and Haidt (2008), Carter’s opinion had been directly influenced by an 
external sensory input that touched an emotional flag in the unconscious portion of his 
cognitive process. 
 In international mediation this is particularly important as one disputant’s 
perception of another or a mediator’s perception of the conflict parties before actually 
meeting them or directly following the initial meeting could quickly produce a 
predisposition toward liking or disliking different members of the conflict; for example 
Carter’s reaction to Begin’s interview. How will the mediator then manifest this 
predisposed feeling while trying to promote an air of neutrality, or will the cognitive 
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predispositions acquired from research or interaction overtly or even subtly influence the 
mediator to show bias toward one party or another based upon her “understanding” of 
who the parties are, or what they represent? How have the conscious and unconscious 
cognitive processes been affected? Again, how well does the mediator actually 
understand these things as defined by her own use-values and can her behavior be edited 
in the best interest of both parties. Indeed, while experienced elements of the sensory 
environment serve to prime the evolved emotion-based reactions to tangible and 
intangible stimuli, communication serves as the trigger to its expression. 
Within the frame of culture we can see, according to Bourdieu (1989, 1990) and 
others (Collet, 2009; Dumais, 2002; Emirbayer, 1997; Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005) the 
existence of interactional opportunities inherent and specific to a particular social setting 
in which an actor is embedded. These opportunities are referred to as one’s “habitus,” and 
tend to individualize the forces shaping an agent’s identity and position within that social 
context. It might be instructive to say that a person’s use-values are somewhat defined 
within the context of the actor’s particular habitus. It helps to define and redefine how an 
actor perceives the world and the strategies used to maximize their benefits of 
interactions by providing tangible and intangible elements with which the brain may label 
with both innate (episodic memory) and learned definitions (semantic memory).  
Again, this habitus does not exist independently of the multitude of social 
elements within a local or universal cultural frame but is reliant upon and exists within 
the interaction of other socio-cultural elements both tangible and intangible (Fowler, 
1997). It is the shaping of this world perception and the tools learned in dealing with it 
that is important to our study of mediation as it is specifically these forces that can serve 
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to over-ride the remnants of a mediator’s behavioral predispositions; of the short-cut 
behavior seen in the human brain and described by dual process theory. The question is to 
what degree they are overwritten and how that manifests in mediator behaviors. 
Mediation has a long history in which disputants realize they are for whatever 
reason incapable of reaching joint decisions that might facilitate some form of peaceful 
coexistence. Researchers have primarily examined the timing of intervention, the history 
of mediator and disputant interactions, the sources of conflict and the motivations of the 
mediator (Bercovitch & Diehl, 1997; Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006), but have yet to reach 
any definitive cause and effect explanation for successful mediation beyond the 
superficial considerations of ‘cultural dissonance.’ (Augsburger, 1992; Avruch & Black, 
1993; Lederach, 1995).  
There have been many uses of the Bercovitch International Conflict database 
where information was compiled on 190 international conflicts occurring between 1945 
and 1995. While not going beyond some preliminary characteristics of the conflict 
mediator descriptors that might give more validity to his findings, one variable is of 
particular interest and lends itself to this study. The data shows a significant difference in 
success rates between conflicts based on tangible issues such as borders and trade 
restrictions than conflicts that were premised upon intangibles like ideologies and 
religious elements that Greene (2007) and others (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Bercovitch & 
Houston, 1993; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; DiMaggio & Useem, 
1978; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) have shown to have significant capacity for editing the 
machinery of cognitive processing and decision-making. Their data shows that tangible 
issues have a much higher rate of success in mediation than intangible ones shown to 
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trigger innate use-value patterns forcing us to look beyond elements that share universal 
definitions overall such as borders, trade, and material.  
The Bercovitch (2007) research shows us that tangible assets are easier to deal 
with as they are clear and relatively easy to define and not necessarily open to many 
conflicting core definitions and not necessarily time sensitive; A border is a border 
(although its line may be under scrutiny) and a trade embargo is still a trade embargo 
regardless of the State to which it applies. No matter where you ask the question it is 
likely you would receive a similar if not identical definition of those tangible concepts. 
On the other hand, defining the elements or driving force of an ideology (intangible), or 
understanding the volatility of a religious premise for law is cognitively quite different 
than a border dispute although sometimes, as in the case of the Camp David Accords an 
excellent example of ideological and use-value disagreement, these things can be 
conflated. Relative to this study, there is an interesting theme that revolves around the 
disputants’ concept, and motivational capacity of the “land,” where one party declares a 
spiritual affinity that transcends earthly conceptualizations and the other regards it as a 
thing of entitled acquisition.  
The intangible elements of conflict are dependent mostly upon local definitions of 
understanding, ascribed use-value and individual experiential history embedded within 
respective cultures (D’Andrade, 1995; Geertz, 1983). Intangible issues also serve to 
symbolize both individual and group identities and more than vicariously impact social 
interactions (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Brewer, 2007; Daloz, 2010; Emirbayer, 1997; 
Fineman, 2000; Hynes, 2007; Jervis, 1976). Here, cultural and interpretive discordance 
would be in its highest representation (Burton, 1969; Grice, 1989; Leng & Regan, 2003). 
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Reviews of the Bercovitch IDC show a distinctly higher almost tautological success rate 
for tangible conflict elements as opposed to the distinctly lower success rate for 
intangible ones indicating some inconclusive, nuanced as yet unidentified cause and 
effect lending to the less than stellar overall long-term success rates for mediation events.  
The Purpose of the Study: 
This grounded theory study sought to establish a link between predispositional 
behaviors arising from evolved cognitive processes common to human beings and the 
relationships between conflict stakeholders. Specially, the study looked at observed bias 
exhibited by a mediator following first contact with a particular stakeholder both positive 
and negative. It examined the relationships between Jimmy Carter, Anwar al-Sadat and 
Menachem Begin before, during and following the Camp David Accords in September of 
1977. It was contextualized by the widely held public opinion that Carter did not like 
Begin and considered Sadat “like a brother” (Perlmutter, 1987; Quandt, 1986a; Wright, 
2014) asking how Carter’s apparent personal bias toward Sadat impacted the overall 
mediation process and its outcome. 
The theory that was generated from this study builds a bridge between cognitive 
and social sciences within the field of conflict analysis, and informs the development of 
an effective procedure that allows mediators to make a knowledgeable choice as to the 
conflicts they wish to engage and the guiding perceptions of stakeholders to that conflict 
that might impact their neutrality. The dual process of cognitive decision-making 
described by Greene (Greene, 2004; Greene & Haidt, 2002), Gazzaniga (2005) and others 
and the assignment of use-values to cultural and communicative symbols in that process 
mitigated by the Moral Foundations described by Greene and Haidt (2002); and Haidt 
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and Graham (2007), while impacted by experiential history, is also susceptible to a 
cognitive dialectic through education and informed familiarity (Haidt & Graham, 2007; 
Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001; LeDoux, 1996; Margolis, 1987; Miller, 2011). In 
short, biases incurred through unconscious priming can be edited through education. This 
is not a new concept in substance as a similar observation was made by Auguste Comte 
who maintained that whoever controlled the distribution of knowledge, would control 
everyone (Mill, 1865). 
In building a bridge by combining the findings of research in the neurosciences, 
developmental anthropology, cognitive psychology and sociology this study provided 
practitioners insight into how external socio-environmental factors can have a decided 
effect on how they and their conflict constituents form first impressions of each other; 
first impressions that could very well the determine the course of the mediation and its 
outcome. More important is possessing the knowledge of how these first impressions 
which are precursors to predispositional behaviors, impact the true nature of the 
mediation process and its eventual outcome. The premise is a simple one, if I do not like 
an actor from the first time I meet or receive information about him and I form an opinion 
of him prior to the first face to face meeting, can I truly be neutral in my dealing with him 
regardless of how professional I consider myself? Conversely, if I form an opinion upon 
a first meeting of another conflict actor and truly care for or sympathize with her or 
perceive her represented situation to be unjust, will I manufacture a process that will 
unilaterally benefit her to the detriment of the other parties? 
Knowing that these behavioral predispositions exist and also knowing that they 
can be influenced by the simple knowledge of their influences it becomes possible to 
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change elements leading to and effecting developing mediation processes. First, the way 
in which mediations is chosen by mediators or other parties. Practitioners will be able to 
select a better “fit” for the projects they choose. For example, if I find a particular conflict 
abhorrent, and I identify one of the disputants as particularly repugnant, what is the 
probability of my conducting a truly equitable mediation, much less setting an outcome 
goal that benefits everyone in a way that everyone accepts? On the other hand, if I find a 
conflict intellectually challenging as opposed to being emotionally paralyzing and am 
able to view both disputants with a degree of professional neutrality, the outcome of 
acceptability and long-term settlement becomes a more probable consequence. The 
second, more obvious outcome of this project is the prospect of informing mediators of 
this cognitive phenomenon. This knowledge will allow them to “check” their previously 
unrecognized feelings. Knowing this, they will be able to conduct a better, more informed 
mediation, leading to increased numbers of long-term, successful outcomes. In effect, 
they are giving more weight to the experiential, conscious portion of their cognitive 
process in making a decision for action and/or strategy. 
Outline of the Study: 
At its core this project sought to understand how external environmental factors 
impact and subsequently modify the evolved cognitive processes of human beings and 
what impact this might have on mediation events. It is informed by the research of 
Greene (2007), Paxton and Greene (2010), Casebeer et al. (2003), and Churchland (2011) 
who describe the model of a dual cognitive process of conscious and unconscious 
mechanisms that result in decision-making. It is also inspired by the work of Haidt and 
his collaborators (Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Joseph, 2007) 
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who developed the notion of innate moral capacities, or Moral Foundations Theory 
(MFT). In this description human behavior is mitigated by a set of innate values evolved 
to assure the survival of individuals and human groups. Specifically, we were concerned 
with how these findings can be employed to understand the variables inherent to the 
mediation process which is fundamentally a human interactive phenomenon.  
This grounded theory study employed content analysis (Creswell, 2013; 
Krippendorff, 2012) to abstract themes that described predispositional behaviors of the 
study subjects President Jimmy Carter of the United States, President Anwar Al-Sadat 
from Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin from Israel. These are the principles 
who participated in the Camp David Accords that were conducted in pursuit of peace 
agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1978. While originally slated as a summit aimed 
toward the larger subject of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement, 
encompassing a larger portion of the Arab world and the plight of Palestinian people, it 
became focused upon the two principle countries, Egypt and Israel. 
 It has already been established in the findings of cognitive and linguistic research 
(Chomsky 1965, 1972, 1975; Cook & Newson, 1996; Habermas, 1984; 1990; Nieme, 
2011; Schaefer et al., 2013) that language, both written and spoken, is ego-contextual and 
represents the inner thoughts and evolved predispositions of the speaker. Knowing this, 
and utilizing the written materials available concerning the communication between the 
study subjects both publically and privately, we showed how early life-factors and 
situations directly impacted their cognitive processes, both conscious and unconscious, 
and formed the social interactions between them through the communicative medium. 
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Phase one: Socio-cultural profiling. To accomplish this, the study gathered data in 
four phases. First was the development of socio-cultural profiles for the study subjects. 
This phase sought to identify significant themes of influence that have been incorporated 
into the subjects’ cognitive processes by abstracting significant elements within their 
experiential histories and how these might be mitigated by the subjects’ evolved moral 
antecedents (Graham et al., 2009). The combination of these innate capacities and the 
interfacing with experiential influences has been shown to be powerful forces throughout 
one’s lifetime in acting as behavioral determinants.  
Longitudinally, the innate perceptions impacting the decision-making processes 
of a person will be modified with the accumulation of social interactions and other 
external environmental stimuli. According to Haidt (2008), these experiences are placed 
into a value hierarchy seen through the lens of the subject’s evolved moral foundations, a 
kind of standard to which experiences are compared. The applicable metaphor in the 
natural sciences would be the conducting of chemistry experiments within the context of 
standard temperature and pressure (STP) or in the behavioral sciences where we refer to 
an “ideal” type from which to compare observable data. The latter has been referred to in 
the works of Emile Durkheim. The outcome of this process assigns a certain importance 
to each experiential element, a kind of use-value within the context of dual process 
decision making. This use-value is employed at various levels in both conscious and 
unconscious components of the decision-making calculus. 
Phase two: Third party Camp David observations. The second phase of the project 
collected and interrogated data concerning Camp David and its principle participants. 
This was third party data found in public documents, biographies (authorized and 
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unauthorized), and media sources. This phase will established both the publically 
perceived tenor of the Accords as well as the perception of the relationship between 
Carter, Sadat and Begin. Note, this study was not necessarily concerned with the political 
face that the principles put on for the sake of political expediency, but more in terms of 
how observers saw or perceived the personal elements of the relationship between the 
three men. This phase also explored the public record of the mediation outcomes as 
reported in government and media reports and therefore allowed the comparison between 
the revealed themes of these research findings and those reported outcomes. It is 
understood that the reported results were subject to the politics and perceptions of the 
time, 1977-78, and reflect the political goals of the period. They also serve as a fairly 
accurate predictor of future Arab/Israeli relations in the region. 
Phase three: Principles’ thoughts and observations. In the study’s third phase, data 
was gathered from two principle sources that reflect the private feelings of each subject. 
Namely, autobiographies, personal letters and diaries were interrogated to establish the 
profile of private feelings individually and between the study subjects. These were 
relatively uncensored reflections of emotions and the influences of the experiential 
histories of each man but understandably at times, “politically correct.” This phase 
developed a comparison between subjects’ individual cognitive reflections and perceived 
public observations. Essentially, two blocks of comparative data with concomitant major 
(behavioral) themes were established, one of private cognition and one of public 
perception. 
Finally, these blocks of thematic information were evaluated against the outcomes 
of that peace process. It is not at this point a declaration of success or failure is important, 
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but more the perceptions of each participant that might yield an indicator of perceived 
bias on one or more their parts: Carter’s in particular. 
 I understand that more of an in-depth understanding may have been gained from 
examining this Arab/Israeli conflict in other frames such as the involvement of Quaker 
mediators like Elmore Jackson (1952) and Clarence Pickett (1999) directly prior to and 
following the establishment of the Israeli State by the Balfour Declaration (1917) and the 
UN Resolution 181 for the partitioning of Palestine (1947) effectively ending the British 
mandate in 1948. This was a time of violence and protest on the parts of both parties to 
the agreements. The Quaker mediators in fact had no power to coerce participants to the 
mediation table, only their reputation for honesty and fairness long established by the 
“Society of Friends.”  
We could have also examine the involvement of the Qatari Emir Hamad Al-Thani 
(Barakat, 2012; El-Effendi, 2012; Woodward, 2006; Wittes, 2005), who reinforced the 
concept of “checkbook diplomacy” in the mediation field (Wittes, 2005). But the 
distribution of resources, political gamesmanship and the utilization of economic or 
military power was not the intent of this study.  
What was important to this project, and to the development of more long-term 
efficacy in the field of mediation and conflict resolution, was the deeper understanding of 
human dynamics in the terms of innate decision-making systems, socio-cultural 
influences that have significant effects on those mechanisms and their representative 
behaviors. Using the proceedings of and the principle actors to the Camp David Accords 
in September of 1978 provided a clear example of conflicting human positions and how 
they impacted a mediation process. Since these decision-making constructs are universal 
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characteristics of human evolution and social interaction, the results can easily be applied 
to a wider field of conflict analysis and resolution. 
Chapter Summary 
Framed within the context of the Camp David Accords the following chapters 
first described past research that addresses the evolved cognitive capacities of human 
beings within the framework of an innate dual process cognitive system; unconscious 
processes that ascribe a value to those environmental stimuli we interact with, conscious 
processes that allow us to calculate a most strategic path to our resultant actions and third, 
the interaction between those two components that have been shown to lead to 
predispositions that impact manifest behaviors.  
We posit that our innate cognitive processes are a result of human evolution and 
serve to assure species survival on a grand scale, but also individual survival as a 
consequence of socio-environmental interactions. Further, using the findings from 
cognitive psychology and developmental anthropology and supported by more recent 
clinical data from fMRI research by Greene and others, this study as well asserts that 
evolved cognitive processes are not possessing of any predetermined solutions to 
interactions within an individual’s environment, but rather provide a “first edition” of 
primal unconscious responses to perceived threats. The content of that first edition serves 
to identify a much broader capacity for interaction based upon its modification through 
experiential history.  
These modifications are indicative of a valuation process of experiences that 
accumulate to form a library of patterns used by the brain to facilitate the best response to 
new and recurring situations. In short, the accumulation of socio-cultural experiences by 
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an individual lends itself to what Sapir-Whorf eludes to as the individual’s perception of 
reality expressed through language. This study extends that assertion to frame a set of 
predispositional behaviors that in the arena of mediation as bias, positing that there is in 
fact, no possible way for a mediator to attain neutrality. 
Finally, the following chapters will discuss this absence in neutrality as a consequence 
of differing cultural socialization between disputants and between disputants and 
mediators within the context of the Camp David Accords. This study uses constructivist 
grounded theory described by Charmaz  (2014) utilizing content analysis to interrogate 
data found in the private and public histories of each of the three major conflict 
stakeholders at Camp David; Carter, Sadat and Begin. Abduction lead us to the ‘best 
explanation’ for the study’s observations and served as the bridge between the cognitive 
and social sciences that inform this research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction to the Study 
Informed by both the sociological and cognitive sciences, this research 
investigated the relationship between disputants from widely dissonant cultures in an 
effort to demonstrate the impact of socio-cultural influences on a) the stakeholders’ 
perception of both the conflict environment and the world in general and b) the 
stakeholders’ perceptions of each other within the context of a well-documented conflict 
resolution setting. The over-arching question though is whether or not the mediator in this 
situation is and perceived by disputants as being truly neutral, or are there innate and 
predictable behavioral predispositions on the part of the mediator that precludes a 
genuine atmosphere of objectivity. By extension, these same questions may be applied to 
disputants who react to the mediators and other disputants as well, ultimately influencing 
the outcome of the resolution process. 
The Camp David Accords of 1978 was an attempt by the U.S. President Jimmy 
Carter to bring together the leaders of two historically belligerent countries, Egypt and 
Israel; that enmity exacerbated by the ending of the British mandate creating the State of 
Israel in 1948. The former was represented by President Anwar al-Sadat, the latter by 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Carter was to serve as the neutral mediator between the 
two disputants. The literature is replete with descriptions of the relationships between the 
three men. However, these perceptions are divided into two camps, one by participants to 
the negotiations present at Camp David and the other as a collective observation by the 
media prior to and following the Accords as they were not permitted access to any 
participant during the event.  
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There are also numerous historical and political commentaries describing the 
conflict history between Egypt and Israel that often disregards the hybrid conflict 
between these two countries and confounds this with the generic title of the “Arab-Israeli 
Conflict.” Analyses of the relationships between the three men appear limited in their 
ability to give a truly comprehensive picture of the human dynamic influencing their 
individual and collective decision-making processes. This research interrogated data 
yielded through  a content analysis of the principles’ own words relative to personal 
impressions of their conflict counterparts and be contrasted against public (media) 
perceptions as well as third party observers to the Camp David events. This analysis was 
done within the context of the cognitive processes demonstrated through linguistic 
constructs. 
The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Elements of Predisposition 
We have seen that the cognitive and moral development of humans rests on the 
innate capacities of evolved neural machinery coupled with the social interactions that 
serve as both an initiator of that machinery’s function and the data input that is factored 
into the dual calculus of the decision-making system (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Casebeer & 
Churchland, 2003). These environmental stimuli play a primary role in conscious 
cognition, but are also internalized over time regardless of their being directly 
experiential or passively absorbed through social-sensory contact to become equally as 
important in unconscious processes that overshadow behavioral outcomes (Dehaene et 
al., 1998; Kohlberg, 1969; Paxton & Greene, 2010). All of this happens within the 
context of a cultural nexus, be it direct or indirect through socialization.  
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So, if we are to comprehensively examine relationships between Begin, Sadat and 
Carter and the predispositions that may have influenced their interaction, it was necessary 
to investigate the historic events that have been woven into the cultural tapestry upon 
which so many determinant actions are premised, specifically, the conflict under 
investigation; the Arab-Israeli conflict. By examining the history of the conflict, and 
understanding that its social actions become part of both Arab and Jewish folklore, 
tradition, ceremony, etc., and most importantly transmitted ill-feelings that may or may 
not be premised on fact or myth or simple misunderstanding, we discovered those 
elements that point to important actor predispositions. The most reductionist inquiry 
concerning the principle actors is what caused them to act the way they did towards each 
other? Traditional social and behavioral research would more focus on that cultural 
tapestry as merely an “influence.” But that label devalues the power it has on the neuro-
psychological makeup of the actors: in brief then, the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Before proceeding we must point out a specific methodological point concerning 
this study. The primary outcome of the Camp David Accords, while being implicated by 
association, was not as much about a comprehensive settlement between all Arabs and 
Israeli States, but more of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. According to Quandt 
(1986a), Wright (2014), Pappé (2006) and others, a comprehensive settlement was never 
a true consideration. The plight of the Palestinians, while used as leverage in early 
conferences, was discarded by Sadat and by Carter as a strategy to finalizing the peace 
agreement, much to the displeasure of other Arab States, although their consternation was 
more cosmetic than actual. According to K. W. Stein (1999), the Saudi Foreign minister, 
when asked about the exclusion of the Palestinians from the negotiations said, “Why 
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should we worry about them?” The true discontent with the Camp David accords was that 
Sadat unilaterally bargained with the Israelis (Quandt, 1999). This study will then focus 
on the real purpose of the Accords and not refer to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli 
settlement. 
The Elements of Ownership 
The basis for the protracted conflict that led to the Camp David Accords in 1978 
can be described in a single word, land. Who actually “owns” the land in dispute, 
historically, legally or by virtue of some vague and contested religious doctrine, is the 
fuel that drives the conflict between Arabs and Jews. Possession, victimology and 
entitlement are the thematic children of the conflict whose parents play on a stage of 
politics and manipulation. The original motivation for the conflict is so far removed from 
present motivations that have built upon elements of revenge and religious mysticism, 
hearsay and changing political definitions that it is often difficult to evaluate the veracity 
of each party’s’ claim to rightful ownership of the land known to the Arabs as Palestine 
and to the Israelis as Judea and Samaria or “Eretz Israel.” If we try and follow the logic 
of each conflict group’s justification for land acquisition, we find it to be convoluted and 
premised upon at best, selective history that favors each group exclusively (Hooker, 
1999; Zeitlin, 1947). 
According to Jewish history, in the Pentateuch God promised, by covenant to the 
Jewish patriarchs, that their children would inherit the land of Judea as long as they 
accepted him as their God. Then, the God of Israel was regarded as the God of the land. 
The Jews were then exiled from their promised land as they became more secular, 
neglecting basic religious norms. The covenant had been broken and they were cast out 
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(Brenner, 2003; Gilbert, 1998; Wood, 1986) Here the history of the twelve tribes begins 
and so the Kingdom of Israel.  
There was for a relatively short time a Jewish Kingdom, the Kingdom of Israel, 
around 2000 years ago. But many other Kingdoms had subsequently claimed the land of 
Eretz Israel over time. In over 7000 years of history, Jewish rule only amounted to a mere 
200 years (Brenner, 2003; Hooker, 1999; Zeitlin, 1947). Zionists point to the 
unsubstantiated existence of the Biblical King David as the revered ruler of Israel 
inferring a sense of historic ownership. Archeological evidence suggests however, that 
even if King David did exist, his reign was more over a chiefdom as opposed to the 
magnificent lands of Biblical fame (Cleveland, 2004; Zeitlin, 1947). He also would not 
have been considered a Jew as he was apparently, according to Brenner (2003), not a 
monotheist. While many Jewish leaders, based on at best less than reliable Biblical 
translation and revisionist history (Brenner, 2003; Zeitlin, 1947), may lay claim to the 
land of Palestine, of Judea and Samaria, their claim is pragmatically without substance 
since historically they only possessed it by rule for a short time and effectively lost its 
title repeatedly during many pogroms and occupations. 
At contest as well is the (historic) legal status of Palestinian possession relative to 
the conquest of the Jews by the Romans prior to and following the first Roman-Jewish 
war with the destruction of the two temples in 586 BCE and 70 CE. This destruction was 
a Roman effort to destroy Judaism and Christianity in one act, their position being that 
Christianity sprang from Judaism based within the prevailing belief of Messianic times 
(Cleveland, 2004; Wood, 1986). Parenthetically, this was an act of religious dominance, 
showing the Roman God Jupiter prevailing over the Jewish/Christian God furthering the 
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notion that Jews were not considered by Rome to be a sovereign State, but rather a 
religious congregation to be converted.  
Depending in which camp one chooses to settle, the historic legal possession of 
Palestine is open for interpretation. One group holds that the claim to Palestine by the 
Jews was made mute after Roman conquest and its annexation into the empire as an 
Imperial Procuratorial Province (Zeitlin, 1947). The opposing camp states that the 
Romans never legally transitioned ownership to the Empire and Palestine (to include 
Judea and its surrounding real estate) and remained as a mere occupied territory of the 
Roman Empire and the personal possession of its conquerors Vespasian and his son Titus 
(Brenner, 2003; Zeitlin, 1947).  
Neither Titus nor his father appended their own titles with “Judacious” since at 
the time Judaism was regarded only as a religion and Vespasian, soon to become 
Emperor left his son Titus to conclude the successful Jewish-Roman war in Jerusalem. 
Some accounts say that Vespasian regarded Judea as his personal possession according to 
the Roman historian Josephus. From this position it might be inferred that Rome did not 
regard Jews as legal title holders to the land at all and only as citizens of Syria in the 
north or Babylonia in the south. This would explain why Jews continued to live in Judea 
and not labeled peregrini dediticii; people whose country had been destroyed and have no 
country (Zeitlin, 1947). 
 Emperor Caracalla eventually conferred Roman citizenship on the Jews (civitas), 
commanding the rights of Roman citizens. This infers the abdication of any past 
membership in a former State, had one existed at all. The Jews were allowed to live under 
their own administration, an Ethnarch, in Judea that reported to the Roman council. As 
59 
 
socii po puli Romani, associate people of the Romans, they were allowed to hold public 
office, something placed into Roman law in 231 C.E. While these titles are sometimes 
challenged, they do indicate the erasure of any previous State loyalties by design. These 
privileges were not enjoyed by the peregrine dediticii, people without a country  
(Brenner, 2003). 
This situation parallels the Jews of the Diaspora many years later. Having left 
their native “land” they dispersed throughout Europe and Russia, developing unique 
cultures and languages specific to the ethno-culture they lived in proximity to. Jews 
occupied specific areas within these countries and concentrated their populations, 
identifying their group through religious practice and history. Eventually, and as was seen 
throughout Russia and Poland during WWI and again in WWII, the Jews were given 
choices of how they might coexist within their resident countries. One of those choices, 
reminiscent of the Roman offer, was one of assimilation (Cleveland, 2004). 
In the Roman war against Persia, the Persian King Sapor declared that he never 
had killed a Jew during the war, only Roman citizens. This was received by the 
Babylonian King of Jews Samuel, not as the killing of thousands of Judean Jews, but of 
Romans. Indeed, the Jews of Judea had been politically assimilated into the Roman 
populous, living in a Roman Imperial province. By tacit acceptance of the rights 
bestowed upon them by the now Emperor Vespasian, Jews had become Roman citizens 
and separated themselves from any inherent ownership of Judea and its surrounding lands 
(Jolowicz, 1965). 
Many Jewish scholars had and continue to interpret the alleged “uninterrupted” 
presence of Jews throughout Judean history as a legal precedent that implies continued 
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ownership of Judea and Palestine, Eretz Israel, by the Jews since transfer to Roman 
ownership never took place in their view. This would indeed contradict the tenants of 
Roman law thought to be rooted in the Etruscan Disciplina (Jolowicz, 1965; Nicholas, 
2008). What is apparent here is that the semantics of the historical records they cite are 
without the proper interpretations and are not based in historic and archaeological fact.  
Vespasian was a Roman Senator soon to be emperor and his son Titus a General 
of the Roman Legion. Both were regarded then as they would be now, considered a 
representative of the Roman State as any Senator today is an officer of the U.S. 
government or an attorney an officer of the court. Any actions on their part reflect upon 
or is representative of their country and its legal system (Schulz, 1946; Stein, P., 1999). 
Their decisions, to regard Palestine as a personal possession, if true, would need 
authorization from the Emperor, which is not ever considered in conservative Hebrew 
interpretations. In addition, Vespasian became Emperor of Rome during his son Titus’ 
vanquishing of Jerusalem, one of the last battles of the first Roman-Jewish war. The 
Emperor is Rome and therefore, Judea is Rome, even considered as a personal possession 
of the then Emperor, was de facto possessed by Rome (Stein, P., 1999).  
Unless Palestine was titled to Vespasian by the Emperor during the early years of 
the war, it would stand as a Roman holding, given the historical epic and the actions of 
the Roman Emperor Nero (Schulz, 1946; Stein, P., 1999; Zeitlin, 1947). The fact that the 
Jews were never labeled as a conquered people in “their own land” so described by 
Roman legal title, validates their position as non-title holders. So, the religious record 
stands as archeologically questionable, the historic record contradicts many of the Zionist 
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claims of perpetual sovereignty as does the legal record of Roman and the subsequent 
holding to Palestinian title.  
One common thread is the remaining of a very few Jews in Palestine, typically 
described as those who did not challenge whichever occupier happened to be in power 
and considered citizens of the conquering authority. Regardless, this land of Eretz Israel 
has only been religiously connected to the Jews from their earliest historical accounts to 
present day. Their less than established connection to the soil of Palestine was so fervent 
that any attempts at geographical relocation of the Holy land such as that proposed for 
upstate New York by Mordecai Manuel Noah, was ultimately doomed to failure before 
its inception (Hooker, 1999; Zeitlin, 1947).  
But, modern arguments in favor of Jewish possession of Palestine remain 
premised on this selected history and misinterpreted legal precedent and stands as the 
root of their demonstrated sense of entitlement. The themes that have emerged relative to 
what has driven subsequent political and conflict history, group identity and the conflict 
under study are deeply rooted in unsupported and sometimes unsupportable assumptions. 
The notion of historic possession became woven into the cultural fabric of not only 
religious, but political Zionism as well and drove its subsequent leadership and activities. 
It became an ideal type, the standard upon which the use-value of interactive symbolism 
became entrenched. 
 Reflecting back on our earlier discussions, these principles would be part of the 
culturally and emotionally based editorial and socializing processes of decision-making 
by the Jewish populace; a foundation for social and individual identity. But of course, the 
counter-position to Palestinian ownership is the Arab population. There is not the 
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religious foundation for Palestine proper as found in Judaism as most of Islamic history 
centers around Mecca and other parts of Arabia. Ironically, the Arabs fall to the same 
argument of continual possession as do their Jewish counterparts (Sharon, 2003; 
Wheeler, 2002). 
Conservative Jewish historians point to the shallowness of the Arab influence in 
Palestine. They maintain the position that in twelve hundred years they had only built one 
town. Ramallah was the local (sub) provincial Arab Palestinian capital in the 8
th
 century 
(Brenner, 2003). Robinson, an early nineteenth century Middle East Scholar, showed that 
many seemingly Arabic names for villages and other sites were actually Arabic 
renderings of Jewish names. They further point out that the name “Palestine” is not an 
Arabic name but a rendering of the Roman name “Filastin,” given to it in an effort to 
eliminate any history of Jewish influence.  
However, without comparison in Jewish law, Islamic law provided one 
fundamental rule concerning territory. This rule, found in the Holy Koran, was 
unequivocal and considered the word of Allah. It states that any territory that comes 
under Islamic rule cannot be “de-Islamized,” even if at any time a non-Muslim conquers 
an Islamic ruled land, the land remains Islamic territory in perpetuity (Sharon, 2003). 
This is a primary element of conflict between the two actors. Palestinian Muslims believe 
that they have both a legal and religious claim to Palestine. Jews believe the same 
religious and legal favor. They have and will continue to fight for the land as will their 
opponents in Israel. There are of course many shades and sub-conflicts involved but the 
land serves as the foundation of the dispute, what drove the original Zionist politics and 
opposition by the Arabs and continues to do so today. It is simplified as a sense of 
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entitlement by the Zionists, and one of a visceral and functional connection on the part of 
the Arabs, specifically the Egyptians. But unlike their Arab counterparts who recognized 
the presence of their Jewish neighbors and for many years lived in coexistence, the 
Zionist movement ignored the indigenous, Arab population who considered the land 
under Islamic rule. 
The Inherent Need for Recognition and Personhood 
There is a significant theme found throughout the Jew’s claim to Palestine in their 
historic lack of consideration, or even recognition of the indigenous Arab population. In 
his novel Mikdamot (Preliminaries), Samuel Yizhar (2007) gave artistic expression to a 
notion that was prevalent among Jews planning to immigrate to Palestine; that the land 
was devoid of human occupation. 
Who knew anything about Arabs? No one had ever mentioned them, in all of 
those speeches, lectures and debates in the Volhynian forests at the banks of the Styr, 
which flowed along lazily in the comfortable carefree twilight and with almost apathetic 
tranquility listened to the boldest songs of home and the most conclusive evidence that 
we would only find a home in our own land, they, the Arabs, never came up, not in any 
discussion or other deliberations, and most assuredly not in the songs; they simply did not 
exist. (p. 49).  
The migrants would soon learn that they were not as welcome as the Zionist 
leader Theodor Herzl had imagined in his novel Altneuland (Old New Land, Herzl, 2009) 
where immigrant Jews and the historic resident Arab population would live in harmony. 
The indigenous Arabs did indeed turn against their new neighbors in many recorded 
instances during the latter part of the 1800’s; the Jews were considered intruders and 
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occupiers illegally settling on Arab land and displacing formerly Arab labor. But Herzl 
publically promoted the idea that the Promised Land was without its occupants; 
“Palestine, is the land without a people for a people without a land” (Brenner, 2003; 
Hooker, 1999). 
Modern Jewish History 
Modern post-diaspora Jewish History and the power it has in defining Jewish 
identity and motivations, according to Ben-Zion Dinur (Morgenstern, 2008) is 
exemplified in the work of the 12
th
 century Jewish poet Yehuda Halevi. One of the most 
exalted Jewish Poets, he chronicled his pilgrimage between his home in Toledo, Spain, 
through Alexandria, Egypt and then on to Jerusalem where he died. His work highlighted 
both the traditional and religious justifications for Jewish manifest destiny toward 
Palestine. Reading his work helps the non-Jew to perhaps understand at a more personal 
level the relationship of modern Jews to the land of their ancestors.  
Culturally, this “living” connection has been transmitted through the centuries by 
prayers, poems, art, language and some creative revisionist history that sought to validate 
the Jews’ and the Zionist movement’s continued campaign of ownership and occupation 
of Palestine at the expense of the indigenous population of Palestinian Arabs. The 
indigent population believed in their own sovereignty according to Islamic tradition, the 
law of the Koran and long-term possession. So, from the very beginning, this protracted 
dispute has been mostly focused upon territory, on the land.  
This same theme is seen in the dispute between Egypt and Israel regarding 
Israel’s occupation of historic Egyptian territory in the Sinai Peninsula following the Six 
Day War in 1967; entitlement felt by the occupiers versus an almost genetic attachment 
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to the land by the indigent population of Egyptians. The point to be made is the schism 
between seeing the land as a tangible right to possession by the Zionists as opposed to its 
intangible ethno-cultural and historic possession supported by Islamic law of the resident 
population. The latter sentiment is made clear by Sadat’s revered Grandmother when she 
told a young Anwar, “Nothing is as significant as your being a child of this land. Land is 
immortal as it harbors the mysteries of creation” (Sadat, 1978, p. 8). Her words reflected 
not only the sentiment, but the historic view of Egypt being the greatest benefactor of the 
Nile River economically, culturally and ultimately the cradle of humankind (Midant-
Reynes, 2000). 
Turkey’s Ottoman Empire, from 1517-1917 controlled the land that today is 
known as Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. During the second half of the 1880’s, the first 
Zionists arrived in Palestine driven by the religious belief and the perceived political 
necessity that an independent Jewish homeland was the only thing that could offer a 
continuous safe-haven from anti-Semitism. The success or failure of the embryonic 
Zionist movement to ‘take back’ the ancestral lands they considered Eretz Israel 
(Palestine and beyond) was dependent upon the Ottoman leaders in Istanbul (Cleveland, 
2004).  
From the very beginning, the (Ottoman) Empire’s leader Sultan Abd al Hamid II, 
also the last ruler of the Ottoman Dynasty, regarded the Zionists with suspicion. Hamid 
believed that the Zionist movement was just another attempt by the Europeans to 
undermine the Empire’s position in the Middle East. Brenner (2003) asserts that since 
most of the Zionists hailed from Russia, the Sultan believed that they would, in times of 
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conflict, side with their former Russian Empire who stood as a threat to the Ottomans in 
the Balkans and regions of Anatolia (Hooker, 1999; Wood, 1986). 
When the early Jewish settlers attempted to purchase land and begin an 
agricultural economy, they soon realized the presence of indigenous Palestinian Arabs. In 
the 1880s information concerning disputes over water rights, pastoral territory, harvesting 
and labor began to emerge from several Jewish settlements. Tahir al-Husayni, the Mufti 
of Jerusalem and the leader of the Muslim community in Palestine, considered the 
attempts by Jews to buy land in and around Palestine and to enlarge their numbers by 
increased immigration a direct threat to the Arab community, a feeling that  spread 
throughout the Palestinian community (Brenner, 2003). Regardless, through relentless 
persuasion and bribery, the Zionist leaders convinced land owners to sell, effectively 
circumventing the opposition of the Ottoman government who loudly opposed the influx 
of Jews to Palestine (Kochavi, 1998). 
Herzl vs. Jabotinsky: Assimilation or Conquest 
Theodor Herzl, a formerly “assimilated” Jew from Vienna and considered one of 
the Founders of modern Zionism, who repeatedly denied the presence of significant 
numbers of Arabs in the Promised Land, had a socialist vision of cooperation between the 
settlers and the locals. His was not a dream of confrontation but of cooperation. His 
model was very similar to the political structures he had left behind, that the rights of any 
Palestinian Arabs, Muslim or Christian, would be protected, as would their religious 
practices, but they would be assimilated into the growing Jewish infrastructure, a process 
he was intimately familiar with (Pappé, 2006). The immediate failure of that cooperation 
and the subsequent clashes between civilizations would lead to an internal conflict 
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between Herzl and the more radical revisionists led by Vladimir Jabotinsky who would 
later stand as the symbolic harbinger of current Arab-Israeli conflict and the ideological 
hero of the young Menachem Begin (Pappé, 2006). 
Herzl took the ethnocentric position that the indigenous Arab population would 
benefit greatly from the cultural and developmental advantages offered by the growing 
population of immigrant European Jews with their supposed technological and 
organizational superiority. Ironically, in later reporting it was shown that the interests of 
Arabs really had no role in Herzl’s model; his was more of a political manipulation than 
an actual socialist ideological system. His was heavily influenced, outwardly, by his 
former environment of European liberalism that espoused equality for all faiths and 
nationalities (Brenner, 2003; Hooker, 1999; Zaar, 1954).  
The more religious foundations of Zionism’s move toward Israel were held by 
Mizrachi. His argument was predicated on Biblical dogma on God’s covenant with 
Abraham, where the land of Canaan was promised to Abraham’s descendants. This 
served as the foundation for an unbroken, yet contested, covenant of continuous Jewish 
claims to Eretz Israel, re, a “God-given” claim (Brenner, 2003; Cleveland, 2004). But 
there were detractors within the Zionists, one prominent voice being Ahad Ha’am. He 
maintained that the Jews would not be welcomed in Palestine by the Arabs. He witnessed 
the group of influential Arabs who signed a formal protest to Istanbul concerning Jewish 
immigration and land purchases (Brenner, 2003; Gilbert, 1998). 
Ze’ev Jabotinsky grew up in an assimilated Jewish family in Odessa, part of the 
Russian empire (now Ukraine). He was witness to the anti-Semitic pogroms of the time 
which stood as the motivation for his more radical militant positions, leading to his 
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recognition as the eventual leader of the more radical right-wing Zionists. He saw the 
most effective solution to perceived discrimination toward the Jews in Palestine as being 
primarily a militaristic one, having been fascinated by the strength and projected power 
of the Russian armed forces (Pappé, 2006).  
His was not the solution of realpolitik forwarded by Herzl, but of conquest and 
domination. His more militant Zionist position saw Eretz Israel on both sides of the 
Jordan River. His position was that if the resident Arab population adapted to the tenants 
of the Jewish states then they could remain. If not, they would be moved to the 
neighboring Arab States. To Jabotinsky, the Arabs who lived in Palestine were opponents 
and obstacles to the Zionists’ historic right to possession (Jabotinsky, 2011). They could 
only be approached from a position of strength, a perception that was reminiscent of the 
ancient massacre at Masada in 73 C.E., considered an act of heroic resistance to the 
Romans by the last Jewish stronghold (Yadin, 1966). Indeed, the story of Masada, a 
staple of Jewish historical DNA certainly could have served as an unconscious primer for 
Jabotinsky’s radicalism, fueled by his witness to growing European anti-Semitism, 
something not as prominent in his counterpart Herzl. 
While Jabotinsky had respect for the Arabs’ position he was more driven by the 
moral dissonance of anti-Semitism occurring in Europe at the time. His moral claim was 
based on a political reality, not the Herzl hope of cooperation and equality held by the 
Socialists. Also, the Arabs had fought and conquered, and possessed, many other States 
in the neighborhood where the Jews were fighting for a single home, a haven from 
persecution promised in Biblical and encompassed in their narrowly interpreted historic 
records (Pappé, 2006). This militaristic position is seen in the many defenses against 
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Arab attacks on the new settlers since 1881. They were fighting back after centuries of 
uncontested and little resisted persecution, displacement and abuse while in the Diaspora. 
They were fighting for what many Jews perceived to be their rightful home. A symbol of 
their determination is seen in immigrant recruiting posters of the time that depicted a 
Jewish sentry, shovel in one hand, a rifle in the other (Brenner, 2003); they would fight to 
the death for their home in Palestine. This outlines a very powerful kind of victimology 
(LeDoux, 1996; Robertson et al, 2007). 
The year 1911 saw an increased conflict over employment. With the increasing 
migration of Jews fleeing from mounting violent anti-Semitism in both eastern and 
western Europe, immigrants were replacing Arab labor in Arab towns. “Hebrew Work” 
became a driving mantra to immigrants and as well a battle cry for the resident Arab 
population. There was increasing pressure to replace Arab farm labor with immigrant 
Jewish workers in pursuit of the Zionist economic transition from being a community 
whose livelihood depended on donations from the diaspora to one of agriculturally based 
self-sufficiency. As the Jewish presence became greater, so did the demand for more 
Arab land and an increased demand for Hebrew Work (Brenner, 2003; Hooker, 1999; 
Kochavi, 1998). 
The Transition to Legitimate Statehood and bilateral Betrayal 
Modern Zionism could never have taken place were it not for the occasion of 
European nationalism and its associated anti-Semitism, (i.e., the Balkans and formerly 
Polish sections of Prussia). The “Great War” provided an even further impetus for mass 
Jewish migration to escape persecution in Europe and the Orient. During the First World 
War, Turkey supported Germany and with the German defeat also came the downfall of 
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the Ottoman Empire and its subsequent partition and Mandate to Great Britain and 
France through the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916. Arab regions were divided into 
“zones of influence;” Lebanon and Syria were assigned to France and “Palestine,” 
today’s Jordan, Israel and the West Bank, were given to Great Britain. The purpose was 
to assist the former Ottoman provinces to become independent States (Brenner, 2003; 
Pappé, 2006; Wood, 1986). 
A second document, the Balfour Declaration, signed November 2, 1917 became 
the primary source of Modern Zionism’s “legal” claim to Palestine and a diplomatic 
breakthrough in pursuit of Eretz Israel for the Zionists. The Declaration was a one page 
letter between then British Foreign Secretary A.J. Balfour to Lord Rothschild that the 
“government of his majesty was favorably inclined to the establishment of a national 
home of the Jewish people in Palestine and would facilitate the realization of this goal 
(Appendix A).” The declaration came out in support of immigrants building their 
permanent homes in Palestine (Friedman, 2000; Fromkin, 1989). 
These two documents could represent a primary cause for the escalation of 
tensions between immigrants and Arabs. Both sides to the draft of the Balfour letter, 
assumed preferred status with Britain (Fromkin, 1989; Pappé, 2006). The mandate as set 
forth by the Sykes-Picot agreement, by its intent, seemed to point to the establishment of 
a consolidated Arab State. But the Balfour communique quickly drew attention to a 
perceived preference toward the Zionists. In Britain, Chaim Weizmann, who founded the 
Palestine Land Development Company and later became Israel’s first President, had 
discussions with the Rothschilds and convinced them of the necessity in forming a Jewish 
National home (Litvinoff, 1982). The Balfour Declaration became the official first volley 
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with a British seal that served as a betrayal to the resident Arab population (Schneer, 
2014). 
The declaration was vague in its wording in terms of the scope of what 
“Palestine” actually comprised from a perspective of recognized geographical borders; 
“National home” was not a legally defined phrase and ‘views with favor’ cannot be 
contractually binding in any court. Weizmann considered this however, the advertisement 
necessary for the validation of and veracity for the Jewish home State. He maintained that 
the pursuit of Palestinian legitimacy could only be accomplished with British cooperation 
and a Zionist commitment to the Mandate power (Litvinoff, 1982). The British felt that 
with the massive immigration from the diaspora to Palestine and the work already 
accomplished in remaking the area into a habitable and tillable site by the early Jewish 
settlers coupled with the concomitant employment opportunities earned British favor. 
Their position was that nobody had ever established a national homeland in Palestine 
since the Jews had done it 2000 years before. This position alone reflected the sentiment 
of Zionist leaders that the Arabs simply did not exist relative to Palestine and the Jews 
goal of colonization (Pappé, 2006; Schneer, 2014). 
Arabs hoped that what they perceived to be a pro-Arab British foreign office 
would repudiate the Balfour declaration and pursue the underlying assumption of the 
Sykes-Picot Accord; a unified Arab State. Realizing that they had been given over to the 
successes if Weizmann who had earlier petitioned the Rothschilds for a Jewish Homeland 
in Palestine, the Arab delegations ceased to participate or overtly rejected most of the 
settlement options since 1930 (Cleveland, 2004; Ma’oz, 2007 Pappé, 2006). The Jews in 
Palestine under David Ben-Gurion’s leadership were active participants in most 
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settlement mediations since the participants attested directly or indirectly to recognizing 
the ‘right’ of the Jews to a homeland.  
This of course did not go unnoticed by the indigenous population in 1926 when a 
new wave of Jewish immigration came from Poland to flee the pogroms of 1924. They 
began to purchase wide tracts of land from the Arabs to accommodate the rising Jewish 
population (Brenner, 2003; Kochavi, 1998; Pappé, 2006; Zaar, 1954). This land grab 
served to promote an increase in the attacks on the new settlers’ villages by those Arabs 
who regarded them as invaders who not only took their land, but by now given the 
displacement of Arab workers in favor of “Hebrew Labor,” took their livelihoods as well; 
a repeat of the Arabs earlier 1890 dissatisfaction with the influx of Jewish workers. The 
Arabs did not, under Islamic law, recognize any of the British decisions relative to Arab 
occupied lands and the Jews de facto, had no claim of ownership or entitlement either 
legally or otherwise. 
The influx of Jewish immigrants during the 1930’s became even more intense 
with the prominence of Fascism and the Nazis in Europe. The growing sense of Arab 
displacement and an increasing number of immigrant Jews culminated in the Arab revolt 
of 1936-1939 (Pappé, 2006). These began as guerilla attacks and soon became outward 
aggression against British military and government installations. Talks with Arab leaders 
persuaded the British to reconsider their position in Palestine regarding the Arabs, and 
culminated in the White Paper of 1939 that seemed to provide the specter of relief to 
Arabs who perceived a loss of their ancestral land.  
This paper stands as a primary source of Zionist action against the British 
Mandate as it stood to repudiate the Balfour declaration and even more important, it 
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placed significant restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchases in Palestine 
culminating in actions by the U.S. and Britain to actively restrict Jewish immigration 
through political and military action such as the Exodus and Aliyah incidents (Brenner, 
2003; Kochavi, 1998; Zaar, 1954; Zeitlin, 1947) to which Menachem Begin was either an 
observer or direct participant. It was the perception of the Jewish communities that the 
diversion or refusal to accept these ships full of Jewish migrants to Palestine, served as 
another emblem of victimhood and isolation. 
But this Jewish immigration was only a part of a protracted larger dynamic of 
betrayal perceived by the Arabs toward the United Kingdom. During the period 1915-
1916 during WWI, the British, represented by the High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir 
Henry McMahon corresponded with the Sharif of Mecca, Husayn bin Ali. In that 
correspondence, McMahon stated that: “Subject to the modifications stated above, Great 
Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the 
regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca” (Cleveland, 2004, pp. 
157-163). 
The purpose of the McMahon correspondence was to assure the Arabs’ 
participation with Britain in fighting the Ottoman Empire occupying the region. This was 
a significant motivator for Arab participation, but following the war, the Sykes-Picot 
agreement partitioned Palestine and represented an act of betrayal to the Arabs followed 
by the subsequent British Mandate of 1920. Together, these acts of betrayal founded the 
stage of conflict between the Arabs, British and Jews. We can directly apply this to the 
Haidt work on moral foundations, as two of these foundations, “Loyalty/Betrayal” and 
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“Fairness/Cheating” are primary motivators to individual and group survival; significant 
motivators for ‘fight or flight’ at both individual and community levels. 
The Mandate (Appendix B) provided no agreement that the land of indigenous 
Palestinians should be handed over to European Jewish immigrants given that the 
population of the region of the time was 95% non-Jewish, as self-determination and 
innate human rights were recognized back then, it is doubtful as to whether or not the 
ignoring of the Arabs desire for a unified state in favor of the immigrating minority bear 
any legal significance at all. It is of note that the Zionists, when interpreting the Mandate, 
focused on the language that favored European Jews over indigenous Arabs, ignoring the 
verbiage that protects the rights of the majority; something they had ironically been 
subject to already in the Diaspora (Hooker, 1999). 
At the time of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the Jewish population was only 
7% of the total 700,000 residents. The majority were Muslim and Christian Arabs. At the 
time of the 1947 partitioning by Britain there only 650,000 Jews in Palestine while there 
were 1.3 million indigenous Arabs both Muslim and Christian. Under the British partition 
plan, 56% of Palestine was given to the Jews for an independent Zionist State to a 
minority that was only 33% of the population and owned only 6% of the land (Lilienthal, 
1982; Wood, 1986). 
The conflict in Palestine had developed since the entry of the first Jewish 
immigrants from Europe. Increasing immigration in pursuit of Zionist ambitions served 
only to intensify already existing ill-feelings over land, water rights, labor and an Arab 
feeling of incursion by these perceived outsiders. To the Arabs, this was historically their 
land, and since Islamized, was not going to be sacrificed. Following the Ottomans, the 
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British agreements, interpreted under specific colonial and persecution-based motivations 
caused a three-way conflict between the Jews, the Arabs and the British. These 
misunderstandings by the principle parties, emanated from different camps of intentions 
and conflicting cultural systems of perceptions, British, Zionist and Arab. It is from these 
camps that violence under the guidance of important players that later influenced the 
Camp David players rose to prominence. 
Following a period of Arab insurgency in 1936, the MacDonald Whitepaper was 
published in 1938. The paper proposed severe restrictions on Jewish immigration and 
land purchases seen in the Exodus incident where Britain actively turned back a Jewish 
refugee ship to Europe. Of particular significance, was the vast increase in the Jewish 
population in Palestine following the events of holocaust and the emotional juggernaut 
that moved the world to side with the Jews and provide for a safe and secure Jewish 
Homeland (Brenner, 2003; Kochavi, 1998; Pappé, 2006; Zaar, 1954)? 
This attempt by the British to deny Jewish immigrants access to their “rightful 
home,” led to the violent campaign conducted by the Jewish underground, most notably 
the Irgun founded by Ze’ev Jabotinsky. Menachem Begin who later became the Israeli 
prime Minister, became the leader of this militant group and was responsible for the 
deadly bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. The Stern Gang led by Yitzhak 
Shamir, latter to become the seventh Prime Minister of Israel, assassinated Lord Moyne 
the British Secretary of State in Cairo (Pappé, 2006). Eventually, a political and 
pragmatic spilt occurred between the moderate Zionists of Hagenah headed by David 
Ben-Gurion and the more radical Jabotinsky Irgun (Kochavi, 1998; Pappé, 2006). While 
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both opposed British restrictions on immigration, the former believed in appeasement to 
some degree while the latter adhered to a mandate for violent resistance. 
Moyne had declared that the Jews were not the descendants of ancient Hebrews 
and therefore had no legitimate claim to the Holy Land. He proposed severe curtailing of 
Jewish immigration from Europe to Palestine following the war. He was declared to be 
“an implacable enemy of Hebrew independence” (Zaar, 1954, p. 574. This was not the 
first assassination by the Stern Gang ordered by Shamir. Count Forte Bernadotte who had 
saved thousands from German concentration camps and served as the head of the 
Swedish Red Cross and the mediator between Zionist settlers and Arabs in 1948, was 
ordered killed by Shamir in what was regarded as his being too much in favor of an 
independent Arab state in the three state solution. From the point of the Jewish 
underground resistance actions, it was becoming apparent that the world was looking at 
the Zionists with a more discerning attitude seeing perhaps too colonial and ethnic 
cleansing actions of the Israelis, truly a bitter irony. 
The United Nations, who had proposed the partition plan following the end of the 
British mandate period, passed Security Council Resolution 93 and General Assembly 
Resolution 194 that compelled Israelis to allow Palestinians to return to their homes; 
something not yet realized and has only been ignored and mocked with the continued 
expansion of Israeli settlements even to this day (Hooker, 1999; Pappé, 2006). Even as 
late as 1967 and 1973 prior to the Camp David Accords following Israel’s complete 
occupation of Palestine, the Security Council voted (Resolutions 237, 242, 338) to return 
to the borders of 1967 (prior to the Arab-Israeli war) and allow refugees to return to their 
homes. These were never heeded by the Israeli government. So overt were the actions of 
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the Jews against the Arabs of Palestine that in 1975, the United Nations declared that 
Zionism was a “racist ideology.” That designation has since been repealed but remains to 
be indicative of world opinion (Pappé, 2006).  
The first reading of the documents that establish a Jewish State points to some 
very important conflict triggers relative to cultural dissonance; not only between the two 
principles, but also between the principles and the British whose task was to establish a 
lasting peace through a partitioned agreement (Pappé, 2006). First is the flawed 
assumption by the British that the Jews and Arabs would accede to the intention of the 
plan. Here they display both a complete neglect of the socio-cultural elements of the 
conflict and an attempt to assuage their own guilt born of their own prejudices that placed 
obstacles in the way of pre- and post-holocaust immigration. They are too enabling a 
sense of entitlement exacted by the Zionists coupled to an acceptance of revisionist 
history and at best, vague religious dogma. In addition, the wording of the document, by 
neglecting the human rights of the Arabs, establishes a hierarchy on power not yet 
diminished in today’s current conflicts. 
From this discussion we can begin to see three themes emerging, that the Jews lay 
historic claim to Palestine based on Biblical record, a legal claim that Palestine was never 
under the rule of transferred ownership to Rome and that because of their neglect in 
working the land the indigenous Arab population have no recognized religious, practical 
or legal right to ownership. Parenthetically, during the Camp David Accords, a primary 
consideration in the negotiations was the returning of land to Egypt taken by Israel to the 
pre 1967 war borders; that land acquired through war is not land possessed by the victor 
as outlined in UN Resolution 242 (Appendix C). It is of interest that the Jews’ legal claim 
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to Palestine and subsequently to Egypt, is premised upon a concept that suits their aspired 
purpose based on Roman law, but one that they denied in order to retain the land 
established as belonging to Egypt. 
From our understanding of cognitive and developmental psychology supported by 
the validation of cited neuroscience, this historic backdrop explains future actions by 
Jewish, as well as Arab leaders. The select historical recollections became part of Jewish 
identity and were internalized by generations as normative. Conversely, the image of 
Jewish immigrants as intruders, and their later identity as violent, land grabbing occupiers 
were woven into Arab moral hardwiring, cognitive editing, as well as subsequent political 
outrage. These images, then, become part of the dual cognitive process contributing to the 
use-value of socially manifest symbolic interactions. Theories of secondary deviance 
inform us that those Jews who have over decades of political influence internalized this 
victimhood/agressor identity coupled with a need for self or collective defense that stands 
as part of our human hard-wiring, adopt the character of the victim and predicate their 
decision-making calculus on those role ascriptions. 
Biographies of Principle Actors 
The Necessity of Personal Histories 
This study has posited that all human beings have an evolved cognitive 
machinery that in some respects exhibits what some call a priori knowledge, 
(E.g., the feelings one has when we witness an injustice, the need for community, 
the feelings we have for our own child, etc.). Haidt (2008) and others (Baron-
Cohen, 1991; Casebeer & Churchland, 2003; Cáceda et al., 2011; Cropanzano et 
al., 2003; Forbes & Grafman, 2010) have determined that these “feelings” or as 
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others would have it, “instincts” are what allows us to be human, to be moral. 
Others have maintained that these “moral foundations” are necessary antecedents 
to the formation of cooperative groups and the maintenance of a certain 
productive and defined labor within a social group. Rawls (1971) refers to this as 
the foundation of (moral) justice and the primary binding principle of human 
relationships. Studies in cognitive neuroscience do in fact identify these moral 
centers, not so much as a single locus, but more like a collaboration between 
areas that determine emotion, calculation and social economics.  
This study accepts the presence of this cognitive machinery in support of 
Greene’s assertion that it serves only as a “first edition” of cognitive functioning 
and that much of its facilitative actions remain in the background as unconscious 
behavioral dispositions that influence the conscious part of a dual-process of 
decision-making (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Paxton & Greene, 2010). The editing of 
those predispositions is seen in what we have labeled the use-value of 
environmental symbols, both material and non-material, and will allow the 
conscious portion of the dual process to override the unconscious component.  
The editing itself comprises the evolved system of neural machinery 
coupled with environmental input provided by the individual’s cultural position 
(Bouchard, 2004; Casebeer & Churchland, 2003; Gross, 2010). While the 
integration of consciously realized experience into an unconscious experiential 
library may seem circuitous, it is accepted as normative in the cognitive and 
neurosciences. 
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As we endeavor to understand not simply the process of mediation, which 
by and large is the combination and execution of recognized methodologies and 
the ad hoc creation of mediation methods in often volatile environments by 
practitioners, we must also consider the cognitive processes, most importantly the 
creation and utilization of stakeholders’ use-values that are attached to the 
symbols relevant to that methodology and subsequent interactions between those 
stakeholders; what are their likes and dislikes, what do they hold in higher and 
lesser regard in comparison to their counterparts and might they have an inherent 
but as yet unexplainable dislike for their opponent at a level that would challenge 
the veracity of the mediation event? 
Finally, while in the realm of diplomatic interactions, we investigated how 
stakeholders express themselves through language, as we have established 
through the work of Chomsky, Habermas and others, that language is a reflection 
of the inner self; a representative of the cognitive processes. Structural linguistics 
can indicate a position, something favored, something upsetting to an individual 
and can, through semiotic analysis, be a harbinger of a mediation outcome. 
Indeed, language is purely ego-textual and reveals much of the inner workings of 
emotional use-values put into play while constructing a communicative 
transmission, regardless of its method of expression, spoken or written. 
In order to determine how these behavioral predispositions are established, 
we must go back to the source. We identified major sources of influence on the 
disputant, the mediator and the project, through expressed semiotics and syntax, 
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the potential positions that this person(s) might hold. Through their own 
representations, positions and likely outcomes may emerge. 
To establish a causal relationship between an individual’s experiential history, the 
cognitive editing of pre-dispositional behaviors of biases and observed behaviors, we 
explored the elements that served as the major influences on the subject’s external 
perceptions. In effect, we examined how the individual describes him or herself and the 
environment in which they find themselves by interrogating their own written 
descriptions as writing is decidedly egotextualized. Looking at the subject’s own 
reporting gives us insight into how they defined the symbols resident to their socio-
cultural environment, the use-value of material and non-material interactions and finally 
their perceptions of those interactions relative to a dual process decision-making formula. 
Piaget (1952), Kohlberg (1981), and then Gilligan (1982) have shown that 
the cognitive development of a child is heavily dependent on early influences and 
manifest themselves in adulthood in some form or another. The most efficient 
way to establish or to make sense of these behavioral “editions,” then is to 
examine the experiential history of the individual and then evaluate, through his 
or her own words, the link between childhood influences, major life events and 
the behavior demonstrated through an evaluation of written and spoken 
communication within the frame of conflict.  
The end point was to determine whether or not a stakeholder’s manifest 
behavioral predispositions prejudice their actions during a mediation; are they 
influenced by experiential history in the form of major life events or media 
influences to like or dislike their opponent based on ascribed use-value resultant 
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of a dual cognitive process and how does that impact the outcome of the 
mediation process. We will, for the sake of establishing a basis for 
predispositional assessment, provide biographical histories of each of the 
principle disputants and mediator under examination. 
Menachem Begin 
Menachem Begin was the son of Zeev Dov and Hassia Biegun in the part 
of the Polish Russian Empire that would later be known as Belarus. Notably, 
Begin lived his early life in a rather well educated, middle class family by that 
time’s standards. In terms of socialization, he was also in a rather closed 
environment as members of the Jewish diaspora tended to live in communities 
separated from the other indigent population (Brenner, 2003; Pappé, 2006). Often, 
these communities were relatively prosperous and were an easy target for 
suspicion and persecution by the lesser well-off non-Jewish surrounding 
communities. Therefore, the early editing of his moral machinery was sensitized 
to the more “binding” foundations outlined by Graham et al. (2009) and manifest 
later on in his ideological and political actions. According to Perlmutter (1987), 
Begin came to manhood during a period of high anti-Semitism in Poland, his 
father fanning the identity of victimhood and Eretz Israel. 
This area was known for its population of Talmudic scholars as well as a 
meteoric rise in both religious and political anti-Semitism between 1900 and the 
Second World War. Begin’s mother was descended from a line of revered rabbis 
while his father Zeev was a passionate Zionist and follower of Theodor Herzl. 
Herzl was considered one of the founders of political Zionism that promoted the 
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immigration of European Jews to Palestine in an effort to establish an 
independent Jewish State (Brenner, 2003). 
Ironically, while Begin later followed the influences of the more radical 
revisionist Zionist Ze’ev Jabotinsky, his early influences were more of a Socialist 
Zionist nature. However, even Herzl who early had thought Jewish immigrants to 
Palestine might assimilate indigenous Arabs, later denied their existence in his 
published works, and placed the political necessity of a Jewish homeland around 
the threat of persecution, supporting Begin’s father’s strong influence of Jewish 
victimization (Perlmutter, 1987, p. 176) 
Begin studied traditional (cheder) education for one year. Here, he was 
introduced to a more regimented study of Judaism and (modern) Hebrew. From 
there, his father moved him to a Tachemoni school (a school offering courses 
both in Judaic and general studies) that was closely associated with the Herzl 
Zionist movement. Herzl, having written of the collective anti-Semitism of all 
Jews worldwide, but particularly in Europe, advocated for their immigration to 
either Argentina or their Biblical homeland of Palestine which he was more 
inclined to advocate (Herzl, 2009).  
In his 1895 book Der Judenstaad, Herzl advocated for this mass migration 
to a homeland in order that Jews could freely practice their own religion, culture 
and politics. Young Begin was a member of the Zionist Scouts movement, the 
Hashomer Hatzair which could be compared to the Boy Scouts of America, with 
a touch of Zionist influence: in all, not heavily ideological but focusing more on 
being outdoors, camping and the establishment of social skills. At the age of 
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fourteen, he attended the Polish Government School where he adopted a love of 
classical literature and a proficiency in Latin. 
Dov, Begin’s father, became disillusioned with Herzl’s brand of political 
Zionism. He could not reconcile the fact that Herzl was promoting a Jewish 
immigration and independence to the Biblically defined Jewish Homeland that 
early accommodated Palestine’s resident Arab population while advocating the 
Jews’ assimilation and cooperation. This belied what Dov considered God’s 
proclamation of an independent State for all Jews tainted by an almost palpable 
shade of revenge to vindicate and avenge the Jewish people (Cleveland, 2004). 
He thought it better that his son be influenced toward his father’s thought 
of an independent homogeneous State and found that satisfaction in the writing 
of and thought of Vladimir (his Hebrew name being Ze’ev) Jabotinsky. This may 
have been a bit confusing for young Begin, his father having always promoted 
revisionist Zionism while at the same time hearing the words of Herzl the 
socialist. However, social science has shown that the primary socializer, the 
family, has the greatest influence on children of that time in their moral and 
cognitive development (Kohlberg, 1981; Palmer & Palmer, 2002; Piaget, 1952). 
Also, Begin was inside the protective enclave of a Jewish community, which 
reinforced the victimology of anti-Semitic persecution at play in Europe. 
Jabotinsky and the revisionist ideology forwarded by his father had a more 
significant play in Begin’s world (Kihlstrom, 1987; Margolis, 1987; Nanda & 
Warms, 2011). 
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Jabotinsky was the founder of the more radical Revisionist Zionism whose 
goal was to establish a Jewish Homeland of a homogeneous population that 
would encompass both sides of the Jordan River, “Eretz Israel” (Pappé, 2006). He 
considered this a historical destiny and a Biblical imperative that did not consider 
the presence or situation of the current Arab residents of any value other than an 
impediment to his goal. Revisionist Zionism served as the core of Begin’s 
commitment to Samaria and Judea (Perlmutter, 1987), those areas  of the West 
Bank that were so often utilized in Begin’s political oratory and as a mechanism 
of rejection in the later “land for peace” mediations with Egypt, Jordan and Syria. 
While we examine the activities of Begin during his adulthood, Jabotinsky’s 
ideology clearly stood as the editor and chief of the use-value, moral foundations 
paradigm, focusing more on the group binding foundations than the individual 
ones (Graham et al., 2009). Begin adopted the Revisionist Zionist banner upon 
Jabotinsky’s death. He saw himself, as did Jabotinsky, as a representation of 
group values, philosophy and needs, almost a messianic personality type leading 
the wandering Jews of the Diaspora home (Aronoff, 2014; Perlmutter, 1987).  
In addition to disregarding the resident population of Palestine, 
Jabotinsky’s model provided the impetus for radical Zionists, into which Begin 
evolved, to attack any presence of the British in Palestine and Algeria who were 
perceived as betrayers to the Jews following the White paper of 1939 which 
served to severely restrict Jewish immigration and land purchases in Palestine 
(Hooker, 1999; Zeitlin, 1947). A key factor in the evolution of future radical 
Jewish movements, who took up Jabotinsky’s quest, was his grand admiration for 
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everything military and the power it could provide in imposing one’s manifest 
will on others; a predilection of watching the Russian military power from his 
home. So, at the age of sixteen and at the behest of his father, young Menachem 
Begin joined the youth group Betar, which was the ideological child of his future 
mentor, Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky. 
It would be instructive at this point to point out a difference that will 
become clearer as we discuss the other antagonist in the Arab/Israeli conflict 
under study, Anwar el-Sadat, the future president of Egypt. These two men, 
although radically different in their views concerning the conflict addressed at 
Camp David, both fought to rid their respective areas of what each considered to 
be British colonialism. Both engaged in what would be considered revolutionary 
activities, Sadat through the use of the mainstream, State sponsored Egyptian 
military of which he was an officer, Begin through what was widely considered 
terrorist actions taken up by Irgun after it had split from the State recognized 
Jewish Defense Agency Haganah. 
Begin’s actions were the result of a  break-away, more radical Zionist 
group that David Ben-Gurion, regarded as the founder of the Israeli State, 
demonized and labeled “anti-Israel” Ironically, both Sadat and Begin were 
reacting to a perceived betrayal on the part of the British mandate, the Arabs 
associating this betrayal with the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour 
Declaration.  
However, what is important to distinguish between the two men, are their 
motivations to engage the conflict. Sadat was fighting for his native homeland 
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where he had grown up, where his family had lived for millennia, where his 
grandmother had taught him the importance of the land and the village and where 
Egypt had its history as a world political, economic and cultural leader.  
Begin’s motivation was the mentality of the conqueror of a land he nor his 
ancestors had ever occupied for more than two millennia coupled with a 
messianic complex of leading his people back to the Promised Land. His was 
more of an ideological and victim-based battle defined and fueled by his primary 
socializers. Until his membership in the Polish military, he had never set foot in 
Palestine so there was more of an ancillary as opposed to a visceral pursuit to the 
land. But now it was property to which he felt he (and the Jews) were entitled to 
ideologically, and validated by religiously based assumptions that discounted the 
history of countless political outcomes and nation shaping wars waged there over 
thousands of years Cleveland, 2004).  
The diaspora occurred over two thousand years ago, and the occupation of 
Palestine by the Jews was driven by religious ideology that evolved and morphed 
into political entitlement, not uninterrupted occupation by history. Sadat felt 
betrayed by Egyptian leaders bought off by the British in a time of weakness, a 
lack of faith in their own history. Begin saw the British as an obstacle to his goal 
of acquiring Eretz Israel.  
Already in Begin’s early life we can see that he was destined to be 
reactionary by a culture that promoted first an encouragement of constant 
probative engagement by both his mother’s rabbinical relatives embedded within 
a culture of Talmudic academia, and second a hatred of anti-Semitism that 
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yielded a particular victimology that directly played on his innate moral 
mechanisms. Earlier, it was shown that Talmudic discourse is one of intense 
questioning and logistics easily bridging the gap between being passive and one 
of emotional challenge. The use-values of the symbolism associated with such 
constant bombardment of scholarly discourse are apparent in his speeches, 
correspondence and other writings. 
The identification with a need to flee from an environment framed by 
visceral religious and political anti-Semitism is easily established both culturally 
and through association with Haidt’s moral foundations or simply the ‘instinct’ 
for survival. But perhaps not so much individual survival as group survival. It 
also constructs a rather predictable victimology in unconsciously placing himself 
and others like him in a position of forced minority or out-group status whose 
only recourse is fight or flee (Harré & van Lagenhove, 1999; Kihlstrom, 1987; 
Kubota et al., 2012; Milgram, 1974; Pettigrew, 1971; Robertson et al., 2007). 
In a sense, Begin was primed to receive the influence of Jabotinsky’s 
vision of an independent, homogenous Palestine, whose establishment would 
embrace any methodology for success, political or violent. His early use-values, 
the first editing of his moral machinery had been done in an atmosphere of acute 
inquiry by Begin’s mother and the latent radicalism of his father. Coupled with 
his mentor’s predilection for the use of military force and the motivations of 
religiously based radical nationalism a picture starts to emerge of Begin as a man 
guided by logic on the one hand, and haunted by a certain predation and 
vengeance on the other (Perlmutter, 1987). This serves as a prime example of 
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how experiential history serves as the editor of moral machinery and plays an 
important role in the assignment of use-value to environmental interactions both 
material and non-material. 
In this case, other people become demonized as obstacles to a goal and a 
disregard for certain human rights in that pursuit. While begin struck out mostly 
against non-Jews, the King David Hotel incident showed that generally, human 
rights were not important to him as both Jews and non-Jews were killed in the 
action against the British. During the Camp David Accords, this penchant for 
demonization of the Palestinians and Arabs in general manifested itself numerous 
times both in the general forum and as evidenced in his private conversation s 
with his entourage (Carter, 1982; Dayan, 1981; Wright, 2014). 
Begin studied law at the University of Warsaw while still being active in 
Betar becoming a disciple of its founder Jabotinsky. At University, he honed his 
skills in oratory and rhetoric that became his strength as a successful politician 
and Israeli leader. His style was authoritative coupled with an almost obsessive 
regard for the forms of legal and constitutional process. He was charismatic, 
autocratic and demonstrated a patriarchal style that bordered on a messianic 
personality. He has been referred to by Perlmutter (1987) and Pappé (2006) as a 
“maximalist.” 
Experiencing harsh anti-Semitism on his Warsaw Law School campus, 
Begin organized an opposition group of Jewish students. Never practicing law, 
he achieved a meteoric rise in Betar in a vain attempt to smuggle 1500 Polish 
Jews to Palestine where Herzl had successfully negotiated a process of property 
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acquisition and control through the Jewish-Ottoman Land Company (Brenner, 
2003; Hooker, 1999). 
As a now well-known pre-World War Two Zionist in Poland, Begin was arrested 
and spent time in a Russian Gulag before being released as a Polish citizen by the 1941 
Sikorski–Mayski Agreement following the German non-Aggression Agreement with the 
Soviet Union in 1939. Joining the new Free Polish Army, Begin was later sent to 
Palestine in 1942. As a Polish Jew in Palestine, he was given the choice by his 
commander to return to anti-Semitic Poland to fight the Nazis who had already killed his 
family or to remain in Palestine to help establish a Jewish State (Perlmutter, 1987). Here 
we see more evidence of use-value and victim-shaping that will influence future decision-
making calculi most notably the foundation of liberty/oppression (Graham et al., 2009) 
that leads Begin to a preference for violent action through radicalism and terrorism. 
He remained in Palestine and joined the paramilitary group Irgun, a group 
considered terroristic by critics like David Ben-Gurion, in its violent efforts to establish 
an independent State of Jewish homogeneity. The loss of his family in the horror of the 
holocaust only intensified Begin’s hatred of anti-Semitism and his identity as a victim 
focusing his conscious decision-making in terms of one seeking personal vindication as a 
survivor and a leader radicalized by an ever-perceived hostile environment (Botvinick et 
al., 2001; Bowlby, 1969; Cahill et al., 1995; de Waal, 2008; Gilovich et al., 2010). A land 
of safety and rights was not a desire, it was a Kantian imperative.  
The editing of Begin’s moral machinery was complete and would always be 
reflected in his personal and political life. His morality and subsequent use-value was 
now premised on the foundation of victim and in-group loyalty, a general feeling of 
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paranoia of any out-group member (non-Jew) and to some extent revenge for the murder 
of two of the most important people in his life, his father Dov and his mother Hassia. The 
history of the Jews was now clear to him, one of pogrom and extermination by non-Jews 
that always lurked in the background. The Holocaust served as a potent metaphor for the 
historic and contemporary suffering of Jews worldwide. Begin was destined to assume 
the role of group protector and protagonist demanding at a minimum, loyalty to the 
Jewish and to his cause. 
Begin’s rise in Betar was a fast one. He used it as a platform to challenge the 
dominant Zionist leadership of Ben-Gurion, considering them passive and too tolerant of 
the Arabs and British mandate. He advocated armed resistance to the British presence and 
joined the Jewish underground splinter group Irgun (aka Etzel) in 1942. Irgun was a more 
radical and violent breakaway component in 1931 of the Jewish military organization 
Haganah. Begin led Irgun in 1944 and vowed to have British troops removed from 
Palestine. This was in response to the British blocking the immigration of thousands of 
European Jews to Palestine from the Displaced Persons Camps (DPC) following the 
Holocaust (Pappé, 2006).  
Begin considered this another example of Britain’s pro-Arab policy as well as 
another move towards British colonialism. So, between 1944 and 1948, Irgun undertook 
a violent campaign against the British in an effort to force their withdrawal from Mandate 
Palestine. Begin ordered the bombing of a night club popular with British officers and the 
bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem where 91 people, British, Arab, and 
Jewish, were killed. Being very adept at the use of symbolism, Begin ordered the 
kidnapping of two British Sergeants from Acre prison and hung them publically in 
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retaliation of the execution of several Irgun officials. He publically flogged British 
military personnel in an effort to persuade Jews to take up arms against what he 
considered British occupiers. It was at this point that Sir John Shaw, Britain’s chief of 
security in Palestine, placed a bounty on Begin’s head and declared Irgun a terrorist 
organization. Clearly, Irgun’s motivations ejected any regard for human rights and could 
be a focused reflection of Begin’s predispositions toward the darker side of moral 
maturity and environmentally influenced dual cognition (Haidt, 2008; Haidt & Nosek, 
2012; Mikhail, 2011; Paxton & Greene, 2010). 
The moral guideposts of Begin’s behavior toward out-group members was 
becoming pronounced coupled to predispositions to prevent other Jewish pogroms as 
well as an early fascination of military power like his mentor Jabotinsky (Hooker, 1999; 
Pappé, 2006). When he regarded the more present Arab population as a whole, he 
perceived an amorphous ghost-like enemy waiting for an opportunity to strike. He 
appeared cold, insensitive and paranoid and showed a peculiar indifference to the 
suffering of others (Perlmutter, 1987). Some biographers correctly attribute this to his 
time spent in the Russian Gulags when he was younger and the loss of his family to the 
holocaust. The Jewish community that he grew up in, the Jewish world that he had 
regarded as his home was now all gone. His insularity and aggression is the result of 
these historic experiences.  
A more contemporary example would be his testimony at the hearings on the 
Sabra and Shatila massacre in Lebanon where 3,500 people, mostly Palestinians, were 
killed by the Israeli Defense Forces who were attempting to destroy a suspected PLO 
stronghold. “He took the PLO threat to destroy Israel at face value and ruthlessly, 
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efficiently and methodically undertook to destroy it” (Perlmutter, 1987, p. 56. Begin had 
earlier staged a similar attack on the Palestinian village of Dir Yassin. It was rumored to 
be a staging area for Arab attacks on Jerusalem. This was also regarded by many 
investigators as a massacre and would be referenced later in the Sabra-Shatila 
investigations (Bregman, 2002; Harris, 1996). What is clear in these examples was his 
lack of moral justice when applied to non-Jews, all of who he viewed as a mortal threat to 
Eretz Israel and her citizens. 
It was reported that Begin demonstrated an almost “Business-like” detachment at 
the massacre hearings. Perlmutter (1987) comments that the victims blurred into a single 
Arab body to which Begin was indifferent. If we refer back to the moral machinery 
discussed earlier, we can see a direct association between that demonstrative lack of 
empathy, and the binding foundation of revenge to out-groups (Haidt, 2008). We  
questioned if in fact, in Begin’s mind, the Arabs had taken the place of the Holocaust 
Nazis. This behavior went far beyond other author’s attributing this behavior to 
Revisionist Zionism’s ideology and ironically was deemed by the Kahan Commission in 
1983 as a form of genocide, later to be labeled “racist” by the UN General Assembly 
although that label later repealed. 
This aggression and indifference is a clear indicator of the manifestation of an 
experiential history of victimology as described by Gross (2010) and Mikhail (2011). 
Begin remained actively ignorant of Arab culture and customs; they were not relevant to 
him, that is, they possessed little if any use-value. Later, this same indifference and moral 
self-righteousness, coupled with a certain oratorical and semiotic aggression was 
manifest in his behavior toward President Anwar el-Sadat at Camp David. His primary 
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consistency was the viewing of his Arab neighbors as a significant threat that they posed 
to the State of Israel and an obstacle to the establishment of Eretz Israel. 
Begin’s controversies did not emanate only from the shadowy threat of the 
Palestinian Arabs or the lurking presence of the British. Indeed, a significant 
piece of opposition came from within his own Jewish constituency represented 
by the leader of some of the original settlers, David Ben-Gurion. Ben-Gurion and 
his group were part of the original pioneers who had emigrated to Palestine in the 
early 1900’s and sought to shape the future of the independent Jewish State, but 
under the flag of Socialist Zionism. Begin represented the more radical 
revisionists and was part of the last diaspora population from Europe (Perlmutter, 
1987). 
Ben-Gurion was in stiff opposition to Irgun’s independent agenda and saw 
it as a direct challenge to the representative authority of the Jewish community. 
He denounced Irgun publically as an ‘enemy of the Jewish people,’ and accused 
it of being a direct contributor to failure in the formation of a Jewish State. To 
that end, Ben-Gurion’s Haganah pursued Irgun members, turning them over to 
British authorities during what was titled the “hunting season” (Gilbert, 1998; 
Pappé, 2006).  
Begin, in wanting to prevent a Jewish civil war, instructed his membership 
to not engage in violent resistance to the JDL/Haganah. A similar outcome was 
present with Ben-Gurion’s sinking of the supply ship Atalena, which was 
bringing weapons to Irgun to fight the British and the Palestinian Arabs. Again, 
instead of taking Jewish lives, Begin backed down (Pappé, 2006). 
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Ben-Gurion despised Begin, both personally and ideologically. Even in 
later years when Begin was a member of the Israeli Knesset, Ben-Gurion would 
contemptuously never refer to him by name, only as ‘that other member” (Carter, 
1997; Perlmutter, 1987) Ironically, Begin respected his conflict partner and it 
was said that he often imitated and emulated him in style and politics 
(Perlmutter,1987). But Ben-Gurion was staunchly opposed to the revisionist’s 
methods, tainting their credibility with the pallor of terrorism and murder. This 
merely adds to Begin’s perceived isolation and victimology, the foundations of 
his sense of self (Gross, 2010). Indeed, Begin was a man haunted by the past, a 
past that quite manifestly defined his future and the future of Israel. 
Anwar Sadat 
“I learned something that stayed with me the rest of my life; that wherever I go, 
wherever I happen to be, I shall always know where I am. I can never lose my 
way because I know that I have living roots there, deep down in the soil of my 
village, in that land in which I grew, like the trees and the plants.” (Anwar al-
Sadat, 1981, p. 6). 
In developing a “mediation profile” of Anwar Sadat we paid close attention to 
how he described his perceptions of those elements prominent in the historical epoch that 
contextualized his early life. Is there a “tone” to his writing, can we identify any sort of 
emotion that is attached to his narrative generally or with regards to specific themes, how 
he responds to obstacles or support manifest in human interactions, ideologies or 
historical events.  
We have already described the early stages of cognitive and moral development in 
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keeping with Piaget and Kohlberg (1969), and how the phenomenon encountered through 
social interactions prove a significant impact on adult behavior, r.e., the editing of innate 
interactional capacities leading to identifiable behavioral predispositions. But to review, 
Greene, Churchland and others would describe this early influence as the evolution and 
editing of a cognitive foundation for dual process decision-making and lends significant 
validation to the notion of symbolic use-value. With those things in mind, we turn to 
Anwar Sadat. 
Sadat was born in 1918, one of 13 children in the small Egyptian village of Mit 
Abul-Kum, close to the much larger urban center of Cairo and situated along the Nile 
River considered by many historians as the cradle of life. Sadat entered the world during 
a time of British occupation and colonialism in Egypt. His country had sold the 
navigation and mooring rights along the Suez Canal to the British in an attempt to 
mitigate its significant debt (Brenner, 2003). The controlling of this primary source of 
commerce allowed the British to exact significant political control over the region, 
resulting in Egypt being considered by its occupiers, a British colony which for the most 
part followed the traditional British rule by military occupation. As will be discussed 
below, it was the presence of “these aliens with bulging eyes and red faces,” (Sadat, 
1978, p. 9) that provided a focus and eventual metaphor of Sadat’s hatred for anyone who 
came to “his” country in order to control “his land” or humiliate “his people.”  
Sadat’s use of the possessive reveals a significant piece of his personality. Sadat 
considered himself, as described by Zahid Mahmood (1985), a father to the Egyptian 
people and the conservator of Egypt itself. In effect, Sadat believed he was Egypt, its 
father and protector, of its land and the people that lived there and the designate to deliver 
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his people from the current occupiers and all future interlopers. The descriptors in this 
brief abstract using Sadat’s own words gives important clues to his predispositions 
relative to the British at that time, and his future regard for Israel’s occupation of the 
Sinai.  
In his written autobiography, Sadat (1978a) demonstrates the psycho-social 
foundations that lead to this messianic like attitude, a man whose very essence is 
intimately linked to the land and to its history, his sacred mission to return Egypt to its 
historic prominence in a post-modern world and a more than personal relationship with, 
justification from and an almost representational relationship with God. 
Sadat paints an intimate picture of a ‘small dark boy, barefooted and wearing a 
long Arab dress over a white calico shirt, my eyes fixed on the jar of delicious treacle” 
(1978a, p. 10). He was referring to a treat brought to him by his grandmother, who was 
one of the most important influences in his young life. She was a storyteller, and nightly 
engaged the young Sadat in the oral history of his family and of Egypt. His grandmother 
instilled in the future president a love of knowledge, history, of the land and his important 
connection to it. While his Grandmother was illiterate, he considered her a well-spring of 
knowledge and insight, a person everyone in the village respected and sought out for 
information, advice and care.  
The use of language to describe his feelings for her only served as a measurable 
variable to validate what the tone of kindness, love and respect already depicted. This 
becomes a common thread in Sadat’s writing. There is no difficulty in identifying which 
emotion he is feeling. He proves himself a skilled and gifted storyteller whose flourish 
for vivid emotional description becomes quickly evident to a reader. The same can be 
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said of watching any one of Sadat’s (1978b) speeches regardless of the venue. His tones, 
his inflections, his body language all demonstrate the intensity and theme of his inner 
thought. This author, in listening to hours of Sadat’s speeches, developed a sense of 
subjective evaluation, sensing whenever there was an inner conflict between what the 
president was feeling and what he was saying. I came to know certain “tells” he had 
when delivering political messages to his people and to other political audiences. While 
difficult to quantify, it does warrant parenthetical mention relative to the cognitive 
evaluation we give to every speaker we encounter. 
The village was a metaphor that described Egypt as a whole, its land, its value 
system and its people. When Sadat (1978b) spoke of his village, he spoke of the place 
that made him happy, taught him about the value of hard work and volunteerism common 
to most everyone there and that the work of a good man is his duty in pursuance of the 
common good for the village. He describes working with the village men bringing water 
to the fields, moving from field to field using an Archimedean screw to raise water from 
the canal to the crops without a thought from anyone of reward, only of increased 
production and happiness for the entire village who benefited from their collective labor. 
Indeed, the presence of a mechanical solidarity (Durkheim, 1982) was in abundant 
evidence.  
Everything in the village made me ineffably happy: going out to get carrots, not 
from the Green grocer but from the land itself. …our boyish games in the village 
by moonlight…and the entertainment that took place on a rustic open stage in the 
heart of the land with nature all around us and the bare sky above. (Sadat, 1981, p. 
10). 
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This collective labor made young Sadat (1982) feel as though he was a part of 
something greater than the village proper, it made him feel a part of the land, something 
he considered more significant, grander, vaster, greater than one’s self. This sentiment 
provides a key to his possessiveness with anything having to do with Egypt and the 
concept of family which clearly transcends what westerners would regard as the 
functional definition. It also serves as a potent element in the development of his moral 
foundations. 
 He would recall that he could often hear the voice of his grandmother in his 
adulthood, echoes that became almost audible telling him that nothing was as important 
as his being a child of this land. She considered it the harbor of creation (Sadat, 1978a, 
1978b). Indeed, how often have we heard the voice of someone in our past guiding us, 
teaching us or warning us to an action or inaction, or our “inner voice” directing us to a 
feeling? Indeed, our brain’s manifestation of pattern recognition can take on many faces. 
Science would tell us that these “voices” are merely the reassembling of pieces of 
memories into a cogent recognizable thought as opposed to someone in absence or our 
“alter-ego” attempting to communicate with us directly (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Bashkow, 
2004). 
To Sadat, the land and everything that came from it, lived upon it or could be 
gained from it, was provided by God. This included the language he used to describe 
God’s gifts. Many of his phrases are “matter-of-fact,” and bore no place for questioning. 
God had said, through the Holy Koran, everything that needed to be said. Man’s purpose 
was merely to communicate it to those that had not yet heard its guidance or its innate 
beauty. This supports the notion discussed earlier that an Arab speaker sees no benefit to 
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empirical inquiry relative to the state of affairs. So questioning or linguistic structures as 
used by Begin, would be considered pointless and almost nonsensical, and at some point 
blasphemous. God’s plan is God’s plan and is immutable.  
This distinct contrast to Judaic inquiry thought to be encouraged by the Talmud 
and the patterns of Modern Hebrew that emerged from that premise are quite 
cacophonous to an Arab listener. From a young age then, Sadat knew that two knowing 
adults could settle great conflicts, if only placed within this presumed contextual 
understanding shown through God’s language, Arabic and the Holy Koran. 
That big shady tree was made by God. He decreed it and it came into being. These 
fresh green plants whose seeds that we ourselves had sown, could never had been 
there if God had not decreed it. This land on which I walked, this running water in 
the canal, indeed everything around me was made and overseen by God, a vast 
and mighty being that takes care of all, including me. (Sadat, 1981, p. 8). 
But God had a way of challenging humankind by providing obstacles that had to 
be overcome. Sadat the child learned this obstacle was called the British and conceivably 
applied this early edited version of justice and in-group identification to the Israeli Prime 
Minister. 
Sadat’s grandmother informed her grandson of British colonialism from the time 
he was old enough to listen to her stories. As she was his primary caregiver during the 
frequent absences of his revered father during war and work, a man referred to by the 
village as “effendi,” or “headman,” due to his heroism and education, she would tell him 
stories of the evil the British had exacted upon the Egyptian people. She told him of the 
abuse perpetrated on his people for resisting British rule and painted them as “odious, 
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tomato skinned aliens with bulging eyes” (Sadat, 1978a, p. 9). Later, Sadat would 
describe the British in the same way, not fearing them, but simply hating them and 
knowing that if this ‘ugly alien’ ever entered his village, “he could never take a step” (p. 
9). 
Sadat’s hatred of the British at an early age was evident, and fanned by the stories 
of his grandmother. It is not a great conceptual leap to see the British as a generic term 
for occupier, with its eventual application to the Israeli occupation of the Sinai. These 
occupiers were in effect, trying to remove a visceral part of Sadat’s essence; the land he 
described as being a part of him, to run through his veins like blood. In the descriptions 
of his early life, we can see clear parallels to his attitudes toward anyone taking 
possession of something he considered sacred, and something that was a part of him, and 
he a part of it. He knew that fighting against the British occupation was dealt harshly by 
them, and his Grandmother recited the ballads of Mustafa Kamil, an Egyptian dissident 
and political leader who was poisoned by the British. Sadat universalized this crime to 
project the offense as having been committed against all Egyptians. Sadat (1978b) said, 
“I knew only, at that young age, that there were forces called the British that were alien to 
us, and they were evil because they poisoned people” (p. 5). 
Coming from this travesty of occupation and abuse were Sadat’s heroes who 
would influence his decision-making processes well into political adulthood, and were 
often referred to his autobiography as part of his decision-making formulae. All four of 
Sadat’s champions, his moral editors, had one thing in common, a rabid disaffection for 
outsiders occupying or attempting to occupy their land; to take something away from his 
people that was part of them, part of God’s grand design, something that was equivalent 
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to their entire cultural history. Historically, practically and as destined by God, this was 
their land in perpetuity; something supported by Islamic law (Irani, 2000; Kamrava, 
2011). 
His grandmother paid particular homage to a man named Zahran whose ballad she 
recited nightly to the young Sadat. In Zahran’s hometown of Denshway, British soldiers 
ignited a fire while randomly shooting at birds injuring several villagers. The villagers 
went after the soldiers who were responsible for the loss of property and the injuries 
killing one of them accidently. Those who were accused of the killing of the soldier were 
summarily executed or put into prison for extended sentences by the British military with 
the collusion of the resident Egyptian legal system. This was all done without a proper 
trial in accordance with Egyptian law, but more for the patronizing of the occupiers.  
One of those to be executed, Zahran, refused to plead for his life. He went to the 
Gallows with his head held high in defiance of the British occupiers and in contempt for 
the Egyptians who had cooperated in his sentence. Sadat felt that Zahran felt “superior, 
since he possessed the most powerful and effective weapon; rejection of anyone or 
anything who sought to humiliate him or his people” (Sadat, 1978b, p. 5). He did not 
limit the presence of the British and their barbarity to any geography. Indeed, he blamed 
those Egyptians who participated in the ‘trial’ of his hero, Zahran, as British collaborators 
and no better than their overlords.  
Here we see a distinct demonstration of Sadat’s expression of betrayal and his 
zero-sum response to it. Also, he associates humiliation to outside actors, never people of 
kind. His grandmother’s stories supported Sadat’s view of humility, bravery, and 
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sacrifice all directed toward the preservation of the village and of the land upon which it 
sat, placed there ultimately by God. 
Sadat (1978b) said later that he revered Zahran and wanted to be Zahran. In many 
references in his autobiography, Sadat reflected that he felt in many ways, that the image 
of Zahran guided him in his zeal to challenge and destroy anyone who invaded his 
country. He hoped that someday, a ballad similar to Zahran’s would be sung about Sadat 
and his protection of his family, his village, his country.  
Sadat’s other heroes included Kemel Ataturk, who challenged the Ottoman 
Empire in establishing the modern state of Turkey. He was instrumental in thwarting 
colonialism and establishing admired civil service reforms. Mohandas Gandhi 
represented the symbol of justice and its attainment in a non-violent manner. Most 
important was Gandhi’s dedication to justice and how it served as the foundational 
definition, or ideal type that Sadat aspired to in his political actions. He so admired 
Gandhi that he adopted his persona when he was a young man, wearing his clothing and 
meditating on a pallet atop the roof of his home (Mahmood, 1985).  
An avid reader, Sadat emulated Napoleon Bonaparte while he was in exile in St. 
Helena. The tale was told of the British officer who was in charge of Napoleon, having 
the doors of the little general’s house made shorter so that he would be forced to bend 
down, to lower his head every time he transited to another room where a picture of the 
King was hung, effectively making him bow and thus be humiliated in the presence of the 
British King. Like Zahran, Napoleon refused to lower his head and twisted his body 
through the door in a way such that he would be able to keep his head held high. While 
professed to be an “old wives’ tale,” Sadat focused on the refusal to submit to unjust 
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authority, a clear association to Haidt’s Fairness/Cheating foundation (Haidt, 2012). 
Finally, Sadat admired Adolf Hitler, but only in so much as he posed a definite 
threat to British authority and colonialism everywhere (he stresses that point in an effort 
not to appear in any way supportive of Hitler’s extermination of the Jews). But in 
retrospect, if this was demonstrated in the security briefings given to Begin before ever 
meeting with Sadat, this direct association with the Holocaust probably served as a 
significant trigger in Begin’s predisposition of dislike toward the Egyptian president. 
Sadat makes the point that through his grandmother’s stories, he had learned already to 
despise the British at a very young age, even before he had ever seen one. “I can say that 
a certain feeling had struck root in me by the time I left school, a hatred of all aggressors 
and a love and admiration for anyone trying to liberate his land” (Sadat, 1978a, p. 15). 
At a very early age, before any of his formal schooling, Sadat (1978a) had 
determined that he would be the one who would destroy the British and deliver the 
people from their rule. The key word in this thought is “deliver,” which will give a clue 
to the origins of a messianic personality evolving and being edited in Anwar Sadat. He 
wished to be the living manifestation of heroism in the Egyptian mind, “…particularly 
was that this hero was a powerful enemy of the British…the people who occupied our 
land and whose presence we resisted in every possible way” (p. 27). 
While desiring to eliminate the British threat and occupation, Sadat looked for a 
method in which to do it. He was well aware that Gandhi’s methods, while admirable, 
only provided the moral justification for what had to be done. Looking for a way that 
would assure the execution of justice this he returned to one of his childhood heroes, 
Kamel Ataturk, the man who liberated and rebuilt his country. Sadat (1978b) says that he 
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first admired Ataturk’s uniform in that it symbolized a common thought and something 
that would stand out among the people identifying his as commonly recognized leader, a 
reference to the commonality, and mechanical solidarity of the village. He also knew that 
Ataturk could not have planned nor executed his revolution, or have even considered his 
plan, had he not had a strong military. A certain irony is shown here in comparing Sadat 
and Begin, as Begin’s mentor and hero, Jabotinsky (Shlaim, 2014), was also enamored of 
the military that served as not only a symbol of righteous and moral power, but a tool for 
Israeli security, a theme repeated again and again at Camp David. 
These experiences, Sadat’s socio-cultural history, serve as a foundation in the 
explanation of the path he chose, the way in which he reacted to threats to himself and to 
his country either directly or symbolically. Upon joining the military he began a 
revolutionary group of officers that culminated in the ousting of the British from Egypt. 
A key participant in this was Gamal Abdel Nasser, later the president who appointed 
Sadat his Vice President who would then succeed him upon Nasser’s death. An important 
point to be made is that, unlike Begin who led a non-State sanctioned resistance group, 
Sadat established a group within the legitimate parameters of a State agency who was 
being burdened with out-group personnel and rules, (i.e., the British).  
 As president it was observed that Sadat behaved like the village headman, a 
position to which all young Egyptian boys aspired. Sadat was now the headman of Egypt 
(Perlmutter, 1982) and in this role, he had come to expect other village headmen, such as 
Begin in Israel, to speak to one another in a certain regard and be able to logically settle 
disagreements between themselves without the intrusion of others. He would also expect, 
in the tradition of Arab social traditions that if something was offered to another 
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headman, that something would be expected in return and in kind from his counterpart. 
This behavior will be seen repeatedly within the context of the Camp David Accords. 
Jimmy Carter 
James Earl “Jimmy” Carter was born October 1, 1924 in the midst of the 
depression. His home was one of minimalist simplicity. In the Carter house, washing 
was done in a large iron pot and two fireplaces were used for heat, sometimes for 
cooking. One cannot help but to already draw a parallel between Carter’s humble 
beginnings and those of Anwar Sadat who relished his simple village home while 
hearing stories told as he lounged over the “old wood heater” (Carter, 2001, p. 32).  
Carter lived in the ultra-segregationist rural Georgia in a town that had as its 
residents 25 black families and very few white families with whom the Carters had 
little contact. Illiteracy was rampant among the black families as they were denied an 
education in white schools. This hierarchy of resources was supplemented by an 
attitude of intimidation of the blacks by the whites, an attitude supported by business, 
government and many clergy. From an early age, by Carter’s own admission he 
recognized the injustices being directed towards a certain population group similar to 
how Sadat described the injustices meted out by the British on his village family 
(Bourne, 1997).  
True, these abuses of justice were particular to the politics and geography of 
the period experienced, however as Boehm (1999) reminds us, the innate cognitive 
machinery of the brain does not early recognize politics or geography, only 
interactions resident to its own directly perceived environment. Still, while Sadat 
made a designation of his people, this is a manifestation of his conscious cultural 
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use-value in conjunction with the foundation of moral justice inherent to his 
unconscious cognition (Rawls, 1971; Tancredi, 2010). Carter, made these 
associations because of who served as his primary socializers when he was a child, 
thus establishing parallel use-values of human rights, truth, equality and empathy. 
Jimmy’s father, Earl Carter employed many of the black families in the town 
and provided rent free housing for those working on the farm or working in the 
warehouse. While maintaining an air of the common segregationist attitude, 
something necessary for political and business survival of the time, Earl leaned more 
toward the liberal outlook of his wife Lillian, both being discussed below (Bourne, 
1997; Carter, 1982). 
Jimmy’s early life, or in the parlance of Kohlberg (1971), Piaget (1952) and 
others the “early stages of his moral development,” was formed inside an 
environment where the influence of black individuals far outweighed others. His 
mother, who was a retired army nurse, continued to provide medical care to all 
families in the area, mostly black. To care for young Jimmy, Lillian hired Annie Mae 
Hollis, a 13 year old black girl who cared for the children and worked for the family 
for over 21 years. According to Carter (2001), Annie was frequently in trouble with 
the law for minor infractions, all punishable by jail, and was always eager to speak of 
her injustices to the young boy. 
A significant influence in young Carter’s life was a black woman named 
Rachael Clark, the wife of Earl’s field hand. Jimmy described her as having a royal 
grace and with a “queen-like” demeanor. She cleaned the Carter home, but would 
take care of Jimmy when the need arose. When his parents were gone for any length 
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of time, Jimmy would stay at the Clark home, a “ramshackle” house near the farm. 
Jimmy described Rachael Clark as his “second mother” (Bourne, 1997), who taught 
him how to fish and most importantly that it was a man’s responsibility to nurture the 
land. It would not be a large leap of concept to insinuate the shadow of Sadat’s 
grandmother who taught the future president the same lesson. This appreciation and 
love for the land grew in young Carter under the influence of other major players in 
his early cognitive development. 
Jimmy’s father Earl Carter was described as being energetic, the hardest working 
man in town, and an aggressive business man with a constant smile, something later 
emblematic of the Carter presidency. Many saw him also as shy and withdrawn whose 
outgoing personality masked a desperate need to be liked by everyone; a characteristic 
that would also be said to avail itself in the future president. His children saw their father 
as serious, self-disciplined and working from sun up to sun down. In his autobiography, 
Carter several times referred to his father as “the hardest working man on the farm.” 
While active in local politics and retail supply, Earl’s greatest passion was for the land 
(Carter, 1997). He considered the land God’s source of all things good and passed this on 
to his son in philosophy and actions, a direct parallel to the Sadat perception. 
In this time of depression era ultra-segregation, Earl Carter was a man of 
contradictions. His role in local business and politics demanded an outward personage of 
prejudice toward the black population yet he would provide the ancillary costs of 
healthcare unaffordable to his wife’s black patients for medicine and health supplies. He 
was frugal and bought nothing on credit giving him the resource of ready cash, something 
few had at the time. However, when he heard of someone in extreme financial need, he 
109 
 
would (anonymously) provide money to help, regardless of the color of their skin. To 
avoid being identified as the benefactor for the purpose of racial politics or altruism, Earl 
would always use a trusted intermediary. Nobody ever knew where the assistance came 
from. At his passing, Earl forgave thousands of dollars in personal debt to the dismay of 
some family members (Bourne, 1997; Carter, 1997). 
He was a man who did not like risking upsetting people and wanted to be liked. 
But in this era of clear lines of racial separation, Earl, in addition to providing free rent to 
the farm workers, also hosted a huge barbeque every fourth of July for his workers and 
their families usually totaling more than 400 people and would place his radio in the 
window of his home during the Joe Lewis versus Max Schmeling heavy-weight title fight 
so many of his 260 black workers could listen (Bourne, 1997). 
A devout Baptist and Secretary of his local church, Earl defiantly took his family 
to the movies on Sunday after the clergy determined that this was prohibited. He 
supported the racist views of others in the community, but was tolerant if not supportive 
of Lillian’s more liberal, egalitarian views. When Jimmy got older, his father put him in 
the fields working side by side with the black help picking cotton, something rarely done 
in the segregationist south and provided another editing force in the future president’s 
cognition (Carter, 2001). 
Jimmy’s father was well known in town running a large farm and peanut 
warehouse. He was involved in the insurance business and various real estate endeavors 
but most important to him and his family, although sometimes controversial, always 
highly regarded and honest. Jimmy was identified with his father and appreciative of that. 
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He was proud of his Dad and like Sadat’s effendi father, regarded often as the headman 
of his community to whom others would seek out for help and counsel (Sadat, 1978a).  
To his children Earl passed on the importance of discipline and respect for 
authority. He was a purveyor of truth and would fast punish anyone he revealed as a liar. 
His wife Lillian said, “He hated a liar. He’d whip for lying faster than anything else,” 
(Bourne, 1997, p. 45). This attitude clearly served to establish an early editing of young 
Jimmy’s moral machinery. Jimmy would later say that, “my father was a very firm but 
understanding director of my life and habits” (Bourne, 1997, p. 34). It is clear that this 
moral foundation of betrayal plays an important role of Carter’s feelings toward his 
stakeholders in the Camp David Accords (Carter, 2010; Zelizer, 2010). As will be shown 
below, he often saw Sadat as an “honorable and honest man,” yet Begin often through his 
actions of establishing new settlements or changing his statements opportunistically 
during the Camp David negotiations, demonstrated a perceived betrayal that would 
inflame Carter as President in Begin’s unspoken but clearly described actions of a liar. 
Since his mother was absent frequently during his early years on her regional 
nursing rounds, Jimmy’s father served as the primary source of emotional support. The 
boy would wake up at night when his mother was gone and often sneak into bed to sleep 
with his father. But Earl’s affection came at the price of hard work and strict discipline to 
labor, business and moral control. After all, President Carter would often state that 
despite his strict adherence to truth and hard work, he “was always my best friend.” 
Ironically, Carter grew up obedient to authority, but at the same time resentful of it 
(Bourne, 1997). This would reveal itself often during his years as a cadet at the U.S. 
111 
 
Naval Academy in Annapolis and again during his later presidency and his interactions 
with Congress (Carter, 2010). 
Jimmy’s mother Lillian showed a level of independence unusual for a woman of 
that time. Her deep concern for the black families was at some degree forgiven as a 
legitimate act of Christian charity, but on the other frowned upon by the resident whites. 
Clearly, she was unafraid of controversy and like Earl, instilled that in her son. Coupled 
with her husband’s quiet philanthropy, their acts of brave volunteerism would be 
emulated and shape their son’s moral philosophy (Bourne, 1997). She was a great reader 
and consumed academia as one would food and passed this love of learning on to her son 
as well, something he was noted for during his presidency; researching each topic of 
governance more than anyone else (Carter, 1997, 2010). His administration said of him 
as Plains had said of his father Earl, “He was the most hard-working of us all” (Quandt, 
1986a). 
That tenacity for knowledge was honed by his teacher, Julia Coleman. She was 
described by Carter as a woman of commanding presence with an air of academic 
aristocracy. She was once invited to tea with Eleanor Roosevelt in recognition of her 
teaching as the Plains school outperformed all others in the regions, no small feat in the 
deep south of the time. Her mantra was “readers make leaders,” proven by her star 
student’s acceptance to the U.S. Naval Academy and eventual presidency (Bourne, 1997; 
Carter, 1997, 2010). 
Miss Coleman incorporated the memorization of Bible verses as representative of 
her sense of responsibility for grounding her students’ philosophical foundations in 
Christian values, something important is establishing young Carter’s moral editing and 
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use-value as it was in young Sadat and Begin as well; the force of religious symbolism. 
Carter has said that the relationship he had with his teacher was at least as important in 
shaping his moral foundations as was with his parents (Carter, 1997, 2010). We could 
draw similar conclusions in interrogating the Sadat autobiography where he attests to the 
same importance to his Grandmother in her teaching him through stories, ballads and the 
memorizing of the Holy Koran. 
Carter’s teacher had him memorize I Corinthians as an exercise in building a 
moral philosophy which focused on selfless love, the central pillar of the Christian faith. 
It was here that Carter recognizes the value and worth of his parents’ acts of philanthropy 
and volunteerism that he had witnessed his entire early life (Carter, 1997). Those acts 
now took on a religious symbolism and high use-value that stuck with him the rest of his 
life and that he admits shaped his perception of the world as it could be. 
Building upon that foundation, and recognizing Carter as an avid reader yet a shy 
student, Coleman enlisted the future president into the school debate club where he 
learned the value of research, preparation and presentation. He most notably learned to 
firmly articulate his positions in the face of conflict during those debate matches. It was 
in this environment that Jimmy overcame his natural shyness and perfected the projection 
of calm during conflict to his repertoire (Carter, 1997).  
One of young Carter’s favorite books was one assigned by his Miss Coleman, 
Tolstoy’s “War and Peace.” It showed him “that the course of human events, even great 
historical ones, is determined ultimately not by the leaders, but by the common ordinary 
people. Their hopes and dreams, their doubts and fears, their courage and tenacity, their 
quiet commitments to determine the destiny of the world” (Carter, 1997, p. 174). This 
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would leave the imprint in the way that Jimmy Carter the president of the United States 
would see the relationship between the government and the people. It no doubt guided 
him toward the topic of his high school commencement speech he presented at the behest 
of his teacher, Miss Coleman, “The Building of a Community.”  
Clearly, many parallels of experiences in the early lives of the future presidents 
Carter and Sadat can be drawn, particularly with respect to the socio-environmental 
context that provided symbolic use-value to their perception of the world. In this last 
section describing Carter, an even stronger association can be drawn between the two 
men. Specifically, their path toward attending respective military academies that would 
not only highlight their personal moral underpinnings, but also serve as a harbinger of 
their future performance in respective political arenas, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict 
at Camp David. 
At a very early age, Carter had decided that he wanted to attend the U.S. Naval 
Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. Similar to the case of Sadat’s pursuit of admittance 
into the Egyptian military Academy, both required a political appointment. Both of the 
men’s fathers, with some tenacity, secured those appointments, although with a deferred 
start-date of about a year. During that year, they both attended other colleges that would 
aid in their Academy studies. Carter, was always at the top of his class during that interim 
period and finished in the top 5% of the academy class. Here however, their histories 
diverge somewhat, as Sadat becomes involved with a group of officers in the Academy 
who wish to rebel against British colonialism and Carter goes on to become a respected 
officer and nuclear engineer in uncontested service to his country. 
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Acquiescing to the discipline of the Navy, Carter the plebe suffered at the hands 
of his upper classmen (a hazing tradition in military academies) but dealt with the conflict 
quietly and internalized his anger and feelings of injustice (Bourne, 1997). His sensitivity 
to injustice was well developed early in life as he witnessed the ultra-segregationalism of 
the Deep South. Similar to the concepts used by John Rawls in his “A Theory of Justice” 
(1971), Carter based his perception on the equal distribution of social capital such as 
education and access to a “healthy life,” and an opportunity for relevant employment. 
He had at an early age seen the injustice of ultra-segregationalism toward blacks 
in the South who had played a significant part in his growing up invoking the names of 
Annie Hollis and Rachael Clark or his best friend as a child, A.D. Carter has written 
extensively on the feelings of anger and moral outrage this caused him in his 
autobiography (1997, 2010); something we will see indicative of his interactions later 
during the Camp David Accord. These feelings should not be confused with the often 
cited presumption of a Southern boy in the USNA Yankee environment. In reality, at the 
time of his attendance, US military academies were often populated by Southern men in 
the majority. Even though he was shielded from the desperate ravages of the depression 
by his father’s relative success and business sense, he was still witness to its horrors and 
this served as a moral delineator in his future interactions. 
But we must ask; did the young cadet perceive a deeper sense of injustice than 
would his mostly privileged white classmates, and would this cause him to act in the way 
he did towards his inner and external conflicts? Consider, at the early stages of his “moral 
editing,” his primary social influences were Southern Blacks, one of which he considered 
his best friend, and another he considered his second mother, who by all estimates spent 
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more time with him than his mother Lillian while she controversially provided primary 
health care to underserved black families throughout the region. These people most loved 
and admired by Carter, were also subject to the prejudice and injustices prevalent at the 
time, all of which was observed by or related to Carter through constant contact. 
He was taught to fish and to appreciate the land and his “village” family by black 
socializers and witnessed at some level a part of his father’s necessity to politically 
cooperate with white segregationists, although not being a direct participant. While at the 
academy, he would respond to the abuse of the upper classman first by smiling at those 
he perceived to be larger and more powerful than he was; something learned by Annie 
Hollis and her stories of her own coping mechanisms. Failing to realize a solution, after a 
period of time he used the tactic of being invisible and anonymous, something social 
psychologists attribute the survival methodology of someone feeling weaker and 
impotent in the face of conflict and overwhelming domination. Bourne (1997) describes 
Carter as “an introvert and a loner” (p. 165), again a method used by southern blacks that 
has been widely examined by social scientists and depicted countless times in the media. 
Another interesting parallel can be made between Carter and Sadat that predicts 
their future relationship. Carter is described as being secure in his identity he did not 
make close friendships at the academy. Sadat was described as having the same character 
(Charles River Editors, 2014). The reasons for this are the ones that are most intriguing. 
Carter’s identity, he writes, is rooted in his “family” in Plains. “The way he carried 
himself was devout, in the alien environment of the Naval Academy represented a piece 
of his home environment that he would rely on for his emotional support (Carter, 1997). 
The similarity between the two men can be summarized in Sadat’s own words, “…I knew 
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that wherever I am, I am never lost because my roots are in the village and my family 
there,” (Sadat, 1978, p. 12).  
Parenthetically, after leaving the Navy, Carter and his wife Rosalyn returned to 
his home village of Plains and instead of living in his parents modest but comparatively 
well-appointed home, he moved his family into public housing, surrounded by those 
persecuted and lacking in social capital as he had seen and lived as a child with his earlier 
moral editing and experiential history. Much to the displeasure of his new wife, in this 
environment of poverty and asymmetric justice Carter said to Rosalyn, “we are home!” 
(Carter, 1997). 
Carter’s self-imposed isolation allowed him to pursue those lessons learned from 
his mother Lillian and his teacher Miss Coleman, to read extensively, the mastery of 
every subject as it presents itself and to be precise in its execution. This would emerge as 
a major descriptor of Carter’s personality at the academy and later as President. These 
would both become an asset and a liability. 
His focus and mastery of engineering by constant study attracted the attention of 
another major personality in his life, Admiral Hyman Rickover, father of the naval 
nuclear submarine program. Like Begin’s relationship with Jabotinsky and Ben-Gurion, 
Carter had relatively little direct interaction with Rickover who was described as having 
influence in his life almost as much as his parents. Carter compared Rickover to his 
father, “he scared me. He demanded everyone be as he was, hardworking and competent. 
I feared and respected him….no comment was his greatest compliment” (Carter, 1997, p. 
142). 
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In his interview with Rickover, perhaps one of the greater influences on Carter’s 
philosophical development, his moral coding, or at the least an extension of what he had 
learned from his teacher Miss Coleman, was revealed. Carter finished in the top one 
percent of his graduating class at Annapolis (Carter, 1997). The admiral asked him if he 
had done his best. Carter thought for a moment and answered, “No sir. I could have done 
better.” The interview was over, but Carter was accepted into the nuclear program with 
Rickover his direct report. From Rickover, he gained insight into what was truly 
important in organizational development, being surrounded by dedicated experts who 
shared his vision and personal morality, rather than trying to build an organizational 
legacy; it was the goal, not the glory. Carter made this philosophy of Rickover his own 
(Carter, 1997). 
Mediation 
The theme of this research centers on the observed behaviors of conflict 
stakeholders participating in the 1978 Camp David Accords. Specifically, it examines the 
behaviors of Carter, Sadat and Begin positing that socio-cultural influences during early 
socialization impacted innate cognitive decision-making processes that may have 
influenced both their perceptions of the conflict itself and of each other, thus impacting 
the mediation outcome. Understanding those processes within the frame of a mediation 
event then is key to demonstrating these proposed predispositional behaviors and the 
importance of their behavior-forming antecedents.  
The functional definition of mediation is one that describes a non-coercive 
intervention between two or more disputants by a neutral third party. Its purpose is to 
effect a resolution to a dispute acceptable to each stakeholder. In theory, the mediator 
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does not and should not promise rewards to one or the other disputant, threaten 
punishments or take sides with either disputant, which distinguishes mediation from 
conflict management. In addition, mediation is not exclusive and may involve other 
conflict resolution methods after all mediation attempts have been exhausted. However, 
the driving force behind mediation is its open-endedness toward the goal of resolution 
(Rifkin et al., 1991).  
Mediation offers disputants the best alternative to elevated conflict that could be 
costly in materials and human capital. As either an opening probative process to conflict 
management or as an independent process to discovering a conflict resolution agreement 
without imposing external power through coercion or other means (Regan, 1996). As a 
process, it is voluntary in that disputants, aside from requesting the mediation, can choose 
to participate or not without suffering significant circumstances inherent to the conflict 
itself (Bercovitch, 2002a).  
Mediation is more a process of communication in which people involved in a 
dispute reach a mutually agreed upon understanding, reconciliation or agreement using 
the third party mediator as the guide through which to traverse the conflict labyrinth. A 
historic trip through the literature shows mediation to be one of the oldest and most 
common tools in conflict resolution as relates to international conflicts (Bercovitch, 
2002b). In some cultures it serves as an important norm in managing conflicts from the 
interpersonal to the interstate. 
According to Bercovitch and Houston (1993), mediation is a: “pacific approach to 
conflict resolution in which impartial third parties help disputants resolve conflicts 
through a process of information and social influence without using violence or invoking 
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the authority of the legal system” (p. 254). It is a voluntary and non-binding process 
(Bercovitch, 1992; Bercovitch & Houston, 1993; Moore, 2003; Touval, 1985; Wall & 
Lynn, 1993) and offers the greatest potential for a mutually navigated and agreed upon 
solution. That plan is arrived at by establishing an environment of safe and equal 
participation by all parties. 
Mediation is a powerful tool for satisfying the needs of its human participants of 
the conflict overall, but also in addressing the human needs brought into the process by 
conflict stakeholders simply as a result of their being human (Avruch, 1998; Burton, 
1969; Coskuner-Balli & Thompson, 2013; Lederach, 1995). Its processes are often 
reflexive to disputants’ and mediators’ needs. The often less than formal nature of the 
process allows for maximum creativity and exchange without necessary consequence to 
the process (Bush & Folger, 2005). Bush and Folger (2005) note that the understanding 
of informality between stakeholders where a neutral third party without any power of 
sanction helps in the parties formulating a mutually acceptable settlement or agreement.  
We maintain that this is a rather uninformed statement in that the mediator, by 
virtue of history or position, brings certain elements to the negotiation that are not 
considered in the Bush and Folger (2005) statement. These influences substantially 
change the social dynamic between stakeholders. The very presence of a mediation 
process labeled “checkbook diplomacy” exercised by the State of Qatar in recent Middle 
Eastern conflict negotiations that premises economic rewards for cooperation of disputant 
parties, highlights that short sightedness of earlier mediation studies (Barakat, 2012; 
Irani, 2000; Kamrava, 2011). We can also point to our earlier discussion of external 
cognitive influence on perception and predispositions. 
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The creation of Rothman’s “foundation for common understanding” serves to 
identify the primary source of difficulty in mediation producing what Bercovitch and 
Oishi (2010) and Beber (2012) view too as mediocre results in sustainability of mediation 
outcomes. Reviewing earlier discussions we have demonstrated that a) the mediator’s 
perception of both the conflict elements and the disputants are seen through a linguistic 
lens of his or her primary cultural identity, and b) the dual process of cognitive decision-
making inherent to all parties manifest predispositional behaviors influenced by 
unconscious experiential processes and c) while these processes and their influences are 
invisible to the mediator, they may not be so to the other parties to the mediation process 
as reflected in their perceptions of each mediation element. Said aptly refers to this 
phenomenon as a “limit to cooperation” in his work “Peace and its Discontents” (1991). 
Said (1991) speaks to the “tragic misunderstandings” that emerge in the mediator 
trying to serve as basically an interpreter trying to methodologically establish a semantic 
subculture of normative diplomacy where definitions and semiotic nuances unique to 
players in what is typically an asymmetrical relationship; the oppressor and the 
oppressed. In essence, he is pointing to the fact that the third party mediator is creating a 
“false dialog” between conflict parties. Bercovitch 2003, 2007; Beber (2012) and others 
(Kaufman & Duncan, 1992; Smith, 1995; Wall, Stark, & Standifer, 2001) support this but 
are only addressing the primary definition of third party neutrality being compromised 
and defined by misunderstanding. What had not been addressed is the root cause of those 
misunderstandings.  
As we progress in explaining the primary cause of mediation difficulties, we must 
remember that even in a diplomatic subculture as promoted by Said (1979), the necessity 
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of language equivalency as impacted and established through socialization to primary 
cultural priorities, that is, the editing of the mechanism of cognitive grammar, has not 
been considered even though misunderstanding by many mediation researchers as a 
significant cause of conflict and mediation failure has been examined. As will be shown 
below, the mediator’s task is to first set up a dictionary of common rhetoric in pursuit of 
common understandings. S/he then serves as a guide to bring disputants symbolically 
through the morass of the conflict maze, hopefully arriving at a mutually agreed upon 
resolution. But, without each party understanding the meaning of each obstacle both 
inherently and consciously, this path will never be solidly established. 
Mediator Characteristics 
Most of the texts dedicated to training mediators offer several basic rules to the 
new practitioner. First and foremost, they must be impartial and neutral in entering into a 
conflict mediation. Second, they are bound ethically not to impose their own agenda on 
disputants in an effort to proffer what they regard as a balanced and preferred outcome. 
Instead, they must assist the disputants to realize an outcome that can be practically 
implemented and consensual (Bercovitch & DeRouen, 2004; Moore, 2003). The mediator 
can occupy both active and passive roles, offering proposals for settlement based on the 
information gathered throughout the mediation process in the former role and acting as 
simply a go-between in the latter (Regan, 1996). 
The ideal mediator acts as a chairman, enunciator and conciliator pursuing a fact-
finding mission on behalf of all disputing parties in an effort to establish a foundation, 
commonly seen by all, that serves as the basis of future agreements (Avruch, 1998; 
Avruch & Black, 1993; Bercovitch, 1985). Serving as guide to the disputants through 
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what is often a complex and fluid conflict labyrinth, the mediator attempts to set all the 
facts uncovered within the context of a common understanding, a linguistic equivalency, 
to minimize misperceptions inherent to the possible influence of dissonant cultural norms 
and value systems (Bercovitch, 2003; Bercovitch, Anagnoson, & Wille, 1991) eluded to 
earlier by Said and later recognized by Bercovitch and others. This is accomplished 
through many different tactical strategies, concrete and observed, which mediators 
employ to influence the course of the dispute and to increase the chances of successful 
resolution. 
What is important to understand is that in this position, the mediator changes the 
social dynamic between the disputing parties and becomes the catalyst to any good or bad 
changes as a result of his or her strategic decision-making (Bercovitch, 2002b;  
Bercovitch & Houston, 1993; Bush & Folger, 2005). This point also takes on a different 
perspective for analysis if one considers the previous discussions regarding dual process 
and cultural influences on perception. The misperceptions inherent to multi-cultural 
diplomacy serves as Jervis’ (1976) cause celebre underlying the dysfunction of the 
delivery of mediation as if it were universal in international conflict. These strategies are 
aimed toward controlling dysfunctional anger resultant of those misperceptions between 
disputants, persuasion, segmenting of complex issues, and establishing common areas of 
understanding (Beber, 2012; Bercovitch & Oishi, 2010; Böhmelt, 2010; Kydd, 2003; 
Wittmer, Carnevale, & Walker, 1991).  
Wehr (1979) observes that successful mediators must have a good sense of 
timing, are active listeners and have an ability to understand the positions of antagonists 
at a personal level. They have done their homework and have a broad understanding of 
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the conflict at hand. Ironically, Wehr (1979) stresses knowledge of the conflict itself, but 
neglects to stress the need for understanding the disputants on a more personal level, (i.e., 
those historical cultural elements that cognitively give value and importance to conflict 
elements). This may, given our earlier discussion of cultural influences on the very 
characteristics he listed, help in aiding the practitioners’ understanding of a conflict based 
on dissonant understandings between disputants. To this, Bercovitch and Oishi (2010), 
and Wittmer et al. (1991) add that the ideal mediator must have a good sense of humor, 
intelligence and stamina. We should also add the virtues of patience, trust and a high 
degree of personal skill and competence relative to perception of external influences 
beyond political posturing (Karim & Pegnetter, 1983). 
There are three major categories of mediator; Individuals not associated with any 
particular group, State representatives, and Non-State institutions and organizations 
(Kleiboer, 1996). Two salient points should be brought into focus before proceeding with 
more detailed descriptions. First and foremost, regardless of any formal or informal 
affiliations, any organized group acting as a State or non-State agency involved in a 
mediation is represented by a human actor (Leng & Regan, 2003). That actor is subject to 
all of the behavioral influences that have been discussed previously.  
The socio-culturally edited cognitive ascription of use-value to relevant 
environmental symbols, the structure of culturally dependent syntax and lexicon are all in 
play (Ting-Toomey, 2001). The only modifier in this scenario is the agent’s capture and 
integration of normative systems within the organizational culture being represented in 
which case could serve as the conscious modifier of any existent predispositions. While 
this does not necessarily change the unconscious segment of the dual process decision-
124 
 
making process, it does add another layer of nuance to the conscious editing at play in the 
cognitive systems that may not be relevant in a non-affiliated agent. 
The second consideration looks at the type of mediator in a manner parallel to the 
same way we have earlier described symbolic use-value. The term “mediator” carries 
with it a generally accepted picture of a third party with an unbiased perception of the 
conflict and disputants at hand, who will serve to facilitate balanced discussions between 
parties in a controlled environment seeking to discover a consensus solution. Attached to 
this general image is a use-value inherent to the group represented by its agents. For 
example, the use-value of the historic mediation traditions in the Sudan (Woodward, 
2006) is far removed from the considerations given to mediation in modern Qatar 
(Barakat, 2012). Similar comparisons can be made of the understanding of 
mediation/mediator between the two principles in this study, Arabs, Americans and 
Israelis (Kelman, 1982; Moaz & Astorino, 1992; Rouhana & Kelman, 1994; Wittes, 
2005). 
For example, a non-affiliated individual brings only her skill in facilitation to the 
process without the capacity for using any leverage in the form of military coercion or 
economic assistance when dealing with tactical rigidities (Kressel & Pruitt, 1989; Smith, 
1995; Touval, 1985; Zartman & Touval, 1985) as is the case of a Quaker mediation team 
(Jackson, 1984; Pickett, 1999), e.g. the Friends Service Committee’s role as mediator in 
the Arab/Israeli war following Israel’s 1948 recognition of Statehood in traditional 
Palestine. In the same light, disputants are also not able to use mediator resources to their 
advantage or expect any substantive reward or punishment for ending or continuing any 
intransigence.  
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Conversely, a mediator affiliated with an organization possessing what the 
disputants consider valued resources are shown to be more likely chosen to lead the 
mediation process by them than an agent with perceived fewer useful resources 
(Bercovitch & Houston, 2000; Kaufman & Duncan, 1992; Leng & Regan, 2003). These 
are not limited to only material assets (e.g., economic or military), but also include the 
mediator’s potential for leverage and influence outside of the mediation process 
(Brookmire & Sistrunk, 1980).  
For example, it has been shown by K. W. Stein (1999) in his work Heroic 
Diplomacy, that Anwar Sadat, in his negotiations at Camp David, sought a closer 
relationship with the United States, represented by then president Jimmy Carter, than 
with the Russians because he perceived the U.S. would exercise less obligatory influence 
over his country than would the Russians who had historically been the Egyptians’ 
benefactor and trade partner. This was of secondary concern to Sadat who also wished 
U.S. military arms sales. In the same mediation, Menachem Begin from Israel engaged 
the talks for a similar reason, adding the necessity for continued U.S. financial support 
for Israel into the equation. This was a frequent theme in much of the Camp David 
literature. 
Conditions that facilitate mediation. There are four conditions of a conflict that 
push disputants toward a resolution. First, the dispute must be protracted and complex. 
Ting-Toomey (2001) considers the degree of complexity (and consequently the 
protracted nature of the dispute) to be a relevantly descriptive function of the importance 
of tangible and intangible factors which also showed to be the most important factor in 
Laitin’s (2001) discussion of language and conflict. Specifically, a more complex dispute 
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has inherently more intangible, or abstract, elements whose communicative discrepancies 
must be overcome (Rosen, 2005; Shaw, 2015; van Creveld, 2008). Earlier research by 
Bercovitch pointed out a measurable relationship between intangible variables and a 
higher rate of unsuccessful mediation events (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2009, Bercovitch & 
Oishi, 2010) which we can relate to the complexities of communicating conceptual 
and/or perceptual values relative to the conflict.  
Given the necessity of language in the description and capture of an abstract 
thought or situation, it is clear that a language non-equivalency or dissonant use-value 
can lead to fundamental misunderstandings in interpretations between disputants 
particularly as regards intangibles or complex abstractions associated with either the 
development of conflicts or the conflict at hand. This was also a focus of discussion in 
Szalay’s research (1965) on the importance of linguistic influence over cultural 
definitions of world perception. These things point to the transition of conflicts 
historically coming as a  response to the competition for material needs such as land or 
food sources for a growing or wanting population and finding contemporary emphasis in 
non-material or intangibles like ideology, religion or in the case of Israeli security and the 
case of Egypt, national face. How these intangibles are defined and incorporated into the 
conflict equation defines each side of the dispute. 
The second necessary condition that facilitates mediation as a conflict resolution 
methodology is that the disputants’ own conflict resolution techniques have not led to a 
solution, and the conflict continues. Avruch and Black (1993) as well as Cohen (1990) 
and Princen (1992) address this failure to arrive at a mutual agreement as a possible 
function of cultural dissonance and gives the example of conflict resolution styles 
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undertaken by high and low context cultures. Each disputant from their respective sets of 
norms and values may view the other with disdain, and not accept resolution conditions 
through the avenues provided by one or the other’s propositions.  
There is often a perceived sense of impropriety by one or the other party. Leng 
and Regan (2003) also found this to be the case whenever a third party was brought in 
unilaterally but less often if agreement was reached mutually on a third party 
intervention. In the case of this research it was found that the resolution styles of each 
disputant, Arab and Israeli, and as demonstrated in their linguistic structures were 
completely discordant and the only chance of a resolution would be through a mutually 
agreed upon third party (Aronoff, 2014; Quandt, 1986a; Rouhana & Kelman, 1994; 
Wittes, 2005). However, the introduction of a third party I posit may add to the conflict if 
we consider the linguistic inequivalency not now between two cultural representatives, 
but now perhaps by three. The complex perceptions of the disputants and of the dispute 
has now been increased by a factor of one. 
The third condition looks at a more utilitarian aspect of the conflict; whether or 
not either side can afford or is willing to accept an escalation in hostilities. Shaw (2015) 
has noted that protracted conflicts usually proceed in cycles as one side gains or has 
reduced the resources available to the conflict, (e.g., men and material). Losses are also 
figured into this equation; how many non-combatants can be lost without friction from 
the general population, re., in terms of retaining legitimate authority (van Creveld, 2008; 
Walzer, 1977, 2015). Sadly, the perception of loss is effected in the same way as one’s 
own view of the world; through a dual process cognition that may assign use-values to 
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the leader which are not in line with the general population as was seen in the case of 
Menachem Begin (Perlmutter, 1987; Quandt & Manning, 1983) 
Finally, Bercovitch et al. (1991) examines the conflation of the previous 
conditions in terms of a “tipping point” when he asks at what instance of loss or 
perceived loss will disputants be willing to end the stalemate and engage in some form of 
mediated communication. Again, this is from the perspective of the leader and not 
necessarily generalized across the constituent population. The notion of a perceived 
tipping point by the leader/negotiator is of particular interest to this study as it sets the 
stage for establishing common definitions and use-values that could possibly lead to a 
reduction in misperceptions between disputants and the probability of a sustainable 
outcome. It also, in another observation, establishes some insight into the way leaders, 
Sadat and Begin in particular, perceived themselves in the leadership role and how that 
impacted their behavior in much the same way Bourdieu (1987, 1996a) describes how the 
occupier of a habitus opportunity plays to the position based on personalized expectations 
and perceptions of that position fostered from his positional experiences, or experiential 
history. 
Another important element relevant to the conditions for resolution is the 
motivation experienced by the mediators that facilitate their entry into the negotiation; 
Bercovitch (1996b) offers three explanations. First, the interests of the disputants may be 
affected by the mediator’s intervention. Second, they may wish to enter into negotiations 
as they perceive an end to or a significant change to an existent structure is imminent. 
Finally, they may intervene in international conflicts because theirs is an inexpensive, 
useful and efficient method of peaceful conflict resolution so recognized (Frazier & 
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Dixon, 2006; Gerring, 2007). The utilitarian nature of this intervention is twofold in 
terms of actual economic expense and the perceived cost in human capital. 
Parenthetically, if we reflect upon the work of Jon Haidt et al. (1993; 2010) we 
might be able to project that a mediator entering into a very contentious conflict might, in 
terms of the moral foundations premise, perceive a great injustice to one party or the 
other and in which case is compelled to offer assistance. Of course, this would effectively 
render the condition of operational neutrality mute with regards to the behavioral 
predisposition for vengeance against injustice as it may reveal itself as mediator bias, 
(i.e., a feeling of disgust toward the actions of aggressor against the aggrieved). In a 
similar light, the obtaining of a successful outcome by the mediator’s intervention could 
also be viewed in terms of the mediator’s own perception of self-worth. 
We are of course recognizing the financial gain and professional status that might 
be secured by such work. But our greater concern within the context of this study is the 
manifestation of a moral principle; is the desire to solve the conflict problem one of 
financial gain, or one of a binding moral foundation that compels the mediator to engage 
the task if a great injustice is perceived through the lens of his or her own personal use-
value attached to the observation of a) the conflict itself; and b) the manner in which 
information is gained describing the disputant(s) either through personal contact or 
through secondary information input; that information then entering into the calculus of a 
decision-making paradigm (i.e., dual process effects).  
Structural power conditions to mediation. Mediation can only proceed if several 
structural conditions are met. Note that historically, small scale conflicts did not require 
such elaborate preconditions but as in every social program, this too has become more 
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complex in response to changing environments both materially and non-materially. First, 
the representatives of adversarial parties must be recognized as legitimate spokespersons 
by all conflict stakeholders and that they be able to enter into agreements as developed 
during the process. Kydd (2003) Saucier and Goldberg (2006) found that the level of 
power represented by disputants is inversely proportional to the success of mediation; 
lower to mid-level powers are more likely to request and abide the mediation process. 
Young (1964) suggests that the less disparity in power between disputants, the greater 
potential for success in mediation. They showed that a great power gap lends to 
decreased potential for success as it is difficult to convince a greater power that they be 
required to concede to an accommodating a lesser power.  
From a cognitive developmental perspective borrowing from developmental 
anthropology, those with less power will assume a subservient role (Boehm, 1999; de 
Waal, 1996). However, as Haidt and Joseph (2004) and Greene and Haidt (2002) show, 
the insinuation of this subservience into the mediation dynamic, particularly if it is 
exercised overtly, quickly gives way to the motivation of vengeance by the moral 
foundation that abhors human rights injustices. 
If we equate the relative successes to the types of power seen in the Arab-
Palestinian conflict, the potential for sustainability based on the power roles and 
expectations of the negotiators somewhat bears out the Bercovitch model. Elmore 
Jackson, a well-known mediator from the American Friends Service Committee, 
attempted agreements between Israel and Palestinians directly following the withdrawal 
of the British Mandate in Palestine, 1948. While some concessions were made, real 
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positive peace (Galtung, 1967) was never achieved (Gilbert, 1998; Pappé, 2006; Pickett, 
1999). 
 In the Quaker mediation case, the principles from the Arab and Israeli 
delegations were not able to be directly implemented, only to influence the outcome of 
the negotiations, and while leaders like David Ben-Gurion held the reins of decision-
making, he often utilized his advisors in negotiations with Arab leaders; a symbol of 
superiority perceived and internalized by the Arabs. As the mediator, Jackson had no 
power to influence any party. The Society of Friends is a passivist Quaker group that only 
offers honest brokerage with no military or economic means with which to proffer 
cooperation (Pickett, 1999).  
In the most recent case of Arab-Israeli negotiations undertaken by the wealthy 
Qatari government and represented by Emir Al-Thani, parties to each disputing side were 
never represented directly by the leadership who had the power to make and implement 
policy. These negotiations are ongoing, but as yet non-productive. However, it has been 
posited by Sultan Barakat (2012) and George Irani (2000) that the only reason these talks 
have been sustainable, is due to the economic influence the oil-rich nation of Qatar 
wields. At Camp David all three representatives, were at the top of their leadership 
structure, Carter, Sadat and Begin. The negotiations concluded with an outline for a peace 
agreement that included economic exchange between Egypt and Israel and has come to 
be acceptable to the majority of the Arab world (Irani, 2000). 
Discounting for the moment how cultural norms and laws might permit, 
encourage or restrict mediation as a process of conflict management and recognizing that 
those same norms and values unique to participating cultures significantly impact these 
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interdependent processes (Kaufman & Duncan, 1992; Kleiboer, 1996; Lederach, 1995), 
we will posit that for any mediation to take place, two important components must be in 
alignment. First, conflict stakeholders must permit a neutral third party mediator to 
intervene and second that the third party has no unethical desire to impose an outcome 
and must agree to mediate (Wall et al., 2001).  These serve as the foundation of the next 
section briefly describing mediation strategies. 
Mediation strategies. There are several ways in which to manage a conflict; 
avoidance, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication (Bercovitch and Houston, 
2000; Moore, 2003; Phillips, 2001). In searching for the most effective way in which to 
manage conflict across cultures, we must keep an eye on three key elements that serve as 
the decision-maker relative to whether or not a process is successful or less than 
successful, a) the integrity of the process of conflict management, b) the integrity of the 
disputants and their constituents, and c) the integrity of the third party and its 
constituents. At the outset of this discussion we will assert that “avoidance” does not 
offer any constructive contribution in a complex and evolving controversy such as 
interstate conflict. Common sense tells us that having one avoidant party opens the door 
for the other to take unfair advantage, or simply postpones the conflict to the point that it 
reaches unmanageable levels (Rosen, 2005; Shaw, 2015; van Creveld, 2008).  
In seeking resolution to a conflict, mediation gives practitioners broad and open-
ended strategies to control the discussion between disputants, reflexive techniques for 
framing the selection of issues or describing the disputants to one another (Bush & 
Folger, 2005; Lederach, 1995; Moore, 2003; Princen, 1992; Umbreit & Armour, 2011), 
ranking of issues and other elements of the dispute that sets a tone and direction of the 
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process (Bush & Folger, 2005). Another significant goal is for the mediator to establish 
consensus goals from which common definitions and perceptions can be built (Moore, 
2003). All of this is aimed at building trust between all parties in the process of reaching 
a mutually acceptable resolution. To be clear, these strategies are wielded against the 
disputants, the relationship between opposing forces and their relationships among and 
between their constituencies. Clearly this is a dynamic social process that changes the 
parameters of a relationship (Goffman, 1959).  
But at the same time, the mediator’s presence and actions significantly modifies 
the social dynamic of the conflict through intervention, information transfer, restructuring 
of both the physical and perceptual environment and shielding from outside social forces 
like the media and respective constituencies (Bercovitch & Diehl, 1997; Bush & Folger, 
2005; Hare, 1985). What is important is that all of the mediator’s activities and their 
results in establishing areas of common understanding are achieved through the use of 
language that is heavily dependent upon perceptions and symbolic use-values established 
by each individual’s personal history and cultural frame a posteriori. 
Within the context of restructuring the physical and social environments of the 
dispute resolution process, the literature shows that eight factors are important in creating 
a successful resolution; type of conflict; type of issue; stage of conflict (re., timing); 
disputants’ relative power within and outside of the dispute (to include 
interorganizational linkages); mediator resources; disputants’ commitment to the 
mediation process; the rank of the mediator; and the visibility of the mediation itself 
(Wall, 1981).  
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The first four factors, conflict type, type of issue, stage of the conflict and the 
disputants’ relative power have been shown by Deutsch (1983) to be elements also 
responsible in providing a potential to escalate a conflict in the spirit of competition and 
dominance by one or another disputant. This is antithetical to Allport’s (1954) contact 
hypothesis, but clearly outlines the potential pitfalls in its premise and the root of its 
ecological fallacy. The second four by comparison are shown to increase the power of the 
mediation process. Bercovitch and Oishi (2010), add two important elements with respect 
to mediation success; membership by disputants in a common (cultural) bloc and the 
perceptions of trust in the mediator. These will later be grouped into the dichotomy of 
direct and indirect strategies (Bercovitch & Lee, 2003), but at the outset reflects a theme 
of cultural-experiential commonality shown to be important to identity and social 
bonding among humans (Amir, 1998; Barash & Webel, 2009; Boehm, 1999; Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004). As well, it provides a foundation for language equivalency described by 
Laitin (2001) and others, so critical to minimizing misunderstanding. 
Bercovitch’s (1986) addition of common blocs is viewed as disputants sharing a 
similar cultural framework, experience and perceptions of trust in the mediator are of 
particular importance to this study. We earlier discussed the presence of a dual process in 
cognitive decision-making that provides an innate predispositional behavioral platform 
for social interaction and a conscious cognition element to a cognitive formula that serves 
to evaluate and sometimes override innate behavioral antecedents. This conscious 
component of interactive decision-making is susceptible to the influence of cultural 
norms and definitions framed by the agent’s socio-cultural environment, which also 
ascribes a use-value to material and non-material components of the mediation 
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components. In effect, they collectively describe a decision-making dialectic, in the 
Hegelian sense, of progress (Hegel, 1894). The Bercovitch considerations and the 
influences of cognition should inform other evaluation studies of the mediation process. 
Bercovitch and Houston (2000) described three categories of strategic behavior 
placing them on a continuum ranging from high to low intervention. Again, the mediator 
must engage a careful balance of behaviors between disputants as the perception of trust 
and neutrality are essential to achieve the desired goals of resolution for both mediator 
and disputants (Kaufman & Duncan, 1992; Kleiboer, 1996; Kydd, 2003). The degree of 
intervention as perceived by all of the engaged parties could be emblematic of that 
balance. The categories from lowest to highest level of intervention described by 
Bercovitch include communication-facilitation, procedural-formulative, and directive 
(Beber, 2010; Bercovitch & Houston, 2000; Wall & Lynn, 1993). Undoubtedly, 
Bercovitch et al, utilized a similar taxonomy developed by Zartman and Touval (2007) 
years earlier who outlined communication, formulation and manipulation as components 
of mediation strategies. The hybridized strategies are outlined below, something 
Bercovitch and Gartner (2009) referred to as the “contingency model” of mediation that 
reflected both contextual factors and the mediation process. For the purpose of 
discussion, we suspended serious considerations of neutrality and simply recognized it as 
an intervening variable for later examination and consideration. 
Types of Mediation 
Communication-Facilitation. Beginning at the lower end of the intervention 
intensity scale, communication-facilitation casts the mediator in a passive, information 
management role. By exerting limited control over the exchange and flow of information 
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between disputants, the mediator encourages cooperation. The key to this strategy is to 
exert little control over the processes and substance of the mediation process. However, 
we must ask about the true nature of the communications carried by the communication-
facilitator (Bercovitch, 1985).  
The interaction between mediator and disputants within the mediation paradigm is 
one of symbolic exchange through language. Inherent to that exchange are each party’s 
expectations, desired goals and costs incurred as they seek a resolution (Thibault & 
Kelly, 1959) keeping in mind that conflict management in general and mediation in 
particular as taking place within a system of culturally specific and defined values, beliefs 
and interests. There are two processes at work in this strategy of low intervention 
information exchange, each having a potentially profound impact based upon our 
knowledge of symbolic use-value as it relates to cultural definitions. During phase one, 
the mediator receives the information transmitted by the sending disputants. In essence 
the disputants are the speakers and the mediator is the listener. 
 The transmission is captured by the mediator whose interpretation is influenced 
by the culturally specific use-values imposed on the symbolic components contained 
within the transmitted message. These serve as the foundation of the predispositional 
behaviors exhibited by the mediator resultant of the perception inherent to the message. 
In other words, how is the receiving mediator interpreting what the sending disputant is 
saying? Is the mediator’s interpretation exactly the same as the sender intended or does it 
reflect the use-value imposed by the mediator in tune with Habermasian constructs?  
The second part of the process is the behavior subsequent to the reception and 
interpretation of the message by mediator/listener. Of course, this is a bi-directional 
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process as the mediator then responds to the message by bundling and transmitting what 
s/he deems as an appropriate response. Here, “active listening” takes on a whole new 
dimension. Inherent to this response are the interpretive perceptions incurred through the 
mediators dual-process cognition in the decision to speak a specific response (Bercovitch, 
1985). 
The mediator presumes, as did the original disputant-sender of the information, 
that the listener will interpret the message captured by him, in the same way as it was sent 
by the speaker/mediator, that is, interpretational consensus or what Habermas would label 
as communicative rationality (Habermas, 1990). The listener/disputant will assume that 
the mediator, the carrier of the message from the sending disputant, is transmitting it in 
the same interpretation as its original configuration. Neither suspects the use-value 
dissonance that may exist between the sender and receiver, is the intentional or 
unintentional mitigation or provocation of the message on the part of the mediator. It may 
be, if Bercovitch could reevaluate his position on the influence of communication-
facilitation in light of this research, that he may consider this as one of the most powerful 
influential strategies in mediation. It also plays to a strategy we will examine below 
promoted by Allport (1954) and others represented conceptually by “contact theory.” 
Procedural-formulative strategies. Moving up the Bercovitch scale of 
intervention intensity, the procedural-formulative strategy ranks as a moderate form of 
intervention. Here, the mediator is primarily structuring the process environment. 
Exerting a more formal kind of control, the mediator determines where and when the 
process takes place, how often the parties meet, the structure of the meeting agenda and 
the content of the information to be distributed among stakeholders (Bercovitch & 
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Houston, 1993). An important element in environmental structuring and one which could 
prove to be as important as information inaccuracies or misunderstandings in mediation 
success is the controlling of input from outside constituencies by the mediator such as 
media publicity or contact with advisors on the outside of meeting environment. As 
pointed out, the mediation system consists essentially of a mediator, two disputants and 
the social relationships between them. Those relationships can be considered in an 
epistemic sense as they evolve dependent upon several contingencies.  
First, agents may be familiar with one or more of the other participants on an 
indirect level in that they have consumed media descriptions of the agents or their actions 
inside of or outside of the conflict under mediation. Conversely, perhaps the participants 
had previous and direct contact with his or her counterparts in the current conflict. In 
either case, the perception of the other agent directly in face to face contact, or indirectly 
through other sources of information is formatted upon their experiential histories (with 
and about each other) coupled to nuanced individual interpretations. Our concern is for 
interpretation through acquired and ascribed use-values associated with the representation 
of the disputants’ counterpart, the conflict or the opponent’s role in making or 
participation in that conflict. 
Next, considering some contact between stakeholders within the context of the 
current dispute, there will be supportive or contrasting input at play concerning 
perceptions previously constructed through direct negotiations. In other words, a 
previously held perception of an opponent may be elevated or diminished in use-value as 
a result of the one’s interaction with another. This interaction, to remain consistent 
between the experiences of the primary disputants and mediator, must remain pure and 
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untouched by other environmental elements such as the negotiator’s constituents, other 
third parties and the media hence the mediator’s control of them. 
The purpose of structuring and controlling the environment then is to attempt to 
modify the relationship between disputants (Augsburger, 1992; Beber, 2010, 2012; 
Bennett et al., 2009; Burton, 1969; Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006). Keeping in mind that 
the editing process of our behavioral antecedents is an ongoing lifetime process with the 
continual influx of new socio-environmental experience facilitating the use-valuing of 
lexicon and syntax, limiting the number of inputs available to the disputants allows the 
mediator to control, to a certain extent, the ascribed use-values of conflict elements 
without the interventions of outside inputs.  
In a sense, the interaction between conflict parties, coupled to any other outside 
influences to include the mediator’s interpretations, is developmental in a Darwinian 
sense, evolving, keeping things of high-use value and jettisoning those of lower position. 
Of course, this is invisible to the mediator who may have at best a conceptual “gut 
feeling” about the impact of external influences upon his clients, but certainly not the 
neurological machinery that governs it. The mediator can begin to develop a consensus 
definition of an issue, an object or a process by leading the parties toward that concept, 
perhaps one that serves as a primary element of their misunderstanding and conflict.  
Once common understandings, devoid of outside and often self-interested input 
from others, have been established, the mediator can then attempt to reduce tensions, 
build trust and establish more effective communications between disputants. Outside 
influence, or the competitiveness that publicity often engenders (Gent & Shannon, 2011), 
could serve only to confound the process as opposed to help it reach consensus on 
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important issues. Outside involvement also limits the potential of the mediator to create 
face-saving outs during the mediation process when disputants’ actions are more public, 
usually requiring validation and justification where inside the mediator’s closed 
environment, this would not occur (Avruch, 2009; Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006; Greig & 
Diehl, 2012). 
Directive strategies. Directive strategies are what Bercovitch (1992) and others 
(Beber, 2012; Carnevale & Arad, 1996; Cobb, 1997; El Affendi, 2001) consider the most 
powerful forms of intervention. Here, the mediator affects the content and substance of 
the negotiation process. This is accomplished by providing various types of incentives to 
disputants. In some cases the mediator might issue an ultimatum to one or both parties in 
an effort to break a deadlock or to compel certain bargaining behaviors. A directive 
strategy is aimed toward changing the motivation and ultimately the behavior of the 
respective disputants. Invoking Castells’ (2007) power typology the mediator can focus 
on several sub-strategies in this regard, using the kinds of power, both actual and 
perceived towards the achievement of a goal. This assumes a certain level of power and 
resources on the side of the mediator, and a desire to benefit or survive some impact of 
those resources by the disputants. 
The first type of social power described is coercive power. Here, the mediator, 
who is generally a high ranking representative of a powerful State, is able to invoke 
military and economic power in pursuit of leveling some type of influence on a disputant. 
Habermas referred to this as an implied empiric consequence in his discussion of latent 
strategic communication (Habermas, 1990); the disputant can either act towards imposing 
a negative effect or give something to a disputant(s) in a positive effect. Economically, 
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the mediator using this stratagem might provide different levels of financial assistance or 
simply overwhelm a disputant with personal gifts in order to sway a behavior in the way 
desired, often referred to as “checkbook diplomacy,” a methodology utilized almost 
exclusively by the Emir of Qatar during mediations involving Yemen, Sudan and Libya 
(Barakat, 2012). 
The next type of power that is available to the mediator, is one of manipulative 
power which bears a striking resemblance to the manifest and latent strategic descriptions 
in Habermas’ (1990) communicative rationality. Using this type of power, language and 
its concomitant symbolism is employed as the primary tool of manipulation. The use of 
lexicon, the changing of syntax are both used in the construction of what Chomsky (1965, 
1975) and Mikhail (2011) consider a synthetic reality necessary to refocus the lens of a 
disputant, changing his reality to something more accommodating to the goal of the 
mediator. In short, the manipulator is ascribing new use-values to the listener’s 
perceptions in an attempt to achieve an egocentric goal. 
This kind of manipulative power deserves particular examination. Consider that 
strategic communication activates those parts of the brain most concerned with 
calculation and risk while not activating the centers that address emotion and moral 
reasoning (Schaefer et al., 2013). Within the realm of the cognitive processes the use of 
strategic language demonstrates to be the most heavily dependent on conscious cognition, 
although still somewhat impacted by the unconscious component of ideation. So, the 
mediator must consciously calculate the application of his or her resources in hopes of 
changing a disputants’ perception and thus their interactions with each other or their 
constituencies. 
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But again, the same qualifier that also serves as perhaps a distinguishing 
characteristic of a culture may also effect the efficacy of the type of power being wielded 
by the mediator; specifically, the use-value of the symbols inherent to the communicative 
exchange and the enticement or deterrent being promoted. When the mediator engages 
directive strategies, it is with the presumption that whatever he or she is communicating 
is weighed equally by the listener. If one threatens military intervention to a culture 
where that would be senseless, for example a hunting and gathering society, the degree of 
empirical consequence is simply not present. If a mediator offers gold to a society whose 
economy is based on shells, the offer has no value. Reviews point to two issues in a 
directive strategy. First is the presumption, on the part of the mediator, of common levels 
of symbolic use-value and second one of language equivalency (Boaz, 1997; Chomsky, 
1975; Habermas, 1990; Laitin, 2001; Mabry, 1995; Moll et al., 2002). 
Between the three methods, it was found by Bercovitch (2007) using data from 
the ICD, that directive strategies were best suited when dealing mostly with tangible 
conflict elements such as borders and trade contracts. They were successful 42% of the 
time in comparison to the 31% realized by communication facilitation strategies (31%). 
This is not difficult to explain with the context of a comparison between negotiations 
concerning tangible and intangible conflict elements. Work by Augsburger (1992), 
Lederach (1995), Beber (2010, 2012), and Touval and Zartman (2007) showed the 
difficulties of settling disputes centered on intangibles. Szalay (1981) and S. H. Swartz 
(1992) linked this to differing assignments of use-value to intangible symbolism. This 
was later supported by the findings by Laitin (2001) and Mabry (1995). 
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The Antecedents of Conflict Management 
Sawyer and Guetzkow’s (1965) study, later modified by Druckman (1973), 
looked at what they regarded as the underlying framework of conflicts and the 
relationships inherent to the conflict management processes. Using the contingency 
approach (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000) they examined the elements between interactive 
and reciprocal behaviors; the influences of personal characteristics, role expectation 
between participants, situation and outcome variables (Bercovitch, 1984). Three major 
dimensions in the conflict management process were identified, the antecedent stage, the 
current context of the conflict and mediation, and the background conditions of the 
mediation. These provided information to construct a formula from which the mediator 
could build a resolution process. 
The antecedent stage examined preexisting, concurrent and background mediation 
contexts both of the events and the constituent players. Here the researchers examined 
such variables as the intensity of the conflict and the nature of the dispute. Specific 
components included the number of fatalities, the severity of prior conflicts and the 
strength of either party relative to their capacity to continue the conflict. The nature of the 
issues were described in more subjective terms but can be collapsed into two relative 
categories, tangible and intangible issues as described above; borders and resources for 
the former, religion and political ideologies for the latter. Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965) 
and Bercovitch and Houston (2000) consider the nature of the conflict to serve as the 
basis of the event and tangible elements to be an appendices to those causes. This again 
points to the power of discordant use-values that lead to foundational misunderstandings 
between players. Ironically, the impact of non-tangibles that are the result of ego-
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contextual discordance can often be insidious in nature and play on the emotions of 
disputants completely unaware. Finally, the background conditions of the conflict, 
experiences from earlier conflicts, are described as things that will impact the perceptions 
of all stakeholders and impact the mediator strategy (communicative-facilitative or 
direct). 
What was under scrutiny in these studies was the degree to which antecedent 
factors establish a conceptual stage of linguistic and hence emotional exchange for all 
participants, that is, editing the innate interpretations of each actor and again 
remembering that language is a reflection of one’s inner thoughts. Throughout the 
Bercovitch (2007) and Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965) studies, it appeared that a variable 
dynamic is at work that has a significant impact on mediator acceptance as a neutral party 
and eventual mediation success.  
Each instance allows for the stakeholders to gather more input relative to the 
personal characteristics of their counterparts. In addition, contact allows, given enough 
time apparently, to begin to reestablish what were once unique definitions and resultant 
perceptions of every aspect of the conflict management process, (i.e., what is the conflict; 
what is its outcome value; and how does the description of these things effect the way 
each participant reacts based on various use-values or the evolution of commonly held 
use-values resultant of skilled mediators). This is parallel to Churchland’s (2011) and 
Hynes’ (2007) observation that the original set of evolved use-values inherent to the 
human species, can be edited over time by exposure to outside stimuli and supportive of 
the Paxton and Greene (2010) position of dual process cognition in decision-making. 
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Here, once again, we are addressing how stakeholders interpret information that 
they receive passively from say the media or from reports, as supplements or that 
competes with the information taken in through direct contact. Each requires a level of 
interpretation that directly impacts outcomes through communicative interactions. Each 
participant holds certain cultural definitions that interact with innate capacities that have 
evolved over the life of human beings based in the brain’s capacity for pattern 
recognition and interpretation. This, in essence, is the foundation for symbolic use-value 
attached to linguistic representations. How effective the mediator is at establishing 
common definitions, symbolic use-values and understandings will, we hypothesized, had 
a measurable impact on mediation outcome. How that mediator, in pursuit of these 
communicative goals is perceived by other stakeholders so that this process can be 
undertaken at all, is the focus of studies examining mediator bias. 
The renowned Quaker mediator, Elmore Jackson (1952), made a prescient 
observation during his tenure as chief intermediary during the 1947-48 negotiations 
between Arabs and Israelis prior to and following the founding of the State of Israel. 
Coming in after repeated failures to secure peace he said, “It will be nearly impossible for 
a single mediator, who was distrusted by one of the parties to carry out any useful 
function” (p. 346). In the previous section, researchers concluded that the resources a 
mediator brought to the table, regarded as a source of leverage and influence between 
disputants, were more important than the perception of neutrality possessed by that same 
individual (Tal-Or et al., 2002; Wittmer et al., 1991; Zartman, 1994). This provided 
support to the notion of strategic calculations favored over the need for communal action 
in pursuit of societal goals. 
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Contemporary investigations into the factors that contribute to successful 
mediation, do assign more value to the necessity of perceived neutrality. Young (1972), 
while positing that “intellectual dexterity” and the ability to persuade held more power 
than physical coercion in forming long-term settlements did agree that the impartiality of 
the mediator was paramount to successful mediation and how they practiced their 
linguistic strategies was a key component to successful dialog between all stakeholders. 
His position was earlier echoed by Northedge and Donelan (1971) and reflected in the 
Jackson (1952) observation that emphasizes the importance of the perception of 
neutrality in maintaining the confidence of disputants. In his 1992 study, Princen stressed 
the importance of perceived neutrality in the selection and retention of mediators. These 
findings appear to contradict the findings of Touval (1985) that consider the possession 
of resources by the mediator as being more important than a perception of neutrality. 
Carter’s Mediation Stratagem 
During the Camp David mediation, President Carter incorporated both the 
strategies of communication/ facilitation and procedural/ formulative. These were 
embedded within the context of Allport’s (1954) contact theory, as Carter truly believed 
that if he could get the chief representatives of the conflict into a room together, if he 
could get each to see the other as another human being from a more personal perspective, 
then a peace agreement would be at hand. Parenthetically, President Sadat embraced the 
same concept as Carter on his first visit to Jerusalem; that if he just laid a plan for peace 
on the knees of Prime Minister Begin, another human being, he would have no choice but 
to see the utility of peace and capitulate to Sadat’s proposal (Sadat, 1978b).  
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Carter disdained the thought of a directive strategy in dealing with the two 
countries although he knew that resources from the United States served as a primary 
motivation to both parties (Carter, 1982). In his writings, Carter stated that he would 
abstain from using the economic and military resources of the U.S. to influence the 
Accords as this would be an imposed peace upon which the investment in it was not 
personal and sustainable, but more econometric and limited  (Carter, 1982, 2001). 
Carter quickly realized that direct contact between these two volatile disputants 
would be at best counter-productive and at worst a direct route to the abject failure of the 
Accords. Following the first day of mediation, Sadat and Begin had to be separated and 
would never again be in the same room until the final day of the meeting (Carter, 1982; 
Quandt, 1986a). From its outset, Carter realized the problematic nature of this personal 
conflict through his antecedent work prior to the Accords. He had instructed the CIA to 
assemble personal dossiers on Begin and Sadat, studied the histories of each country and 
their historic conflicts trying to establish some framework within which to understand the 
personal enmity between these two countries, and most importantly, between the 
representatives of these countries, Sadat and Begin. 
Carter utilized the principles of procedural/ formulative mediation strategy by 
controlling the mediation environment. From the positioning of the cabins each team 
stayed in at Camp David, the negotiating environment, the clothing worn (Carter was 
casual as was Sadat. Begin refused to relax and always wore a suit and tie throughout the 
event), the tone and location of the ancillary staff gatherings and a complete ban of press 
access to anyone involved in the event within the Camp David grounds. As well, news 
was not permitted to be broadcast in the compound. In effect, Carter was managing the 
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inputs to the stakeholder that might influence politically as opposed to personally, the 
perceptions of the disputants. In this according to his Chief Foreign Policy Advisor Bill 
Quandt (1982b), he was quite successful. 
However, one important point must be raised in consideration of having answered 
the research questions. As will be pointed out in the next section, there are several 
important influences that directed Carter’s behavior and may have influenced his 
decision-making process relative to the conflict stakeholders, the conflict itself and the 
desired outcome of that mediation.  
First and as has already been pointed out, communication is based upon the 
assignment of use-value to symbols comprising the execution of message transfer and 
reception (Chomsky, 1972), specifically, language. This innate ascriptive mechanism is a 
combination of conscious and unconscious processes, both subservient to early socio-
cultural experience. Carter was a child of the ultra-segregationist South, the son of 
socially aware parents that repeatedly helped and sacrificed for the minority black 
population in Carter’s home town. Throughout his career both personal and professional 
he demonstrated empathy for those marginalized and socially abused. His mother, one of 
the more important figures in his life, as well as his father, Earl, demonstrated a quiet 
rebellion towards the oppression of any person which was validated through Carter’s 
Baptist upbringing. 
During the antecedent portion of his preparation for the Camp David mediation, 
Carter shows a penitent early for sympathizing with Israel, citing Biblical persecution 
(Carter, 1982, 2001) by the Arabs. However, further reading on his part and his 
comments thereafter, indicate that he began to lean toward an Arab penitent as he began 
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to identify them as the new underdog, suffering at the overplayed and “vengeful” 
responses to minor events by the Israelis. He found speeches made by Begin 
“frightening” and began to form a perception of the overall conflict through the eyes of 
Sadat, whom he describes in much gentler terms as he had earlier described the plight of 
black America. During the Accords, Carter often found himself to be irritated and angry 
when dealing with Begin. It appears that he often found solace in discussions with Sadat, 
who shared a very similar view of Begin as Carter. 
This raises a second point. As Carter’s perception of the conflict and the 
disputants unfolds, we posit that his words, both received and written were already 
predisposing him to certain preferences toward personal considerations of the two men. 
His interpretations of the language in the CIA dossiers suffered what Said would consider 
“orientalism,” influenced his perceptions based on earlier use-value assignments. The 
information contained was tainted through a western lens. The reception of that language 
was influenced by Carter’s early socio-cultural history being manifest in both his written 
recount of the event, but also in his interpretation of linguistic inputs. 
Further, the problem exists that the Accords were conducted exclusively in 
English, the second language of the diglossic Arabic speaking Sadat, and the strategic 
Modern Hebrew speaking Begin. It would not be a great conceptual leap to assume that 
not every concept has interchangeable syntax between languages and dialects. The old 
adage “lost in translation” avails itself here as well. Earlier, we discussed the probability 
of failure, or difficulty in mediation rises with the complexity of the non-material aspects 
of the dispute. The Arab-Israeli dispute was complex in that its material concern was for 
land occupation, but its non-material portion dealt in Biblical and Koranic translation, 
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ancient myth and evolved ideologies. That Carter had to account for all of that 
complexity, and serve as a conceptual translator based on his own western lens, escapes 
rational thought. We could not help to wonder how much hatred and complexities were 
inserted into the mediation by the simple element of language non-equivalency. 
We can see than, that Carter’s choice of direct contact was less than productive 
for the reasons cited. It was also difficult for all parties to embrace important elements of 
the conflict because of socio-cultural influences and an absence of deep understanding of 
the nuances of syntactic structure, not to mention perceptions of everyone rooted in early 
use-value assignments. Here, we can say that the antecedents of misunderstanding and 
value ascription served as the precursor to secondary conflicts seen in personal attacks 
and accusations on the parts of Sadat and Begin, and parenthetically by Carter in favor of 
his “dear friend” Sadat. The reasons behind this cascading list of misunderstandings and 
perceptual inaccuracies are seen in Chapter Three. 
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Chapter 3: Theory Literature Review 
Introduction 
This chapter serves three purposes. First, it outlines for the reader a basic 
discussion of how the human brain has evolved a set of genetically unfolding systems 
that allows an individual to respond quickly and often unconsciously to inputs it 
perceives in its environment. The presence of these systems would be supported by 
current research in developmental anthropology and the cognitive neurosciences. In 
addition, the chapter discusses the way in which that cognitive system performs a 
balancing act between the conscious part of the decision-making calculus, that is, our 
linear processing of environmental stimuli, and the unconscious portion that continually 
unfolds to serve as both a place for experiential storage and as a modifier to conscious 
action, a sort of a subroutine that is always looking outward at the individual’s 
surroundings. 
Second, the chapter discusses how the brain creates a hierarchy of use-value 
relative to our decision-making actions and that it is in fact circuitous being both 
conscious and unconscious elements of a dual process of cognition, one creating or 
supplementing the other over time, that is, something experienced while the individual is 
consciously aware, over time falls into an unconscious subroutine of recall. This is 
necessary so that in many situations where survival is paramount, we do not need to 
consciously think about what our reactions should be, but rather we simply or 
“instinctually” react in pursuit of survival. Using the work of Jon Haidt and Jesse Graham 
(2007), the chapter discusses their concept of a set of “moral foundations” as the 
manifestation of that use-value formula and hierarchy. 
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Third, the chapter discusses the role of culture in establishing, or editing, the first 
edition of our moral foundations. Knowing that as an individual we must utilize the 
cooperation of others at many levels being a social animal to ensure both personal and 
group survival, culture is that thing within which the sensory net is embedded, taking in 
environmental stimuli that have been directly impacted by cultural parameters in terms of 
definition, importance and symbolism. For example, what is the perceptive and expressed 
value of rice to a westerner in contrast to someone hailing from Korea? Laitin (2001) has 
shown a vast gap between the use-values of the two. Culture, then, according to 
researchers in cognitive psychology, serves as the editor of the first edition of the use-
value hierarchy. 
Fourth, the chapter discusses how language serves as the visible manifestation of 
both internal and external thought. Utilizing the work of Noam Chomsky (1972) and his 
thesis on “universal grammar” it will show an interplay between the dual process of 
cognition described by Greene (2007) and the construction of language morphology. 
Further, the chapter focuses on the importance in language as a primary source of conflict 
based on the use-value of its particular semiotic structure looking specifically at the great 
differences in meaning and emotion between diglossic Arabic and strategically-based 
Modern Hebrew. 
Finally, all of these elements were brought together to examine how each, both 
collectively and individually, might impact any type of mediation. It stresses that 
although earlier research in mediation that determined cultural dissonance was a 
significant part of mediation’s moderate success over time, it was not theoretically 
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comprehensive in its investigation of why this was so. It is the purpose of this chapter 
then established a foundation upon which the study can be built. 
Culture and Social Learning 
Social scientists have long maintained that a “society” is a grouping of individuals 
interacting with environmental phenomenon in pursuit of individual and group well-
being. In his work “Rules of the Sociological Method,” Emile Durkheim (1982) collapsed 
the physical elements of the environment and the various sociogenic descriptors into a 
single all-inclusive category and collectively called them, “social facts.” By his 
definition, a social fact is something external to the individual, coercive in its power to 
compel an actor or the group to perform, something that is quantifiable, and embedded 
within the influences of other social facts (Durkheim, 1982, 1997). In essence, a society 
is recognized by more than politically defined territorial borders, but by the aggregate and 
the interplay between actors and social facts resulting in locally collaborative schema that 
define and predict a group’s collective behavior or the tacitly or otherwise approved 
individual actions of its representatives.  
Culture encourages common patterns of interacting by creating and codifying 
shared values and norms that guide acceptable individual behaviors. Conversely, the 
normative systems that both define and govern the behavior of the group, also define its 
deviance and corrective procedures in its obligation to restore functionality. Through 
those behavioral schemas we create a lens through which the world comes into focus and 
a logic by which we bring it into predictable order (Rohner, 1969; Meade, 1967). They 
provide us with a grammar of recall and the semiotics necessary for social binding 
facilitating social reflexivity and adaptation. This body of rules reduces the amount of 
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randomness in our perceived world and allows us a certain degree of stress-reducing 
predictability. In essence, humans do not necessarily enjoy new things and situations 
because they do not have a convenient set of rules that will guide what they deem an 
appropriate and ultimately productive response. 
To understand the innate dynamic occurring between mediators and their conflict 
stakeholders acting within the context of individually recognized cultural definitions, it is 
essential to outline two important premises. First, human beings communicate abstract 
concepts like rules and accepted behaviors symbolically among and between members of 
their own and other social groups by virtue of a shared and innate capacity for language. 
Specifically, humans possess evolved neural mechanisms and physical structures that are 
unique to our species and allow us a physical capacity for sociolinguistic abstraction and 
interpretation. These genetically unfolding physical structures act as the projection of and 
in concert with cognitive decision-making elements and provide us with the ability to 
assign meaning to symbolic representations encountered in our physical world. In effect, 
we are not reacting to a physical thing directly, we are reacting to what we perceive it to 
represent such as threat, pleasure, justice or injustice (Mikhail, 2011; Rawls, 1971).  This 
is the way in which we capture, perceive and respond to the multitude of social facts 
described by Durkheim. 
Second, we assert that there is also an innate cognitive mechanism that allows an 
actor to ascribe a value, or a “use-value,” to those symbols which can be modified based 
upon the actors’ individual experiences within the context of their cultural settings. These 
experiences will move from individual ones to shared ones ultimately being transmitted 
to other members of the group (Richardson & Boyd, 2005; Trivers, 1971; Wright, 1994). 
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These considerations helped us to understand how perceptions born of dissonant cultural 
schema can lead to latent conflict between mediator and conflict stakeholder simply 
through misunderstanding either innately or interpretively. 
Clyde Kluckhohn’s (1951) meta-survey of anthropological literature found 150 
different definitions for “culture.”  Since that time, there has been a consolidation to 
around fifty working descriptions (D’Andrade & Romney, 2003). In an effort to develop 
a usable idea of culture that would capture the essence of our theme of perception-
shaping experiences that add to predispositional behaviors, Evans-Pritchard (1965) 
suggested that we not simply regard culture as “natural” systems of evolved transactions.  
Instead, culture must be considered as a “moral” or “symbolic system” of bounded 
human existence. To his credit, Evans-Pritchard, while not having the technology 
available to assert such a position, current work by Haidt and Joseph (2004) supports the 
notion of an evolved system of interaction between symbol and use-value based in 
evolved moral foundations. 
Tylor (1870) offered a more refined concept of culture that was more reflective of 
modern influences; “a complex whole that includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, laws, 
customs and other capabilities and habits acquired by humans as a member of society” (p. 
49). In his view, culture was not the reductionist observation of human behavior reacting 
to a “symbolic system,” that would reflect the position of determinists. Rather, from a 
more naturalist perspective culture was both an individual and collective reaction to the 
presence of many kinds of environmental phenomenon both material and non-material. 
These formed a confluence yielding a unique picture of society to each group member 
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that was framed by definitions and values acquired through both unique and shared 
experiences.  
However,  at all  levels, the perception of and the values ascribed to these 
environmental elements are fluid and continually changing in representation as new 
technologies frame both new and historic experiences within the context of modernity. 
Here we are referring more to the non-material or intangible found within the social 
milieu. It is no longer possible to consider any culture as a static particularistic 
phenomenon as Boas and others did in their early research (Brewer, 2007; Dewey, 1983; 
Goldthorpe, 2007).  
Clearly, in cursory reviews of the transient, time relevant importance of norms, 
values and ideologies, culture can easily be considered a truly living thing structurally 
dependent on outside influences (Amir, 1998; Augsburger, 1992; Durkheim, 1982; Miller 
& Page, 2007) and inherently dependent upon its constituents’ perceptions derived from 
individual and collective experiences that are embedded in a particular physical 
environment (Bashkow, 2004; Kuper, 1988; Marcus, 2004; Margolis, 1987). 
This is particularly important to the mediator who finds herself in a “local” 
conflict culture quite apart from her own since the experiential history that shapes local 
definitions and perceptions of their world and specifically of their conflict may be 
dissonant to hers and render any mediation in that particular realm difficult to nearly 
impossible. Unfortunately, some mediators convince themselves that their view of the 
conflict field they have engaged has reached a successful conclusion, while the data 
shows quite a different phenomenon. What value is ascribed to each conflict element is of 
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particular importance as this will significantly impact perception and subsequent actor 
interactions. 
As discussed by Lederach (1995) and Augsburger (1992), dissonant cultures and 
belief systems serve as the most significant obstacles to the successful resolution of any 
conflict. This reaction to dissonance occurs at two levels, one conscious, “why do they do 
it like this,” and the other unconscious, as we know now, through evolved cognitive 
systems of use-value assignment and its associated decision-making. Later we will 
discuss these two levels of cognition as a subroutine of cognitive functioning with the 
brain essentially looking out at something that reminds it of some past event. Paxton and 
Greene (2010) refer to this as the “dual process theory” of cognitive functioning. The 
unconscious portion of the equation is the result of the interplay between our evolved 
neurological capacities for rapid responses to perceived threats, and it’s editing by our 
experiential histories that are perceived within our primary cultural frame. This is 
mitigated by evolved innate capacities for the valuation of tangible and intangible stimuli 
described in Graham, Haidt, and Nosek’s Moral Foundation Theory (2009) described 
below. 
Earlier research was conducted from the perspective that one’s own culture is 
taken for granted and seeing the world through it was veridical (Said, 1979). Cultural 
relativity truly presented itself as an opacity; things we know are present but are not seen 
or understood clearly; things that are, in effect, taken for granted. According to Paxton 
and Greene (2010) these are the elements of the unconscious decision-making system. 
The point being that “culture” cannot be reduced simply to some vaguely defined forces 
that encourage common patterns of interacting and reacting through a set of imperfectly 
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shared values and beliefs. In practice, each of those forces are seen through a lens of 
perception whose representations have been ascribed a use-value specific to the 
individual both in terms of biology and experience. This use-value is an amalgamation of 
personal experiences that have in many cases been redefined by other social interactions, 
later incorporated into an unconscious calculus of decision-making. One “force” 
therefore cannot exist in and of itself, but is the reflection of collective experiences within 
a particular group that offers perceptions based on collective and  individual experiences 
within an acceptable range of behaviors, but functional within the larger group 
(D’Andrade, 1995; de Waal, 1996; Hofstede, 1984).   
In its many definitions, culture is commonly regarded as an immutable and 
timeless “thing” comprised of predictable and stereotypical behaviors; merely a hybrid 
representation of local norms, values, customs and traditions. Looking at culture as a 
thing allows its individual components to be evaluated and explained empirically as one 
would any other object. But this tends to dehumanize and detaches it from the very 
dynamic of human agency that shapes it (Bennett et al., 2009). 
 However, regarding culture in terms of being merely a social static does not 
consider the environmental forces that shape it or the manner in which each individual 
group member interprets and interacts with those forces as defined by his or her own 
individual experiences and perceptions (Avruch & Black, 2001). They are generalized 
without consideration to local social forces in an attempt to construct some grand theory 
or Universalist explanation. The concept of cultural universals has been a continuous 
battle inside the social sciences; one that significantly impacts the field of conflict 
resolution. 
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Researchers have also taken the logically flawed position, particularly in light of 
our earlier discussion, that culture is evenly distributed across its members giving no 
consideration to the interpersonal or behavioral factors influencing individuals’ 
prioritization and weighting of each of those factors in formulating acceptable or 
unacceptable social interactions. Evans-Pritchard (1965) maintains a particularistic view 
and speaks to the shaping of individual perspectives as opposed to the broader viewpoints 
held across the population. This is more in keeping with contemporary definitions; 
recognizing local elements that provide for the shaping of independent actions and 
structures, but knowing that these local elements are embedded in and impacted by a 
larger social construct that changes with time and political demands (Bayart, 2005; 
Cohen, 1990; D’Andrade, 1995; Haidt et al., 1993). We can understand then, how 
members of different cultures might attach different meanings to similar experiences or 
schemas and react differently to the encodements coming from others within even their 
own community. 
While this study recognizes that many theorists have promoted the idea of a 
global culture as a reflection of the post-modern social media networks described by 
Castells (2007) assuming broad universal value systems, it focused fundamentally on the 
concept of local definitions and interpretations of environmental input reflective of 
primary socializing influences, (i.e., one’s “native” habitat). These local inputs showed to 
have the most significant guiding influence on an individual’s self-perception, self-worth, 
environmental perceptions and identity (Bayart, 2005; Brewer, 2007; Hamlin, Wynn & 
Bloom, 2007; Kagan, 1984). This dynamic was applied to the mediator to investigate 
how locally apprehended cultural influences as both the conscious and unconscious 
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equation of cognition, are mirrored in strategy selection and execution inside the frame of 
a conflict mediated within and between dissonant cultures and symbolically by their 
representatives. 
The recognition of some universally recognized concepts as they relate to social 
interaction were regarded as foundational: necessary to be able to humanly relate and 
discuss “culture” within a quantifiable frame, (E.g., family, economy, ritual, etc.). These 
sociogenic elements will be used in the conceptualization of a “local” culture and 
establishes a point of departure that enables us to conceptualize the uniqueness of each of 
our experiential histories. These unique histories, by their very nature, define and shape 
our perceptions of the world and our place in it (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992). The position that these cultural influences, within and between social groups, are 
evenly distributed is wrongheaded. They are instead differentially and uniquely 
distributed and interpreted across any given population contrary to earlier Universalist 
theories (Bashkow, 2004; Bunzl, 2004; Daloz, 2010; Geertz, 1983; Leng & Regan, 2003; 
Rosenblatt, 2004). 
It is clear that culture is a comprehensive, yet sometimes misleading descriptor 
used in many social sciences to describe a bounded set of behaviors and their 
antecedents. Within the social sciences however, the term is heavily burdened by its 
multiple meanings and the political value attached to it making the task of reaching a 
common understanding relative to its presence and influence (D’Andrade, 1995; Hirschi, 
1969; Leng & Regan, 2003). We recognized the influence of semantics and ideological 
agendas, but also asserted that generally, these varied influences only served to validate 
this study’s premise, that uniquely perceived sets of social phenomenon like ideologies 
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influence the expressed perceptions and behaviors both of mediators and their conflict 
stakeholders. 
Culture then, can be viewed as a derivative of both group and individual 
experience. These experiences are learned and created by individuals in a population by 
sequentially cataloging and prioritizing individual and interactive encounters with other 
members of the group that have lent themselves to the group’s prosperity. These 
experiences can include anything learned or created by the individuals themselves, as 
well as current and past members of the that particular social structure. Collectively, 
these experiences are embedded in and subject to the interpretations and perceptions of 
other group members to include both tangible and non-tangible encodements (Schwartz, 
1992). Culture-based experience provides the mechanism for organizing and responding 
to the social environment and guides the behavior of the individual in social 
circumstances.  
Therefore, individuals can embody and reflect multiple cultures so that its 
elements are psychologically distributed and interpreted differentially by various 
members within the group, family, profession, community, etc. (Bourdieu, 1989, 1990, 
1996a; Brubaker, 1985 Cheries, Mitroff, Wynn, & Scholl, 2008). However, the selection 
of which experiences hold the most influence over a resultant human action does not exist 
randomly or in a vacuum. Rather, our experiences are prioritized both consciously and 
unconsciously (Rosen, 2005), integrated and placed within a mechanism of “best choice,” 
that is, each element of every experience is valued and categorized for future reference in 
what are referred to in the cognitive sciences as emotion-based pattern recognition 
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(Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; Bouchard, 2004; Cahill et al., 1995; Cáceda et al., 
2011) or “EPR.”  
The Neuroscience of Decision-Making 
Emotion-based pattern recognition. Emotion-Based Pattern Recognition, or EPR, 
is responsible for what is colloquially referred to as one’s gut feeling or Deja vous when 
actually it is the brain recognizing similar patterns from past experiences and entering 
those into its calculus of current decision-making. As we will see below, EPR also serves 
as a significant element of the unconscious portion of our behavioral predispositions that 
could show themselves as bias in a conflict resolution event. For example, if we fear 
something in our past and see something that reminds us of that experience, chances are, 
we will somatically demonstrate an initial fear response once again (Gross, 2010; Rosen, 
2005). In short, EPR is the mechanism the brain utilizes to assure quick decision-making 
since the processing of all environmental inputs linearly as they occur, would not bode 
well for species survival as it takes too much time to process and to respond to an 
impending threat. It exists as a combination of some inherent and some experiential 
knowledge.  
An interesting corollary that lies at the heart of the nature versus nurture debate is 
the method by which our brain prioritizes those past experiences and places a certain 
innate value upon them using EPR.  Determinists have said that we possess at birth, all 
the knowledge necessary to make decisions in any situation. Pragmatism tells us, as well 
as the media shows this not to true. The next section will discuss, from a constructivist 
position mirroring Peirce’s abductive hypothesis, that it is not the knowledge a priori that 
is present, but an evolved mechanism of input process that assures species survival. 
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Decision-making hierarchies. Research done by Joseph Paxton and Josh Greene 
(2010) and others in the fields of cognitive neuroscience and cognitive anthropology 
inform us that when we make a decision in response to a tangible or intangible sensory 
input the process occurs simultaneously in two dimensions; one conscious and the other 
unconscious (Greene, 2007; Greene & Haidt, 2002, Greene, et al., 2004). It is referred to 
as a “dual process” (figure 1). Dual Process Theory (Paxton & Greene, 2010) provides a 
comprehensive look into human cognitive decision-making processes from both an 
evolutionary and social constructivist perspective. Data in support of the theory was 
gathered through extensive sociometric testing coupled with neural-processing 
schematics obtained from detailed studies of (fMRI) functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (Graham et al., 2009) data. 
 
Figure 2. Dual Process Theory 
Their research paid particular attention to the evolutionary aspects of the neuro-
physiological mechanisms of decision-making in trying to identify whether or not we 
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possess artifacts of a priori knowledge relative to social interaction that has been retained 
and added to throughout our species’ development. While their findings did verify certain 
mechanisms that one might consider as “instinctual” relative to threat avoidance and 
group formation (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) it also revealed a critical 
element in decision-making that helps to explain how we deal with our world perception. 
Their findings demonstrated that our conscious response to a challenge is heavily 
influenced by an unconscious interpretation and ascribed use-value to the stimulus. The 
elements necessary for that interpretation are found in recalled patterns of experiential 
history, a postiori, and allow us to consciously arrive at the decisions which appear to us 
to be the most obvious (Carnevale & Arad, 1996; Casebeer & Churchland, 2003; Hynes, 
2007); sometimes not so obvious to others.  
In other words, our unconscious brain has early on made a predominant decision 
for us based upon its evolved capacity for self-interest (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt et 
al., 1993) and survival (Kihlstrom, 1987; Miller & Page 2007) that has unfolded through 
innate genetically based programs combining a priori primers and elements from the 
brain’s immense storage of environmental observations, (i.e., experiential history). The 
conscious part of our brain that is more linear in its evaluation of current incoming data, 
while able to override the unconscious impulse, is still heavily influenced by it (Boehm, 
1999; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Gilovich et al., 2010). Those first impressions we have of 
people prior to actually meeting them gathered through investigation or rumor, or 
immediately following a face-to-face encounter may be more important than we had 
previously considered. Particularly as it relates to a mediator retaining an objective eye 
toward a conflict and its stakeholders or disputants relating to their mediator; things 
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consciously unseen but unconsciously ‘in play’ that can have significant influence over 
our final decisions. 
Jon Haidt and Jesse Graham (2007) worked with Greene in trying to determine 
the way in which humans prioritize or place a use-value on the factors involved in the 
decision-making calculus and whether or not this was a factor in both parts of the dual 
process equation. Their research presumed that exploring the role of experiential history 
in conscious cognition was tautological in that it is understood that everyone responds to 
trial and error at a conscious level in some linear value-ordered fashion (Cahill et al., 
1995; Casebeer & Churchland, 2003; Damasio et al., 1994; Flack and de Waal, 2000).  
 Their focus was more positioned toward whether or not the evolved neural 
machinery already identified in their earlier work was running an unconscious subroutine 
whose updating lay in social experience. They wished to know whether or not this system 
played a significant role in conscious decision-making and what form that role might 
take. Further, knowing the conscious portion of the process can edit or override the 
eventual decision, the researchers wanted to know whether or not there remained any 
artifact of these innate elements identifiable in a final decision construct. Their findings 
were succinct, that unconscious elements in the decision-making calculus indeed 
influenced manifest responses even if sometimes contrary to an agent’s conscious desires 
(Greene & Haidt, 2002). 
The question was already serving as the basis for theoretical discussions in the 
field of cognitive anthropology. It asked, if evolution has constructed a mechanism by 
which humans can prioritize the myriad of experiences stored throughout an individual’s 
lifetime and then operationalize those prioritized facts into decision-making paradigms, 
166 
 
then what are the socially interactive elements effecting that cognitive hierarchy, that is, 
what is the calculus of priority. In short they were asking how social interaction causes 
the brain to edit its evolved software.  
Chomsky (1965) and Turiel (1983) posited the same argument as it related to the 
structuring of social communication given the innate quantifiable symbolism of 
semiotics; how do social influences impact on a genetic program that facilitates language 
and how does language reflect the inner thoughts of the individual. In their seminal study 
of language, emotion and autism, Bigler et al., (2007) questioned whether or not the real 
message a speaker transmits can be masked by language or does a receiver have an innate 
capacity for emotional interpretation.  
Grenfell (2011) and Grice (1989) took this question into the social realm in their 
study of linguistics under Bourdieu’s frame of symbolism and power. Their conclusions, 
although preliminary, indicate that regardless of the speakers’ attempt at, for instance 
being politically correct, the receivers always have a gut reaction indicative of a truer 
emotional interpretation. This lends itself to the notion that human beings have the 
capacity to sense deception (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Hamlin et al., 2007), something that 
directly impacts conflict resolution practice. 
Researchers have tried to empirically describe the process by which we value and 
subsequently prioritize information into a decision-making hierarchy that facilitates the 
interpretation of environmental encodements, that is, symbolic actions and language-
based messages. Kohlberg (1969) and Piaget (1952) hypothesized for example, that there 
was an innate sense of justice and fairness in people that was the result of individuals 
needing to work together as a functional group, particularly as the environment became 
167 
 
more complex. While limited in their scope, they succeeded in identifying a process by 
which humans began their actions utilizing a rudimentary knowledge base that appeared 
innate. 
Their assumptions were born from the fact that their research subjects were 
infants who had yet to develop the capacity to speak and fully grasp the meanings of the 
symbols around them. From these observed basic and presumably unconscious 
behavioral antecedents, the primary behavior profile changed as the subject “grew” while 
acquiring experience from his or her environment. This led to the widely recognized 
concept of “moral stages,” progressing towards a “moral maturity.” The term morality in 
subsequent research is overtly burdened with significant political and religious baggage 
much in the same way as the term “culture,” and now reflects less science than political 
correctness or religious definition. 
However, the primary observations by early investigators of an apparent set of 
behavioral predispositions facilitated by evolved genetic engineering remains patent 
(Cahill et al., 1995; Dehaene et al., 1998; Elman et al., 1996). Here “moral maturity” will 
only serve as a label representative of a complex process of constructing a value 
hierarchy of experiences to make a complex equation a little less complex for the sake of 
cognitive expediency and predictability, and to demonstrate that this discussion is far 
from being only a contemporary one. It also builds upon the concept that the human brain 
resists complex change and defers to early recognized patterns. 
Turiel (1983) provides the most widely accepted and utilized definition of 
morality. He posits that the moral domain is comprised of “prescriptive assessments of 
justice, rights and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other” (p. 
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386). Turiel’s definition reflects elements from Kant’s “Categorical Imperative,” 
discussed in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), the utilitarian concept of inherent 
goodness and the cooperative nature of humanity in pursuit of happiness espoused by 
John Stewart Mill (1998), the utilitarian premise in Jeremy Bentham’s Principles of 
Morals and Legislation (1985) and the Philosophy of Justice described by John Rawls 
(1971). Morality does not and cannot serve as the universal explanation of behavior that 
is implicit in social interaction. The common thread is the reference to an “innate sense” 
reflective of the previously mentioned genetic program of cognition. 
In keeping with our consideration of culture as an important factor in the 
hierarchy of interaction (Augsburger, 1992), we would be remiss if it were not pointed 
out that Turiel (1983) bares a western flavor of morality centering on the “ethic of 
autonomy” (Brewer, 2007; Graham et al., 2009). The understanding of morality in other 
non-western countries focuses more on an “ethic of community” focusing on obedience, 
duty, interdependence and cohesiveness of groups and institutions and the “ethic of 
divinity” defining purity and the control of our propensity for carnal action (Brewer, 
2007; Fisher, 1997; Haidt, 2008). This becomes important in our discussion of the Camp 
David Accords as we weigh the cognitive differences between its principle actors, Carter, 
Sadat and Begin, and evaluate the impact of cultural influences on their use-value and 
moral calculi. It also reinforces the position of culture serving as an interactive editor to 
innate mechanisms as well as framing the uniqueness of the individual embedded within 
resident social groups. 
The distinction between individual and community premised on moral 
functioning establishes the basis for a comparison between “individualistic” and 
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“collective” kinds of societies (Augsburger, 1992; Bashkow, 2004; Benedict, 1959; 
Forbes, 1997; Said, 1979) or “low” context and “high” context groups. This will be 
important in the comparison of styles between Israeli and Egyptian cultures as it also 
influences the structures of negotiation and linguistics, a key component of evaluation in 
topic of this study (Abu-Nimir, 1996; Aronoff, 2014; Cohen, 1990, 1997). It was from 
these different kinds of hierarchies of interactions formed out of cultural influences that 
guided Haidt in his study of Moral Foundations Theory. 
The divergence in comparing individualistic and collective societies requires 
more depth in answering the question why there is a difference in perceptions and 
interaction if everyone is basically constructed in the same way, that is, to cooperate and 
survive through universal genetic programming. The discourse on nature versus nurture 
begins to take on a special relevance. According to Haidt and Joseph (2007), these innate 
psychological mechanisms coevolved with cultural institutions, serving as the foundation 
of socialization to local virtues and customs, thus assuring the perpetuation of behaviors 
(and institutions) favorable to group survival (Kuper, 1988; Nanda & Warms, 2011; 
Pickett, 1999). 
To that end, Hynes (2007) describes the creation of consensual rules, normative 
systems of control that protect society from the tendency of individuals to actively 
advance their own agenda at the expense of others within the group. The adherence to 
these rules defines the presence of a moral guideline or cognitive hierarchy later to be 
both unconsciously and consciously perceived working in conjunction toward the 
construction of an acceptable social performance (Bouchard, 2004; Mikhail, 2011; 
Rawls, 1971).  
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Hynes (2007) does not, however, imply that those group conformists possess any 
sort of innate knowledge of these prescriptions rather that these guidelines are part of the 
socialization process, a learned set of behaviors. Clearly though, the mechanism of 
apprehending the stratified nature of these “moral” behaviors, or use-values need to be 
present similar to the capacities to apprehend language construction outlined by Chomsky 
and others (Boehm, 1999; Bouchard, 2004; Chomsky, 1965, 1975; Dik, 1989; Mikhail, 
2011; Paxton & Greene, 2010; Rawls, 1971;) in their discussion of universal grammar 
and our innate capacity for constructing and transmitting symbolic abstractions to a 
listener. Over time, these external rules become internalized, part of the unconscious 
decision-making formulary and, according to Steger, Hicks, Krueger, and Bouchard 
(2011), Cahill et al. (1995), and West-Eberhard (2003), part of humans’ DNA. While this 
stands to currently be an untestable hypothesis, we can assert that the perception and 
transmission of these rules become part of the encodements of resident languages and a 
reflection of the individual’s inner cognitive process; a moral foundation for decision-
making. 
Moral Foundations Theory 
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) (Graham et al, 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 
Young et al., 2010) provides a bridge between the neuroscience of decision-making and 
the socio-cultural influences that shape their final outcomes. MFT research also adds 
insight to the later work of Greene (Greene et al., 2009; Paxton & Greene, 2010) on dual 
process cognition. It recognizes the developmental aspect of brain function in that the 
human brain “learns” how to process environmental inputs through its sensory-cognitive 
pathways favoring behaviors that will maximize individual survivability, and which 
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assigns value to every complex social interaction (Amir, 1998; Cahill et al., 1995; 
Churchland, 2011; Elman et al., 1996; Greene, 2007; Paxton & Greene, 2010;). MFT 
provides us with the tools to examine qualitatively and quantitatively the manner and 
degree to which social facts influence and even override genetically mediated behaviors 
toward self-interest, social interaction and survival. It is informed by the earlier work of 
Jean Piaget (1952) and Lawrence Kohlberg (1971) on moral development. In essence the 
Haidt and Graham findings provide scientific validation for the earlier hypotheses on 
moral cognition, moral development and moral maturity by utilizing modern technology. 
Unlike other research in moral psychology Haidt departs from the content of a 
moral judgment and focuses more on the functions of “moral systems” (Haidt & Joseph, 
2004, 2007; Haidt, et al., 1993; Hume, 1751; Hynes, 2007; Mikhail, 2011). This is in 
keeping with the theme of innate social tools that persist through evolution and 
Kohlberg’s moral development. According to Haidt and Joseph (2004), “moral systems 
are interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions and evolved psychological 
mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and makes social life 
possible” (p. 173). These moral systems are the basis for the “social glue” that Durkheim 
eluded to in his book, “The Elementary Forms of Religious Life” (reprinted 1995) by 
offering a guide for what behaviors are acceptable to one’s social group, and which ones 
are not. 
Significant to this study, Haidt found that most non-western cultures did not limit 
their scope of moral functioning to the right or wrong actions of the individual as did 
western cultures, but rather focused the attention on the moral actions of the community 
(Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt et al., 1993). This becomes important 
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in assessing the dynamic between representatives of two different cultures within the 
context of mediation serving as the premise for an examination of cultural dissonance 
(Lederach, 2010), specifically Egypt and Israel the former being high context while the 
latter is low context (Cohen, 1995).  
Haidt’s work allows us to see the essence of basic cognitive and subsequently 
ideological difficulties between actors who are trying to perceive their separate worlds 
within a mediation context that demands common moral values or a more similar 
“cultural lens.” To reflect back on our previous discussion, the different cultures and the 
socio-environmental conditions that comprise the constituency’s experiential histories 
serve as specific editors to their innately established behavioral predispositions. These 
predispositions, within the frame of high and low context cultures, that is, individualistic 
versus community sentiments, are also contextualized by their delineator of being 
categorized as either individualistic or binding respectively (Haidt & Graham, 2007). 
The five moral foundations described in the Haidt (Haidt, 2008; Haidt & Kesebir, 
2010) literature (Table 1) describe those innate capacities that cause us to feel 
emotionally, a primary sense of right and wrong both from an individual and collective 
frame, and subsequently impact our eventual response to interactions. They have taken 
the essence of Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s theoretical framework, and provided validation 
through sociometric and fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) testing. Earlier, 
we described how the “feeling” produced by these foundations can be placed within a 
hierarchy by environmental and culturally normative systems within the context of Dual 
Process Theory described by Paxton and Greene (2010). Following are the moral 
foundations described in the Haidt research. It is important to remember that the 
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operationalization of each foundation elicits not only a cognitive process, but also a 
somatic response reflecting the findings of both Paxton and Greene (2010), as well as 
Rosen (2005) relative to dual process and emotional pattern recognition or emotional 
priming. Note that each category contains a primary moral descriptor and its antonym.  
Table 1 
Moral Foundations: Use –values and manifest behaviors 
Moral 
Foundation 
Evolutionary 
Purpose 
Attached 
Use-Value 
Behavioral 
Predisposition 
Care/Harm Attachment Kindness, 
Gentleness 
Nurturance 
Empathy 
Fairness/Cheating Reciprocity 
Altruism 
Proportionality 
Equality 
Justice 
Human Rights 
Loyalty/Betrayal Tribalism Group Identity 
Group Defense 
Self-Sacrifice 
Patriotism 
Authority/Subversion Social/Group 
Hierarchies 
Leadership 
Followership 
Submission 
Aggression 
Sanctity/Degradation Disgust 
Contamination 
Valuable 
Disposable 
Maximal 
Minimal 
Ideological 
Righteousness 
Religion 
 
Harm/Care. This foundation describes the human concern about caring, 
nurturance and protecting vulnerable individuals from any form of harm or abuse. Its 
evolutionary origin is traced to a mother’s concern for her child and has become encoded 
into part of our genetic programming for all vulnerable individuals (Bowlby, 1969; 
Brewer, 2007; Cheries et al., 2008; Haidt, 2008; 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). For 
example, examine your feelings while seeing refugee children in television commercials 
without knowing who they are or what their dilemma might be or a distressed child in 
your own neighborhood. Most of us will feel the same twinge of empathy and a need to 
help regardless of whether or not the child is ours. Earlier work done in the area of the 
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evolution of empathy (Boehm, 1999; Bouchard, 2004; Bowlby, 1969; de Waal, 2008) and 
attachment systems (Benedict, 1959; Bowlby, 1969; Kohlberg, 1971) fits with the tenet 
of this foundation.  
Within the context of this discussion, if a mediator has witnessed or received 
information concerning atrocities perpetrated upon a vulnerable population, something 
that would touch upon this foundation of empathy and compassion, coupled to the 
somatic responses attached to it which we have demonstrated will form an emotional 
recognition pathway in the brain, subject to cultural definitions and perceptions, we asked 
how might that predispose him or her to dealing with the subject of an atrocity in later 
mediations? We also know that these somatic responses are now logged into the 
experiential library and will be called upon within the context of decision-making relative 
to the conflict at hand.  
More important, how will the mediator regard the representative of that conflict in 
the mediation process who is a living symbol of the witnessed abuse? Will s/he be 
negatively biased against that representative party to the pogrom, or positively biased 
toward the perceived victim? Recalling earlier research, we can understand that 
academically, the mediator can override these behavioral predispositions toward a dislike 
for a disputant, but as well, we are informed that those same behavioral antecedents will 
still have influence in the final decision-making outcome manifest in mediator behavior 
(Cáceda et al., 2011; Greene, 2004; Robertson et al., 2007), something made clear in past 
research dealing with “moral dilemmas.” 
Fairness/Cheating. This is regarded by Haidt as the focus of the human fixation on 
fairness, egalitarianism, justice and reciprocal action. It came from the work on 
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evolutionary reciprocal altruism (Hubbard, 1999; Trivers, 1971) the research on moral 
development by Kohlberg (1971) and the theoretical premise of Rawls (1971) and 
Mikhail (2011) in “A Theory of Justice.” De Waal (1982; 1996; 2008) has associated this 
foundation with the need for vengeance in studies of primatology and developmental 
anthropology. Fairness is an important consideration on the part of the mediator. As well, 
the propensity of a participant to lie in order to achieve an unfair goal is addressed in this 
description. It also forms part of the foundation of trust that is alluded to in the other 
MFT categories. 
 As might be surmised, this moral foundation is a significant element in the 
construction of a value hierarchy or symbolic use-value of perception, being part of the 
cognitive calculus of decision-making that determines the mediator’s behavior toward 
conflict stakeholders. It might be that a mediator may feel some form of animus toward a 
participant who has demonstrated presently or historically some form of unfair behavior 
in how captives, refugees or other non-combatants are treated, that is, a violator of human 
rights. 
Perhaps the mediator has a developed sense of visceral attachment to some 
tangible object such as the land of their birth and heritage or a concept of home that is in 
conflict with the perception or behavior of one of the disputants relative to having it taken 
away unjustly by someone they regard as inappropriate. This was the crux of the 
Arab/Israeli conflict addressed by the Camp David Accords. How this unconscious 
predisposition is manifest will be of particular importance to the other conflict 
stakeholders as it relates to perceived neutrality. If we make a small conceptual leap, and 
combine this “individualistic” foundation with the prior foundation of harm and care, it 
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becomes clear how together these fundamentals have the potential for priming the 
mediator toward feeling empathy towards a perceived victim, and seeking some sort of 
retribution, perhaps through an unconscious display of bias toward the aggrieved.  
These first two “moral” foundations are principally concerned with how we feel 
about actions taken for or against us and the outwardly directed empathy we show for 
others perceived as suffering or not receiving fair treatment and serve as the key 
component in the consideration of justice (Bentham, 1970; Boehm, 1999; Cropanzano et 
al., 2003; de Waal, 1996). These foundations have been labeled as “individualizing” by 
Haidt (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) and are in concert with the findings of 
Kohlberg (1981) and Rawls (1971) on the “ethics of justice” and the “ethic of care” 
described by Gilligan (1982).  
Work by Wynn (2008) and Hamlin et al. (2007) in developmental psychology at 
the Yale University Infant Cognition Center, examined infants that demonstrated 
empathy towards other distressed infants or the apparent perceived recognition of a good 
or a bad person after observing certain types of behaviors in a puppet show. This 
occurred before they had acquired the ability to verbally communicate as well as having 
only a very limited experiential history, that is, they had not had the experience of a 
“bad” person (de Waal, 2008; Hamlin et al., 2007).  
Their conclusion was that there exists in these infants and looking outward, all 
humans, some rudimentary or innate sense of what is acceptable and what is unacceptable 
relative to security and fairness. The key factor was that the infants had not had the 
experiential history necessary for value judgments, that is, to have the ability to assign 
use-value gained through social experience. Important too is how the infants manifest 
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their feelings of observed impropriety; they cried and the parallel somatic responses 
included increases in blood pressure, temperature and pupil dilation providing us with 
some context for the term “emotional” recognition pathways. Parenthetically, the brain 
uses these somatic responses as flags to allow easy access to the experience in the 
construction of future rapid decision-making when faced with a new or threatening 
situation (Churchland, 2011). 
The present study asked how this observation and subsequent perceptions might 
be manifested in an adult. We already know through earlier research that the cognitive 
machinery innate to all humans matures at a relatively steady rate, a combination of 
genetically based programming and the required stimulations coming from the 
environment. We also know that an individual’s moral maturity is impacted by socio-
cultural inputs that assist in establishing a value hierarchy of the interactions between 
themselves and other socio-environmental stimuli. Moral development as a consequence 
of social interaction is however, not linear as is genetic maturity overall. It was important 
to discover how these mature mechanisms are demonstrated, particularly in a diplomatic 
subculture that limits the kinds of responses among and between other diplomats. How do 
they manifest feelings of vengeance and revulsion elicited by reading about or directly 
witnessing atrocities performed by their conflict stakeholders? 
Binding Foundations: The Glue of Society 
Cultural anthropology and evolutionary sociology shows that humans’ need to 
participate in a group is directly related to the advancing complexities and interactions 
within and between societies (Bashkow, 2004; Bunzl, 2004; Kuper, 1988; Rosenblatt, 
2004). Graham et al. (2009) posit that these following three foundations, considered 
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“binding” in the context of group behavior, not only allow for group sustainability, but 
also define two separate moral operatives that translate as predominant political 
ideologies, liberal and conservative, thus laying the framework for defining two 
behavioral or “moral types.” This distinction also has overtones of social bonding theory 
described by Hirschi (1969) relative to the formation of morally defined identity groups 
(Bourdieu, 1987). Again, perhaps this is a predecessor of a mediator identifying more 
with one disputant than another, perhaps leading to some level of mediator bias. At a 
minimum it takes Allport’s (1954) notion of Contact Theory to task, that is, there will be 
some observable, and predictable, level of dissonance between two identified moral 
“types.” 
The decision-making formula utilizing the moral use-valuation metric and how it 
led to types of moral individuals can be described simply in terms of a percentage of 
concern as described by Graham et al. (2012). For example, according to the Haidt 
hypotheses supported by the fMRI data gathered by Greene and others, a “liberal” will 
tend to (unconsciously) engage a decision using only the first two foundations, (i.e., 
harm/care and fairness/cheating), both being described as individualistic in nature. So, 
each of the two elements is used in the total use-value calculus, 50% harm/care, 50% 
fairness cheating.  
On the other hand, a “conservative” has been shown to use all five foundations in 
their decision-making formulae applying each in a 20% proportion so that harm/care and 
fairness cheating only receive a 40% consideration overall, where each foundation 
receives a 20% consideration. Researchers in the field of cognitive science have no 
wonder why liberals and conservatives simply cannot seem to get along with each other, 
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or at least agree on policy issues. Their moral influences simply are not consonant with 
each other and therefore their perception of a particular issue is skewed toward their 
heuristic yet unconscious method of value assignment. We can project, as implied earlier, 
that this schism will be more pronounced as the substance of a mediation moves away 
from tangible issues such as land and supplies, and moves more toward the intangible 
arena of religion and political ideologies. Certainly the impact of enculturation as applied 
to perceptions and symbolic use-values will become more apparent (Graham and Haidt 
and Nosek, 2009). 
Loyalty/Betrayal. This foundation identified in the Haidt research described the 
altruistic traits of loyalty, patriotism and self-sacrifice for the group as a binding principle 
of social sustainability. They also describe the group’s constant watchfulness for traitors 
and liars inside the group with harsh consequences to the offenders, thus assuring group 
functioning and viability. Through the work of Brewer (2007), we can also extend this to 
intergroup relationships as well. Cognitively we can assert the reliance of patent 
cognition on predictability of action relative to group harmony reminding the reader that 
the human brain is not comfortable with change. When bringing together two opposing 
groups, each with its own moral identity as proposed in Allport’s (1954) “contact 
theory,” antagonisms might not be reduced through interaction, but rather exacerbated 
and runs the risk of bringing into focus one party’s weakness or dissonant value system to 
another thus compromising the environment of egalitarianism so essential in mediation 
(Bercovitch & Oishi, 2010; Fisher, 1997; Forbes, 1997; Gaertner et al., 1994).  
We can now speculate as to whether or not the mediator, whose moral maturity is 
intimately linked to his or her own culture, will accept a conflict stakeholder that they 
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perceive more closely approximates his or her own moral predispositions as preferred 
over one who does not. In this situation we could postulate that the mediator might 
identify more closely with a morally similar stakeholder as opposed to the one he or she 
perceives to be more morally dissonant; the dissonance being a perceptual manifestation 
of his innate moral hierarchies or symbolic “use-values.” In essence we are externalizing 
elements of a group that make it unique and  approximating an equivalency with what 
might be conflicting moral systems much in the same way we described the conflicts of 
perception between liberals and conservatives. 
We could also speculate that this moral consonance between mediator and 
stakeholder might be an indicator of the cultural and/or experiential familiarity which 
might give some support to Frazier and Dixon’s (2006) argument for a diplomatic 
subculture. Unfortunately, the large body of data found in the ICD from Bercovitch and 
Oishi (2010) does not identify in any usable detail the diplomatic relationships between 
mediators and other stakeholders. As far back as Aristotle in his Nichomachean Ethics he 
proposes that we tend to gravitate toward people that look like us, and prefer the same 
things we do (Bartlett & Collins, 2012). The investigation of subcultural consonance 
between diplomats could be the subject of future research. 
Authority/Subversion. The fourth foundation refers to one’s proclivity towards 
leadership or followership. It also underlies the recognition of and deference to 
“legitimate” or “just” authority seen in group interaction. In his 1996 study of the 
evolution of “right and wrong” in humans, de Waal described the attributes of 
subordinates and examined terms of leadership and protection inherent to the evolution of 
hierarchy in primates. As well, these descriptors are reminiscent of Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
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(1981) work on the class specificity of cultural norms. Where this quality is revered in 
both individualistic and collectivist societies, Cohen (1997) showed that it is valued in 
different ways and may be dissonant to each respective group relative to group identity. 
Haidt (2012) cautions that this foundation cannot stand alone, but must be placed in 
concert with other individualizing foundations in what appears to be a recognition of the 
a posteori nature of the binding foundations, that is, individual survival trumps group 
harmony. 
Parenthetically, Haidt’s mentioning of the difficulty of examining binding 
foundations as unique independent variables might signal the presence of a particular 
hierarchy within the foundations themselves. It may be, given the research in primatology 
by de Waal (1982, 1996, 2008) and the extensive cognitive testing shown in the Forbes 
and Grafman (2010) research, that the primary mechanism of use-value assignment is 
found within the individualizing foundations, (i.e., harm/care and fairness/cheating). 
Perhaps the drive for an individual’s survival by recognizing threats to one’s self and 
one’s family took evolutionary precedence over its need for inclusion and identity within 
the social group. But, this is a digression from our discussion however significant for 
future research in conflict resolution. 
The recognition of legitimate authority is what is of most interest relative to 
mediator action and supports the work done by Bercovitch (Houston, Bercovitch & 2000; 
Bercovitch & Oishi, 2010) and Kaufman and Duncan (1992) who described the 
importance of mediator and disputant ranking. Based on the mediator’s predisposed 
motivations, is there a chance that he or she will identify a conflict stakeholder as a non-
legitimate participant given our notion of the conflict resolution system as a sub-culture 
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encompassing the same dynamic as one would encounter describing in-group and out-
group discussions of different cultures or neighborhoods (Greig & Diehl, 2005; Hubbard, 
1999; Kubota et al., 2012; Levy, 2009)?  
If we examine the Bercovitch dataset, one of the descriptors speaks to the concept 
of “authority.” It identifies the position of a mediator/stakeholder relative to their 
capacity to make decisions and commitments on behalf of the entity they represent. 
Those able to make important decisions unilaterally, referring to accepting or making 
concessions, might be regarded as more legitimate than those not able to do so by conflict 
stakeholders. This might beg the question as to what level the mediator, innately 
recognizing the authority position of the counterpart, regards the actor as possessing 
“legitimate” authority and how this consideration will manifest in mediator behavior. 
Parenthetically, Prime Minster Begin continually reminded his counterparts, presidents 
Carter and Sadat, that he was not at their level, “only a Prime Minister,” perhaps 
strategically leaving himself an out relative to acceptance of peace proposals, deferring 
responsibility to the Knesset, although history has shown this feigned minimalism to be 
less than accurate. 
Sanctity/Degradation. The final foundation described by the Haidt research is 
premised upon the psychology of disgust and contamination. Its modern manifestation 
underlies religious notions of striving to live in an elevated, less carnal, nobler way. 
According to Haidt, “It underlies the widespread idea that the body is a temple which can 
be desecrated by immoral activities and contaminants” (2012, p. 73). It defines the moral 
codes and behaviors of both men and women relative to mate selection and socialization 
of children into moral beings (Monroe, Martin & Ghosh, 2009; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; 
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Wynn, 2008) thus existing as one of the moral compasses or basis of normative action 
relative to sexual behavior and religious dogma (Haidt & Hersch, 2001). Underlying the 
discussion is the unconscious behavioral antecedent that informs the individual as to what 
is acceptable in the perceived characteristics of another individual or thing; which do we 
choose to select one over another? This is not a recent observation since Aristotle said, 
“We tend to associate with those that look like us and like the same things we do” 
(Bartlett & Collins, 2012, p. 235). 
The question that arises from this binding foundation, focuses on the mediator’s 
perception of what constitutes an “immoral,” unjust or humanly degrading activity on the 
part of one or both conflict stakeholders and how that insinuates itself into an interaction 
relative to our cognitive dual processing. The mediator’s unconscious moral equation 
may be reduced to a hierarchy of performance, but still serves to sort out between actors, 
that is, which one has committed a more heinous act than the other. Placing that strata 
within the framework of moral behaviors, it may elicit in the mediator a need to put the 
worst offender “back in their place,” that is, vengeance, for the greatest offender 
(Bentham, 1970; Boehm, 1999; Cahill et al., 1995; Cobb, 1997; Damasio et al., 1994; de 
Waal, 1982; Kihlstrom, 1987).  
Summary of theory. If we bring together the Contact Theory of Allport (1954) 
and Moral Foundations Theory of Haidt (1997) and place those within the frame of an 
innate dual-process mechanism of cognition, personal likes and dislikes become more 
clear. Specifically, how biases on the part of conflict stakeholders are influenced by 
socio-cultural experiences manifesting in predispositional behaviors like bias. The 
evolved “foundations” serve as a backdrop to which environmental experiences are 
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compared relative to individual and group well-bring. The resultant symbolic values are 
placed within a dual process cognition to produce a decision-making formula guiding 
social interactions. How those interactions are manifest is clearly dependent upon 
experiential history that has occurred within a unique socio-cultural context that provided 
input to that dual process calculus and is therefore manifest as preference or avoidance. 
Clearly, this weighs as a significant factor in assessing mediator bias and stakeholder 
perceptions. The next section will lay out factors that describe the outward expressions of 
these processes. 
The Importance of Language as a Representation of Behavior 
The previous section described a schema that defines a moral or use-value 
assignment mechanism as a function of an individual’s evolved biology and its key role 
on the social stage. At the heart of the discussion, the one that facilitates all other actions, 
is how the information being received by the mediator and stakeholders as regards the 
descriptive construct of each participant is communicated, is being received and 
perceived, and is evaluated based upon local cultural definitions that frame  acceptable 
responses.  
Also, we asked if these responses reflect more or less of the predispositions 
informed by unconscious cognitive decision-making equations. Aside from the obvious 
witnessing of an act, information from our environment concerning the actions of other 
individuals is facilitated by our sensory net capturing information from our environment, 
be that printed, verbal or some other form of communication category, (i.e., personal, 
research or media). All of these are placed within our long and short-term memories and 
are utilized by our brain as a pattern recognition and operational use-value system. The 
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key is to understand what is going on inside the mind of each participant based on this 
socio-environmental data-acquisition system. 
In every case, this is accomplished through some level of communication that is 
facilitated by language. We think in language as well. In its essence, any form of 
communication through any mode of language is ego-contextual and reveals certain 
predispositions of the speaker (Laitin, 1977; Ting-Toomey & Chung, 2011; Tomasello, 
2008). However, language is not a one-way phenomenon, but requires a speaker (sender) 
and a listener (receiver). The listener’s perception of the transmitted message, as we have 
seen, is nuanced by his or her culturally embedded experiential history that frames 
perception through use-value, which impacts the relationship between the two agents. 
This will be the focus of this section. 
Language as a Reflection of Inner Thought 
There is a large body of philosophical and biological literature that advances 
several positions on the age-old debate of what makes humans, human. The theme of the 
discussion seeks to identify what it was that separated us from the lower animals; what 
about humans was peculiar. A soul, the ability to self-reflect, the theory of mind (Baron-
Cohen, 1991), were those things Alexander von Humboldt (Helferich, 2004) denied to 
lower animals. He referred to them as “automata” with regards to how they could 
primitively respond only to immediate environmental stimuli; a response to their 
“passions.” Von Humboldt’s position was that animals were more or less complex 
machines that reacted only through response or command to their physical environment. 
But they could only react within the confines of this “passion-driven” manner, limited to 
the basic ‘instincts’ necessary for survival both individually and as a species.  
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They did not, according to von Humboldt and subsequently other developmental 
anthropologists, have the capacity to self-reflect or to communicate abstractions 
(Bouchard, 2004; D’Andrade, 1995; de Waal, 2008; Elman et al., 1996). Developmental 
psychology informs us that a non-human species has not developed the high functioning 
brain as demonstrated by the presence of our well-developed and large cerebral cortex, 
the site of calculation and higher executive functions unique to our own species (Bechara 
et al., 2000; Greene, 2007; West-Eberhard, 2003). 
These scientists tell us the vocalizations of lower animals were simply triggers to 
those passions essential to their survival (de Waal, 2008). What they lacked, and what 
humans possessed, was a capacity to reflect and spontaneously respond to anything in 
their environment, but to also speculate and create questions and answers to elements that 
had never been and perhaps never would be part of their social or cultural milieu (Palmer 
& Palmer, 2002). Most important, humans are able to communicate these abstract 
constructs through a system of sounds, compressions and decompressions that are 
captured and understood and variously assigned both consciously and unconsciously use-
value by others (Chomsky, 1972). The focal point of these discussions of “humanness” is 
language; the symbolic representation of innate human self-reflection and self-expression 
through symbolic action (Chomsky & Bidwai, 1996). Samuel Coleridge (1893), in 
describing Shakespearean verse said, that “… Nature, the prime genial artist, 
inexhaustible in diverse powers, is equally inexhaustible in forms: “each exterior 
(expression) is the physiognomy of the being within” (Gillian, 2008); an observation on 
the ego-contextuality of language. 
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Language is 1) something de Cordemoy (1667) described as the  single most 
necessary component of social interaction; 2) something that is purely mechanics are 
innate to all humans both biologically and socially as the result of evolutionary forces 
heavily influenced by an ascribed symbolic use-value reflective of its socio-cultural 
environment (Chomsky, 1965; Dik, 1989; Palmer & Palmer, 2002); and 3) an instrument 
through which innate behavioral predispositions are edited to accommodate local cultural 
and situational demands (Chomsky, 1970, 1972; Forbes & Grafman, 2010; Grice, 1989; 
Haidt, 2008; Haidt et al., 1993; Paxton & Greene, 2010).  
We deconstruct language into two principle parts, its bio-linguistic component 
and its socially interactive component in line with the work of Sapir (1925, 1936); Whorf 
et al., (1993); and Richardson and Boyd (2005). Each has a profound impact on the way 
in which humans, more specifically, mediators and disputants, perceive and interpret their 
world necessary for the construction of an appropriate strategy, response and interaction 
(Cobb, 1997; Dik, 1989; Geertz, 1983; Grenfell, 2011). Our question was whether or not 
one’s response is indicative of the dual process and predispositions described earlier or is 
it completely masked to the receiver. Basically, can we hide what we really feel about the 
other parties, or is it expressed through our use of language in a particular and 
demonstrative linguistic construct through lexicon, semantics and semiotics? 
The two theorists most prominent in describing these two elements are Noam 
Chomsky in his research on universal grammar (Chomsky, 1965; Cook & Newson, 1996) 
and Cartesian Linguistics, and Jürgen Habermas, known for his theories on social 
communication, making a distinction between the use of communicative language and 
strategic language (Habermas, 1984, 1990; Schaefer et al., 2013). Their work has served 
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as the foundation for a substantial amount of research and theory-building relative to this 
human peculiarity of communicative rationality and abstraction. Each was particularistic 
in our discussion of mediator and disputant behavior and its representation through 
spoken and written language. Specifically, this study established a primary cause of 
intercultural dissonance in the Arab-Israeli conflict by examining the origins, cultural 
nuances, and behavioral implications manifest by spoken Arabic and Modern Hebrew in 
conjunction with earlier described cognitive processes. Each represented a high context 
and low context culture respectively with their concomitant influences on cognitive dual 
processes and manifest predispositions. 
A brief summary that brings together both bodies of theory will be helpful. In 
short, according to Chomsky (1975) and others (Laitin, 1977; Palmer & Palmer, 2002; 
Szalay, 1981; Van Valin, 2000) the human brain has evolved into a genetically defined 
neural mechanism that allows us to construct an interactive schema between 
environmental stimuli captured by our sensory net, a representative symbol for that 
stimuli and its ascribed use-value to the actor (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). The combination 
of symbolic representation and use-value became key variables in the cognitive equation 
that dictates self-expression and social interaction by means of verbal interaction.  
De Cordemoy (1667) provided an excellent summary that answered the historic 
question of what makes us human. He was regarded as holding in contention the 
behaviorists who regarded all social interaction as merely the acquired and 
operationalization of experience without regard to how that experience is processed and 
subsequently expressed. Indeed, de Cordemoy is considered by Chomsky and others as a 
true “rational romantic,” and whose focus is captured in his statement that, “the most 
189 
 
fundamental feature of humanity is a certain type of linguistic interaction, not an 
unsupported metaphysics of sociality” (p. 151). 
These two schools of thought support our assertion of innate capacities facilitating 
and informing social interaction and so are in consonance with the behaviorists. Together, 
they transcend the nativist constructs of mechanistic responses to social influences; the 
human as automata that operates solely within a finite library of information and unable 
to effectively create appropriate and beneficial responses to new situations as credited to 
the lower animals (D’Andrade, 1995; de Waal, 1982; 1996; Dewey, 1983; Flack & de 
Waal, 2000). Were nativism the case, predictability in human behavior would by 
something less than mundane and mediation would be nothing more than completing a 
predictable puzzle, unfulfilling in its success and tautological in its essence. 
 Instead, we humans have the unique ability to respond to an infinite number of 
complex situations by utilizing the innate capacities of evolved cognitive systems; 
coupled with cumulative environmental and interactive experiences we can produce both 
predictable and spontaneous responses in constantly changing environments and we 
manifest that in some form of written or spoken language. In short, as humans, we can 
adapt to almost any situation. Indeed, in the parlance of the rational romantics, human 
behavior is unpredictable and flourishes in a milieu of communication.  They considered 
human behavior as “mystifying in its expression” and remarkable in its capacity to 
spontaneously evolve relative to time and space (Cook & Newson, 1996; Palmer & 
Palmer, 2002). The position of nativists seems pale in comparison to how Miller and 
Page (2007) refer to human beings as a “complex adaptive system.” 
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These studies, shown valid by contemporary research in neurology and the 
cognitive sciences tell us that our humanness permits us to express not only our passions 
but to speculate on them, to interrogate them, to have ideas and to be able to 
appropriately respond to any new and complex situation, indeed the manifestation of a 
complex adaptive system (Kihlstrom, 1987; Miller & Page, 2007). Language is regarded 
by the cognitive sciences and social philosophers as a derivative of our inner selves 
(Burton, 1969; Chomsky, 1965; Dik, 1989; Grenfell, 2011; Harman, 2000; Hume, 1751; 
Kant, 1781), and as will be shown later, an accurate evaluation tool of self-expressed 
social strategy and a valid, generalizable predictor of future behaviors (Hynes, 2007; 
Hubbard, 1999).  
But, although the mechanism of language is finite, its ability to synthesize 
incoming environmental stimuli and the formulation of appropriate responses both 
abstract and material in the form of self-expression is infinite. However, those infinite 
formulations, or schema is influenced and often mitigated by the socio-cultural 
environment, be it social or physical as it requires stimuli to work as an engine requires 
fuel (Greene, 2004; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Habermas, 1990; Harman, 2000; Hamlin et 
al., 2007; Wynn, 2008). It is the kind of fuel that generates the type of response, that is, 
“the brain only knows what it sees.” Chomsky (1965) has referred to this phenomenon as 
a “poverty of the stimulus” and cites the incredible capacities in our evolved systems to 
process so little input from the environment. For example, a child commands a very small 
lexicon but has the capability of expressing a wide array of complex and abstract 
communications that its parents can interpret. Note however, that their interpretation is 
embedded within the confines of a similar socio-cultural library of experience. An 
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interesting study would be the investigation of the level of understanding between 
adoptive parents and children who begin to socialize a child from another culture, already 
possessing the primary experiences of its birth culture. 
The information necessary for the brain to recognize and value symbols coming in 
through its sensory net is heavily influenced by the conditions present in the resident 
environment (Hamlin et al., 2007; Wynn, 2008). The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis speculated 
that the language first acquired by an individual serves as the lens through which they see 
the world and it is through this lens that the brain establishes a first look to a new 
situation. However, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis does not provide a comprehensive theory 
on language as a biological and subsequently as a behavioral mechanism; it does provide 
the stuff of inquiry relative to the state of language as a defining environmental tool that 
can influence future behaviors, that is, birth to a certain age and post developmental 
stages of comprehension and cognitive functioning (Kohlberg, 1969, 1981; Marcus, 
2004; Miller, 2011; Piaget, 1952).   
Szalay (1981) conducted research that supports the findings in Chomsky’s (1972; 
Cook & Newson, 1996) theory of Universal Grammar that humans, while possessing the 
machinery necessary to process language, required environmental information for its 
initial activation and continued maturation. In addition, these inputs were symbolic 
constructs representative of that particular cultural environment and as such, they 
hypothesized, would have values consistent with their specific use, (i.e., use-value). This 
validates the Sapir/Whorf position of one’s primary language serving as an interpretive 
lens through which the person perceives his or her surroundings. At the same time 
though, Szalay maintained that these cultural use-values, could serve to obscure the 
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message between speaker and listener, in effect causing a background noise impeding 
accurate interpretations eventually leading to conflict through misinterpretation and 
misunderstandings, that is, cultural dissonance. 
Szalay and Windle’s (1968) study compared a ranking of “stimulus words” 
semantically understood across Korean, English and Colombian speakers; something 
referred to as a “translation equivalent.” Two important observations were discussed. 
First, when applying stimulus words to semantic use-value, that is, the importance of the 
word relative to resident culture, Szalay found that when moving between languages, 
there was only a 40% equivalency in interpretation and conceptual visualization. For 
example, the respondents were asked the importance of a word, e.g., rice, relative to other 
words. 
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Figure 3. Szalay’s model of communication 
The Korean speakers ranked rice as first and related it to social position, hunger 
and poverty where Colombian speakers only ranked it as a food source, similar to English 
speakers. The difference in semiotic importance between languages showed a greater-
than 5% significance when ranked within and between cultures. This is also reflective of 
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the use-value afforded in contrasting high and low context cultures. Their findings were 
supported by later findings in the work of Laitin (2001), and Harman (2000).  
If we refer back to the level of discord potential between tangible and intangible 
social facts that we discussed earlier, and associate it with the Szalay work, the 
probability of conflict as regards cultural dissonance comes even more into focus. In this 
case, rice is a tangible thing and offers only a slight language equivalency. Imagine the 
disparity between the interpretations of use-value between intangible stimuli such as 
political ideology or religion, each embedded in specific definition-ascribing cultural 
milieus. This also lends evidence to the importance, and veracity of Haidt’s (2008) and 
Kohlberg’s (1969) work in Moral development and moral maturity. Together, these 
concepts framed the Camp David Accords and the interpersonal associations that 
influenced its mediation process and eventual outcome. 
Predictably then, the second most important finding in the Szalay (1981) research 
was the great difference in translation equivalence when comparing words that described 
tangible and intangible things. Tangible subjects had a more significant equivalence than 
did intangible subjects. In many instances for example, a car was still a car, but the notion 
of “social,” “poor,” or “equality” showed vast potentials for misinterpretations across 
languages and more often associated with specific cultural utility, hence we again 
identify this gap as a differential “use-value.”  
This finding is significant in our examination of mediation and mediators as it 
points to the difficulty in conducting such socially-based processes across cultures, 
particularly if those negotiations are conducted in a third, non-native language to one or 
more stakeholders as it identifies what Szalay referred to as minimal “intergroup 
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associative affinity.” His issue would be compounded depending on the number of 
translations that were necessary between speaker and listener in multi-party negotiations, 
(i.e., what population of neural processors, each manifesting their own use-value, does 
the sender/listener have to traverse). 
Okanabe’s examination of the semiotics between high and low context cultures’ 
use of language (Ting-Toomey, 2001) is of interest in looking at the potential difficulties 
in multicultural mediations and directly applies to the Arab/Israeli mediations before and 
during Camp David. One might also extend that difficulty to current conflicts in the 
region. His examination of Japanese and English speakers gives more support to both the 
Chomsky’s and Habermas’ positions. He found the former tends to view verbal 
transmissions as a means of communication only. Non-verbal and extra-verbal 
transmission at times assumed a greater importance than the verbal dimensions of 
communication. Conversely, words and rhetoric represented truth and power in a low 
context culture utilizing Modern Hebrew, particularly as regards communicative and 
strategic rationalities outlined by Habermas and scientifically demonstrated by Nieme 
(2011). 
In a comparative study of Somali and English speakers, David Laitin (1977) 
examined two significant variables that serve as a source of conflict between non-native 
speakers; the cultural power in language development reminiscent of the work by Sapir 
and Whorf, and the delivery path of language between sender and receiver. He found that 
Somali speakers were often non-confrontational, tactful and had an “emollient” semantic 
style. Coming from a High Context Culture (HCC), the Somalis were seen too often to 
“test the waters” of a mediation environment before engaging in an effort to avoid losing 
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face. In contrast, the English speakers were more confrontational in their delivery with a 
more angular style. They, in contrast to the Somalis, were considered abrasive and 
aggressive in the delivery of their semantic message. The English were from a low 
context culture where individuality and success trumped face-saving behaviors. It was 
important for the former to “get along” within the confines of a smaller community as 
opposed to a low context culture that valued individualism over community.  
Cohen (1990) made similar comparisons between Arabic and Hebrew language 
styles focusing primarily on the delivery and semiotics of the messages between sender 
and receiver. Essentially, the structure and the purpose of the language used by each 
group were directly linked to its historic purpose as demonstrated within the confines of 
the different cultural contexts, (i.e., semiotics and semantics). 
The structure of the definitions and symbolic representations (semiotics) of a 
specific language reflects a culture’s collective memory (Cohen, 1997; Geertz, 1983). It 
is a derivative of culture and finds its essence in the stores of social experience. It then 
provides for its own replication and growth through individuals’ cognitive calculations 
that yield relevant perceptions unique to the speaker’s and listener’s world and the 
necessity to classify and categorize it for future reference. Essentially, as we learn and 
experience new things, if there is no existent term to be associated with it, we create one 
(Chomsky, 19765 1972; Grenfell, 2011). That definition is then transmitted throughout 
the culture of residence and assigned a use-value: first individually then throughout the 
collective. We can assume the use-value established by the collective is a general one 
since individual experiences with the object will elicit individual use-values relevant to 
197 
 
the observer. However, that individual use-value will be weighed against the collective 
designation (Ting-Toomey & Chung, 2011; Tomasello, 2008) as a mitigator of action. 
It becomes an almost abductive realization (Peirce, 1931-5, 1958) that the most 
significant source of cultural dissonance, and one that translates directly into difficulties 
in mediation environments, is one of competing semantic and semiotic nuance coupled 
with culturally specific use-value. So, in this case, foreign policy initiatives transmitted 
through speeches and media coverage would, in line with our discussion of 
communicative rationality, be encoded by a speaker and decoded properly at home, but 
remain unacceptable or even unintelligible in the other conflict party’s arena.  
This was observed frequently between Egyptian and Israeli leaders prior to the 
Camp David Accords in 1978 where each would transmit his interpretation of the results 
of negotiations to their respective audiences which was met often with outrage and 
enmity by the other (Aronoff, 2014; Cohen, 1990; Quandt, 1986b). Clearly, in reviewing 
the speeches of these two leaders Sadat and Begin, following with a review of their critics 
on both sides, the positions taken by Ting-Toomey, Szalay, Cohen and Habermas shed a 
bright light on the cognitive findings of language as a derivative of culturally mediated 
thought. 
Recognizing Szalay’s and others’ results and with an eye towards Sapir-Whorf, 
Chomsky and Habermas provide the foundation for building insight into not only 
mediator behaviors, but the reasons behind why mediations often prove less than 
successful. They also indirectly show why the contact theory of Allport (1954) that has 
served as a driving force in the development of restorative justice texts and mediation 
strategies, is not only lacking in practical validity, but could serve as a catalyst for 
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increasing conflict (Beber, 2010; Tal-Or et al., 2002; Umbreit & Armour, 2011; Zajonc & 
Markus, 1982). They set the stage for our position that humans are endowed with innate 
capacities for certain behaviors, specifically, predispositional bias, but that these can be 
modified (or exacerbated) according to environmental inputs and expressed through 
specific concept building and situational language, that is, communicative or strategic. 
We begin with Chomsky’s discussion of Cartesian Linguistics. 
Cartesian Linguistics 
The origin of human communication has been explored for millennia. The task of 
its interlocutors was to simply and concisely explain the elements of what allowed us to 
understand each other and how this differed from other “lower” species. The concept of 
“Cartesian Linguistics” begins with Descartes’ philosophical quest of identifying the 
specific mechanisms that hierarchically separated humans from the lower animals (1989). 
From Plato to Chomsky, the most accepted descriptor that served to define “humanness” 
was found in language and its capacity to provide us with the unique aptitude for 
expressing our inner thoughts and form new statements unrelated to direct participatory 
experience but appropriate to new situations at both physical and abstract levels. This was 
called a “species specific” capacity (Chomsky, 2002). 
Descartes (1989) and de Cordemoy (1667) maintained that animal “language” 
was within the confines of a mechanical explanation since it primarily described a 
communicative tool that was stimulated by the instinctual needs of survival and species 
maintenance, re., their “passions.” Animals could not and were not able to express what 
something meant to them, how they felt about a particular situation or speculate on a 
future event. External factors merely served to stimulate their innate passions which were 
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expressed in fairly predictable and observable ways (de Waal, 1982, 1996; Dik, 1989; 
Flack & de Waal, 2000). 
Conversely, humans may choose not to respond to an external stimulus that would 
drive a lesser animal to distraction as they occur outside of the passion-driven 
environmental envelope (Palmer & Palmer, 2002; West-Eberhard, 2003). Indeed, humans 
are often self or externally regulated by “social convention.” Language, described as 
being the primary organ of thought and reason, could cause humans to not engage a 
situation but rather to avoid it for sometimes irrational reasons as one has a discussion of 
alternatives with himself using language as the medium of self-communication and 
expression (Damasio, 1994; Forbes & Grafman, 2010; Gilovich et al., 2010). We can see 
this, recalling our earlier discussion of cognitive processes, as the conscious component 
of Greene’s dual process (Greene et al., 2004).  
Durkheim referred to this repeatedly in his study “On Suicide: A Study in 
Sociology” (1997), where the decision to not end one’s life could be made at the 
precipice of a deadly action for inexplicable reasons. He called this human choice. 
Human language, according to Descartes, served as the medium of self-reflection and 
facilitated an internal discussion leading to the rational choice of not engaging a non-
rational act. Both acts, the choice to commit suicide, and the eventual rational decision 
not to employ suicide as a solution to stress are not witnessed in animals as their passions 
are predicated on survival. De Cordemoy observed, “One cannot attribute man’s 
linguistic abilities to the natural disposition of his organs. Only animals live in a world of 
states of affairs” (1667, p.39). 
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In the early days of linguistic study, the driving force among theorists was clearly 
to show what difference(s) existed between humans and lower animals relative to the 
content and complexity of their communication. Language served to provide a consensus 
and focused upon the kind of “mechanical” or “automatomistic” communication utilized 
by animals in responding to primal demands and the “creative” form of semiotic and 
semantic structure seen in humans. The language of animals was simply a communicative 
device of command, reporting location, food source or sexual availability. Human 
language in contrast was ostensibly free from control (sans influence) by any outside 
stimuli and served the important purpose of being the tool of introspection and self-
expression (Chomsky, 1970; Dik, 1989; Grenfell, 2011). 
This epistemic discussion centered on the inability of current linguistic theory to 
explain the coherence, novelty (in terms of creating appropriate responses to new 
situations) and relevance in normal (human) speech. De Cordemoy (1667) provided the 
observation that, “to speak is not to repeat the same words that one has heard, but to utter 
different words in (appropriate) response to those” (p. 23).  A.W. Schlegel (in Chomsky, 
1970; Van Valin, 2000) posited that human language may arouse in both the speaker and 
listener ideas of “things that they have not directly perceived but know only by verbal 
description or that they aren’t able to intuit sensuously at all because they exist in an 
intellectual world” (p. 42). 
Schlegel (1829) romantically referred to language as “an ever-becoming, self-
transforming, unending poem of the entire human race.” Their theme was the 
boundlessness of human language and its utility for self-expression and as a creative 
mental act that is manifest in any medium in which it is embedded. It is this last point, the 
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variety of social environments in which the linguistic mechanism is found, that this study 
will capitalize upon in evaluating the self-expression of the mediator and disputants of 
Camp David as reflected in their writings and speeches. 
In order to place the use of language within the framework necessary to explain 
how it can be used to evaluate the potential for success or failure in any conflict 
mediation, we must begin with how it is formulated, moving beyond the distinction 
between what constitutes the difference between human and animal communication that 
is more the work of linguistic anthropologists and evolutionary psychology. Essentially, 
we are moving beyond the brain’s generative capacity for language to its expression 
outside of the individual examining speech as a social phenomenological construct and 
the primary culprit in dissonant cultural conflict.  
We are regarding language as a reflection of behaviors or actions of some sort 
(Chomsky, 1975), influenced by both innate mechanisms and culturally defined use-
values. Note this does not exclude those environmental stimuli that can be described by 
‘instinctive’ human response, or what Greene might consider an element of the 
unconscious equation in dual process cognition. Cognitive psychologists would place 
these activities as a non-executive function of the lower brain (Palmer and Palmer, 2002). 
According to every discussion found in linguistic theory, speech underlies any human act 
which is both a derivative of thought and internal schema; it explores pragmatic 
competence, the epistemology of how language is related to the situation in which it is 
used.  
In his examination of Universal Grammar, Chomsky built upon the work of 
Humboldt (1854) who did not consider a particular language simply a memorized list of 
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words that allowed a speaker to assemble and reassemble sentences appropriate to a 
situation as might a nativist; this would require the human brain to possess an 
incalculable storage capacity of both lexicon and semantics. Rather, Chomsky speculated 
in his concept of ‘semantic fields’ that the brain innately had certain organizing and 
generative principles that could produce those appropriate responses, after learning a 
finite list of (locally relevant) words over time (Chomsky, 1965; Cook & Newson, 1996). 
The fundamental property of language was its capacity to use these finite mechanisms to 
respond to an infinite set of social situations through lexiconic assemblage and 
associations; “it must make infinite use of finite means” (Chomsky, 1972). 
The semantic fields Humboldt and Chomsky spoke of undergo a metamorphosis 
with experiential history (Geertz, 1983; Nanda and Warms, 2011). This history is in part 
a result of the cultural environment in which the speaker finds herself embedded. 
Incorporating Greene’s dual process theory, Chomsky’s innate generative mechanism of 
the brain for language serves as the unconscious, utilitarian side of the semantic equation. 
The conscious portion of the process is seen in the application of use-value captured and 
defined through cultural exposure. Over time, the consciously acquired use-value 
becomes internalized as an unconscious modifier in the development of (language based) 
responses. This is not to say, since there is not yet reliable empirical evidence that this 
use-value becomes part of the innate generative mechanism, only that it becomes a 
generally unconscious factor in the semantic field and one that can influence the 
speaker’s behavior acting derivatively as a tool for social interaction (Mikhail, 2011; 
Miller, 2011).  
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Coleridge (1893) made this point when he said that “each exterior (referring to 
language) is the physiognomy of the being within.” He was guiding us to try and 
understand that language reflects both the internal machine and the external facts that 
influence that machine in the construction of socially based interactions. Clearly then, a 
speaker from one culture could easily have difficulty understanding another culture’s 
response to a situation since the use-value of symbols represented through language both 
in lexicon and semantically as intimately defined in one and systemically different from 
another. We see that the development of a culturally influenced language that can shape 
predispositional as well as manifest behavior could very well be the seed of cultural 
dissonance and tragic misunderstandings that result in interpersonal and interstate 
conflict.  
The general presumption of Chomsky’s universal grammar, is that the basic 
schema of language construction are known unconsciously and that they serve also as a 
precondition for language acquisition and utilization (Cook and Newson, 1996). This is in 
conflict with behaviorists that see language purely as a construct of social interaction. 
Chomsky (1965; 1970) went on to subsume that experience (defined and accepted by the 
speaker’s social group) was necessary to activate (stimulate) this internal mechanism.  
We know from studies in cognitive neuroscience that these physical mechanisms 
do not reside in a single location of the human brain’s geography, but rather are 
interconnections of several centers that comprise an internal logic, sensory network and 
active memory (Greene, 2004; Casebeer & Churchland, 2003; Cahill, et al, 1995). The 
insinuation of active memory further supports our assumption of cultural influences in the 
construction of language and the essential nature of captured and internally motivated 
204 
 
use-values. Feral child studies (Curtis & Krashen, 1978) provide additional support to the 
necessity of external stimulation of an innate language ‘mechanism.’  
To summarize, language acquisition can be thought of in the same way we regard 
the process of moral development outlined by Kohlberg (1971; 1981) or the process of 
cognitive development described by Piaget (1952). All are a matter of the growth and 
maturation of finite genetically programmed systems that require stimulation by external 
stimuli to activate the program or to modify its content (Casebeer and Churchland, 2003). 
The optimal development of these capacities occur within a relatively fixed time during 
intellectual development, becoming atrophied over a short period of time if not 
stimulated as demonstrated in earlier behavioral and cognitive studies (Richardson & 
Boyd, 2005). 
Language, while being influenced by and a direct reflection of the speaker’s 
socio-cultural environment, is essential in her perceiving and interacting within that same 
environment. Its other important function is the conscious and unconscious (assimilated 
through the sensory net) assignment of a use-value to the environmental symbols the 
brain observes.  Again, this assignment occurs at the level of both personal and cultural 
experience facilitating acceptable (moral) social interaction. The work completed by 
Szalay and others supports the assumption that if this use-value is taken outside of the 
socio-cultural environment in which the speaker is embedded the potential for 
misinterpretation by listeners and cultural dissonance increases significantly because of 
what is called ‘noise’ shown in figure 2 above. 
We postulate then, that since language is acquired through innate cognitive 
processes and matures within the influence of the speaker’s resident culture and through 
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the resultant perceptual constructs define certain (culturally relevant) behaviors, then that 
agent’s interaction in other cultural environments might be impacted negatively 
principally as a result of misinterpretation or misunderstanding (Szalay, 1981). According 
to Amir (1998) Augsburger (1992) and others the misunderstanding of relevant 
definitions and perceived deviant behavior by an extra-cultural actor serves as a primary 
cause of cultural dissonance particularly as it impacts a mediator. The indicators of this 
dissonance and its manifestation will be seen in the translation, understanding and 
language equivalence of the speaker and contrasted with the perception of the listener. 
Essentially, Chomsky (1970) is examining the mechanism of language and Habermas 
(1984) is examining language as the principle “binding and bonding force” of any socio-
cultural group. 
Habermas and Communicative rationality 
It might be prudent to offer a brief summary of Habermas’ (1984) theory of 
communicative rationality before deconstructing its true complexities as it relates to 
conflict mediation. At the base of any language is the assumption that it serves only as 
the transmission medium for the thought attached to it by the speaker. Her guiding yet 
unconscious presumption is that this thought will be decoded and understood by the 
listener in exactly the same way it was understood by the speaker (Habermas, 1990; 
Geertz, 1983). The success in communication rests upon the ability to achieve a mutual 
and pragmatic understanding, equivalence of definition and symbolic use-value between 
the two actors. Language is essentially the transmission mechanism with an implicit 
capacity to communicate a speaker’s inner thoughts effectively and accurately.  
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The success of the (communicative) action could not be possible however without 
at least some basic level of inter-subjective agreement between speaker and listener. In 
other words, speaker and listener may very well comprehend the lexicon and syntax 
attached to a native or non-native language as a native English speaker might understand 
the rote learning of French, but it is our position that the symbolic use-value embedded in 
those languages are ascribed based upon a formulary of innate unconscious rules as 
described by Chomsky, and the conscious reception and cataloging of cultural 
information, a dual process described by Greene and others. All of this projected on the 
backdrop of Moral Foundations. 
Driving our need to communicate then, is an evolutionary necessity for human 
interaction (Gilovich, Kesner and Nesbit, 2010) that results in some determinate social 
achievement. This is critical to the mediation process, that the participants will interact 
and interpret messages sent to them accurately and avoid inaccurate interpretations of 
encodements, i.e., use-value, that could lead to disastrous escalations resultant of the 
unintentional misrepresentations and false perceptions of another stakeholder; ‘words are 
the face of language’ (Cook and Newson, 1996). This concept points to the weaknesses in 
Allport’s (1954) original research. Bringing two parties into proximity where one or both 
suffer from deep seated misperceptions of each other, and lack the resources necessary 
for language equivalence is doomed to failure before its undertaking. A similar assertion 
is made in Laitin’s (1977) and Cohen’s (1997) research findings outlined above. 
The chance for misinterpretation either on the part of the speaker or listener is 
inherent to the transmission process yet unexpected in any communicative exchange 
while at the same time both speaker and listener have a common expectation of content 
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equivalency in messages sent and received. The universal assumption of understanding is 
premised upon an unconscious expectation of mutually shared use-value of symbolism 
between discussants, e.g., that a red apple in one language is expected to be the same red 
apple in another language with identical color and expectation of taste and shape (Burton, 
1969; Brewer, 2007; Cohen, 2001; Dehaene, et al, 1998; Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005). 
This is also the premise of Laitin (1977) and Ting-Toomey’s (2011) concept of language 
equivalency although ‘use-value’ is more comprehensive in its premise and complexity.  
Intrinsic to this interaction is an unconscious assumption on the part of the 
speaker, of a universal value system attached to her words that is equally distributed 
amongst everyone in the hearer’s listening group, i.e., that thing T has the same meaning 
and value to speaker S as to listener L due to the assumption by S that T possess a 
universal understanding of and use-value by L (Habermas. 1990; Schaefer, et al., 2013).  
The potential for misinterpretation is rooted in two particular genres, the cultural 
and the innate capacities of humanness. First, reminiscent of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 
(Sapir, 1936) the cultural influences of the speaker that ascribe use-value to a word or 
concept serves as the perceptual lens of preference through which the speaker sees the 
world. But the focus afforded by that lens may be culturally unique or situational, not 
common to the other cultural lens through which the listener perceives those same 
symbolic representations. Second, in combination with the schema of environmentally 
edited neural programming (Greene, 2007; Haidt and Graham, 2007; Tancredi, 2012; 
Turiel, 1983; Wright, 1994), that use-value becomes part of an evolved dual process 
(Greene, 2004) that might predispose the speaker/receiver toward particular behaviors 
that are both consciously and unconsciously perceived as being the best or most obvious 
208 
 
course of action (Haidt and Nosek, 2007; Haidt, Koller and Dias, 1993). Communicative 
rationality described by Habermas begins to illustrate this dilemma and points to the 
difficulties of cultural dissonance in multi-cultural mediations. 
Language for thought and language for Achieving Goals 
Humans communicate in two interactive environments, one internal using 
language as a precursor to thought (at both conscious and unconscious cognitive levels), 
and the other external which facilitates social interactions within and outside of their 
groups. We will focus upon the latter external language with an understanding that our 
internal language is the result of the former (Chomsky, 1965; 1970). Our external 
language serves two purposes according to Habermas, one being oriented toward 
understanding between individuals, and the other being goal oriented. 
Habermas (1990) makes clear the difference between the kinds of communicative 
action based upon the preferred goal of the speaker. These motivations focus on either 
emancipative (communicative) reasoning or strategic (instrumental) reasoning 
(Habermas, 1990; Grenfell, 2011). The first, emancipative or communicative reasoning is 
representative of everyday communications and is necessary to facilitate social 
integration and cooperation. This kind of communication was the result of an evolved 
need for cooperation within groups to assure both individual and collective well-being 
(Bashkow, 2004; Bayart, 2005; Bechara, et al, 1997; Boehm, 1999; Schifrin and 
Schneider, 1977; Schwartz, 1992; Tal-Or, Boninger, Glenicher, 2002) much along the 
same lines as MFT’s notion of “Binding Foundations.”  
It also served the important function of establishing an individual and group 
identity that focused upon the recognition, valuation, interpretation and behavior resultant 
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of symbols or environmental elements unique to the speaker’s socio-cultural arena. 
Significant research has shown how an individual’s identity is intimately linked to 
uniquely recognizable group symbolism, e.g., the American flag, the Star of David, the 
ISIL flag or the many ‘gang’ colors evident in many locally defined neighborhoods 
(Bourdieu, 1990; Brewer, 2007; Bunzl, 2004; Colarosi, et al, 2008). Note that within each 
group, the identity has inherent to it, certain cultural elements which will influence the 
use-value placed upon goal oriented language and as well place into action other moral 
capacities that will predispose environmental responses. 
Reflective of the group’s division of labor and parallel to our discussion of culture 
based use-value, this kind of communication was the direct result of needing to describe 
the speaker’s local environmental inputs; agricultural societies would need to be able to 
communicate at a level necessary to that economy, while a post-modern or Bedouin 
culture would need to do the same amongst their own group members. This need extends 
beyond tangible elements and also describes non-tangibles such as ideologies of political 
systems.  
Similar to the studies by Szalay (1965) and Ting-Toomey (2001), a plow may 
have extreme use-value in the former agricultural economy, but of little use or even 
comprehension in the latter Bedouin society or value equivalency to an urban dweller. 
One of the central themes of this study focused on a differential use-value of occupied 
land in Egypt by Israel. Egypt’s President Sadat saw the land as something equivalent to 
his life’s blood, he was the land. The Israeli Prime Minister Begin on the other hand, saw 
the occupied land as a tangible possession, whose occupation defined his country’s size 
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and ultimately its identity (Aronoff, 2014; Perlmutter, 1987; Cassirer, 1988; Cohen, 
1990; Kelman, 1982; Quandt, 1986a; Sadat 1978). 
So, according to the Sapir-Whorf concept, the cultural lens through which an 
individual sees her world, is an internal reflection of culturally captured use-value and 
influence, or communicative reason, and facilitates collective problem-solving within the 
group. We can easily pair this concept with the aforementioned dual process theory of 
Greene (2004; 2007) when he describes a system of inherent moral desirability based 
upon the evolved need for group harmony and consciously controlled cognition relative 
to goal-directed interactions. 
Habermas regarded emancipative or communicative language as “ordinary” and 
the “original mode of language” as it was tasked with facilitating the common 
understanding of environmentally relevant symbols between group members (Habermas, 
1990; Nieme, 2011; Schaefer, et al, 2013). Shared encodements were social, assuring 
group consensus and progress and at the same time satisfying the binding concepts 
articulated in the Haidt research (2008). This is similar to the concepts of language 
equivalence and use-value. Its genesis through communicative reasoning was inherent in 
expressed language and semantic systems. Hence, communicative reasoning was 
considered ‘moral’ as it was oriented positively towards others. Being greatly influenced 
by Max Horkheimer and his discussion of free and critical thinking in his book Eclipse of 
Reason (2013), Habermas was keenly aware that humans often acted in a self-interested 
yet rational way.  
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The Neuroscience of Emancipatory and Strategic Communication 
In evaluating the way in which humans attempted to establish and maintain social 
relationships while at the same time assuring self-efficacy, Habermas concluded that 
there were two kinds of communicative action. The earlier alluding to communicative or 
emancipatory action was focused toward group consensus where another form of 
communication, strategic reasoning, was aimed more toward individual, utilitarian 
activities. The former he considered as desirable and morally premised, the latter he 
considered antisocial, parasitic, and therefore morally undesirable; these were mutually 
exclusive categories (Harman, 2000; Huttunen & Heikkinen, 1998; Schaefer, et al, 2013). 
Research by Nieme (2011) and Schaefer, et al, (2013) demonstrated using the fMRI, that 
communicative reasoning and its associated language activated moral and emotional 
centers in the brain while strategic reasoning did not thus supporting both Greene’s dual 
process theory and Haidt’s work in moral foundations theory and our premise of use-
value assignment. In reviewing the moral dilemma scenarios used in both Kohlberg’s and 
Haidt’s research, we can see how this is relevant. 
Strategic or instrumental reasoning was shown as purposive and necessarily a 
conscious cognitive process oriented toward the (strategic) utilitarian use of other people 
in pursuit of the speaker’s self-interested goals; “a calculative manipulation of words and 
intent to fulfill an ego-based need” (Nieme, 2011). This stands in contrast to 
communicative reasoning that is aimed at group harmony and collective understanding, 
the morally positive, socially interactive facilitator. We must point out however, that this 
type of strategic reasoning, although individually goal-oriented is still part of a system of 
collectively accepted use-values unique to the individual’s cultural lexicon. It was clear 
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that Habermas had equal regard for both modes of reasoning but prioritized the former 
emancipatory communication over the latter strategic communication relative to peace 
and harmonious social interactions (Habermas, 1990; Schaefer, et al, 2011). 
Communicative Deliberation 
Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality began from the premise that to 
understand a sentence’s meaning from the perspective of both speaker and listener is to 
first understand what makes it acceptable. Without belaboring the above observations of 
Okanabe (in Ting-Toomey & Chung, 2011), Ting-Toomey (2012) and Szalay (1981), we 
can simply allude to the impact of semantic use-value for both. In other words, when we 
speak or when we listen, we assume two positions. First, we assert that our belief in what 
we are saying is true and second that we possess information that upholds our assertion 
be it real or imagined. In short, we believe what we are saying is true and you should 
believe what I am saying is true and correct. This provides motivation to both speaker 
and listener to some reactive engagement. 
This is foundational to Habermas’ assertions and at the same time separates two 
aspects of language Habermas regarded as mutually exclusive communicative and 
strategic language; the first necessary for social maintenance and the second a utilitarian 
use of others through manipulation, much of what we see in mediation. Habermas 
considered strategic action as parasitic because its success could only be achieved 
through the use of a communicative, truth-based position of the speaker, i.e., what the 
speaker had encoded in her message was transmitted to the listener within a presumed 
frame of truth (Habermas, 1990; Schaefer, et al, 2013). However, the comprehensive 
validity of that statement, while presumably based in truth, may very well be manipulated 
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beyond its commonly recognized veracity in order to influence the listener’s behavior to 
the speaker’s satisfaction or desired outcome; purely an act of self-interest. 
Strategic Deliberation 
In his theory, Habermas (1990) described two classes of the strategic use of 
language, one manifest the other latent. The manifest use of (strategic) language would 
appear as one would expect, the implementation of overt threats to the listener in an effort 
to directly influence a listener’s behavior, i.e., “if you don’t do A, you can be certain B 
will happen.”  
Here, as would probably occur in a dissonant communicative exchange, there is 
no reaching of an understanding between speaker and listener in the conduct of mutually 
acceptable cultural maintenance. Rather, the speaker’s desired result is reached by 
invoking a measurable and presumably less then beneficial consequence to the listener. If 
that consequence to the listener is removed from the exchange, the strength of the 
message toward the listener is mitigated and perhaps rendered inconsequential. The 
success to the speaker is determined by the revealed consequence to and acceptance by 
the listener. Here, the strength of that consequence stands as a derivative of the listener’s 
‘symbolic use-value’ promoted by the speaker, i.e., if the object of the threat has no use-
value to the listener, the threat is essentially mute. 
Conversely, a latent use of strategic language is the concealing of the explicit 
consequence to the listener as revealed in a manifest exchange of the speaker’s attempt to 
achieve a desired result. This kind of threat is not open to challenge or rejection by the 
listener due to the hidden nature of the threat or condition as uttered by the speaker. In 
both cases, the desire by the speaker to arrive at some mutual understanding is absent. 
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According to Schaefer, et al (2007), “Manifestly strategic utterances are sheer 
impositions of will on others, while latently strategic actions are a form of deceit and 
manipulation.”  
The determining factor in distinguishing between communicative and strategic 
function is the intent of the speaker. Huttunen and Heikkinen  (1998)  describes the kind 
of ‘incentive’ to the speaker in determining the species of use in terms of Kant’s (1781) 
categorical and hypothetical imperatives; the former referring to the intent of the speaker 
being a primary cause of duty where the latter was indicative of the speaker’s own 
inclinations or desires. Kant argued, as did Habermas, that the categorical or 
communicative use of language was first and foremost in the maintenance of the human 
society and that strategic action was centered in self-interest, e.g., non-moral and 
parasitic. Greene agreed in his examination of how our brains process such strategic 
positioning (Greene, 2007). 
According to Habermas, all strategic language relies upon instrumental reasoning. 
The speaker begins with a set of goals and constructs linguistic schema in which to 
satisfy them. In the case of strategic reasoning and its derivative language, the primary 
source of success in this exchange is extra-linguistic, re., the overt or concealed threat. To 
be clear then, instrumental reasoning upon which strategic language is premised is non-
social and within the construct of technical rules such as shooting a gun, hammering a 
nail, picking up a package. Parenthetically but no less important is the Nosek, Haidt and 
Graham’s work (2009) that alludes to the linkage between western legal interrogation and 
non-moral, strategic calculation. 
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The strategic employment of language relies on the exertion of some kind of 
influence on the part of the speaker while communicative use of language depends upon a 
mutual understanding, more egalitarian between speaker and listener. Communicative 
action seeks to organize social interaction by agreed upon mutual and functional benefits 
while strategic action coordinates social interaction in a non-egalitarian fashion usually 
through extra-linguistic means (Habermas, 1990). Since both aim toward the realization 
of a successful plan, Habermas (1994) and Schaefer, et al., (2013) regards these as 
teleological actions, the only difference is how each achieves its goal. 
Since both communicative and strategic actions are premised upon the intent of a 
speaker and the belief systems of both speaker and listener, a distinction must be made 
between the two. A belief is a product of cultural interaction and socialization. They are 
about such non-tangible things as political positions, considerations of social 
performance, etc. They are dependent upon and interact with social approval and group 
consensus and are therefore not private or unique to the individual speaker or listener 
(Habermas, 1990; Nieme, 2011; Schaefer, et al, 2013). 
Desires, however, are resultant of a different mechanism and are heavily weighted 
by the internal perceptions of the individual relative to use-value and personal goals. 
These are not subject to public examination and justification and are more subject to 
social pressures and psychological influence. How one influences the other could serve as 
another topic of research in the cognitive sciences, but they are alluded to in the studies 
by Greene and Haidt (2002) and others (Grenfell, 2011; Gilligan, 1982; Fowler, 1997; 
Burton, 1969; Bourdieu, 1984; Bechara,  et al, 1997) in their examination of dual process 
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and moral foundations theories. Clearly, the ascribed and unconscious use-value of 
linguistic constructs is an important consideration. 
We can summarize Habermas’ discussion of speaker/listener interaction by saying 
that ‘communicative action’ seeks everyday conflict resolution by reaching mutual 
understandings between speaker and listener. Earlier discussions allow us to associate 
this type of communication with high context cultures (Ting-Toomey & Chung, 2011) 
and we can intuitively assume that low-context cultures will often more utilize strategic 
communication particularly when engaging cross-cultural mediation (Zajonc & Marcus, 
1982).We have examined the inherent meaning of ‘understanding” in our discussion of 
symbolic use-value as regards semiotics and semantics and its importance in establishing 
various levels of social interactions. This mutual understanding Habermas (1990) 
regarded as being moral and desired from a social interaction perspective. 
Strategic action is purposive and relates to the utilitarian nature of social 
interaction by the speaker in pursuit of self-interest. Strategic action is more goal-oriented 
towards the future where communicative action is episodically directed. Both actions are 
indicative of complex communication styles each heavily dependent upon the presumed 
understandings and perceptions of speaker and listener each embedded in the consonant 
or dissonant cultures.  In each case however, and in agreement with Habermas’ assertion, 
each action has associated with it an ascribed level of moral judgment as a product of 
dual process cognition. 
The Neuroscience of Communicative reasoning 
Early research in the neuroscience of human social cognition were those that 
came from observing subjects who had suffered various levels of social and physical 
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dysfunction resultant of injury or ill health. The most famous case was that of Phineas 
Gage, an American railroad construction foreman. The victim of a construction accident 
in mid-1800, Gage suffered a traumatic injury that severely damaged a portion of his 
brain that is now known to participate in the moral regulation of cognition and social 
actions, i.e., the assignment of use value to symbols and calculated actions (Harlow, 
1848; Damasio, et al, 1994).  
Gage was previously seen as a moral, hardworking and responsible man never 
prone to emotional outbursts and demonstrating a good balance between his intellect and 
‘animal propensities’ (Harlow, 1848). Following the injury his family and friends 
reported him frequently demonstrating loud and verbally abusive outbursts using the 
‘grossest of profanities’ over relatively minor incidents escalating with to the point of 
fearsome actions.   
Clearly, the mechanism that regulated the balance between acceptable and 
unacceptable social behavior, i.e., the moral and the non-moral, the collection of brain 
centers that are responsible for the comparative processes between moral foundations and 
action, were apparently deactivated and subsequently dysfunctional as the result of the 
injury. Contemporary examination of Gage’s case, utilizing both the exhumed remains 
and similar more contemporary cases showed the complete annihilation of an area of the 
brain thought to participate in moral decision-making, the ventromedial lateral pre-frontal 
cortex (Moll, et al, 2002; Van Horn, et al., 2012; Yamada, et al., 2012). An interesting 
corollary to the Gage case is that over time, the balance between intellect and behaviors 
necessary for social functioning returned to him (Harlow, 1848; Van Horn, et al., 2012). 
The speculation was that Gage “learned” to control his violent outbursts and 
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inappropriate behaviors. As we have shown, that learning is a byproduct of social 
experience and apparently centered in other, non-dysfunctional areas of the human brain. 
Clearly, the whole notion of use-value is a paradox, a mechanism compartmentalized and 
at the same time multi-faceted. 
Contemporary research using fMRI technology has validated the initial findings 
that portions of the human brain are tasked with regulating social interactions premised 
upon the (moral) weighting, i.e., use-value, of various behaviors as well as how those 
behaviors are expressed through language (Greene, et al, 2004; Leube, et al, 2012). 
Further, it adds validity to Greene’s dual system theory in that the injury impacting a 
control center can be overcome through social learning and experience while 
demonstrating a (mechanical) capacity to process and interpret experiential data.  In 
effect, if we infer from Greene and Haidt’s conclusions, this data is demonstrative of an 
actor’s ability to override unconscious behavioral preferences or predispositions. 
Other research shows that these control centers are important to our understanding 
the elements of moral behavior and their antecedents. These data also validate the 
relevance of our current discussion of Habermas’ communicative action as being moral 
and strategic communication as being non-moral or parasitic. The case of Phineas Gage, 
evaluated with the aid of modern technology sets the stage for the final considerations of 
language as a tool for the facilitation and difficulties in the mediation processes. 
Studies by Nieme, et al, (2011) showed that the reasoning manifest in 
communicative action activates the moral centers in the brain while strategic reasoning 
does not. It also showed that emotional centers in the brain were more active in testing 
for communicative reasoning and less active in strategic testing (Bigler, et al., 2007; 
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Greene, 2007). Researchers found that the degree of neural activity was also dependent 
upon the variable use-value of the descriptive test language used in the testing format 
(Robertson, et al., 2007; Moll, et al, 2002). The fact that these areas of the brain 
demonstrated activation resultant of experiential recall, i.e., short and long term memory 
centers, and social perspective-taking shows that moral sensitivity is individualized and 
dependent upon use-value relevance. That relevance is, importantly, mitigated by 
normative cultural structures. 
While the capacity for moral sensitivity is normally a universal one, its expression 
is varied dependent upon this use-value as defined by cultural relevance and experience. 
The same moral sensitivity when applied to using strategic language, again recognizing 
the importance of symbolic use-value, does not activate these moral control areas. Rather 
it facilitates the activation of the centers in the brain dealing more with logical 
econometric calculation supporting the Habermasian position of strategic reasoning is 
more one of self-interest and utilitarianism (Casebeer & Churchland, 2003; Churchland, 
2011; Nieme, 2011).  
Based on contemporary linguistic and cognitive sociological research, we can 
conclude that if two different cultures are involved in a conflict mediation, particularly if 
a third language is used in primary communication, re., utilizing ‘assumed’ universal use-
value by the interpreter(s),  and given that strategic and communicative reasoning differ 
not only in moral and social terms, but also appear different in the recruited neural 
network of language production and processing,  that we will observe two different and 
competing linguistic structures that activate two different brain complexes. This will 
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impact the perception of preferred, i.e., moral, actions between actors ultimately 
increasing the potential for an unsuccessful mediation attempt. 
If one linguistic structure encounters the other in debate, each possessing 
symbolic use-value based on cultural experience (presuming Chomsky’s unconscious 
universal mechanism for processing) but differing in the use of communicative and 
strategic constructs during negotiation, adding to that the premise of language 
equivalency, then moral conflicts inherent to separate communication structures and 
mechanisms cannot help but ensue making mediation less likely to succeed or at least 
make it more difficult. Indeed, if my culturally based, emotionally charged perceptions 
are challenged by one of differing use-values, it is more than likely that my entire armory 
of moral defenses will be brought into play. The next section operationalizes these 
positions by examining Arabic and Hebrew languages and their potential for conflict 
through misunderstanding or as Cohen (1997; 2001) has labeled “the negotiation of the 
deaf.” 
Language Summary 
The previous discussion demonstrated a link between the predispositions of 
humans toward behaviors in social interactions and the genetically defined machinery 
that facilitates it. These evolved predispositions (Graham, et al, 2008; Haidt, 2008; Haidt 
and Nosek, 2004; 2014) are posited to facilitate and manage the sociocultural and 
physiological requirements of the individual relative to her own survival. Observation of 
these predispositions by others within a social milieu serve to define one’s individual 
identity as well as an affiliated group identity based upon compliance by the actor to 
collectively defined norms. The importance of each of these environmental elements by a 
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single group member or the collective has been linked to an a posteriori ‘use-value,’ 
ascribed collectively through experiential history within a socio-cultural milieu, i.e., trial 
and error as operationalized by a mechanism providing an a priori element for 
comparison of preferred outcomes. 
It has been the goal of this study, without the use of technology designed to 
observe and catalog the function of different neuroanatomical structures in humans, to 
establish a valid demonstration of these behavioral predispositions and the influence on 
them by directly observable cultural elements (social facts) and how these impact 
mediation processes. By linking prior research in cognitive psychology, developmental 
anthropology and evolutionary sociology, we can infer these associations between neural-
functioning and social behavior as it relates to the determination of whether or not 
mediation is more likely to result in success or failure based upon the unconscious 
predispositions of the mediator. This study stands to lend support to the seminal work by 
Augsburger, Bercovitch and others in cross-cultural dissonance and its impact upon ADR 
systems. Hopefully, examining the influence of experiential history on the use of 
language used by stakeholders from different cultures and how importance is ascribed to 
that lexicon by being informed by evolved cognitive systems, we will be able more aptly 
match mediator to conflict and increase rates of sustainable success. 
We have shown that the most apparent and recognizable demonstration of a 
human’s predisposition towards another is found in her use of language. Linguists have 
said that language is the reflection of an individual’s inner thoughts, a manifestation of 
self, and a derivative of experience. There can be no doubt that we express our most inner 
thoughts, our emotions and our desires through the use of culturally impacted 
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communication structures. One need only explore the shelves of the local library where 
vivid descriptions of science, geography, astrophysics and an author’s inner most 
personal reflections can be read and sometimes become transformative to the reader 
because at some emotional level, what the author has to say is important to or ‘clicks’ 
with the reader. If vocalization is added to the process, additional emotional responses 
may become apparent (Churchland, 2011; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen, 
2001).  Nieme (2007) has shown us that different kinds of Habermasian communications 
stimulate different parts of our brains, calculative and emotional, dependent upon our 
purpose in engaging a particular semantic representation.  
Studies by Laitin (1977) Cohen (1990; 2007; Curtis, Fromkin and Krashen, 1978) 
and others have shown that language is a derivative of culture. According to Sapir (1925) 
and Whorf (1993), culture is also a function of language. How we express ourselves and 
the value with which we use specific descriptors are pulled from a catalog of cultural 
experience, not as Descartes (1989) would have us believe, from a predetermined set of 
reactions. Cohen (1990; 2007) says that language is the “collective memory, the archive 
of culture, the shared existence of a civilization” and supports the assumption by 
Chomsky (1972) that the perceptions afforded by this collective memory serves to edit an 
innate mechanism of expression and understanding by the individual and her resident 
group.  
Research shows that language is a continually evolving, complex adaptive system 
in that as needs for description arise, necessary to individual or group survival, new 
lexicon will develop and be incorporated into the cultural library (Geertz, 1983; Miller 
and Page, 2007). How that is expressed is then mitigated by the normative parameters 
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and local nuance of the culture experienced by the speaker. What is important here is the 
semiotic and semantic specificity of an individual’s language both written and spoken.  
Habermas (1984) has established that dissonance of understanding between 
speaker and listener based upon the absence of equivalent lexicon (Ting-Toomey, 2012), 
use-value, semantic fields and cultural definitions has shown to be almost a tautology 
relative to misunderstanding between speaker and listener. If applied to cross-cultural 
mediation, is it is regarded as a primary cause of mediation failure (Augsburger, 1992; 
Beber, 2012;; Bercovitch, 1996a; Burton, 1969; Gartner, and Bercovitch, 2006; Gaertner, 
et al., 1994). 
David Laitin (1977) describes the dissonance that can occur as a result of the 
above concerns. He studied the verbal communication patters of both Somali and English 
speakers. English speakers demonstrated a probative, confrontational and angular style of 
speech common to debate and prosecution. This type of communication is common to 
low context individualist cultures where the concern is not for the group, but more for the 
establishment of the individual’s power and position relative to other members of the 
group. His findings were reflected in Okanabe’s study of signal words used in a 
comparing language equivalence between Korean and western speakers (Ting-Toomey, 
2012). 
The Somali style of communication was common to a collectivist high context 
culture where every word is examined and taken personally; saving face is of utmost 
concern in a close community (Avruch and Black, 1993; Augsburger, 1992; Lederach, 
1995; Woodward, 2006). The Somali pattern, was more indirect and sought to find a 
common ground upon which to establish a mutual problem-solving semiotic field. This 
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style was more concerned with making the listener comfortable and the speaker often 
embellished or manufactured untruths in pursuit of mutual accommodation and comfort. 
This is necessary in communal existence where face to face interaction cannot abide 
extended ill-feelings. The speaker might contemplate, why make someone uncomfortable 
when it is not necessary, the truth will always and eventually avail itself.  
 As will be shown later, high context language styles are often considered 
misleading and suspicious by low context cultures in its effort to establish a speaker’s 
strategic position without making an explicit commitment that could entail a loss of face 
(Cohen, 1990; 2001; Fisher, 1997). Clearly, the ‘origin by necessity’ of a particular 
language in all of its parts, serves a specific function based on environmental needs of 
both the individual and the community, and is heavily influenced by cultural definitions 
and collective cultural experiences which might not be understood by otherwise 
differently motivated cultural groups (Forbes, 1997; Gent & Shannon, 2011; Greig & 
Diehl. 2012; Jervis, 1976; Koch; Margolis, 1987). 
This exemplifies the difference in Habermas’ communicative and strategic 
rationalities in language transmission. Also important is the origin of the language under 
investigation; what were the environmental conditions that led to its development in 
terms of its lexicon and semantics and how long a history does it have that would lend to 
its rhetorical repository and modification over time and circumstance. Sapir and Whorf, 
while assuming language served to be the lens of cultural experience failed to examine 
closely and therefore assign it a role as a primary source of dissonance between conflict 
parties, a topic to be examined where Arabs and Israelis serve as the chief disputants. 
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Spoken Arabic and Modern Hebrew 
The Arabic language found its origin within a social environment that reflected a 
collectivist ethos where lexicon and semantics were often localized and relevant to 
particular sociocultural needs, e.g., agriculture versus Bedouin (Cohen, 1990; Owens, 
2001). Language emanated from pockets of shared dictionaries of meaning that were the 
result of historic collective experiences within and between tribal communities. Shades of 
meaning could be insinuated both verbally and non-verbally, received by other in-group 
members being interpreted as it was transmitted where outsiders would be left without 
understanding (Cohen, R. 1990; Cohen, B., et al, 1957; Irani, 2000; Kelman, 1982) due to 
dissimilar linguistic influences. This discordance would often lead to serious 
misunderstandings between tribal communities who did not have access to the shared 
knowledge of in-group members; a phenomenon not unusual in communities of 
mechanical solidarity (Durkheim, 1982; Cohen, 1990; Geertz, 1982). 
 Speakers could transmit their messages through implication in a fashion, much as 
Laitin 1977; Owens, 2001) had seen in the Somali language, which permitted the 
speaker’s attempt at discovering common ground for problem solving without making the 
listener uncomfortable (Wittes, 2005). Indeed, because of the close daily proximity in the 
collectivist culture, discretion and indirectness were a necessity; what was not said, what 
was assumed to be understood was often more important than what had been said. 
Language fulfilled more than to function as a mechanism of fact transmission in this 
environment, it was a device that defined and solidified social relationships (Cohen, 
1990; 2007; Geertz, 1983). 
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Cohen (2007) describes the Egyptian culture as one of high context where every 
verbal and non-verbal nuance must be weighed and considered with particular care. The 
speakers know that each word or motion or inflection will be scrutinized with an eye 
toward the group’s welfare, every word will be taken personally and every linguistic 
misstep will be internalized and placed in the listener’s emotional permanent file. 
Directness and contradiction are vehemently disliked in the collective Arab culture as it 
might be seen to challenge one’s position, sometimes causing the loss of face and 
subsequent social standing (Cohen, 2001; 1990; Ting-Toomey, 2011). Retribution for 
such action ranged from the immediate to the protracted. 
Concomitantly, it is anathema for members of Egyptian and other high context 
cultures to transmit any statement that might cause distress in the listener. That is not to 
say that Arabic is not marbled with hyperbole. Indeed it is necessary in the production of 
effect. Hyperbole is not necessarily meant to convey any direct transmission of 
information (Owens, 2001). It is more a method of linguistic theater, used to establish an 
image of intensity and exclamatory significance. The Arab speaker qualifies his own 
apparent lack of concern for hyperbole by saying, “they are only words” (Cohen, 2001; 
Owens, 2001). A possible origin for this sentiment aside from communal proximity and 
harmony may lie in the consideration of the Holy Koran. While a relatively more recent 
phenomenon in comparison to the long linguistic history of the Arabic language, the Holy 
Koran might be regarded as s synopsis of linguistic particularism in the Arab world.  The 
faithful accept that God had said everything there was to say and therefore, use of words 
and their understanding was a matter of rational predetermination. 
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 Explicitness and precision in the transmission of information, what Habermas 
might refer to as being rooted in strategic rationality, is not preferred; why cause distress 
when the speaker can maintain civility through imprecision and inaccuracy. The 
implementation of seemingly unimportant probing and small talk is simply a mechanism 
to avoid embarrassment on the part of the listener/speaker. Clearly, as evidenced by 
Nieme (2011) and Patterson & Rogers (2007), this endless inquiry is based in emotional 
and conscious cognition while being represented within the moral mechanisms of human 
evolution (Graham, Nosek & Haidt, 2012). 
To someone outside of this speaking collective, the high context speaker may 
appear insincere, untrustworthy and generally suspicious. In this study, indeed the Israeli 
Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan, exemplified this position by questioning the 
truthfulness and sincerity of the Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat (Quandt, 1986b; 
Perlmutter, 1987). Sadat was the exemplar of Arabic linguistic structure and tradition in 
his lugubrious overtures to negotiations that were shown to be peppered with 
embellishment, unsupported facts and exaggerations, often elevated by the Arabic 
tradition of hyperbole (Moaz & Astorino, 1992).  
To Sadat, his presentations in his written speeches, letters to Carter and Begin as 
well as his video presentations, that were perceived as insincere or dishonest by Israelis, 
were merely a laminate of convoluted courteous necessity, in his culture, to preserve 
social harmony. Similarly, according to Cohen (2001), Sadat’s outward suspicion of 
Begin in their initial exchanges were not regarded as deviant by other Arab interlocutors 
but a necessary filter searching for hidden meaning in what the Israelis were saying. 
Unfortunately, to someone like Begin who knew very little about Arabic culture this 
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suspicion was viewed as Sadat’s showing a lack of trust or goodwill nor an intention to 
negotiate honestly (Cohen, 1990; Kelman, 1982; Wittes, 2005). The Arabic saying, ‘these 
are merely words,’ certainly had no purchase with Israeli listeners who came from a low 
context culture of Talmudic scholarly tradition to be discussed below. 
Arabic hyperbole and linguistic structure have its roots in the bardic, oral tradition 
of Arabic poetry. The epitome of this tradition is seen in the Prophet’s writings in the 
Holy Koran (Cohen 2001; Geertz, 1983; Owens, 2001). Arabic linguistic structure 
evolved to become the highest expression of culture and importance in the Islamic 
population. Geertz (1983) posited that Arabic had the ascribed position of being the 
language of God and to speak it is to represent God’s creation and plan, something not to 
be challenged. It becomes apparent why Arabic speakers go to such lengths to gather 
information, to make certain that their listener is comfortable at the expense of telling a 
complete truth or misdirection. According to the Arabic tradition, argumentation does not 
reveal anything new, as everything has already been revealed as God has already stated it 
(Owens, 2001). Language then, becomes a reality in and of itself, not merely the 
representation of reality to be interpreted by humankind. Barbara Koch (1983), in her 
study of Arabic rhetoric, states, “The idea that some fresh insight can be derived from 
logic or empirical investigation is antithetical to the serene tradition of Islam that all that 
is worth knowing has already been revealed by God.” 
Making the link between the two Habermasian communicative rationalities now 
becomes a simple exercise in neurobiology. Churchland (2011), Haidt (2008) and Moaz 
and Astorino, (1992) have shown through their research that any religious referent 
activates the specific areas of the brain that address emotion and empathy. Haidt and his 
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colleagues (2012) and Mikhail (2011) have shown the difficulty in agreement that occurs 
between emotion-based and calculative based cognition in two groups, i.e., individualistic 
and binding groups. Examining the two styles of language used by negotiators in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict demonstrates a clear delineation between strategic and 
communicative styles used respectively by the two disputant teams and the subsequent 
dissonance that separated them. 
Low Context Linguistics: The Culturally Heterogeneous Israel 
The creation of the Israeli State in Palestine brought together Jews in the diaspora 
from many corners of the world. Each individual community had over many generations 
created cultures and languages that were a reflection of their local socio-cultural 
environment; a language representative of local need. In the early years of Israel, when 
these many immigrant groups converged, joined by a biblical impetus toward an Israeli 
homeland, people were sensitive to subcultural differences. Yes, they were all self-
identified as Jews, but each had brought with them the cultural and linguistic nuances that 
identified them with their own cultural history, from Russia, from Germany from Poland 
and 80 other countries (Cohen, 2001; Perlmutter, 1987; Pappe’, 2015). Language 
provided its own inherent perceptions the environment both current and historic. 
Each had unique mannerisms, dress, and accents that provided them with a 
personal and group identity. However, maintaining this individual, multi-group identity 
and the semantic subcultures that more than partially defined them was not conducive to 
establishing a unified State with a single recognizable identity (Bayart, 2005; Brewer, 
2007). It was necessary to integrate and to assimilate a unified identity in this new 
collective, the social purpose being to establish cultural borders that separated the new 
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Israelis from those who were not. The first and most important step in establishing a 
‘Jewish’ identity, was to establish a commonly used language, recognized semiotic and 
rhetorical coding, and their subsequent perceptions of reality defined through this new 
collective lens. Overall, the Zionist founders needed to ‘rediscover’ spoken Hebrew; one 
that had not been commonly recognized for centuries (Wexler, 1995; Glinert, 1996; 
Fellman, 1975). 
Language is a reflection of a group’s experience, its rhetorical history describes 
the use-value of symbols, the perceptions of an interactive environment, a ranking of 
those interactions and the filing away of the results for future reference from both group 
and individual perspectives in conscious memory or as the emotional flags utilized by the 
brain in search of its recognizing actionable patterns (Dehaene, et al, 1998; Damasio, 
1994; Casebeer & Churchland, 2003). Rhetorical history is a databank of utility 
(Chomsky, 1970). In the process of establishing a Modern spoken Hebrew, non-spoken 
codes of behavior, entire linguistic structures were sacrificed for universality (Wexler, 
1995; Glinert, 1996). Flourish that comes with cultural and rhetorical history was given 
over to simplicity and directness. Words came to have individualistic high use-value as 
they represented truth and power; defining an individual by his use of semantics and 
semiotics, defining a culture through its perceptions of reality and interactional 
consequences. 
In the Modern spoken Hebrew, language has a different purpose from its Arabic 
counterpart (Wexler, 1995). Language is used instrumentally as opposed to socially 
(Cohen, 1990; Koch, 1983). Modern Spoken Hebrew tends to be individualistic and 
modern in its lexicon and semiotics having only been established around 1947 with the 
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Zionist movement (Sa’ar, 2007). In Modern Hebrew, very little meaning is implicit 
within the context of articulation and transmits facts without the cushioning ancillaries 
seen in high context Arabic (Glinert, 1996).  
Bluntness and directness are equated with honesty and position as a result of a 
language short on modern historic inferences. This exists in a community that is not 
possessive of the same face to face intensity seen in Arab community experience, what 
Durkheim (1992) would refer to as a group possessing an organic type solidarity. While 
community is valued, it is at the national rather than the clan level (Koch, 1983; Owens, 
2001). Implicitness and suggestion is lost on the Modern Hebrew Israeli speaker. 
Insinuation and elusive rhetoric, if perceived at all by the Israeli is not admired and 
considered untrustworthy (Amara and Spolsky1986; Cohen, 2011).  
Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defense Minister often asked whether or not Anwar al-
Sadat, the President of Egypt, could be trusted (Dayan, 1981; Quandt, 1986b). This was a 
result of a Hebrew speaker short on tolerance for indirectness and embellishment 
listening to the flamboyant deliveries of an Arab speaker intimately linked to a semantic 
rich in semiotic and poetic history (Owens, 2001; Cohen, 2007; Parkinson, 1985).  
 Face has little value in the low context Israeli society and therefore one is less 
sensitive to what others say to or about them in direct contrast to the high context Arab 
speaker. To the Modern Hebrew speaker like Dayan, language is considered primarily a 
mechanism for transmitting information, the context of which is important to the speaker 
who assumes linguistic parity with the listener (Fellman, 1975; Glinert, 1996; Grice, 
1989; Owens, 2001). Unlike the Arab speaker, an Israeli would never say, “these are 
merely words.” Hyperbole is never dismissed as empty in meaning or purpose. They are 
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taken simply as delivered by the speaker. Terms of abuse in Modern Hebrew like 
invectives, are borrowed from other languages, usually Arabic or Russian giving us a 
sense that hyperbole, while used in Modern Hebrew, is only a borrowed mechanism of 
little importance perhaps necessary to give an image as opposed to a reality (Amara & 
Spolsky, 1986). 
Similar to Arabic, Modern Hebrew has its roots in religious study. However, 
while Arabic finds its substance and purpose in the Holy Koran, establishing it as the 
primary basis for its semiotics, Modern Hebrew takes only its mechanism from Talmudic 
study, a language more geared toward legal interrogation and aggressiveness (Crosby, 
1953; Wexler, 1995). Where Islam considers the substance of the Prophet’s revelations 
God’s final word as told, the mechanism of Talmudic study focuses on constant 
questioning, exegesis and probity (Cohen, 2001; 2007; Owens, 2001; Fellman, 1975). 
Talmudic study encourages the reader/speaker to investigate for the best solution, that 
blueprint provided by God.  
In the Talmudic tradition, it is humankind’s obligation to challenge, to extrapolate 
and to seek the answers to existence that God did not provide, but did provide humans the 
(innate) tools necessary to support that inquiry (Fellman, 1975; Glinert, 1996; Cohen, 
2007; Koch, 1983; Wexler, 1995). The Zionists preserved and insinuated the laconic tone 
of the Talmud into Modern Spoken Hebrew (Fellman, 1975; Cohen, 2001). The ability to 
win an argument then, is premised on skillful reasoning and dialecticism essential to legal 
presentation, and carried over into everyday dialog considered by Habermas 1990) to be a 
strategic form of communication. This epistemic development of Modern Hebrew would 
explain the many comments (and research observations) regarding Menachem Begin’s 
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direct, probative, almost interrogation of each participant in the Camp David process. It is 
also evident in his writing and speeches, to the point that President Carter, in his 
preparation for his first Begin meeting, found one of Begin’s speeches to the Knesset, 
“frightening” (Carter, 1982). 
Contrast this to the semiotic origins of Arabic speakers that considers 
argumentation and empiricism to have no purpose in revealing anything new, as God has 
already revealed everything of earthly relevance through his prophet. The Islamic sense 
of a collection of indisputable truths is absent in Judaism that conversely encourages 
debate. So Modern Hebrew is branded with a literary heritage of biblical and legal study 
which was a primary binding agent of diaspora life. Primary local nuance was present 
and oft provided a sense of individual cultural identity to a Jewish speaker. But to this 
new Israeli population a universality in mechanics was essential in establishing a more 
universal and recognized Jewish identity (Glinert, 1996; Wexler, 1995). The structure of 
Modern Hebrew then defined not only a cultural group, but the individuals within it. Its 
proper use required a keen sense of the power of spoken (and written) language and its 
strategic delivery as a logical presentation (Cohen, 2001; 2007; Crosby, 1953; Dik, 1989; 
Fellman, 1975; Sapir, 1936). 
This use of language as a strategic tool employed by Hebrew speakers makes 
clear a primary reason for dissonance between Israelis and Arabs. Menachem Begin, the 
Prime Minister of Israel and principle to the 1978 Camp David accords, has been 
described as being a keen intellect trained in the legal dissection of the Talmudic texts. 
Cohen (2001) observed in transcripts and Stein (1999) bore witness that unless Arab 
disputants involved in the Accords, specifically Anwar Sadat, did not present a 
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semantically sound irrefutable presentation of a proposal that it would not be taken 
seriously by the Israeli listener(s). A sentiment reflected in the Quandt descriptions 
(1986b). The Arabs, hearing and perceiving doubt and contradiction on the part of the 
Israeli speakers would take that personally as a loss of face. This was apparent to 
observers throughout these proceedings and pointed to a primary cause of dissonance 
between stakeholders (Quandt, 1986b; Wittes, 2005). 
Mediator Bias and the Perception of Neutrality 
We discussed earlier how the emphasis placed on neutrality by researchers as an 
independent variable effecting mediation outcome points to an environmental fallacy of 
basic reasoning. Theirs is a failure to recognize the mediation process as a specific 
problem-solving social interaction in which each participant, including the mediator, 
enters the negotiation process with distinct interests and influences, some consciously 
manufactured others the result of innate predispositions at play in our dual-process 
schema. Problem solving and its requisite decision-making engage both the calculative 
aspect of conscious cognition but is overshadowed by unconscious (evolved) modifiers 
(Tancredi, 2010; 2012; Churchland, 2011; Greene, 2007; 2014). 
 Each agent, through his or her own bias and intent, has a distinct impact on the 
mediation process, one which is mitigated by internal and external influences serving to 
modify the physical and social structure of the dispute’s representation inside the 
mediation environment. Specifically, cultural dissonance and ideological constructs. As 
well, the mutually held perceptions of the agents are one subject both to earlier 
predispositional perceptions and their evolution as a result of current interactions. 
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Disputants, by definition often have an inherent distrust of each other, suspecting 
a move toward some apparent or hidden agenda (Cropanzano, et al; 2003; Dahaene, 
1998; de Waal, 1982; 1996). While researchers have established the major characteristics 
that often need to be present before disputants decide to go to mediation, i.e., timing, 
intensity and nature of the conflict and the characteristics sought by disputants relative to 
the selection of a particular mediator, there appears to be a theme throughout the 
mediation literature that shows preference to the neutrality of the mediator. In Meta 
studies by Bercovitch (1996a) and Beber (2012) the variable of ‘perceived neutrality” 
was not addressed. Yet, a cursory review of thematic content seems to indicate this 
presumption of neutrality by many authors in qualitative research. This has been shown 
not only in the literature on mediation but also throughout many of the cognitive 
sciences; developmental anthropology, cognitive psychology, and the neurosciences 
examining the evolution of moral cognition (Greene, et al., 2004; Haidt, 2008; Kohlberg, 
1981; Mikhail, 2011; Piaget, 1953).  
In each, the innate expectation of a neutral listener is present. Habermas (1984) 
pointed to the same assumption concerning basic human communication; that there is a 
presumption on the part of the speaker, that the listener will perceive the message in the 
same manner in which it was transmitted and that the foundation of the message is based 
on truth. The question asked here is whether or not any agent can be completely unbiased 
and neutral given the knowledge that informs us from the cognitive sciences and how that 
manifests itself during a mediation process. Inherent to this question is the impact of 
stakeholder behavior on mediation outcomes. 
236 
 
Studies by Zartman and Touval (2007) have contrasted the utility of a mediator’s 
neutrality against the level of resources brought to the mediation. It is their position that 
objectives are fulfilled not when the mediator is unbiased or neutral, but when they 
possess and use resources that one or both disputants value such as political support, 
economic assistance or the threat of military intervention. This would be considered a 
directive type strategy. The value of these resources over the perceived neutrality of the 
mediator remains a point of debate and disputed veracity. 
The concern for neutrality is premised on the notion that human beings are 
inherently good and seek group harmony, that the categorical imperative of Kant (1781) 
guides us in our everyday interactions (Rawls, 1971; Dewey, 1922; Schweder, Mahapatra 
& Miller, 1987). In his 1954 book “The Nature of Prejudice,” Allport (1954) discussed 
the elements of in-group and out-group theory as it might apply to mediation processes. 
His premise was that people tend to have a positive outlook concerning their ‘in-group’ 
and will tend to show bias toward it and maintain or manufacture prejudices and negative 
stereotypes of out-group members. These prejudices and negative stereotypes were the 
seeds of intergroup conflict (Brewer, 2004; Tal-Or, Boninger & Glenicher, 2002). There 
is debate today as to whether or not this prejudice is indeed genetically founded, having 
evolved in the same fashion as our moral machinery; its express purpose being the 
homogeneity of the group (Boehm, 1999; Bouchard, 2004; Brewer, 2004; Cook, 1971; 
Kuper, 1988; Kurzban, Tooby & Cosmides, 2001) 
Mediation, by its nature, gives the mediator broad powers in structuring the 
mediation environment and the shaping or reshaping of the relationship between the 
disputants. This power is ostensibly granted consensually by the other stakeholders as a 
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required premise for a third-party intervention (Bercovitch, 1996b). However, from what 
we have discovered concerning predispositions that are shaped by the mediator’s own 
home culture, and the way in which language is used as an expression of internal thought, 
we could posit that by the very structure of the mediation process, the biases of the 
mediator are given free-reign to manipulate the outcomes toward those very biases at 
some measurable level both inherent and overt so that in essence, neutrality of the 
mediator is at best difficult and at worst an obstacle to mediation success and 
sustainability. 
The use-value of certain symbols utilized in the strategic and communicative 
process of mediation is what is used to frame the conflict and establish the foundations of 
discussion that will contextualize and direct the process. While the task of the mediator is 
to construct a basis of common understanding for negotiation, in effect to try and 
overcome the predispositions of the disputants, we must ask whose perceptions have been 
paramount in establishing that lexicon and its associated use-value that ostensibly 
displaces or supplants the disputants’ native concepts. In other words, we are exploring 
the possibility that the processes inherent to the mediator coupled with the conscious and 
perceived influences of cultural norms that define use-value, may be absent in, or in 
conflict with those same elements found in each disputant. 
While mediators are ethically bound not impose their desire for particular 
outcomes on disputants, we maintain that it is naïve to assume that the mediator can 
remain completely unbiased, not only throughout the mediation itself, but prior to her 
engagement with the parties to the conflict. Bercovitch (1992) has provided empirical 
evidence to supports the notion that mediators from the same “bloc” or cultural area are 
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more likely to be acceptable and effective in negotiations than those from other “blocs.” 
He further goes on to express that a state involved in mediation activities are more likely 
to appear neutral to those other states with they share a more common or recognizable 
cultural history and similarity, thus a symmetric use-value library. This begs the question 
unanswered by Bercovitch and others, why? 
Bercovitch, in later studies concluded that it would be foolish to assume complete 
mediator neutrality towards conflict parties before and during mediation processes. While 
Bercovitch (2007), Beber (2012) and others (Augsburger, 1992; Lederach, 2010; Brewer, 
2007; Calvert, 1985) never truly address the issue of bias causality beyond the level of 
‘cultural dissonance,’ ironically one of Bercovitch’s own criticisms (Bercovitch & 
Chalfin, 2011; Bercovitch and Gartner, 2009), the explanation of why dissonant culture 
predicts bias prior to and during mediation processes and how that bias might be 
recognized as a function of mediator behavior or its predispositions is never thoroughly 
explored. 
In a 2012 study conducted by Bernd Beber utilizing and supplementing the 
Bercovitch ICD database (2007), the subject of mediator bias and mediation success was 
directly examined. Beber’s definition of bias centered upon the mediator’s utility to 
assigning stakes to either side of the dispute. His was one of addressing material 
assignment without examining other forms of bias that can be revealed through an 
analysis of language indicative of internal thought (Chomsky, 1970; Nieme, 2005). 
Overall, he found that bias mediators were more likely to be ineffective since they 
showed to be less able to share conflict-relevant insights than their unbiased counterparts. 
He found that a perception of bias on one or more of the participants lent to distrust and 
239 
 
likely led to a lesser degree of effectiveness. Parenthetically, distrust has been linked to 
Haidt’s moral foundations (2012) and Kohlberg’s (1981) notion of moral development 
through both sociometric testing and fMRI data. 
This pays particular tribute to the idea that a mediator must be able to reshape the 
dynamic between conflict stakeholders. The reshaping of this relationships rests on her 
ability to displace commonly held perceptions by stakeholders of the conflict and the 
opposing sides (Calvert, 1985; Habermas, 1990; Fisher, 1997; Botvinick, etal, 2001; 
Kydd, 2003; Brewer, 2007; Bercovitch, 2007; Beber, 2012). This is accomplished by 
establishing common bases of understanding, definitions, symbolic use-values and 
resultant perceptions as informed by Habermas (1990) and others. However, this 
restructuring of communications and perceptions must be made by the mediator with the 
knowledge of how human beings perceive and behave as a result of those perceptions, 
not so much in an esoteric sense, but more of a functional one relative to cognitive dual-
process, decision-making processes. Without the trust of all stakeholders, the likelihood 
of accomplishing a sustainable resolution is minimized as observed by Jackson (1952). 
This concept is supported in the work of Kydd (2003) and Favretto (2009).  
Contact Theory and Neutrality 
Allport (1954) posited that increasing contact between intergroup members would 
decrease the negative images and make the description of adversaries to constituencies 
more accurate providing the venue for discovering intergroup similarities. He recognized 
that contact alone would not suffice to establish common recognitions, i.e., definitions 
and perceptions of the opposition. He needed to establish a sense of process inside 
intergroup meetings that transformed earlier perceptions with new presumably more 
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accurate ones. In effect, although the mechanics of it would had never occurred to him, 
ironic as the work of Jean Piaget (1952) had emerged a year earlier, Allport was 
searching for a mechanism that could edit or override what he observed to be inherent 
prejudices and misconceptions held by the conflict parties. He concluded that several 
elements had to be in place to make his ‘contact hypothesis’ a viable theory. 
His premise was that parties would get to know each other on a more personal 
level. But,  before this could happen the contact had to be held in a cooperative 
environment, the contact had to be sanctioned by an authority on all parts, to include the 
mediator (Allport, 1954; Deutsch, 1983) and finally that there must be equal status 
between groups during the contact situation. In short, Allport sought to minimize 
intergroup conflict by establishing a forum whereby commonly accepted definitions and 
perceptions inherent to interpersonal contacts are reestablished under the control of the 
(neutral) mediator. However, Allport, in his apparent lack of understanding the human 
psyche, was naïve in his presumption of any good that could come from direct contact 
between disputants. 
Forbes study (1997) supports this skepticism in his study that posited disputants 
often use direct contact to confirm prejudicial attitudes and perceptions. Also, the 
imposition of pseudo-equal status among historically unequal groups could simply serve 
to confirm that inequality through attitudes of subordination. This easily could lead to 
further validation of in-group and out-group status and prejudices contributing to conflict 
escalation. 
In concert with his criticism of Allport’s hypothesis, Forbes challenges the notion 
that misperceptions held between disputants are emotionally and cognitively based. He 
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asserts that according to ‘group identity theory’ that individual behaviors are profoundly 
affected by identification with groups and conformity to group norms. He concludes that 
a discussion of intergroup conflict cannot exclude the dynamics of intergroup process, 
although we consider his exclusion of emotional and cognitive processes a decided 
weakness in his findings as being unsupportable and derivative of the findings of theories 
in sociology. 
 Included in various hypotheses concerning human interaction during conflict is 
the notion that face-to-face contact between disputants and mediators promoted trust as 
direct contact eliminated what was perceived to be a bureaucratic screen that served as an 
interpersonal obstacle (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). They considered direct contact a 
mechanism by which the mediator could reduce suspicion and clarify impressions, 
getting one party to see the other as more human and on a personal level. Again, the 
researchers failed to consider the power of what we have shown to be inherent behavioral 
predispositions rooted in a brain’s cultural editing and hardwiring that is unique to each 
party and often specific to their resident social environment. These underlie the 
interpersonal perceptions of neutrality and trust (Rifken, Millen & Cobb, 1991; Savun, 
2008; Sinnot-Armstrong, 2008; Tal-Orr, et al, 2002) but are scientifically disputable in 
the cognitive world. 
Osgood (1962) and Kelman (1982; 1996) encourage direct contact between 
disputants and also posit this will lead to more productive mediations, later contradicted 
by Beber (2012). Their rationale is to cultivate more interpersonal relationships between 
participants which will lead to the uncovering of a conflict’s root causes and identify the 
unmet needs of the conflict stakeholders (Galtung, 1967). They maintain that these 
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increased interactions would decrease the negative perceptions of the ‘others’ and make 
descriptions of conflict participants more accurate setting the stage to explore intergroup 
similarities along the same lines as Allport’s earlier work. Lederach (1995) as well 
maintained that face to face contact reduces personal biases and hostility. What is missing 
from their discussion is the probability of one party using newly acquired information as 
an element of the manipulative power nexus described earlier, i.e., strategic 
communication. 
The weakness in their research presumes positive interaction simply by proximity 
or with minimal facilitation by the mediator, again neglecting the unconscious 
predispositions of the mediator (and the disputants) whose job it is to structure and serve 
as the cultural translator for that interactional field (Augsburger, 1992), which might also 
lead to situations where contact leads to distrust (Pettigrew, 1971; Trivers, 1971; Zajonc, 
1982; Zartman, 1994). These presumptions are reminiscent of the considerations of 
Augsburger (1992) of a non-official diplomatic subculture where mediating diplomats are 
‘friends’ outside of the office. 
During his role as mediator concerning the displacement of Palestinians as a 
consequence to the establishment of the State of Israel, Elmore Jackson (1952), the 
renowned Quaker mediator, encountered significant resistance on the part of the Israelis 
because of his past association with the Arab refugees. He was not trusted initially by the 
Israeli representatives despite his affiliation with the International Friends Service Group, 
a Quaker organization renowned for its impartiality and service. In his autobiography he 
concluded, “It will be nearly impossible for a single mediator, who is distrusted by one of 
the parties to carry out any useful function (Jackson, 1952). In their study of mediation, 
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Princen (1992) and Kaufman and Duncan (1992) echoed Jackson’s assertion in stressing 
the importance of perceived neutrality in the selection and acceptance of any mediator. 
Neutrality allows the mediator to fulfill his role as guide and facilitator by 
establishing clear and understood lines of communication that leads to trust-building and 
the reduction of tensions inherent to multi-cultural mediations (Augsburger 1992). 
Eventually, the trust built through this perception of neutrality allows the mediator to 
effectively modify and restructure the relationship between stakeholders within the 
process and at home as a clearer understanding of common values is established through 
what Habermas would consider a more communicative form of reasoning that has 
evolved out of strategic communications.  
Meta-studies of conflict resolution by Bercovitch, (1996b) Beber, (2010; 2012) 
and Amir (1998) have shown consistently that mediation, while the most commonly used 
for third party intervention, has proven to be only marginally successful (Bercovitch and 
Gartner, 2009). Mediation is a special and dynamic process that overall pivots on many 
queues from the conflict and mediation environments causing stakeholders to change 
perspectives, decisions and behaviors (Fisher & Keashly, 1991). At its core however, 
successful mediation, whichever way it is measured, comes down to the socially 
interactive relationships within and between the mediator and the disputants.  
Since it is not always possible to either observe or to interview disputants and 
mediators regarding potential biases prior to a mediation event, it is necessary to look for 
clues revealed in research that can be considered constituent to our questions and 
abductively arrive at a supportable and researchable conclusion. Gochman (1997) 
examined several characteristics of disputants and mediators, evaluating the outcomes of 
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process within the context of the internal characteristics of stakeholders. Gochman’s 
focus was upon the cohesiveness of political structures, homogeneity between social 
structures and relative resources of power resonant of Bourdieu’s and Amir’s work. It 
parallels the work of Gent and Shannon (2011) who posited that mediations concerning 
tangible assets were more successful than those where intangible concepts were at issue. 
 Gochman concluded that the closer to resembling each other these variables 
were, the more likely a successful mediation would result. The weakness in his research 
was a neglect to examine the relationships between successful mediations and the 
influence of asset type, i.e., tangible versus intangible. Regarding the power variable, he 
was most interested in how the respective spheres of influence within and between 
stakeholders were aligned concluding that states (and representative mediators) belonging 
to the same alliance or spheres of influence would share complimentary or 
“recognizable” interests, referring here to the value of those tangible interests. We can 
infer these results to Allport’s and others work in contact theory as well. 
Carnevale (1996) demonstrated that when previous relationships existed between 
stakeholders, a variable also examined by Bercovitch and Gartner (2010), stakeholders 
revealed common bonds in recognition, histories, experiences, value systems and 
interests. These acted to establish a degree of familiarity, rapport, understanding, trust 
and acceptability. In light of our consideration of dual process theory, this makes sense as 
the modifiers of the unconscious portion of cognition, borrows its assignment of 
definition and use-value from the same experiential library. 
In this context, Witmer, Carnevale and Walker (1991) showed that the perception 
of behavior of the mediator by other disputants was paramount to assessing actual 
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fairness, credibility and acceptability in mediation processes. When this same behavioral 
perception is reversed and the mediator is the observer, Baily (1985), Gibson, Thomas 
and Bazerman (1996) and Kaufman and Duncan (1992) regarded this to be a determinant 
of strategy used by the practitioner. In short, perceptions of behavior manifesting trust or 
bias works both for the mediator and disputants. In effect, each party is developing a 
conflict profile used in the present or the future to be used as a reference point in 
determining interactive behaviors. This is consistent, parenthetically, with Boehm’s 
(1999) and Kihlstrom (1987) work on mirror neurons and how humans respond to the 
present and previously observed behavior of others. We might also invoke Cooley’s 
looking glass self, but again, this neglects the importance of influence between the 
conscious and unconscious loop of cognition on behavioral decision-making. 
Their findings showed that this familiarity either with the experiential history or 
direct cultural interaction between conflict stakeholders, renders significant impacts on 
the success or failure of a mediation process. Bercovitch (1996b) showed that parties with 
similar political systems achieved a 74% increase in positive relations contrasting a 58% 
success rate between parties from dissimilar political systems. Heterogeneity between 
parties in their military, political, economic and cultural resources proved to be a 
causative variable in conflict escalation by Brecher (1993). His findings indicated that the 
underlying motivation for escalation due to these differences lie in the construction of 
misperceptions that mischaracterize the primary elements of the conflict and its 
stakeholders. This serves as more support for our position that intangible conflict 
elements are more likely to cause or be more difficult to mediate in a conflict. 
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In a study that examined mediations using data from 295 international conflicts 
between 1945 and 1995, Bercovitch and Houston (2000) studied the factors that 
influenced mediator behavior and choice of mediation strategy as it related to mediation 
success. Specifically, they looked at three dimensions of influence, 1) preexisting factors 
that included the identity of the parties and the conflict context, 2) concurrent factors that 
considered the identity of the mediator and the mediation event, and 3) the background 
factors that included the impact of information from previous mediations within that 
conflict environment. Their findings showed that the conditions of the mediation 
environment and the identities of the parties played the most significant roles in mediator 
behavior and eventual outcome. Subsequent studies by Beber (2012), a student of 
Bercovitch, supported those results. We can, from their findings, insinuate the findings of 
the cognitive sciences that recognized patterns of familiarity lend themselves to the 
influence of those variables. 
Later work by Bercovitch and Gartner (2009) examined the underlying dynamics 
present during contact between disputants and mediator seeking to identify the most 
significant variable in determining long-term successes and which might exacerbate them 
(Tal-Or, Boninger& Glenicher, 2002). Theirs was an extension of and a more 
comprehensive examination of the Allport (1954) research. The basic question was 
whether or not the proximity of disputants that allowed for more direct contact was 
significant in determining outcome. 
The work in “Group Identity Theory” done by Forbes (1994) and supported by 
earlier discussions of contact theory (Bercovitch and Houston, 2000) argued that the 
bringing together of conflicting groups might aid in the confirmation of prejudicial 
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attitudes if the mediator should require an equal status in the ground rules; in effect 
establishing a precondition of inequality among participants. He disagreed with the work 
of Allport (1954) who assumed that the misperceptions held by conflicting groups were 
emotionally and cognitively based. This does not disprove Forbes, but might be 
considered constitutive as bringing together groups with dissonant culture could lead to 
intergroup conflict and negatively impact the mediation process.  
A discussion by Margolis (1987) showed that cultural dissonance created a 
cognitive dissonance in the subject as they grasped for meaning and value in lexicon and 
syntax as they discovered meanings and value in their culture did not have the same 
meaning and value in another culture. These findings were supported in the linguistic 
investigations by Laitin (1977) and others. Kydd (2003), Monroe, Martin and Ghosh 
(2009) and Sapir (1925), showed that this dissonance increased further and language 
equivalence decreased if disputants were in a situation where a third language was 
necessary for any meaningful communication.  
By invoking Habermas’ communicative structures, Chomsky’s mechanisms of 
universal grammar, the editing principles of dual process theory and our notion of lexicon 
and semantic use-value, it is not difficult to see that cognitive dissonance that is 
manifested as a result of non-equivalent language and use-value could become a major 
determinant of mediation outcomes, particularly when using a third syntactic structure. 
Recalling that a major theme of conflict causality is misunderstanding, this explanation 
appears the most informed. In effect, a mediator might transmit a message that means just 
the opposite of what was intended; something that would quickly be internalized by a 
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disputant, particularly if they have come from a high-context culture, and subsequently 
shown as chronically dissonant relationships. 
The concept of cognitive dissonance is constituent to Saatciaglu and Olzanne’s 
(2013) assertion in their study of status negotiation in a working class neighborhood that 
a culturally mediated lexiconal use-value serves as a mechanism for group identity and 
boundary construction.  The principle foundations of contact theory describe the impact 
of in-group bias on members’ perceptions of outsiders (Bercovitch & Chalfin 2011; 
Beber, 2012, Wall, 1981; Allport, 1954). Together these concepts support the presence of 
unconscious predisposed behaviors; biases, consequential to pattern recognition (the 
brain’s short-cut mechanism for non-linear flight responses) and use-value recognition in 
communicative symbols, sometimes referred to as “moral competence” (Haidt and 
Nosek, 2004; Haidt, Graham and Nosek, 2007; Savun, 2008; Gent and Shannon, 2011; 
Mikhail, 2011) or “moral maturity.” 
Studies by Simmel (1955), Triel (2006) and Bashkow (2004) have shown that 
individual behaviors are significantly affected by identification with groups and the 
conformity to their norms. This would include the prescribed and proscribed norms of 
moral (socially sanctioned, acceptable) behavior so prevalent in the literature (Piaget, 
1953; Kohlberg, 1981; Rawls, 1993; Aquino and Reed, 2002; Mikhail, 2011; Nanda and 
Warms, 2011). The homogeneity of functional group behavior manifest in normative 
conformities, a “moral consonance,” sets the stage for intergroup conflict with those that 
are dissonant to those practices (Graham & Haidt, 2008).  
Bercovitch  and Gartner (2009) took Forbes’ research a bit further by examining 
which of these independent variables, establishing equal ground or by inference cognitive 
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dissonance, would be the most significant in shaping the outcome of a mediation, i.e., 
which enhanced its success and which increased the level of conflict (Bercovitch, 2010; 
Tal-Or, Boninger & Glenicher, 2002). The premise was that an open line of 
communication between disputants would enhance understanding of normative systems 
thereby reducing cultural prejudices. This assumes of course that the disputants do in fact 
communicate with each other at some level. The weakness of the Bercovitch research 
though, was and has been throughout the conflict resolution literature, is a disregard for 
the symbolic use-value in the linguistic constructs of the mediator and how this might 
impact the proceedings. Clearly, had he known of the recent studies in moral and 
cognitive psychology, cognitive dissonance might have been regarded a significant 
independent variable that served as a solid foundation for a discussion of cultural 
dissonance so important to the studies of Avruch (1998),  Lederach (1995), Bush and 
Folger (2005) and others. 
Clearly, groups of unequal status will suffer the predispositions of in-group 
loyalty and out-group prejudice based on the competencies established in the unique 
cultural editing of their members’ communicative structures (Chomsky, 1970; Gartner & 
Bercovitch, 2006; Habermas, 1990; Haidt and Graham, 2007; Schweder, Mahapatra, and 
Miller, 1987). This will not be limited to the disputants however, as a mediator is victim 
to the same mechanisms and influences as those participants she is attempting to bring 
together. This could be manifest as some expression of bias on her part (Botvinick, et al, 
2001; Brewer, 2007; Carnevale & Arad, 1996; Zartman, 1994). In this study it is not our 
goal to demonstrate the level or intensity of mediator bias, only to demonstrate that it can 
be manifest in some recognizable and ultimately quantifiable way, overtly through 
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resource allocation, personally in ways such as time spent with someone, or linguistically 
in the type of language used to mediate or describe one or both disputants. In essence, we 
are addressing mediator bias and its concomitant elements as Durkheim would a social 
fact, i.e., it is external to the mediator, it can be quantified as a ‘thing,’ it compels the 
mediator to act in an observable fashion and it is influenced by other social facts 
(Durkheim, 1982). 
Returning to the notion of bringing disputants into direct contact it is important to 
reexamine the alleged benefits of such a strategy.  But at the same time we need to 
recognize the process at play within that environment. Osgood (1962) and later Kelman 
(1996) in support of Allport’s (1954) position promote direct contact between disputants 
as a way to explore the root causes of the conflict and identifying what might prove to be 
their unmet human needs. They posit that such a strategy generates personal relationships 
and cooperation through joint exercises requiring cooperative problem-solving. It was 
also their position that once key representatives were brought together, that elements of 
that contact could be manipulated by the mediator in her role as facilitator.  
Allport (1954) and later Kelman (1996) believed that this process would 
accomplish three goals. First, that bringing disputants together in a controlled 
environment would promote active listening allowing disputants to voice their own needs 
and views. Under the communicative construct, his assumption was that this exercise 
might produce a basis of common definitions and values, perhaps based upon this new 
shared “group culture.” However, there is no evidence of this in the literature.  
With deference to Habermas’ distinction between communicative and strategic 
constructs, Kelman is assuming one of communicative rationality. His presumption 
251 
 
points to the same weaknesses we observe in other research premised on the direct 
contact hypothesis. It discounts the presence of emotional pattern recognitions leading to 
predispositions toward opposing disputants and mediators and the lack of activity in the 
emotional centers of the brain when engaging strategic communication (Nakayama & 
Joseph, 1998; Nieme, 2011). 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, bringing together disputants provided an 
opportunity for different groups to gain insights into each other’s perspective on the 
conflict and beyond. Rouhana and Kelman (1994) sites the utilization of this concept in 
the Israeli-Palestinian talks and observed that these workshops succeeded in reducing in-
group bias and out-group discrimination among participants, fostering a sense of hope in 
establishing an improvement of intergroup relations. Recent news out of that region 
serves as a contradiction to Kelman’s position and support for later positions taken by 
Bercovitch and Beber. 
Bercovitch (1996a) offers one explanation for Kelman’s erred hope of group 
harmony underlying contact theory. He discusses the fact that in the many mediations 
examined in his own study culminating in the International Conflict Database (1996a) 
that political and socio-economic factors may inhibit the creation of the environment that 
could contribute to the application of such a cognitive strategy. Often, third parties 
involved in the dispute are unaware of important facts such as each disputant’s social or 
personal histories or the type of culture, i.e., high context or low context, that each 
disputant hails from (Bercovitch, 2007). This can, in contrast to the premise of contact 
theory, create an environment where dissonant perceptions and prejudices are enhanced, 
both as a function of previous characterizing inputs of opponents and the dissonant 
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symbolic use-value necessary in the very process of active listening (Rauchaus, 2006). 
Taking into consideration the significant impact culture has on conflict resolution 
elements, even the structure of the room for which the mediator is responsible, might 
trigger an emotional negativity through the perception of one or more disputants 
(Patterson & Rogers, 2007). 
Layered on top of this notion of disputant qualifiers must be the considerations of 
motivations on the part of the mediator, both in the selection of the mediation assignment 
and the strategies selected to conduct the mediation (Kydd, 2003; Gerring, 2007). The 
question must be asked, what the perceived and actual rewards for the mediator are and 
whether or not there is some innate mediator perceptions brought to the mediation table.  
Again, consideration must be given to the dissonance of linguistic constructs and 
how it may shape relationships among and between disputants and mediators; how 
language is used and interpreted in the pursuit of a desired goal through messages 
transmitted between all parties (Grenfell, 2011; Harmon, 2000; Sapir, 1936). It is also 
important to remember that language is a primary mechanism for the transmission and 
defining of the complex abstractions inherent to any conflict mediation.  
The mediator’s position is considered an important element in successful direct 
contact situations as she serves primarily as an interpreter of transmitted messages, and in 
some cases the architect of commonly agreed upon use-values for non-tangible conflict 
elements (Bercovitch & Oishi, 2010; Beber, 2012; Lanz, 2008).  How these semantic 
constructs are transmitted and received through the lens of culturally based experiential 
history, ascribed use-value and personal goals established through self-interest, provides 
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a significant understanding of the conflict process and subsequently the chosen 
methodology with which to resolve it. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has established the theoretical basis upon which the study is built. It 
has shown scientific and clinical research that establishes the presence of and evolved 
neurological system of hierarchically placing experiential history into a cognitive library 
that serves in the construction of a decision-making action on the part of an individual. 
While possessing both conscious and unconscious components, research by Greene and 
others establish that although we perceive our environment from a conscious position, 
that the unconscious element of decision-making heavily influences the collective 
outcome. Simply put, the innate dislikes we have both from an evolutionary and 
experiential perspective, remains as a significant portion of the eventual decision action. 
Work by both Chomsky and Habermas, and later supported by Schaefer, et al 
(2013) demonstrated the symbolic importance of communicative and strategic 
communication styles, one utilizing emotional centers while the others did not. The 
bringing together of two speakers demonstrating differing communicative styles, in this 
case Sadat’s use of Diglossic Arabic, Carter’s use of English and Begin’s use of Modern 
Hebrew, the former being communicative and the latter strategic, primes the situation for 
disharmony and mediation failure. These languages, a reflection of our dual process 
cognition, is the external; demonstration of deeper, more innately based conflicts, only 
made more intense by dissonant cultural origins of each conflict percipient. 
The next chapter will outline a method by which the reader can apply theory and 
earlier research to the real world. This constructivist grounded theory study, using the 
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tools of content analysis, will show how the language demonstrated by principles in the 
Camp David Accords of 1978 that sought a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel 
lent to the limited success, as well as the extreme difficulties experienced during the 
mediation process. The elements of a use-value hierarchy, the cultural environment of 
each principle and the resultant enmity will be explained in the concluding chapters. It 
will also be made clear by applying the work earlier described, that this kind of 
predispositional behavior, an innate unconscious bias that guides our likes and dislikes, is 
applicable far beyond the field of mediation, but to every human interaction. 
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Chapter Four: Methods 
Introduction to Research Design 
This study explores the possibility that early socio-cultural experience 
coupled to innate moral foundations as described by Haidt (2012) and others are a 
component of a cognitive dual process of decision-making, and may influence 
conflict actors toward predictable predispositional behaviors manifest as bias. 
Specifically, we are concerned that these biases will influence the perceived and 
actual neutrality of the principle mediator thus compromising a mediation success. 
The presence of these predispositions in both mediators and conflict stakeholders 
challenges the validity of the conclusions in other research that does not consider the 
comprehensive impact of cultural dissonance on more than a superficial albeit 
external level. This will be accomplished through interrogating data yielded through 
the actors’ use of language both spoken and written utilizing the techniques used in 
grounded theory studies. 
In order to investigate this completely interactive human phenomenon, it was 
necessary to examine a conflict that pits very strong personalities against each other 
within the frame of a conflict that addresses both tangible and intangible resources as 
described by Laitin (1977), Augsburger (1992) and others, relative to its intensity and 
duration. The Arab/Israeli conflict that was addressed during the twelve days of the 
Camp David Accords beginning 17 September, 1978 is one that incorporates all of 
the necessary elements to sufficiently address the research questions. During this 
event, the personalities of three world leaders, Carter, Sadat and Begin came together 
with the motive of establishing the framework of a lasting peace agreement between 
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Israel and Egypt. The historic and experiential influences on each man, both 
conscious and unconscious, will be explored through their own, and others reporting. 
A review of the literature surrounding the proceedings at the Camp David 
Accords, demonstrates an as yet little studied phenomenon. It shows that the 
individual and collectively interacting personalities of the principle players appeared 
to have more of an impact on the mediation’s outcome than did other dynamics in 
play. It highlights the importance of understanding what factors contributed to the 
evolution of those personalities and how those forces were facilitating the preference 
of one agent over another, i.e., Carter’s admitted and observed preference for Sadat 
over Begin prior to and during the mediation event (Carter, 1987), perceived by 
Begin and his entourage as “collusion and plotting” (Colarosi, et al, 2008); Perlmutter, 
1987; Quandt, 1986b; Wright, 2014). Specifically, why did Carter appear to so many 
reviewers to largely prefer and to like Sadat over Begin often referring to the former 
as his “dear friend” while referring to Begin as an “obstacle to peace” (Quandt, 
1986b) all the while publically attesting to his neutrality toward both disputants. The 
enmity between Sadat and Begin was widely known, yet neither man had ever met 
the other before espousing their frequently acted upon verbal and policy-based hatred 
for one another.  
The next question concerns how these feelings manifested themselves in such 
historic circumstances and what were the effects on the outcome becomes almost 
secondary to the question of why enmity and distrust existed between two people that 
had never known each other. The guiding question to this study centers upon the 
interaction between innate cognitive and socio-evolutionary dynamic in each man 
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that could serve to predetermine their feelings and subsequently impact the overall 
Camp David process as a result of both perceptions and misunderstanding. 
In a comprehensive sense, for us to follow the traditional methods of social 
science research, the results of this study would only repeat the time-worn 
examination of the interactions between the principles and the many social facts that 
Durkheim described as ‘externally coercive,’ (Durkheim, 1982) without investigating 
their human origin and interplay. Granted, we have more technology available to us 
than in Durkheim’s time, but it is rarely used in assessing the dynamics of human 
interaction in a conflict situation. The Bercovitch (2008), the International Conflict 
Database, ICD takes practitioners far along the path of examining post-hoc 
dynamics, but is weak in establishing causality beyond hypothetical inference.  
It does not help future mediators to comprehensively address the question of 
how these seemingly visceral likes and dislikes arise in disputants, but more 
importantly in the mediator who by definition is presumed to be neutral. It is one 
thing to hold true to the interactive position of the Chicago School apostles and 
maintain that humans interact with things in their environment that facilitate an 
agent’s social and individual development. I believe this be true at its core, but short-
sighted in its vision. It is quite another task, yet one necessary for a full and 
comprehensive understanding that allows us to address the original question, to 
understand what it is about human beings that facilitates and more importantly 
predisposes their interaction and subsequently gives insight into the ‘why’ they 
interact the way they do from more than the current social science methodologies.  
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So, while accepting the basic premise of symbolic interactionism, I consider it 
inadequate in its ability to explain basic human interaction as reflects universal innate 
cognitive processes, but adequate as a foundation for building a new theoretical 
paradigm of human interaction as it relates to conflict. Finally, if this is understood, I 
posit that a new methodology of matching the appropriate mediator to the appropriate 
conflict, and developing a methodology in which our innate and evolved 
predispositions toward one another are assessed and included into resolution 
decision-making constructs are taken into account, than a higher success rate for an 
age-old method for resolving conflict will be possible. 
If we wish to truly understand the dynamic of a conflict, its agents and the 
factors inherent to its resolution or continuance, it will be necessary to combine what 
we know from the findings coming out of the cognitive neurosciences and place 
them inside the frame of conflict resolution. Without being able to use the 
economically prohibitive tools of medicine, a methodology using a descriptive 
variable common to everyone that will aptly represent the innate decision-making 
processes we are looking for and economically permissive to the researcher is 
necessary. Of course, the results of other, more technologically informed research 
will be applied and used to guide our research. 
Using the research findings that led to the theory of Universal Grammar and 
Cartesian Linguistics (Chomsky, 1965; 1970), we will assert that language will serve 
as the common denominator of predispositional personality assessment and 
indicative of internal decision-making processes both conscious and unconscious. 
This study will utilize a qualitative content analysis (Creswell, 2013; Krippendorff, 
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2012; Saldana, 2012) in assessing a wide range of literature to show a link between 
manifestations of innate behavioral predispositions and the interactional dynamics of 
the principles of the Camp David Accords effecting both the mediation process and 
its outcomes. 
We begin from the premise that language in all of its forms is a multifaceted 
phenomenon unique to humans. On the other hand, the capturing of that language by 
a listener is perhaps even more complicated in its processing than the packing and 
transmission of the message by the speaker. The interpretation of a message, the 
heart of the assertion that misunderstanding is a primary cause of conflict 
(Bercovitch, 1996b; Cohen, 2001; Northedge & Donelan, 1971; Greig and Diehl, 
2012), is contingent upon both articulated and non-articulated elements (Jervis, 1976; 
Habermas, 1985) an employs both conscious and unconscious processing influenced 
by external environmental elements. 
These are all impacted by several factors but include semiotics, intonation, 
special definitions unique to the speaker but perhaps unknown or misinterpreted by 
the listener, tone and body positions (Schooler & Melcher, 1995; Cook & Newson, 
1996). Cognitive science informs us that these primary elements of 
communication are rarely if ever consciously deliberated, but rely more on 
unconscious interpretations and subsequent predispositional behaviors also 
interpreted by the other conversant. Also, in reviewing the findings of 
neuroscientists examining Habermas’ communicative and strategic 
communication constructs, this also reflects, parenthetically, an employing of 
emotional centers for the former, and a lack of same in the latter. 
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Since we are conflating the findings from several different scientific 
disciplines as well as borrowing from their theoretical underpinnings to serve as 
guideposts for a new theoretical paradigm, we enter this research without a central or 
binding theoretical foundation nor a set of driving hypotheses. A thematic theoretical 
foundation is a prerequisite in deductive and inductive scientific research (Kuzel, 
1999; Patton, 1992) and would allow for the comprehensive alignment of common 
elements and processes inherent to disputants and mediators. However, while 
informative, they do not describe why the players are similar in their evolved and 
universal cognitive abilities but different in their interactive preferences. This quest is 
better served through an abductive logical premise that provides a ‘best explanation’ 
for observed phenomenon and also allows for the researcher’s theoretical artifact 
(Charmaz, 2014; Corbin & Strauss, 2014; Pierce, 1931-35). 
 We will have to build a theory from many sources of scientific insight, some 
familiar, some obscure, some completely new. But, that is the intrigue of science and 
the stuff of what helps us understand ourselves with a goal toward minimizing the 
historic and admittedly tired observation of so many conflict resolutionists that 
conflict has been around for as long as humankind; this researcher is not quite that 
pessimistic. To this researcher, the current study is part of a Hegelian dialectic, a 
move forward in understanding the importance of innate human factors to the success 
of conflict resolution efforts.  
Perhaps a comprehensive understanding of what comprises a human conflict 
at an innately human level will eventually serve to mitigate its continuance. Indeed 
this takes us beyond the discussions of cultural dissonance as a source of conflict so 
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often focused upon by conflict researchers like Lederach and Augsburger. Rather, it 
examines the mechanisms unique to humankind that predicate conflict using cultural 
dissonance essentially as a starting point in explaining misunderstandings that feed 
the fires of conflict and ultimately Clausewitz uncontrollable war (Clausewitz, 1984). 
Since we have identified language as the key evaluative element that is 
reflective of innate human decision-making processes (Margolis, 1987; Lazarus, 
1982; Harman, 2000; Elman, et al, 1996), a content analysis of written records is 
appropriate for this study. Framed by Constructivist Grounded Theory described by 
Kathy Charmaz (2014) and informed by the Glaser (1965), Strauss and Corbin 
paradigms (1998) it will serve to highlight three important observations brought out 
in the literature: 
1. Why mediation has been shown by Bercovitch and Gartner (2009) to 
demonstrate  only a ‘mediocre performance,’ in resolving cross-cultural 
conflicts,  
2. Why cultural dissonance between disputants appears to play such an 
important part in determining many conflict dynamics particularly with 
attention to intangible social facts, and leading to a major overarching 
question; 
3. Does cultural dissonance also innately and perhaps unconsciously influence 
the presumed ‘neutral’ mediator in the pursuance of a conflict resolution 
begging the question as to whether or not the mediator can be unequivocally 
neutral? For now, we will table the notion of conscious manifestations of bias 
for the sake of clarity and future discussions. 
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The purpose of this Grounded Theory Study is to discover a best explanation for 
the mediocre performance of mediations being conducted between disputants of 
dissonant cultures. Applying the data analysis techniques of grounded theory to 
information collected through content analysis, this research will assess the veracity of 
claims by cognitive neuroscience that human beings are predisposed to predictable 
behaviors as a result of socio-cultural influences on innate decision-making mechanisms; 
these mechanisms being the result of human evolution. These findings will then be 
applied to the field of mediation, specifically to assess whether or not a mediator might 
show predispositional bias toward a disputant as a result of the interaction between 
external stimuli and innate, genetically evolved, decision-making systems. 
The study will be informed by Josh Greene’s (2004) work on Dual Process 
Theory and by Haidt’s (2008) seminal work in cognitive psychology called Moral 
Foundations Theory to investigate the assertion of an internal decision-making calculus is 
possessed by all humans and how that might impact mediator bias. Further, approaching 
the problem from Charmaz’s (2006; 2014) constructivist grounded theory approach of 
symbolism, the study will also apply Chomsky’s work in Universal Grammar (1970) and 
Habermas’ (1984; 1990) study of Communicative Action to investigate how these 
decision-making processes might be represented and expressed through the language 
used by disputant speakers to transmit positions on the perception of the disputant 
listener, each percipient’s language being impacted by their respective culture’s linguistic 
morphology. 
Common knowledge tells us that some things are more important to us than other 
things. These translate into our likes and dislikes; we like some foods and dislike others. 
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Similarly, and often upon first meeting, we quickly come to like or dislike an individual. 
If a mediator prefers one disputant over another, is that mediator predisposed to bias in 
some positive or negative form? This study seeks to answer by best explanation, from 
where these predispositions emanate and how they can both be predicted and perhaps 
even changed lending to a better mediator neutrality and hence more sustainable and 
successful outcomes. 
This research sought to compare individuals and their behaviors within the 
context of what can be considered as a conflict involving dissonant cultures. Therefore, it 
was necessary to select such a conflict and representatives of that conflict that would a) 
demonstrate clear preferences, b) represent clearly dissonant cultures and c) be virtue of 
their positions have been the source of extensive biographical and media material. The 
three main players in the Camp David Accords of 1978 between Jimmy Carter, Anwar al-
Sadat and Menachem Begin who sought a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel 
using the United States President as the mediator between the conflict countries provided 
the most ideal study subjects. Collecting data from written materials and applying the 
results of earlier cognitive studies, we will ask the following research questions: 
5. Is there an observable difference in situational responses between conflict 
stakeholders that can be attributed to differences in their socio-cultural history? 
6. Are these differences in situational responses a result of individual perceptions 
whose value is grounded in socio-cultural experiences? 
7. Are these perceptions a result of the interplay between evolved cognitive 
mechanisms and the socio-cultural experiences unique to the individual? 
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8. Is the result of this interplay manifest in particular situational preferences 
important to social interactions and therefore to mediation events? 
Discovering the ‘Best’ Explanation: Abduction 
Abduction encourages a type of open-mindedness when reviewing data, but at 
the same time recognizes the guiding principles of a priori theoretical models 
inherent to the experiential history of the researcher or “researcher artifact’ 
(Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2009) something later referred to by Strauss (1995) as 
‘theoretical sensitivity.’ This kind of theory construction pays homage to C. Wright 
Mills who maintained that a strict adherence to scientific parameters confined our 
creativity to uncover the true meaning of most social interactions (Mills, 1956). 
Abductive analysis is an ancillary to a qualitative methodology that allows for 
the application of previously held knowledge a priori and theory in the discovery of 
probable explanations when faced with new situations. This resident knowledge 
generally referred to as experience does not necessarily reside in our cognitive 
forefront, but serves often as one unconscious component in our multi-faceted 
cognitive processes of decision-making. Abduction is not necessarily a preplanned 
schema, but more of an almost spontaneous recognition of a new explanation for a 
novel situation that “comes to us like a flash,” since conceptually the different 
elements of our new hypothesis were in us all along; we just needed the proper 
stimulus to make them cogent (Pierce, 1931-35, p. 217-218). In the parlance of 
cognitive psychologists, we are experiencing a ‘pattern’ that reminds us of something 
else previously experienced similar to an academic deja vous (Haidt, 2008; Greene, 
2014; Schacter, 1996; Sinnot-Armstrong, 2008). 
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 "The surprising fact, C is observed. But if A were true, C would be a matter of 
course. Hence there is a reason to suspect that A is true" (Peirce, 1931-35). In that 
regard, abduction acknowledges a theoretical sensitivity gained through earlier 
experiences. It encourages entering in to a research project with the broadest base of 
theoretical experience in order to develop new theoretical constructs throughout the 
research endeavor similar to taking known facts and rearranging them into the most 
appropriate and logical explanation. 
"Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only 
logical operation which introduces any new ideas; for induction does nothing 
but determine a value, and deduction merely involves the necessary 
consequences of a pure hypothesis" (Peirce 1931-35, p.171) 
In Pierce’s view, abduction serves as the principle and foundational element 
in the epistemic pursuit of new theoretical constructs explaining human interactions. 
He does not conclude that abduction is in fact the only way to underlie new 
knowledge as this would simply be a tautology. He regards abduction, while 
functional and necessary, as inconclusive, demanding first an inductive verification 
of developed hypotheses with permanence rooted in deductive logic. In this regard, 
abduction is an integral part in the process of theory development. "Abduction seeks 
a theory. Induction seeks for facts" (Peirce 1931-35, p. 217-18).  
Abduction can be viewed as a means to support traditional Grounded Theory 
as opposed to the general notion that it answers what is considered to be its great 
weakness by relying on inductivism in the creation of new paradigms. We 
understand now, through our study of cognitive processes, that new theory 
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development is a process bringing earlier learned facts forward and testing them 
within the frame of logical processes. We also know that it is rare that logical 
processes are spontaneous, but rely an earlier catalog of use-value semiotics (Baron-
Cohen, 1991; Chomsky, 1970; Dehaene, et al, 1998; Forbes & Grafman, 2010; 
Kihlstrom, 1987).  
So in that regard, new questions arriving through abductive inference are 
framed within the context of prior knowledge necessary to evaluate and ‘value’ new 
combinations of social facts and inside the process of coding we form as many new 
and seasoned links to observed phenomenon even after we think we have the answer 
to our questions; a constant comparison and reformulation. The theories that are born 
of abductive inference serve as a “best attempt” to universalize causality and to 
describe the observed interactions from particular quantifiable instances (Abend, 
2008; Gross, 2010) and a guidepost for constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz, 
2014). According to Pierce we, "tum over our recollection of observed facts" (Peirce, 
1934, p. 167). Abduction therefore serves as the perfect metaphor for dual process 
cognition and is essential to the development of theory resultant of this research. 
Abduction and Theory Construction v. Induction and Grounded Theory 
Glaser and Strauss (1965) promoted a method to ‘discover theory’ through an 
inductive process that was premised on a frequent revisiting of collected data and 
making iterative changes in its analyses through the constant comparison of 
researcher defined coding categories. These descriptive categories emerged, 
ostensibly, as new experiences or insights came to the researcher who had chosen her 
topic to advance a particular aspect of social science that she found interesting. In 
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effect, the researcher was listening to the ‘voices in the library stacks’ (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1965) that served as her siren song of discovery. 
In their early work “The Discovery of Grounded Theory,” Glaser and Strauss 
(1965) sought to construct a method that would both inform the social science 
community to the possibility of new theory that flew in the face of the tried and true 
hypothetico-deductive theories that had been in place already for many years. In the 
same motion their goal was to establish the credibility of qualitative analysis in a 
scientific world that more readily accepted the traditional model of theory 
construction.  
Traditionally, research was seen as the primary avenue of hypothesis testing 
through experimental strategies. This was, in the eyes of Glaser and Strauss, who 
parenthetically were products of the interactionist Chicago School, limiting the social 
sciences as hypotheses could not emerge from data, as opposed to the data validating 
a presupposition (Kelle, 2003). Their task was to construct new theory from observed 
phenomenon outside of HD experimental confines as every social interaction yielded 
what they felt might be patterned processes and strategies that could not be explained 
completely by quantitative studies. In retrospect, and given our newly acquired 
knowledge of how we think, Glaser and Strauss were setting the stage for a 
researcher’s ‘gut feeling’ that came from observation as opposed to looking for 
something they presumed already to be there that only required quantitative 
verification, or as my former sociology chair used to repeat constantly to the new 
sociology recruits, “show me the data!” 
Their earliest work took on a Spencerian tone; “An effective strategy is, at first, 
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literally to ignore the literature of theory and fact of the area under study, in order to 
assure that the emergence of categories will not be contaminated by concepts more suited 
to different areas" (Glaser and Strauss 1965, p.37). While a Spencerian approach to the 
evolution of new knowledge may have been their desire, they effectively turned their 
backs on their roots in the Chicago School, favoring an inductive assumption that was 
actually a masked deductive paradigm (Charmaz, 2014). They proposed a ‘general 
method of comparative analysis’ that would facilitate the emergence of descriptive ‘data 
groups, and eventual subgroups,’ that would serve as an alternative to social science’s 
traditional research constructs. 
In this regard, considering that this research examines both the theoretical and 
decisive pronouncements of several social and cognitive scientific fields of study, it 
would be wrongheaded to presuppose the ability to induce or deduce a unified theory 
of mediation based upon a first brush confluence of different and sometimes 
competing fields. 
 Abductive reasoning provides a logical but open construct to explore that 
confluence. Indeed, the notion of experiencing one of Pierce’s ‘bright moments’ 
while reviewing the data, and perhaps seeing a new perspective or an explanation for 
an old observation is intriguing and is essential in moving the field of conflict 
resolution epistemically forward. 
Traditional Grounded Theory as Untenable 
The founding principle of many theorists from the Chicago School was that 
society is a combination of individual experiences framed by the parameters of 
cultural influences; what we have referred to as experiential history, and is generally 
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called interactionism. The definitions that shape our perceptions and facilitate our 
interactions are subject to the endless files of our past exchanges and what we now 
include as inherent knowledge derived from evolutionary experience.  
Similarly we can assert, in concert with Straus and Corbin (1998), Charmaz 
(2014) and other interactionists, that even the grounded theories ‘discovered’ in our 
research emerge as the result of the interactions between observed and a priori 
phenomenon and form the patterns recognized by the brain of the researcher 
manifesting as those revelations, or even the ‘bright moments’ described by Pierce. 
This notion of ‘preprogramming’ that is implied in the language of abductionists fits 
very well into the research of Haidt and others previously discussed. Indeed, we can 
now take the frame of abductive logic and demonstrate its veracity using the clinical 
work of cognitive psychology and neuroscience. 
Researchers are haunted by explanations that give support to Habermas’ 
linguistic constructs by positing that the world is interpreted within the definitions of 
some earlier framework experienced by the speaker (Kenny, 1994; Laudan, 1977). 
Those definitions are embedded in languages which transmit that experiential 
influence to the listener, i.e., observation A is shaped by the knowledge of B. Lakatos 
(1978) maintains that the most important insights of epistemology and later by 
cognitive psychology was that “there can be no sensations unimpregnated by 
expectations.” Similarly, Kelle (2003) states that any theory draws on an ‘existent 
stock of knowledge.’ 
The dispute between Glaser and Strauss iterated in the later works of Strauss 
and Corbin (1998) centered upon Glaser’s calling for the researcher to enter with 
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‘naïve empty wonderment,’ a reference to conducting research and trying to separate 
one’s self from previously learned theories. It is also reminiscent of Max Weber’s 
call for a ‘value free sociology, (1963; Bendix, 1977). However, cognitive science 
informs us that this is not a feasible position as everything we understand is rooted in 
experiential history, framed by one’s resident culture although placed in a common 
human machinery (Chomsky, 1970; Greene, 2007). 
Writing with Juliet Corbin (2014), Strauss forwarded the concept of 
‘theoretical sensitivity,’ that recognized how a researcher’s past exposure and 
understanding of theory will ‘sensitize’ her to any emerging theory from her 
evaluation of the data. Every interaction we have had couples to that theoretical 
sensitivity to shape not only our perception of data, but the very way in which we ask 
the questions of the data (Brubaker, 1993). Our new discoveries, Pierce’s abductive 
‘bright light,’ will always be informed by the integration of our past and new 
knowledge, "that is to say, we put old ideas together in a new way and this 
reorganization itself constitutes a new idea" (Anderson, 1989).  
Corbin and Strauss maintained, with deference to Glaser’s later work, that 
the researcher possessing a broad theoretical background would do well in the 
Grounded Theory design and later inform data analysis. Experience would 
provide a broad basis upon which to build categories and subcategories that 
might emerge from the data after which to construct new or rebuilt theoretical 
principles. Blumer (1954) observed that ‘knowing the theory,’ means in essence, 
knowing the theories. He regarded past experience as a sensitizing mechanism 
that frames or informs emerging observations but do not limit the researcher to 
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whatever findings might be possible. In short, the Grounded Theory of Glaser 
and Strauss that was predicated on a tabula rasa, given our knowledge of 
cognitive science and a dual processing of environmental inputs, is untenable. 
Constructivist Grounded Theory 
Our method will be rooted in the perspective of symbolic interactionism 
(Meade, 1967; Blumer, 1954). Departing from the original process of induction that is 
the basis of the Glaser and Strauss work (Charmaz, 2014), and avoiding the limiting 
framework of hypothetico-deductive theory construction with its inherent 
predetermined coding schema (Crabtree and Miller, 1999), constructivist grounded 
theory uses a more appropriate Abductive process of theory construction developed 
by Pierce (1931-35) where the data illuminates a ‘bright idea’ for the researcher. It 
encourages a type of open-mindedness when reviewing data, but at the same time 
recognizes the guiding principles of a priori theoretical models inherent to the 
experiential history of the researcher or “researcher artifact’ (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 
2009). 
Following Charmaz’ (2014) constructivist Grounded Theory paradigm this 
study placed the interrogation of data gained from a detailed content analysis 
employing the grounded theory technique of constant comparison described by 
Glaser and Strauss, focused through the lens of symbolic interactionism but 
qualified by our earlier discussion of cognitive dual processes. Constructivist GT 
recognizes that we build our knowledge of the world and the use-value premised 
language inherent to that process through lifetime interactions with other actors 
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and elements within and outside of our cultural environment; each serving as a 
qualifier or genesis of new understandings and outcomes.  
In short, interactions serve to edit that unconscious process of cognition by 
providing definitions of environmental stimuli, although still remaining as an 
underlying significance to the interaction equation (Graham, et al, 2011). This 
recalls the Marxian notion of men creating their own history, but a history that is 
embedded in a larger social history and is therefore more collective than 
individual (Bendix, 1977; Brubaker, 1985) sensations. 
Charmaz (2006) argues for a Grounded Theory that recognizes the 
significance of the researcher’s intellectual history, everyday interpretations of 
simply being, and how this impacts on how the researcher ‘sees’ the data. Glaser 
and Strauss’ traditional concept of GT is merely a snapshot of data (Charmaz, 
2014; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). It limits itself by not seeking to understand the 
motivating and qualifying actions of actors. That omission of purpose may serve 
to having the researcher miss a particular nuanced reaction to something common 
to the actor’s environment thus redefining the meaning of the data under 
investigation in an all but truthful ways. 
For example, how many times can we examine a home movie that we 
have seen through the years, and redefine something we always see, but see 
differently each time? This is the result of not interrogating the underlying 
motivation for the action we see on the screen within the context of time, place or 
other influences at play during the time of the filming. Is this something that is 
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common to everyone, or is it unique to that individual? Can others do that thing I 
am observing? 
By utilizing the Charmaz concept of constructivist GT, we are more 
interested in why the action we are witnessing appears at all; what prompted the 
action, and whether or not that action is something always engaged by the actor 
or unique to the current situation in which he finds himself? What would 
preclude the action in that particular situation and can that be extended to other 
similar arenas? Finally, will that motivation for engaging or not engaging that 
particular action or that particular type of action be transferable to other actors 
and in what circumstances.  
Constructivist GT does not merely and simply seek out patterns as much 
as it seeks to discover underlying explanations. I will make abductive inferences, 
depending on the previous knowledge acquired through thirty years of teaching 
social theory. This will allow me to build a categorical structure for interpretation 
of ideas emerging from the data and allow an informed explanation of the world 
it describes. This study will view interpretation and action as a process of 
reciprocity (Charmaz, 2014); how the present informs interpretation of the past 
and most important, how the past informs the present. Keep in mind that however 
we see it, interaction is never unidirectional nor limited to a single actor; i.e., one 
thing leads to another, and another and another (Saldana, 2012). 
Charmaz (2014) refers to abduction in her recent work on constructivist 
GT. However, she regards abduction as secondary to induction in line with other 
GT researchers: 
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"Grounded theory begins with inductive analyses of data but moves beyond 
induction to create an imaginative interpretation of studied life. We adopt 
abductive logic when we engage in imaginative thinking about intriguing findings 
and then return to the field to check our conjectures" (Charmaz 2009: 137-38). 
Charmaz (2006; 2011; 2014) points to the course of abduction as requiring not 
only the circular cross-examination of data through constant comparison in line with 
traditional GT, but also utilizing previously held experiential influences as important 
codicils in these comparative and descriptive processes. In that regard, abduction 
serves in concert and as an important guide for traditional grounded theory in its 
constant comparative format. It is a creative inferential process and is essential in 
producing new hypothesis and theories resultant of Pierce’s “bright idea” arising from 
the confluence of multi-sourced research evidence (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). 
To summarize Grounded Theory through the SI lens, invoking Blumer’s (1954) 
and Charmaz’ discussion:  
Table 2 
Constructivist Grounded Theory 
Constructivist Grounded Theory 
Human beings act on things on the basis of meanings that things have for them. 
The meaning of such things is derived from or arises out of the social interaction 
that one has with one’s fellows. 
These meanings are handled in and modified through an interpretive process used 
by the person on dealing with things he encounters whose genesis lies in the 
person’s experiential history thus cognitively cataloged. 
Language is an indispensable part of thoughtful interaction between actor and 
(social) environment through shared meanings that may be impacted by cultural 
inputs  
In making abductive inferences, researchers depend on previous knowledge 
that provides them with the necessary categorical framework for the interpretation, 
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description and explanation of the empirical world under study (Pierce, 2013), or 
cognitively we regard as pattern recognition or more descriptively, emotion-based 
pattern recognition (Graham, et al, 2007; 2012).  
The Importance of Language as a Medium for Interaction 
Examining the data using the Constructivist GT approach, through the lens 
of symbolic interactionism, we are reminded that human beings see themselves, 
converse with themselves and interact socially through the common medium of 
language (Chomsky, 1972; 2002; Cook & Newson, 1996; Curtis, 1978; Kihlstrom, 
1987). Meade (1967) noted that SI stresses the necessity of language for the 
construction of ‘self-hood’ and social life, and to understand that the social world 
consists of meaningful objects. Within this explanation, he maintains that subjective 
meanings are the refection of experiential history and can be edited as additional 
environmental input is accumulated; hence Blumer’s (1954) assertion that 
perception is a derivative of reciprocal social relationships between interpretation 
and actions, and that language reflects human conduct and is not simply a means of 
describing it. 
Meade (1967) asserted that language, as an expression of inner thought, is 
indisputably necessary for the development of self (we think in language) and for one’s 
construction of a social life. SI allows for the consideration of the continuity of linguistic 
symbolism relative to syntax and lexicon in the face of multicultural influences 
(Chomsky, 1970; Gilligan, 1982; Habermas, 1990). Thus, interaction is a symbolic 
process, it depends on commonly shared meanings in language both spoken and 
unspoken. Here we refer back to the discussion of Habermas’ (1990) communicative and 
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strategic reasoning and its representation within specific (and contrasting) areas of the 
brain; emotional and moral for the former, calculative and unemotional for the latter 
(Nieme, 2011; Harman, 2000; Schutz, 1973). 
Language serves as the communicative avenue for interaction, thought and 
identity on both individual and community levels. The position of this research 
takes that notion a step further in establishing the link between inner feelings, 
both inherent and acquired, and the multi-faceted system of the medium that 
demonstrates them. In this regard, a detailed content analysis of conflict 
stakeholders, and how they manifest innate behavioral predispositions through 
language, which in turn might impact decision-making outcomes, is ideal. The 
researcher in this environment must as well be careful that his own emotional and 
experiential artifacts relative to the examined conflict, does not skew his own 
interpretations of the data. We do recognize that to some degree, based on earlier 
discussions that this is impossible to accomplish. But, we also maintain as we did 
in our discussion of dual process theory, that a recognition of these artifacts at 
some level mitigate their impact and lend to a more valid interrogation and 
discussion of the data (Charmaz, 1980; Snow, 2001). 
Phases of Data Analysis 
To assist the reader in thoroughly grasping the evaluative process, below is a 
summary of this study’s four phase analysis. 
1. Evaluation of biographies and early media material that describes the early 
lives of the participants. 
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2. Establishment of a first-round list of ‘open’ codes that label significant 
influences on the principles with regard to use-value and moral cognition. 
3. Evaluation of autobiographical material within the frame of previously 
established codes for use-value influence. 
4. Establishing the validity of concepts and codes identified in first round 
readings by cross referencing other-author and autobiographical descriptions 
and perceptions of, by and between participants. 
Data Collection and Sampling 
The study subjects comprise the three principle world leaders that were in 
attendance at the Camp David Accords September 6, 1978, until its conclusion on 
September 17, 1978. They are, Jimmy Carter, then President of the United States, Anwar 
al-Sadat, then president of Egypt and then Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel. 
The time period of investigation will extend one year prior to the meetings and one year 
following. The year prior to the meetings at Camp David allows data to be interrogated 
concerning the principles as they first get reports describing personal and political 
profiles of the other participants as they did not know each other prior to the meetings. 
The year following the agreement allows us to see if inter-relational attitudes had 
changed following the formal meetings. 
Data will be collected from autobiographies by the principles, biographies of the 
principles, media accounts describing the principles in both video and news formats and 
books written of the meetings by those who were in attendance and by those who have 
secondary information through research and interviews with participants. Specifically, 
the data from outside sources provides another perspective on the relationships between 
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the subjects. Data will be abstracted utilizing content analysis and utilizing the techniques 
of constructivist grounded theory for evaluation. 
Information describing the principle subjects will be evaluated in four phases 
described below. Discussions by principles themselves that will provide historic 
biographical data that will be interrogated first. This will be cross-referenced to 
biographical materials provided by other sources looking to assess how close their own 
perceptions are to those seeing them from the outside. It also provides background 
material on each subject in addition to and from another perspective relative to their 
histories. People tend to romanticize their own childhoods at times. 
 Interactions between principles will first be investigated using the perceptions of 
the principles regarding their impressions of the other subjects, i.e., their feelings about 
their counterparts. These data will then be compared to the perceptions of others who 
were in attendance to the meetings and to the impressions of others regarding the 
proceedings themselves and the interactions inherent to them. Comparing data from 
various sources provides different perspectives and a level of validity to this study. As no 
subject was interviewed, nor is there any attempt to judge or give weight to any of the 
subjects’ actions either personal or political, there will be no ethical dilemmas. 
Having developed socio-cultural profiles of each subject, the study will evaluate 
how they interacted with each other prior to, during and following the Accords. It is here 
the study will seek to establish a connection between innate mechanisms of decision-
making, external cultural influences on those decision-making processes and to see 
whether or not a bias on the part of the mediator (Carter) is perceived by Sadat and/or 
Begin as well by outside observers. The study will also pay close attention to the different 
279 
 
uses of language among and between the subjects to evaluate potential impacts of 
different semantic and morphological linguistic structures given the previous discussion 
of high and low context cultural inflluences. 
Phase One: Review of Material and identification of Major Thematic Content  
The first phase of the study is a collection and general review of material content 
within the frame of a) an acute understanding of social theory acquired over decades of 
research and practice, b) searching for obvious ‘tells’ that the conflict agents might 
exhibit revealing a link to their experiential histories through communicative schema and, 
c) identifying socio-cultural elements and themes that might have significantly impacted 
the ‘moral maturity’ of each participant. This phase is informed by the earlier evaluation 
of research findings from the fields of neurological, cognitive and social sciences. This is 
also influenced by the researcher’s earlier academic endeavors. 
In effect, a significant part of the first phase of research is to gain a general ‘feel’ 
for the literature and for the development of a neuro-cultural, egotextual profile of each 
conflict stakeholder under study using the findings of Haidt (2012) Green (2014) and 
Churchland (2011) as a guide in labeling characteristics of the principle agents during 
this initial phase of coding. The elements identified here will serve to guide additional 
interrogation of the data and form the link between the two major factors under 
consideration for the possibility of prediction of conflict mediation outcomes. It also 
satisfies the requirements outlined by Charmaz (2014) in structuring the study within the 
context of Constructivist Grounded Theory. 
Before interrogating data available on each participant completed in phase three, 
i.e., how they behave within the context of the specific conflict environment under 
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examination, it was first necessary to identify the socio-cultural elements that could ‘edit’ 
what earlier research by Haidt and others had shown to be innate moral capacities or the 
evolved system described by Chomsky (1970) thus predisposing them to certain 
predictable behaviors. These would be found in the histories available specific to each 
agent first as described by others in authorized and unauthorized biographies and 
supplemental media materials followed by an evaluation of autobiographical and other 
agent-authored materials that eluded to significant early life influences. In effect, this 
particular phase of the research sought to identify what could be considered an inferential 
link between the themes in the biographical and conflict literature with the findings 
advanced by cognitive researchers. 
Note that in this phase of discovery, I have consciously deferred from reading 
about any mention of other Camp David conflict elements by other observers and 
researchers in hopes of minimizing the agents’ perceptions influencing my own. For 
example, in President Carter’s later works like Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid (2007) he 
specifically mentions his disappointment in the actions of Menachem Begin during and 
following the Camp David Accords. Had that been read prior to other material, or out of 
the sequence of ‘naïve discovery,” my future readings might have been somehow biased 
for or against Begin, thus decreasing the purity of discovery and the subsequent validity 
of my own revelations formed into theoretical constructs.  In addition, this progression in 
reading categories of descriptive narratives will also familiarize the researcher with 
nuances impacting the semiotic and semantic structures of each agent when encountering 
quotes or transcripts found within this first brush of the literature. This activity is 
conducted during phase three of the study. 
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The first phase of the study, with an understanding that there are no pre-
determined categories or expectations in place that guide hypothetico-deductive or 
inductive grounded theory projects (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser and Strauss, 1965; Walton, 
2005), engaged initial coding, in-vivo and process coding which actually served as 
exploratory coding to Saldana (2012)  to first identify broad categories or themes that 
might avail themselves to the researcher within the context of Pierce’s abductive 
inference; an ad hoc creation of core codes premised upon theoretical sensitivity (Corbin 
and Strauss, 2014). These general themes will then lend themselves to inform a two-
phase coding process described by Saldana (2013). Reading the materials, with deference 
to Pierce (1931-35) and Goffman (1959; 1963), additional codes reflecting themes began 
to emerge and be applied in both first and second rounds of coding. The principle coding 
schemes are shown in figure one. This phase establishes the primary editors of the actors’ 
innate capacities, Re., moral maturity and use-value. 
Analysis of Data Phase Two: Data Concerning Subjects’ Self-Descriptions 
During this second phase of the study, the researcher read the autobiographies of 
each subject identifying themes that might point to some kind of predictive algorithm in 
support of Haidt’s (2008) concept of innate capacities lending to symbolic use-values. In 
short, are the words of the actors indicative of a cognitive moral development in the way 
they describe their social environments and the elements within them.  
It was necessary to couple those observations to the perceptions of the subjects 
themselves. This was done for two purposes. First, autobiographical materials allowed for 
the verification of outside observations and the matching of perceptions from two 
perspectives, the outsider and the actor by their own descriptions. For example, in Anwar 
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Sadat’s autobiography he consistently speaks to the importance of the land, how it shaped 
him and made him to a great degree into the man he was. Observations by several 
biographers and historians agreed with this, establishing a theme of land as a non-
material influence and its associated use-value to the subject as much more than simply a 
tangible influence. Care was taken to search for contradictions that might run contrary to 
these cross-validations. The same procedure of theme-building was used for each of the 
principle subjects under investigation. 
This allowed the researcher to complete a valid and comprehensive profile for 
each subject under study. It must be noted that when the autobiographies began to focus 
on the relationship to the other principles in the study or on the Camp David Accords, 
reading stopped as this would be evaluated later when themes were applied to the 
research questions in phase four of the study. 
Analysis of Data Phase Three: Application of General Themes to Agent Interactions 
The third phase of the study builds upon the socio-cultural profiles constructed for 
each of the actors. In this phase, we are interested in seeing if whether or not the social 
editing process of each actor under study are a root of or cause of consonance or 
dissonance. This goes beyond the current frame of cultural dissonance as an obstacle to 
mediation as described by Avruch and others. This focuses more on the internal processes 
of decision-making and the acquired predispositions that impact them. The first phase 
provided certain personal themes such as whether or not the agent came from a low or a 
high context culture or whether their language patterns are direct or angular (Cohen, 
1990; Cohen, et al, 1957). This phase offered some insight to perhaps how the agent 
possessed and valued certain kinds of social capital such as positions of power, ideology 
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or important attachments to people or things revealed by the research of biographers 
other than the agent himself.  
To be clear, and reminiscent of cultural sensitivity, the themes discovered served 
almost as a predictor for what was to come. For example, knowing that the land was a 
most visceral part of Sadat’s existence at both tangible and intangible levels, and that 
Begin had demonstrated a more tangible acquisition-perception type attitude toward the 
land, particularly the Sinai Peninsula, it seemed conceivable that these two men would be 
hard-pressed to like each other, particularly if we relate the resultant enmity to the moral 
foundation of fairness and cheating. Carter on the other hand had a similar attachment to 
the land as was part of his rural upbringing the same as Sadat. Logically then, Carter and 
Sadat might be more inclined to like each other given a large part of the moral maturity 
was predicated on the same or similar experiences. 
Care was taken to exclude autobiographies from the first phase of study as the 
nuances revealed in the agents’ self-reflections might not have the same significance to 
this researcher had he not been primed by the secondary studies of others. In essence, the 
observations of others describing their perceptions of the agents allowed me a conceptual 
framework in which to draw not conclusions concerning the conflict agents, but flags 
designated by thematic codes to identify when reading the disputants’ own work. So, if 
one author says that Begin and Carter did not get along, while reading the principle 
writings of Carter and Begin, I will have some preliminary tools to identify words, 
phrases and pictures (codes) that would point to why this enmity might have developed 
between the two men prior to their having any knowledge or contact with each other, i.e., 
use-value assignments resultant of significant experiential historic elements. 
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It must be kept in mind, that throughout this study, this researcher recognized the 
importance of controlling for, by recognition, his own and the biographers’ researcher 
artifact (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2009). The biographical materials written by those other 
than the agents were read first to identify some broad themes and to inform the 
perceptions gained by this researcher’s reading of the agents’ autobiographies.  
In a sense, the major themes identified in biographical works served to sometimes 
validate those same themes seen in the autobiographies. In the sense of full-disclosure, 
following these first readings that were framed within the context of establishing some 
moral and use-value schema resultant of innate capacities discussed earlier, the researcher 
was overcome with a sense of expectation, of almost being able to predict how the 
conflict agents under study would react to each other. The next phases of interrogating 
the research seemed only necessary to validate what had already been demonstrated 
through others observations and subjects’ self-descriptions; Pierce’s bright idea had 
indeed availed itself. 
Phase Four: Agent Interactions within the Conflict Environment: The Camp David 
Accords 
In the next set of readings, armed with the individual experiential histories of the 
conflict agents through biographical and autobiographical work, the researcher moved 
onto the next set of materials that placed the conflict agents within the context of the 
conflict itself, the Camp David Accords, 1978.  This meeting provided for direct contact 
and observable behavioral interaction within the context of the subject profiles previously 
established in phases one and two. Materials consisted of observational writings specific 
to the accords and material describing agent interactions prior to and following the Camp 
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David meetings. They also included works by the principle disputants and mediator 
(Carter) to include their description and perception of the proceedings and of each other 
by inference or directly. Descriptions by the principles included materials written 
specifically for their Camp David Recollections such as secretarial notes and government 
documents, as well as material now focused upon by the researcher that was included in 
each subject’s autobiographies on the subject at hand. 
Here was also an opportunity to directly observe, and ultimately, to qualitatively 
contest what Allport (1954) had predicted in his earlier work, that bringing disputants 
together would lead to a more personal relationship and therefore serve to mitigate the 
conflict. It was also a place to contrast the Bercovitch (2007) and Beber (2012) prediction 
that bringing disputants in face to face contact would only serve to heighten the tensions 
already present by reasserting the dominance of one party over another through personal 
interactions bolstered by positions held in the field of conflict. While parenthetical to this 
study, it could render some interesting observations to be examined in later research such 
as the intent of Begin’s insistence in depicting himself as having less power than Sadat or 
Carter; was this a true belief or a strategy of manipulation, s sort of a plea to pathos. 
In this phase, materials that included personal and observer accounts of the 
mediation directly, commentaries by media reports and secondary participants, re., 
advisors to the principle participants like Moshe Dyan from Israel, Ismail Fahmy from 
Egypt or Zbigniew Brzezinski from the United States, minutes of individual and group 
meetings of the principles (as recorded by consistent representatives from each 
delegation), personal letters between principles and post-mediation memoires from 
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principles and observers, speeches to agents’ various government bodies and constituents 
and interviews conducted by hosts from several talk shows following the proceedings.  
As an example of how the first phase of this research guided the literature 
selection and interrogation we return to the Sadat’s attachment to the land. Sadat 
continuously expressed the visceral attachment he had to his neighborhood as a metaphor 
for his attachment to all things Egypt; its history, culture and language, at one point 
declaring rather grandly that “he was Egypt!” (Sadat, 1978a, p. 4).  
Carter described how a black woman named Rachael Clark, who he regarded as 
his ‘second mother’ (Carter, 1982; 2001), instilled in him a love and a responsibility to 
take care of not just his own, but all the land in his community and country. However, 
when reading the relationship the Israeli Prime Minister Begin had with land, it began 
with a notion of victimology, loss, acquisition and ‘taking back,’ reminiscent of the 
Szalay (1965; 1981) studies on comparative semiotics between English and Korean 
speakers. Clearly, a conflict of use-value that guided their relationships with each other. 
So, it was necessary to first understand, through open coding, the emotional positions of 
each actor relative to an important part of the mediation, and interpersonally. 
The casual and uncoded examination of audio-visual material supplemented and 
in some cases gave a clearer and deeper insight into the attitudes and feelings of each 
agent as well as a personal validation of a new ability of the researcher to actually ‘see’ 
cognitive influences in action. For example, Chomsky (1965; 1970) and others elude to 
the fact that a significant portion of our communicative style is non-verbal, and manifests 
as body language, positioning, etc. 
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 In having established a relative dramaturgical theme between agents, say that 
Sadat and Begin did not ‘like’ each other, viewing such things as how they positioned 
themselves relative to each other in group photos or interviews, this observation might 
validate what was gathered from reading personal communications between them. It was 
also well-known for instance that Carter considered Sadat a dear and close friend, while 
he held Begin in distain. One only needs to look at the facial expressions of Carter when 
near Begin as opposed to Sadat to gain some insight to what he is feeling and whether or 
not this coincides with his verbal and written communication to each man. 
Chapter Summary 
In summary then, the first three phases of the study built a conceptual stage upon 
which the principle players would act. It provides background and substance to exactly 
what we will be conceptually looking for, whether or not experiential history guides the 
observed behaviors of each actor and if so, does this facilitate a consonant or dissonant 
personal interaction. We can then, by inference, apply these observations to the 
framework system of dual cognitive processing as described by Greene (2010). 
 Finally, does that interaction somehow impact the outcome of the mediation? The 
final phase of the study, allows the researcher to observe the action that is playing out 
upon that stage of mediated interactions and make assertions from those observations that 
support or do not support the earlier suppositions. A similar construct is offered by 
Erving Goffman (1959) in his works on Dramaturgical and Frame Analysis (1963). 
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Chapter Five: Findings 
Introduction 
This section demonstrates a preponderance of evidence that suggests an 
association between evolved human capacities guiding a dual cognitive process of 
decision-making leading to human behaviors that facilitate predispositions toward certain 
acceptance or abhorrence of socio-environmental stimuli or social interactions. These 
predispositions are the result of an interaction between conscious and unconscious 
cognitive systems described by Greene (2010). The findings will demonstrate the 
application of emergent themes derived from the interrogation of a vast amount of 
literature that interrogates each actor’s biographical elements, speeches to respective 
governments, published transcripts, autobiographies and materials describing the Camp 
David Accords focusing on the interactions of and between the three primary percipients, 
Carter, Sadat and Begin. These data will be examined within the frame of Constructivist 
Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2014) using the tools of content analysis (Saldana, 2012). 
Those themes will then be placed within the context of broader categories illustrated by 
Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2012) and demonstrate how these can lead to 
predictable conscious and unconscious behaviors such as bias or actor preference. 
This chapter seeks to accomplish two goals. First, it serves to operationalize the 
cognitive theories that serve as the foundation for the primary research question; do 
humans possesses predispositional behaviors, either evolved or ascribed, that influence 
decision-making within the context of conflict resolution and how these are manifest 
through symbolically valued social interactions. Second, it lays a foundation of 
understanding for the next chapter that focuses on how observers interpreted the 
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interactions between and among the principle actors, and thus how the findings of this 
research might be applied to other conflict arenas. 
Phase One: Review of Material and identification of Major Thematic Content  
The purpose of the first phase of discovery was the identification of major 
categories and themes that would guide the interrogation of data from other sources and 
as well the revisiting of earlier readings. Earlier, in recalling the research into Moral 
Foundations Theory of Haidt, et al (2008), it became apparent to me, perhaps the first 
abductive moment, that those foundations served well as major categories into which 
emergent themes might be grouped. Each had a purpose that could be easily translated 
into behavioral manifestations that could lead to the identification of predispositions 
based upon the socio-cultural histories of the percipients, much in line with the earlier 
work of Piaget and Kohlberg, but at a more functional level accounting for increasingly 
complex environmental inputs. Below is a review of those categories, their purpose as 
described in evolutionary anthropological and cognitive texts, the associated use-value 
for the category relative to human performance and the behavioral manifestations that can 
be directly observed. Keep in mind that these findings are rooted in and supported by 
clinical data and neuroscientific research. 
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Table 3 
Major Categories and Behavioral Dispositions 
Category  Purpose  Use-Value  Predisposition 
 
Harm/Care  Attachment  Kindness  Empathy 
Nurturance  Gentleness 
 
Fairness/Cheating Reciprocity  Proportionality Justice 
Altruism  Equality                          Human Rights 
 
Loyalty/Betrayal Patriotism  One for All  In-Group Identity 
Self-Sacrifice  Coalitions  Out-Group Identity 
 
Authority/  Leadership  Legitimate-  Respect Traditions 
Subversion      Authority 
Followership  Recognition  Cultural legitimacy 
 
Sanctity/             Disgust  Immorality  Demonization 
Degradation                Contamination  Sacred/Profane Elimination 
 
Briefly, each ‘category’ represents an innate motivation subsequent to the 
unfolding of a genetic program derived through human evolution similar in concept to 
Chomsky’s ‘universal grammar’ (1974). They are significant sociologically as they 
provide a basis of comparison, a kind of Weberian ‘ideal type’ for an unconscious 
response to situations of survival by the individual and/or the social group. It serves as an 
evolutionary library of best-responses and serves as the unconscious factor in cognitive 
behavior. The categories operationalize humans’ fight or flight metaphor in eliminating 
the need for linear cognition that may situationally preclude ‘thinking about something’ 
such as a previously unidentified predator and its necessary avoidance or engagement. 
The ‘purpose’ of each innate moral foundation category (read “acceptable” or 
“unacceptable” behavior) is the operational descriptor of its utility and provides insight to 
its origin. For example, the Foundation ‘harm/care’ arose from the necessity of a mother 
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to care for her child. Originally focused on her own offspring, this developed into a 
person’s consideration for other children and eventually other humans in general 
particularly those of the individual’s resident to the social group. 
The concept of ‘use-value’ is apart from the traditional representation in Marxian 
economics. It represents the value or level of importance assigned to both material and 
non-material environmental elements and could be regarded as a cognitive hierarchy, 
specifically the symbols that represent those elements serving as sensory stimuli and how 
they might play into the econometric behaviors of the percipient. This accepts and 
exemplifies the frame of symbolic interactionism that serves as the basis for 
Constructivist Grounded Theory. We only need to compare the moral dissonance 
between the concepts of good and evil to gain a basic understanding of use-value. As 
well, it serves as a Durkhiemian ‘social fact’ in its externality to the percipient, its 
compelling social action and of most importance, its plasticity under the influence of 
other and evolving symbolic use-values. Marcus (2004) often used the metaphor of social 
interaction serving as the editor of the second edition of humans’ moral first edition. 
Clearly, it serves as the keystone to our motivations in and between social actors.  
Predisposition simply describes the outward manifestation of each innate moral 
capacity and the result of dual-cognition. These are behaviors seen in social interactions 
and have been extensively evaluated by Graham, et al (2011) Greene (2010) and 
Churchland (2011) and subsequently linked to earlier research that defined each category 
of moral competency described by Mikhail (2011). 
So, for example, the category harm/care is the evolutionary result of a mother 
caring for her child and the necessary attachment and nurturance to that child. This is 
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valued as kindness by observers and lends itself to one’s ability to empathize, etc. These 
then translate as perceptible demonstrations in action and in words (language) as 
symbolic interactions and are parts of the decision-making calculus of both sender and 
receiver, i.e., speaker and listener within the context of social contact. Figure three 
demonstrates this interplay of categories within the cognitive machinery. 
Figure 4. Decision-making matrices 
What figure three allows us to do is visualize how environmental stimuli impact 
the behaviors of the percipient based upon the category’s impact on the use-value of the 
inputs, i.e. stimulus. Again, these use-value hierarchies are the result of the editing 
function of recent and earlier socio-cultural, vis., continuing environmental, inputs. It 
illustrates a multi-faceted decision calculus that results in behaviors that directly impact 
social interaction. In this regard, each emergent theme can be placed within the 
“Environmental Stimulus” box and weighed against the moral foundational “categories” 
that have been defined through earlier inputs as described to be predictive of subsequent 
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social interactions. Placed within the context of any kind of conflict involving mediators 
and disputants, a clearer picture of success probabilities become apparent. 
A first review of the preliminary readings pointed immediately to the varied styles 
of language used by the percipients in their biographical materials (Carter, 1982; 2001; 
Sadat, 1978; Perlmutter, 1987) as well as the perceptions of outside observers. A reader 
would get an almost visceral feeling of kindness toward Carter as he describes his 
childhood, the feelings he had for his parents and friends and finally for his ‘dear’ friend, 
Anwar Sadat. Truly, Carter’s words played to a definite pathos, as did Sadat’s in 
describing those same environmental influences. 
On Carter’s first meeting of Sadat, he said, “There was an easy and a ‘natural’ 
friendship between us. We trusted each other. We began to learn about each other’s 
families, early life, home towns, private plans and ambitions,” (Carter, 1982. P. 284).  “I 
feel protective of Sadat. President Sadat would need all the protection we could offer,” 
(Carter, 1977. P. 300). Sadat said of Carter, “My brother Jimmy, I will do whatever you 
think is best.” (Sadat, 1987. P. 438). 
Reading descriptions of Begin, and watching his numerous speeches that were 
presented in the United States, the Egyptian Parliament and his own Israeli Knesset, a 
similar visceral reaction wells up in the reader. But instead of a feeling of kindness and 
empathy, this reader felt more anger, rage and divisiveness characteristic of an 
emotionally volatile aggressor. While I recognize this may be a reflection of my own 
constructed bias, it appears to be supported by outside observers as well as the other two 
percipients in this study. Carter’s first exposure to Begin was his viewing the Prime 
Minister’s interview on the news show, ‘Issues and Answers.’ His first reaction to 
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listening to and watching the level of vitriol pouring from Begin he described as 
“Frightening,” (Carter, 1977. P. 238). He would later maintain this theme of abhorrence 
and distrust during the Camp David meeting  describing Begin in terms of being 
untruthful, an “obstacle to peace,” and being unconcerned with the human rights of 
Palestinians. Carter, after being informed of the construction of additional Israeli 
settlements during and contrary to the Camp David proceedings said, “This behavior was 
not only irritating, but seriously endangered the prospects for peace…..and Sadat’s 
reputation,” (Carter, 1977. P. 240). This serves as not only an acquired attitude towards 
Begin following earlier more positive encounters he had had, influenced by an earlier trip 
to Israel hosted by Prime Minister Meir (Carter, 1977), but the establishment of an in-
group identity with Sadat, counter-posed to Begin and his team. This reading did 
reinforce the assertion that language serves as a very good indicator of the predispositions 
outlined. 
Upon reading the first set of materials, several strong and descriptive themes 
began to emerge. Later on in the study, they were validated in phase four, outside 
observers’ descriptions. Below is a description of each theme expressed by each 
percipient.  
Figure four demonstrates the path of cognition inherent to manifest behaviors of 
bias and stakeholder association. Carter and Sadat ‘disliked’ Begin in part due to his 
aggression shown in his use of language and the use-values associated with his semantic 
structures. We have already pointed to the fact that low context language like English and 
Arabic stand in stark contrast to the high context Modern Hebrew and have been shown 
to elicit different responses in the human brain, i.e., strategic and communicative, which 
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was demonstrated through fMRI studies to be non-emotionally based and emotionally 
based respectively. 
Figure 5. Cognitive path to behavior 
Identification of Emergent Themes 
Figure five provides a summary of the emergent themes discovered during this 
phase of the study that can be linked directly to the individual and binding moral 
capacities described above. It became clear through the readings that there were distinct 
similarities between Carter and Sadat in how they valued basic moral elements of human 
interaction; human rights, truth, and trust. What appeared to be a metaphor for loyalty 
and as well a primary point of mediation between all the parties was the individuals’ 
regard for the land, i.e., are you loyal to the land as an ascribed caretaker by God and 
hence loyal to God, or is the land seen more as an element of possession and tangibility, 
something more linked to the secular world?  
Environmental  
Stimulus 
(Language) 
Percipient 
(Carter and Sadat) 
Moral Foundation 
Categories 
Dual Process 
Cognition 
Use-Value 
Hierarchy 
Predispositional  
Behaviors 
(Carter: frightened of Begin) 
(Sadat: Angered by Begin) 
Manifest  
Behaviors 
Carter: Biased against 
Begin 
Sadat: Demonized Begin 
296 
 
Table 4 
Emergent Themes 
Theme Carter  Sadat  Begin 
 
Human  Universal Universal Jew Specific 
Rights 
 
Truth   Ideological  Ideological Pragmatic Use 
Telling 
 
Trust  Primary Primary Mediation Tool 
 
Land   Caretaker Caretaker Ownership 
 
While figure five is more illustrative of the core use-values of Sadat and Carter 
whose two most character shaping edits are to be found in the foundations of harm and 
care, fairness and cheating, a case can also be made for their ideological foundation of 
truth, found within the frame of the binding capacities of loyalty and betrayal. BY 
contrast, Figure six demonstrates not only the political position of Begin when entering in 
to the Camp David Accords, but also reflects the dissonance between Begin and his two 
counterparts relative to the underlying moral foundations.  
What came to be known as ‘the six no’s’ shows Begin’s disregard for human 
rights of the Palestinians (and of the Egyptians living in the Sinai), and his deep 
conviction toward possession of land in pursuit of his goal of establishing Eretz Israel as 
opposed to its nurturance. The notion of the land being a responsibility given to humanity 
to care for, i.e., remaining in the possession of God as believed by Sadat and Carter, and 
the religious ‘right to the land as designated by God,’ as possessed by man posited by 
Begin serves as a clarifying element of perceptual dissonance. Later, the reader will note 
that a significant identification with betrayal by Sadat and Carter on Begin’s part, is seen 
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in the establishment of new settlements during the Camp David talks inside the Sinai. 
While figure six speaks to the non-stoppage of new settlements, he had agreed to in fact 
cease the establishment of any new settlements, subsequently continuing their 
establishment impacting his counterparts’ foundation of truth and trust, Re., loyalty and 
betrayal. 
Table 5 
Begin’s Six No’s 
NO withdrawal from the West bank (politically or militarily) 
NO stopping new settlements or expansion of existing ones 
NO withdrawal of Israelis from the Sinai 
NO recognition of UN 242 of borders or west Bank 
NO self-governance for Palestinians (fear of them taking over Israel) 
NO voice of Palestinians in their own future 
After identifying these major themes, it was noted that Carter and Sadat, whose 
semantic style was notably similar, were more universal and over-arching in the 
application of their descriptive categories and concomitant themes such as the non-
tangible feelings about the land or the application of human rights. Begin’s application of 
those categories was very specific and limiting to his Jewish people. He again made 
explicit that an “us versus them” or a “Jew versus Goyim” mentality was at work when 
he spoke to the legitimation of terrorist acts or earlier massacres of non-Jews by the 
Israeli military and his earlier activities with Irgun in a tone that almost reflected a 
transference of vengeance that is often played out in the literature on victimology. He 
exemplifies this during a speech to the Knesset in 1977 when he says, “Goyim kill Goyim 
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and the Jews are blamed, “and “Poles did not like Jews and they were worse than 
Germans,” (Perlmutter, 1987. P. 276). Clearly this reveals distinct boundary between 
Jews and everyone else while at the same time positioning Jews as victims within the 
frame of global politics. The concept of individualizing foundations described by Haidt 
and Graham (2007) for Carter and Sadat and the binding foundations for Begin quickly 
became evident.  
During this first read of the data, it became evident that the cognitive development 
of Carter and Sadat, while culturally different, were thematically similar. It was also 
curious that the language used to describe a common element in their cognitive 
environment, for example the land, might be considered softer, or in Szalay’s vernacular, 
emollient, as opposed to the language seen in Begin’s quotes that reflected a colder, 
strategically based morphology. These respective linguistic styles are seen throughout 
each actor’s narration, from their early years to descriptions of the Camp David process 
and the actors playing within it.  
SADAT. …”Men and boys taking their (collective) cattle and our beasts of 
burden to the fields. 
When farmers went out to work in a land of unlimited richness extending as it 
seemed into infinity. I belonged to something vaster and more significant…THE 
LAND. I recognized an invisible bond of love and friendship with everything 
around me.” (Sadat, 1978. P. 5) 
CARTER. “It is good to realize that if love and peace can prevail on earth, and if 
we can teach our children to honor nature's gifts, the joys and beauties of the 
outdoors will be here forever,” (Carter, 1980). 
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BEGIN. The Partition of Palestine is illegal. It will never be recognized.... 
Jerusalem was and will forever be our capital. Eretz Israel will be restored to the 
people of Israel. All of it. And forever,” and “…Israel will not transfer Judea, 
Samaria, and the Gaza District to any foreign sovereign authority, [because] of the 
historic right of our nation to this land…” (Shlaim, 2014, p. 181). 
A clear feeling of a broader human acceptance was demonstrated in the former 
two subjects where a definite exclusionary tone was seen in the latter, all centering 
around the use-value hierarchy of symbols or perhaps more aptly put what we both 
innately and consciously regard as more important, that shaped the perceptions of each 
keeping in mind we interact not with material elements, but more the symbols that 
represent them.  
CARTER. “We become not a melting pot but a beautiful mosaic. Different 
people, different beliefs, different yearnings, different hopes, different dreams,” 
(Carter, 2001, p. 356). 
SADAT. If human values were relative, all laws-whether those based on revealed 
religions or those devised by man-would become meaningless,” (Sadat, 1978. P. 
175) 
BEGIN. “You Israeli you should never become lenient if you would kill your 
enemies. You shall have no pity on them until you shall have destroyed all their 
so-called Arab culture, on the ruins of which we shall build our own civilization,” 
(Begin speech at Mt. Herzl for Ze’ev Jabotinsky 100th birthday, 1980). 
So our perception of a person is accurately associated with what they represent to 
us as opposed to who they really are. For example, a student does not interact with a 
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professor as the human individual but with the definitions and considerations given to the 
symbolic representation of “professor,” that person that controls my grade with other 
concomitant perceived role expectations. With this in mind, one could not help to already 
wonder how it would be possible for Carter ad Sadat to ever accept Begin as the 
differences in moral themes and linguistic morphology stood so far apart.  
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It must be reiterated here that the structure of language within the context of 
sender and receiver, according to the literature on cognitive development and the 
descriptions demonstrated by Chomsky (1970) and Habermas (1984), can serve as a 
behavioral trigger eliciting the manifestation of certain emotional processes such as fight 
or flight, happiness and sadness or acceptance and abhorrence. We must recall the work 
showing the activation of emotional centers associated with the speech patterns of Carter 
and Sadat as communicative as opposed to the non-emotional strategic rationality of 
Begin and they might therefore impact their interactions. 
The difference in morphology caused me to reexamine linguistic texts and 
materials that contrasted Arabic, English and Modern Hebrew. Again, in terms of 
semiotics and sematic structures, there appeared to be a coalition of sorts between 
English and Arabic (where English had indeed retained some Arabic morphology in its 
development) where Modern Hebrew, despite its more recent emergence onto the 
linguistic stage, had a probative core or a more rigid semantic. Similar to Arabic 
however, Modern Hebrew had to borrow it’s invectives from the Greeks and early 
Roman (Latin) roots. It will be interesting to discover if these two preliminary group 
impressions hold throughout each phase of the study findings. 
Phase Two: Themes Describing Subjects’ Self-Descriptions 
Phase two focuses on the early environmental inputs to Sadat, Carter and Begin 
from primary socializers that serve to edit the use-value machinery we have referred to as 
moral foundations (Haidt and Graham, 2007). A reexamination of figure three above 
makes this clearer. Each foundation allows the percipient a basis in which to compare 
use-values through the experiential construction of a symbolic hierarchy of importance 
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associated with recognized emotional patterns external to the actor; referred to by 
Durkheim as a social fact. We can assert that the presence of a comparative standard 
innate to the actor and the unconscious comparative mechanism inherent to its utilization 
is far from simply a social “fact.”  
Somehow, the label tends to diminish the complexity of the process. It has been 
established that the interactions of the actor with these stimuli that are incorporated into a 
dual process cognition calculus of conscious and unconscious processes, impact any 
outward interactions, motivations, or perceptions of the percipient. Each major theme will 
be presented separately for each actor with a comparative summary. For the sake of 
clarity, the findings of earlier researchers in cognitive and developmental psychology that 
describe each foundation will be presented as a descriptor more than as a theme although 
it does more than suggest thematic contexts. This will make it easier for the reader to 
associate emergent data collected from descriptive materials to compare emergent themes 
to those major cognitive categories. 
Theme One: Harm/Care 
Figure Three provides a description of the first major category and serves as a 
reference in the identification of predispositions of conflict stakeholders. Note, this serves 
only as a contextual reference that should guide the reader in understanding the frame in 
which socio-cultural inputs shape the percipients’ environmental perceptions. 
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Table 6 
Theme One 
Sadat. Anwar al-Sadat’s primary socializing agent was his Grandmother. The 
moral use-values that she instilled were accomplished through storytelling, which also, in 
accordance with the Arab culture, established the linguistic structures and patterns that 
define the diglossic Arab language and subsequently the semantic tone of Sadat’s 
communicative style. That same style will be shown to be present later in Jimmy Carter 
and contrasted by the direct and strategic style seen in Menachem Begin.  The major 
theme that emerged from the Sadat autobiographical and related readings focused upon 
the care of ‘his’ people and the visceral attachment to the Egyptian land as the primary 
element of what defined the Egyptian people and their culture: 
…”the echoes of a saying of my grandmothers became almost audible: ‘Nothing 
is as significant as your being a child of this land. Land is immortal, for it harbors 
the mysteries of creation.” (Sadat, 1978, p.3) 
Individual and group Identity: Sadat believed that the identity of the people was 
viscerally linked to their association with the village and the land, a foundational element 
instilled and supported by his grandmother’s storytelling. Sadat pointed regularly to:  
“…the fact that wherever I go, wherever I happen to be, I shall always know 
where I really am. I can never lose my way because I know that I have living 
Category Purpose  Use Value                  Predisposition 
 
Harm/Care Attachment  Kindness  Empathy 
Nurturance  Gentleness 
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roots there, deep down in the soil of my village, in that land out of which I grew, 
like the trees and the plants.” (Sadat, 1978, p.6).  
Sadat’s prose painted a picture of the land as a living thing to be cared for and 
respected as it is a reflection of God on earth. To that end, the land was 
anthropomorphized deserving all the protection, care and nurturing given to another 
human being, at times deserving of even more should a choice need to be made. An 
association with the land is what defined an individual Egyptian’s identity to him or 
herself and to the primary group of association  Ironically, this observation sets the stage 
for a later controversy with Jewish settlers, as they were seen as displacing the original 
residents who were working the land, doing God’s work, and using it to its maximum 
productivity; in essence showing an unacceptable level of perhaps agricultural usury, 
more important to the theme of fairness and cheating, or even loyalty (to God’s land) and 
betrayal (to God’s directive). 
Incorporated into that identity was an empathy toward their own people who 
resided in the village and by extension the Egyptian geography. It was a high-context 
group of mechanical solidarity.  While care was shown for others, a stronger associative 
bond was demonstrated among and between Sadat’s villagers; the village later serving as 
a metaphor for all Egyptians.  
“Life in the village was a succession of pleasant discoveries.” (Sadat, 1978. P. 5) 
As a self-described ‘father of his people,’ Sadat showed a great empathy and 
kindness for his villagers from the time he was a small boy aspiring to be the village 
‘headman,’ in the footsteps of his father, with whom he shared a visceral linguistic and 
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cultural affinity. When he spoke of his father, Sadat exuded pride, respect and the primers 
of future leadership. 
“…my village called my father “Effendi” and his sons, everybody knew that it 
was my father and his family who are meant.” (Sadat, 1978. P. 15) 
The group as a whole was described by Sadat as demonstrating clear definitions 
of privilege to members along the same lines as in-group/out-group preferences (Bayart, 
2005; Brewer, 2007; Druckman, 1973; Forbes & Grafman, 2010), but at the same time 
tolerance of others who behaved within accepted normative systems as we have shown 
earlier to include linguistic styles of communicative and strategic constructs. In Sadat’s 
case this is a holy mandate spelled out in the Holy Quran: 
“God does not forbid you from being good to those who have not fought you in 
the religion or driven you from your homes, or from being just towards them. God 
loves those who are just.” (Surat al-Mumtahana, 8) 
“Beware!  Whoever is cruel and hard on a non-Muslim minority, or curtails their 
rights, or burdens them with more than they can bear, or takes anything from them 
against their free will; I (Prophet Muhammad) will complain against the person on 
the Day of Judgment.” (Abu Dawud) 
Each member was treated as a family member with the village serving as the 
metaphorically maternal link between them all. Throughout the readings the repeated 
themes of love, empathy and compassion were expressed by Sadat through his use of 
storytelling either directly or by metaphor as is the style found in the majority of Arabic 
poetry to include the Holy Quran (Fellman, 1975). The only antithesis to this harmony 
was seen in Sadat’s description of the British occupiers prior to and during the mandate 
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of post WWI. In accordance with group theory, the semiotic use of the word “red-faced, 
bulgy-eyed alien” (Sadat, 1978, p.10) with reference to a specific British officer is an apt 
summary of out-group perceptions inculcated first by his Grandmother’s stories which 
edited young Sadat’s cognitive processes and later through conscious observation and 
experience. “Even before I saw the British I had learned to hate them. They were 
aggressors that whipped and killed our people,” (Sadat, 1978, p.7). 
Carter. Jimmy Carter’s early primary socializers include his father, Earl, by 
observation his mother Lillian, and the wife of his father’s black farm worker, Rachael 
Clark. His 8
th
 grade teacher, Julia Coleman, while a later socializing force served to 
reinforce the earlier cognitive editing of his parents and black caretakers. Carter’s father 
used lesson-based tasks so that his son could see the value of discipline, hard work and 
dedication to anything he pursed. “My father was very firm but an understanding director 
of my life and habits. My father was my best friend,” (Carter, 1982, p. 26). 
Earl and Lillian often stood as an observational example for their son by 
demonstrating the importance of philanthropy and volunteerism in their empathy and care 
for an impoverished local black population of farm workers in the ultra-segregationist 
post-depression era pre-WWII South (Carter, 1982; Quandt, 1986a). 
Carter’s socio-cultural immersion in a community where its principle residents, 
black Americans, were severely discriminated against in the ultra-segregationist south 
establishes the foundational editing of Carter’s first major theme of harm/care in this first 
phase of analyses. Here it is important to note that had Carter’s father not through deed 
demonstrated his commitment to volunteerism and philanthropy to the black population 
and his mother’s defiance of southern white culture by providing free healthcare to the 
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black population (Carter, 1982), his perception of equal rights and demonstrated empathy 
toward minority populations experiencing many levels of discrimination might not have 
manifested itself; not only in self-described interactions, but later in presidential policy 
initiatives and subsequently during the mediation under study (Quandt, 1986a). Of his 
mother Carter perceived a woman who, independent for her time, was unafraid of 
controversy, running dissonant to segregationist southern values. She told her young son 
Jimmy, “I like controversial people and my father did too,” (Carter, 1982, p. 26). 
Individual and Group Identity: Similar to Anwar Sadat, Jimmy Carter had a 
palpable connection to the land and to all those who revered it. Aside from serving as the 
family’s primary source of income, the importance of it was instilled by his father, and 
Rachael Clark his black caretaker. 
“Rachael taught him (Jimmy) man’s responsibility to nurture the land. She also 
taught him how to fish, taking him on long treks to special fishing holes. Her 
husband taught him how to hunt…” (Quandt, 1986, p. 30). 
These teachings became a large element of Carter’s continued and growing 
concern for the land as evidenced by his comments during the signing ceremony of the 
Alaska Land Conservation Act of 1980, preserving 56 million acres of “nature’s beauty.” 
“We cannot let our eagerness for progress in energy and in technology outstrip 
our care for our land, for our water and for air, and for the plants and animals that 
share all of these precious vital resources with us. Every time we dig out minerals 
or drill wells, every time we ignore erosion or destroy a sand dune or dam a wild 
river or dump garbage or create pollution, we're changing the living Earth,” 
(Carter, 1980). 
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The land was something to be cared for, respected and as well one of God’s 
greatest gifts according to these two primary socializers. Humankind was considered 
merely an indentured caretaker of the land which was anthropomorphized as by Sadat. In 
each of Carter’s self-descriptions of where he set his moral compass, he often referred to 
his hard work in the field on his father’s land. He asserted that this discipline and care 
made him the man he had become. It was also the medium for his perception of his own 
and subsequently his group identity. To this end, Carter did not consider himself as a 
‘white’ man in the ultra-segregationist south, but more as a child of God a generic 
reference for universal membership in the family of man, deserving of care and 
nurturance. 
Carter’s favorite book as a child was James Agee’s “Let us Now Praise Famous 
Men.” It was a description of the suffering during the depression era of both Black and 
White men. Quandt (1986a) describes the work as showing the “unity of suffering 
between blacks and whites. Carter said, “the book showed the beauty and dignity of the 
poor that transcended their circumstances. They were richer in spiritual gratification,” 
(Quandt, 1986a, p. 35). Clearly, Carter associates with those who work hard, and nurture 
the earth, and constructs a moral boundary between others who do not. 
Another significant factor in Carter’s cognitive editing that shaped his future 
consideration of Human Rights, a hallmark of his future administration, were the acts of 
his primary socializers such as his parents’ philanthropy and volunteerism toward a 
minority population. However, the majority of Carter’s youth was surrounded by black 
friends and both regular and occasional black caretakers. He comments repeatedly on the 
his best friend “Knock” and how they were inseparable until their first day of school as 
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Knock was not permitted to receive the same education in the same school as his friend 
Jimmy. Carter witnessed the abuses of power inherent to segregation and showed 
remorse for the actions of his contemporaries.  
“Not so many white playmates lived near the Carter farm, so Jimmy played 
mostly with black boys, some of whose parents were tenants or sharecroppers on 
Earl Carter's farm. His favorite playmate was A.D. Davis (“Knock”). As soon as 
they could convince the black foreman, Uncle Jack Clark, that they had done 
enough work, Jimmy and A.D. would take off, both barefooted, usually with 
Jimmy's bulldog Bozo….” (Haley, 1977). 
“One day they went to Americus, where Jimmy insisted they see the movie at the 
Rylander Theater and that A.D. sit with him downstairs in the white-only section. 
But as a muttering arose, A.D. slipped upstairs to the "crow's nest" followed by 
Jimmy demanding that he come back downstairs. But A.D. wouldn't and they 
both left, highly indignant. They found themselves sometimes involved now in 
embarrassed, confused conversations about race. "Don't know as I'm ever going to 
start calling you 'Mr. Jimmy,' " said A.D., and Jimmy replied, "I wouldn't blame 
you—I wouldn't either," (Bourne, 1997, p. 359). 
Much of his angst was balanced by his parents’ philanthropy and care giving to 
the resident black population of Plains and the surrounding counties. He reflects on the 
right of the minorities to healthcare, education and economic security, He worked in the 
fields alongside the black workers that were the field-hands of his father (Carter, 2015; 
Quandt, 1986a). Earl Carter thought it important that his son understand the meaning of 
equality in work. In his narrative, it is clear that Carter developed an affinity, a certain 
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egalitarianism for his coworkers and their families expressing anger for their rights 
abuses and a motivation to assure those rights bringing the moral foundation of harm and 
care into clear focus.  
His moving back to Plains, living in to low income housing after abandoning a 
promising career in the US Navy, demonstrates a certain identification with those with 
whom he had been raised and felt most comfortable with as opposed to moving into the 
wealthier part of town that was expected of him. His empathy toward the black 
population with regards to their human rights served as a guidepost for the development 
of future policy and directives. It also lends a plane of perspective in terms of his 
relationship to Sadat who was considered a ‘dark skinned’ Egyptian, relevant to the 
concept of emotion-based pattern recognition explained by Churchland (2011). The 
argument for emotion based pattern recognition is supported here in Carter’s 
identification with the neglected and empathy toward human rights as applies to the 
Camp David actors and events. 
The language used by Carter is a reflection of not only a more generalized 
southern lexicon and sematic, but also indicative of a more emollient style of southern 
blacks. It was essential that he be able to communicate and sought to function among his 
coworkers without the stigma of being the white boss. This was a communicative as 
opposed to a strategic style and employed the emotional centers of the brain, indicative of 
this first thematic foundation (Wilson, 2015). 
A clear indicator of a socio-cultural influence on Carter’s sematic structure was 
seen in his own description of how he was timid to speak in groups and in any verbal 
conflict, lowered is head and remained silent. This was typical of his communication 
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style until he reached eighth grade where is teacher Julia Coleman, assigned Carter to the 
debate team, teaching him to be strong in any verbal defense and state his positions 
clearly and succinctly a clear evolution of style, but a strong indicator of identity and the 
first thematic foundation (Carter, 2010). 
Begin. Menachem Begin, Israel’s sixth Prime Minister, in subsequent phases of 
this study, has been perceived by observers, both Jewish and Non-Jewish, as terroristic, 
cold, calculative, radical and aggressively cruel toward Non-Jews (Perlmutter, 1987). 
Jews regarded by him as unsupportive of revisionist Zionism and Eretz Israel. These 
observations were rendered prior to, during and subsequent to the Camp David Accords 
in 1978 that serves as frame of conflict for this study. The language that he uses in his 
speeches and his personal correspondence lack the soft emollience and emotion seen in 
Sadat and Carter’s communications. 
Begin: “The deterrent power, or in Jabotinsky's language, the ‘iron wall’ was 
intended to convince the Arabs that they would not be able to get rid of the 
sovereign Jewish presence in the Land of Israeli, even if they would not bring 
themselves to recognize the justice of the Jewish people's claim to the homeland." 
(Shlaim, 2014, p. 354)  
Sadat: “Let there be no more war or bloodshed between Arabs and Israelis. Let 
there be no more suffering or denial of rights. Let there be no more despair or loss 
of faith.” (Sadat, 1977). 
Carter: “In order for us human beings to commit ourselves personally to the 
inhumanity of war, we find it necessary first to dehumanize our opponents, which 
is in itself a violation of the beliefs of all religions. Once we characterize our 
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adversaries as beyond the scope of God's mercy and grace, their lives lose all 
value. We deny personal responsibility when we plant landmines and, days or 
years later, a stranger to us — often a child – is crippled or killed. From a great 
distance, we launch bombs or missiles with almost total impunity, and never want 
to know the number or identity of the victims.” (Jimmy Carter. Nobel Lecture, 
2002) 
Begin’s is of a more strategic rational sematic structure indicative of Modern 
Hebrew, but more important upon closer interrogation displays the character of a victim 
seeking vengeance. While we have earlier demonstrated the cognitive editing 
environment in which the young Begin reached adolescence, a transient journey from 
Poland to Russia pre-WWI and back to Poland following the war where he and his family 
experienced a growing anti-Semitism, it is important to understand the human editors of 
his use-value library that is demonstrated throughout his political tenure. 
Begin’s mother is rarely mentioned in any of his memoirs save that she was 
revered by her son as loving of him and obedient to his father Dov. It is one of the rare 
occasions that Begin softens his tone. She was from a family of scholars, focusing on 
oratory and the Talmudic tradition. His father was more radical in nature, opposing the 
Jewish movements of assimilation and resident self-rule and favoring the return of all 
Jews to Eretz Israel in the Palestine (Perlmutter, 1987; Doran, e al, 2015). 
Young Begin observed his father’s radicalism not simply by word inside the 
home, but in actions such as when Dov Begin crashed in the doors of the synagogue so 
all could attend the memorial service for Theodor Herzl, the father of Zionism. Begin’s 
father also inculcated revisionist ideology into his by directing the youth groups he would 
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be a member of. His first experience with an exclusively Jewish youth group was with the 
more moderate Hashomer Hatzair. Soon, not seeing the exclusive revisionist ideology he 
wished for his son to adopt, Dov moved the young Begin to a more radical revisionist 
group called Betar, headed by his second primary socializer, Vladimir Jabotinsky.  
Jabotinsky was a radical revisionist that promoted the exclusivity of Jews in 
Palestine and an independent Jewish State. He was a trained orator, as was Begin’s father 
thus lending to the young revisionist’s great command of Modern Hebrew in all of its 
low-context culture influenced nuances. Jabotinsky was an ideology and in effect a 
segregationist when it came to Jews mixing with non-Jews in the new Israel. His tenor 
matched those of the Southern whites in Carter’s American South with whom he had 
issues concerning equality and human rights and flew in direct opposition to Sadat’s 
culture of acceptance. He spoke of the land of the Goyim in which Jews were disregarded 
as humans living in diaspora countries more like ghosts but constantly threatened with 
ridicule and suspicion by those non-Jews so prevalent in Begin’s earlier and later 
addresses. In a speech commemorating Jabotinski and his ‘Iron Wall,’ Begin said, 
“Goyim kill Goyim, and the jews are blamed,” (Shlaim, 2014, p. 356).  
It was here that the young Begin began to develop the identity of a victim, one 
that was superior to their oppressors throughout history as reflected in the Jewish 
awakening in Poland, the Haskalah. These feelings of victimhood, exclusivity and 
vengeance were solidified by the British Mandate that prevented Jewish immigration to 
Palestine to escape Jewish oppression in Europe, the Holocaust and post-WWII actions of 
both United States and the mandate prior to 1948. All of these use-value editors are 
314 
 
demonstrated throughout Begin’s adult political and public sector lives in references such 
as these:  
“In the name of Jerusalem. If I forget the extermination of the Jews, may my right 
hand wither, may my tongue stick to my palate if I cease to think of you, if I do 
not keep the extermination of the Jews in memory even at my happiest hour,” 
(Shlaim, 2014, p. 358) 
“We were granted the right to exist by the God of our fathers at the glimmer of 
the dawn of human civilization nearly 4,000 years ago. For that right, which has 
been sanctified in Jewish blood from generation to generation, we have paid a 
price unexampled in the annals of the nations,” (Begin, 1948). 
Individual and Group Identity: It is important to understand that Begin does in 
fact identify himself as a Jew and as one entitled by Biblical contract to an independent 
State of Israel. What is more important, relative to this first major theme of “harm/care,” 
is to understand what identifies him as a member of such a calculatedly exclusive group. 
If a subtheme to group and self-identity were to be listed, the most prominent one for 
Begin and his colleagues would be victims and those that recognize the gravity of that 
victimology, because it is here that the exclusivity for harm and care is limited to that 
specific collection of individuals. In the following quote to the Knesset in 1977, note the 
use of the word “we” to define his Jewish group identity. 
“We were granted the right to exist by the God of our fathers at the glimmer of 
the dawn of human civilization nearly 4,000 years ago. For that right, which has 
been sanctified in Jewish blood from generation to generation, we have paid a 
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price unexampled in the annals of the nations,” (Begin speech to the Knesset, 
1977) 
Following the Jewish diaspora it has been noted that the cultural influences, to 
include the Hebrew language, was buried within the framework of the host or master 
cultures overseeing segregated Jewish populations (Amara & Spolsky, 1986; Laitin, 
1977; 2001; Owens, 2001; Szalay, 1981; Wexler, 1995). Here, the Jews were under 
constant threat of discrimination, violence and transience. Within the context of biblical 
myths, the diaspora, for millennia, looked forward to returning to a Jewish State; 
something unsupported by international law or by strict adherence to biblical dogma. So, 
the two main themes emerging from the diaspora experience were victimhood and a 
continued existential threat from anyone outside of his identified group. This was later 
expanded to include those not supporting his revisionist ideology. These two criteria were 
the keys to revisionist Zionist identity and shaped the sentiments of exclusionism of all 
non-Jews and violent acts of perceived and justified vengeance or land grabbing from the 
Arabs. 
While the identity of self and group revolved around the historic oppression of the 
diaspora, it was a group without an attachment to the land as was held by Carter and 
Sadat. The diaspora were under the umbrella of being either unwelcomed or tolerated 
guests of a host country, such as Begin being resident to Poland. Begin did not possess 
the visceral attachment or respect for the land that Carter and Sadat possessed. The land 
was not simply a gift that God placed in his care, but something to be acquired by right 
and violent contest as one might acquire a new tractor or other tangible prize considered 
worth fighting for not as a trust, but as an entitlement. Clearly, the perception of land 
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between Carter and Sadat was almost identical from the time of their earliest memory, 
where for Begin a diametrically opposed and tangible perception was instilled and 
vigorously pursued.  
However, his identity revolved around intangible descriptions of a “house where I 
learned Hebrew,” (Perlmutter, 1987, p.34) that could at any time move to another 
location or be discontinued by Polish authorities. Another house that he hated, was 
described as permanent fixture, a “big terrible house at the end of the street where we 
learned the foreigner’s language,” (sic) Polish (Perlmutter, 1987, p. 34). Here a reference 
to the more contemporary vernacular of, “us versus them” begins to emerge, the masked 
articulation of group identity. 
If a Jew followed the notion of radical revisionism coupled with the role of 
victim, Begin and his contemporaries considered them a member of that group worthy of 
protection and care. However, if one subscribed to the more conservative ideology of 
assimilationist or autonomist Begin and his followers would exclude them as anathema 
the Zionist cause. If an individual were a non-Jew, particularly a Palestinian Arab, you 
were demonized, considered an inhuman obstacle to the glory of Eretz Israel and not 
entitled to human rights. 
"We cannot give any compensation for Palestine, neither to the Palestinians nor to 
other Arabs. Therefore, a voluntary agreement is inconceivable. All colonization, 
even the most restricted, must continue in defiance of the will of the native 
population. Therefore, it can continue and develop only under the shield of force 
which comprises an Iron Wall which the local population can never break 
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through. This is our Arab policy. To formulate it any other way would be 
hypocrisy." (Jabotinsky, 2011, p. 153). 
These behaviors, included in both the unconscious and conscious calculus of 
decision-making is seen throughout Begin’s Camp David dissertations, something not 
seen in the more egalitarian presidents Carter and Sadat, evidenced by his iteration of the 
‘Six No’s.” 
Theme Two: Fairness/ cheating 
Table 7 
Theme Two Fairness/Cheating 
Sadat: A primary sub-theme that echoes in Sadat’s writings is coupled to the 
earlier theme of identity. However, there is an extension of the empathy held for his 
group that demonstrates a universal concern for everyone being treated with dignity and 
fairness. This is reflected in two major metaphors, one of the equal collective of village 
men working together for securing harvests each performing a task that is “shared” and 
seeking no recognition, and the other in a third party identification with a hero that Sadat 
says shaped his notion of dignity, equal rights, defiance against unjust authority (to be 
addressed in a later theme) and the subterfuge exercised by the British to cheat his people 
out of their just rights and resources. This hero’s name was Zahran whose story was told 
repeatedly by his grandmother as a lesson in morality ‘every night.’ So essential to 
Sadat’s Moral compass was Zahran that Sadat wished he could be Zahran and hoped that 
future Egyptians would sing praises to him as they had Zahran.“…he held his head high 
Category  Purpose  Use-Value  Predisposition 
Fairness/Cheating Reciprocity  Proportionality Justice  
   Altruism  Equality  Human Rights 
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on the way to the scaffold. He was proud that he had stood up against the aggressors and 
killed one of them: I wish I was Zahran!” (Sadat, 1978a, p. 5-6).  
Sadat was clear in his disdain for the British occupiers as they had first cheated 
his people of their rights to the Nile in terms of trade and navigation since Egypt was in 
the midst of a crippling recession, selling its rights to the Suez canal.  He considered them 
aliens that sought to undermine the ‘peaceful and equality based’ existence of his people. 
He railed at their ‘lies’ of bringing to Egypt the technological and social advances of 
European culture, taking lying and taking away his peoples’ right to choose for 
themselves the path they wished to take. He was clear in describing the betrayal of 
Egyptian politicians who had cooperated in the British subterfuge for their own gain. His 
repeated references to the historic unfairness to people in his group by outsiders reflects 
the observations of Brewer (2007) with regards to in-group prejudice.  
Fairness, in this regard, is a measure of the equal application of rights from within 
and between the group members. Conversely, cheating is the abrogation of those rights 
and has been deeply incorporated into the Egyptian culture. The adjectives used in 
Sadat’s writing demonstrates this clearly, respect, equality, rights, peaceful, moral 
practice and the phrase ‘all God’s children’ make repeated reference to this second major 
theme of fairness and cheating. “To damage the sovereignty of the individual is to replace 
a community inspired by love, benevolence, and beauty by another based solely on 
power,” (Sadat, 1977, p. 158). 
Heroes and Moral Patterns: Having earlier established the criteria for who might 
be included in the group, in Sadat and Carter’s cases a more universal concept based in 
religious consideration and equality of moral investment, as opposed to Begin whose 
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perception was limited to who he considered worthy as defined by revisionist Zionism, it 
is interesting to see how a particular transference of responsibility is conveyed in Sadat’s 
use of his espoused hero, Zahran. Remember, that the Egyptian culture in particular is 
steeped in emotion-based story telling as a way of documenting history and moral lessons 
(Amara, et al, 1986; Cahill, et al, 1995; Cleveland, 2004). This emotional tagging, 
demonstrated repeatedly in this study’s coding patterns, has a significant importance in 
the development of future unconscious use-value equations and will manifest itself 
clearly in Sadat’s behavior during the Camp David Accords. 
The story of Zahran first establishes the unfairness of the British occupation, and 
the non-moral and horrific behavior of the British actors. Zahran is shown to heroically 
exact justice upon an enemy that wantonly killed one of his villagers. His trial, overseen 
by Egyptian judges, was described as a sham in that the judges were pawns of the British, 
again an unfair execution of justice and cheating the accused of his rights. However, 
Zahran refused to succumb to his captors holding is head high on the way to the gallows, 
never giving in to the will of the unfair process and letting everyone know that they were 
being deprived unfairly of their human rights. Clearly, Sadat’s people in this third party 
story, are the fair and egalitarian team while the aliens were unfair cheaters. He went so 
far as to fantasize that future Egyptians would be singing songs of praise to him, as they 
had his hero Zahran.”He held his head high on the way to the scaffold. He was proud that 
he had stood up against the aggressors and killed one of them: I wish I was Zahran!” 
(Sadat, 1978, p. 5-6).  
Sadat also idolized Mohandas Gandhi who again, resisted the British but did so in 
a peaceful way. He admired Gandhi for his universal love toward his fellow humans, as 
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well as his refusal to engage any violence or unfairness in his dealing with the British, 
His was one of messianic stature, suffering for what he considered the greater good. So 
impressed was Sadat, that he emulated Gandhi by dressing and meditating like him and 
often suffering the criticism of his friends. Although not quite as intent, Sadat had a 
similar admiration for Napoleon Bonaparte. Again, what was attractive was Bonaparte’s 
refusal to acknowledge the dominance of his captor’s authority while imprisoned on 
Elba, never lowering his head toward a picture of the King, Indeed, it was said that his 
captors had lowered the doorway so Napoleon would have to raise his head toward the 
King’s picture to get through. Instead, it is said he twisted his body to deny his captors’ 
satisfaction. 
It is clear that Sadat used his third party heroes as proxies to display his own 
moral foundation describing the use-value of fairness and cheating. It underlies a 
significant number of his decisions, or his reactions to those who would compromise the 
integrity of the Egyptian village through unfair negotiation or cheating in other ways. 
This obsession with equal and fair dealing can be shown through numerous studies of 
Arab culture, where bargaining is a part of everyday life, as long as it is fair bargaining 
and not in any way perceived as one party taking unfair advantage of another. This 
extends to people outside of the group and serves more of a universal guide to decision-
making throughout his life. His focus on familial metaphors and the presumptions of 
equality within the family is exemplified when he says, “There can be hope only for a 
society which acts as one big family, not as many separate ones,” (Sadat, 1978, p. 59) 
For example, Sadat was a maximalist and the purveyor of grand gesture; an 
indicator of universal applications of moral principles. When he first went to Jerusalem to 
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meet Begin for the first time he went with the thought that as a leader, he was making a 
grand gesture for peace. He fully expected Begin to make a gesture of parity, also 
engaging an almost immediate cessation of hostilities and building a governing coalition 
of cooperation. Begin never did this. In many of Sadat’s writing and again in his 
speeches, he comments on the unfair return of proposals on Begin’s part. He also 
demonstrates that while he was proposing peace, Begin used that as a mechanism of 
diversion to ‘cheat, and establish more illegal settlements in the Sinai. His writing reflects 
an almost disbelief that anyone could act in such a profane and immoral way, acting in 
direct opposition to the fair agreements offered for peace and cooperation. In a speech to 
the National Press Club (April 10, 1980) Sadat said, "Certainly, all peoples must be 
treated equally and without any discrimination. However, no people has any right to live 
in other people's territory without their consent and free acceptance." (Washington Post, 
April 11, 1980, p. 2). 
Overall, this major theme of fairness and cheating is experienced by the young 
Sadat through all of his primary socializers, principally his Grandmother. Often, it is 
shown through stories, a primary emotional pattern recognition venue (Cohen, 1990; 
Fromkin, 1989; Koch, 1983) and his adoption of the morality of the principle character, 
Zahran. There were other less frequented stories told to the young president also by his 
grandmother, but the moral message was clear, equal treatment of God’s children, a 
universal regard for fairness and the intense evil of cheating, particularly of his home 
group. Abu-Nimir (1996) has shown this to be pervasive in the Arab culture and 
demonstrated in various ways, but at their foundation was the imperative of telling the 
truth and fair reciprocity in all social interactions. It was noted, however, that there was a 
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slight preference to the in-group members in terms of giving the benefit of the doubt and 
second chances. 
Carter. While Carter did not describe any heroes as is common in a storytelling 
culture, he did revere several people that reinforced his perception of the major theme of 
fairness and cheating. The context of both his observation and learning through 
interaction occurred within the frame of the segregationist south during an era of high and 
overt discrimination principally leveled at its black constituency. As an observer, Carter 
learned two things from his father. First, that resources necessary for living, in this case 
heath care, should be available to anyone. Earl supported his wife Lillian’s activities as a 
nurse providing care to the black families at little or no cost. When one of those families 
was in financial distress, Earl would make secret, third party loans through an agent so 
not to raise the political ire of the white authority (Quandt, 1986a). Upon his death, all of 
those loans were forgiven. Carter knew that providing outright assistance would not be 
good for his father’s position in the business community, although to those who did know 
of Earl’s philanthropy, they forgave this ‘indiscretion’ within the context of Christian 
charity. 
The second thing that Carter learned through observation, and in several cases a 
direct receiving of abrogating the rules, was Earl’s heavy investment in telling the truth. 
His wife Lillian testified that lying would bring the fastest execution of a beating to instill 
the value of truth. Everyone knew that Earl Carter ‘hated a liar.’ Carter often, in his 
dealings with midshipman while attending the U.S. Naval Academy, would be branded a 
Boy Scout due to his penchant for telling the truth. This is one of the primary 
characteristics that Admiral Rickover considered on his admission to the nuclear 
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engineering program later on. Truth, equality and the universal application of human 
rights was something that not only shaped his adolescent life, but his presidency as well 
(Bourne, 1997) and is demonstrated in his White House remarks commemorating the 30
th
 
anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in December of 
1976. Carter said, “Human Rights is the soul of our foreign policy, because human rights 
is the very soul of our sense of nationhood.” 
Heroes and Moral Patterns: It is not a long bridge to equate heroism for the 
future president with several people, his father Earl, his mother Lillian, his black 
caretaker Rachael Clark and his teacher Julia Coleman. Each contributed a specific 
editorial component to Carter’s use-value mechanism, i.e., forming the evolved and 
innate moral foundations calculus. Subsequently, these predispositions are reflected in the 
semantic structure and chosen semiotic structures of how Carter expressed himself as a 
boy and later as a leader of the free world who was obsessed by his own admission 
(Carter, 2001; Bourne, 1997) with fairness, equality and human rights. “What are the 
things that you can't see that are important? I would say justice, truth, humility, service, 
compassion, love...They're the guiding lights of a life.” (PBS Interview, 10/11/2002). 
These are still seen in his renowned work in volunteerism and philanthropy 
through the Carter Foundation. While this not contrary to the manner in which Sadat 
received moral lessons, it does point to a difference on cultural expression. Sadat, as is in 
line with Arabic culture, expressed moral lessons and influences using the medium of 
stories, where Carter utilized the venue of autobiographical description to describe his 
moral education. Both mechanisms have been shown effective, but are indicative only of 
culturally based presentations of the same influences. 
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With regards to this major theme describing Carter’s predispositions, overall, the 
major human influences in his life each stressed the importance of equality and 
volunteerism, something ironically not so much in evidence within the cultural milieu in 
which Carter lived. His father made loans to the impoverished and made certain their 
healthcare was available contrary to the political and ideological thought of the time. 
Racheal Clark made certain that the young Carter understood the importance of the land 
and God’s many gifts as a necessity to spread generosity among all people. By 
observation and through an affection for his black friends, young Carter extended his 
empathy to feel badly and angry when he witness improprieties against those he would 
describe as second mothers, best friends or brothers, all experiencing discrimination. 
Carter felt that pain of unfairness by observation and personal association and often 
commented on a profound sadness felt for year when realizing him and his best friend, 
his ‘brother’ Knock could not attend the same school after being together throughout 
their preschool years.  
Carter was taught by his father a respect for authority and to always be fair 
personally and in business. Earl’s caveat to his young son was that, ‘there would always 
be a reckoning” (Carter, 2002). Although, on the same hand he demonstrated a certain 
defiance when it was apparent that authority might impinge on a person’s right to choose 
either through the unfair exercise of power or through cheating, to be the captain of their 
own destiny, the ultimate demonstration of fairness.  
“I believe that anyone can be successful in life, regardless of natural talent or the 
environment within which we live. This is not based on measuring success by 
human competitiveness for wealth, possessions, influence, and fame, but adhering 
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to God's standards of truth, justice, humility, service, compassion, forgiveness, 
and love,” (Carter, 2013). 
The Baptist preacher in plains told the congregation that seeing movies on Sunday 
was wrong and that they must abstain. Earl Carter, in direct defiance to the order issued 
by the preacher declared this unfair and a demonstration of how wrongly power could be 
used. Something key to the later president. He took his family to the movies every 
Sunday after that and made certain to make a side comment on the unfairness of the 
preacher’s order (Carter, 2001).  
In strict defiance to segregationist ideology, Earl supported his wife Lillian’s 
medical practice to rural black families, bit financially and supportively. He considered 
healthcare not only a right, but a responsibility of those able to provide for those not as 
fortunate. In a sense, Earl was transmitting a notion of altruism and reciprocity, key both 
to Carter’s view on charity, but also indicative of expectations later seen in the older 
Anwar Sadat when dealing with a culture where reciprocity was not a moral imperative, 
save for the application of reprisals within the context of Begin’s victimology. 
Begin. Like Jimmy Carter, Menachem Begin did not describe ‘heroes’ in the 
typical manner as would a child, but as is indicative of Modern Hebrew, described men 
that he ‘respected,’ and ‘looked up to,’ a particular nuance of his culture. These included 
his father Dov, and the revisionist Zionist Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky. It would not be 
too farfetched to say that anyone who directly opposed the British occupiers following 
WWI, or Arabs opposing the first Zionist settlers would be held also in high regard by 
Begin. Unlike Sadat and Carter, Begin’s sense of fairness and cheating is limited to his 
group that identifies themselves, or lives the exclusive role of victim. That would include 
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all Jews, at least those that agreed with his methodology of vengeance, not so much 
assimilationists and autonomists (Perlmutter, 1987).  
Begin lived his early years in Poland and for a short time in Russia, in an 
atmosphere of anti-Semitism, exclusionism and nationalism. He was part of the diaspora 
and was taught from an early age that Jews were excluded from the greater society and 
had to exist outside of the boundaries and resources of the Goyim. Begin’s father taught 
him that anyone having not suffered at the hands of the European anti-Semites and later 
those that stood in the way of the Jews returning to their rightful home of Israel, were in 
fact the enemy, and not to be afforded any form of human consideration. Fairness, the 
contemplation of care was restricted to those of the victim group. Cheating was 
permissible in pursuit of the goal of returning to Eretz Israel as the Jewish homeland 
promised to them by God. Cheating in this case was not viewed so much as a moral 
depravity, but more as a stratagem to take back something wrongfully taken away 
millennia ago. 
In one instance, the young Begin witnessed his father kick down the door of the 
synagogue where the Zionist founder Theodor Herzl was being memorialized. Dov found 
it unfair that only a select few could pay respects to the man whom he considered an icon 
and the founder of Zionism. Herzl was one of the original Israeli pioneers, going back to 
the original homeland of Eretz Israel. Here, young Begin associated the use of violence in 
pursuit of fair access. He came to understand that being a victim, gives validity to that 
violence, or cheating, re., through lying about settlements, as a valid and moral form of 
behavior. In this one event, the stage had been set for future Camp David conflicts. 
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This sense of restricting fairness and the justifiable use of cheating to attain a 
desired goal, was supported by Begin’s membership in his early youth groups. The 
foundations were laid during his years as a Jewish Boy Scout in the group Hashomer 
Hatzair. “The image of the victorious Jewish Cowboy prevailing over the marauding 
Arabs occupying the future Eretz Israel stuck in the young Begin’s mind,” (Perlmutter, 
1986) establishing the early feelings of an in-group outgroup definition. This also speaks 
to a primary difference between the thematic applications between the three principle 
subjects. This also served as the foundation for the demonization of any ideological 
opposition as demonstrated through his membership in opposition parties such Herut, 
later called Likud and his participation in terrorist actions by Irgun at the King David 
Hotel bombing (Shindler, 2002).  
Where Sadat and Carter’s consideration of the theme of fairness and cheating 
were more universal in its consideration, Begin, because of the victim mentality he had 
been inundated with as a child, and witness to severe anti-Semitism during his 
adolescence in Poland was more exclusionary in his thematic manifestations giving great 
energy toward the notion of security, learned from his mentor, Ze’ev Jabotinsky. 
"Israel will not transfer Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District to any foreign 
sovereign authority, [because] of the historic right of our nation to this land, [and] 
the needs of our national security, which demand a capability to defend our State 
and the lives of our citizens." (Brenner & Einstein, 2015, p. 164) 
Here, there was a clear line drawn in the identification between Jews and non-
Jews; the former deserving of fairness, albeit a delayed fairness and cheating not as an 
antithesis to fairness, but as a tool for the accomplishment of a goal, re, Eretz Israel.   
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Where Begin’s father served as his primary socializer in his early years, the data 
shows that Begin’s exclusionary attitude was an evolved one. His father, who demanded 
the use of Modern Hebrew in the Begin household as a primary means of establishing 
both individual and group identity markers, introduced his young son into Zionism 
through stories much like Sadat’s grandmother had done to the young Arab. Dov entered 
his son into a rather conservative youth group that espoused the tenants of the Haganah, 
or Jewish enlightenment, Hashomer Hatzair.  
The end of the war showed a new nationalism in Begin’s native Poland that had 
as one of its foundations, the notion that resident Jews were ‘ghosts’ and needed to be 
excluded or assimilated. This gave rise to the three alternatives forwarded inside the 
Jewish communities; assimilation, autonomists or revisionists. As the discrimination 
toward the Jews became more overt, Dov Begin’s attitude became more radicalized 
which he then passed to his son Menachem. 
Not only through words, but through the deeds of his father, young Begin began 
to establish a new “us versus them” mentality. His father had become more radicalized, 
demanded fair treatment, not for everyone, but for the Jews who were excluded from not 
simply the politics of the time, but from within their own community, citing the 
synagogue door incident at the memorial for the Zionist founder Theodor Herzl. Young 
Begin was moved out of Hashomer Hatzair, not because of his father’s disagreement for 
its foundational Zionism, but for its lack of intensity relative to both message and action.  
Dov placed his son into an environment that would soon serve as the emotional 
and moral foundation for the future prime minister’s rabid exclusionism of non-Jews and 
what he had witnessed in Poland now applied to out-group members, nationalism 
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justified by Jewish exceptionalism. This was found in the group Betar that many have 
argued served as the incubator for a terroristic splinter group responsible for the killing of 
not only British administration meeting at the King David Hotel, but also other Jews, 
Arabs and a multitude of innocents. 
Begin came under the direct influence of his mentor of many years, Vladimir 
(Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, an ardent revisionist Zionist, cited by Begin as his moral compass for 
the attainment of Eretz Israel. Jabotinsky went far beyond words, preferring militaristic 
solutions historically documented in Zionist history in a not altogether favorable light by 
leaders such as David Ben-Gurion, often being cited as terroristic and anti-Jew. 
Ironically, this same group became a key breeding ground for the later infamous terror 
group, Irgun, to which Begin rose to leadership not only against the British mandate, but 
against the Arab residents of Palestine.  
Heroes and Moral Patterns: The early editing of Begin’s moral foundation, or 
use-value symbolism is not difficult to understand and is frequently revealed in his 
writing and speeches. At an early age he was told of how often Jews had been ‘cast out’ 
of their Israeli homeland in Palestine and had been persecuted as outsiders and threats in 
every community of the diaspora. His native Poland was seen as a prison, a ‘land of the 
goyim,’ by both his father, community leaders and later by Begin himself demonstrating 
how he had already established the sense of exclusionism and Jewish exceptionalism. His 
father, regarded as a more radical revisionist, constantly reinforced this notion of 
victimhood and the need to attain the goal of Eretz Israel in any way possible. Cheating 
was seen as a methodology of attaining a moral and deserved goal. 
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The ideology of revisionist Zionism was reinforced through early membership in 
youth groups such as Hashomer Hatzair and later a more radicalized Betar under the 
mentorship of Jabotinsky. Begin saw his father act outside of what would be considered 
moderate Zionism. Modern Hebrew and its invectives came from other, more 
militaristically radicalized languages such as Russian and Polish (Wexler, 1995). It was 
the household language used by both parents. Its foundational qualities of being probative 
and direct running in opposition to not only the diglossic Arabic, but to western 
diplomatic dialects as well (Amara & Spolsky, 1986). 
Later, during the Second World War, Begin lost his family to the Holocaust 
further cementing the notion of victimhood and revenge. Throughout his descriptions of 
his childhood and adolescence, repeated emotional themes of being a victim, not simply 
to the Nazis, but to the ‘marauding Arabs in Eretz Israel,” the British during the mandate 
prior to 1948 and anyone in opposition to the establishment of an independent Israeli 
State were pervasive. In adolescence there was constant reference to death and fear from 
the ‘outside.’ Begin demonstrated a distinct paranoia fueled by past experience, of being 
constantly under some kind of existential threat. 
As a consequence to this stress of paranoia, of always sensing a threat from non-
Jews two phenomenon availed themselves with some regularity and predictability. First, 
in a particularly unconscious effort to primarily justify violence against outsiders, such as 
Arabs resident to Palestine, or later to Egyptians trapped within the established post-war 
borders, Begin would consistently demonize those he perceived to be in opposition to his 
goal. The derogatory labels of Goyim, Palestinians as Nazis, Arafat as Hitler, British 
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oppressors or Arabs not simply as a threat, but as a ‘dire threat,’ served to nullify the 
theme of fairness and cheating to anyone outside of the Zionist circle. 
Begin’s early influences from his father and of Vladimir Jabotinsky were 
powerful editors to the young Begin’s use-value mechanism. It demonstrates and 
supports Greene’s theory of dualism as what began is external influences, presented itself 
as a key component of Begin’s early and later decision-making calculus. He actively 
pushed back from the acceptance of other cultural value systems and according to 
Perlmutter (1987) remained “culturally ignorant.” He influences therefore remained with 
the frame of his early primary socializers.  
Another subtheme that permeates Begin’s demonstrated behavior toward fairness  
and cheating, is a distinct sense of entitlement as a debt incurred of his 
victimization.  
Where the words written and spoken show a biblical justification for his actions, 
both violent and political, a comprehensive reading of Begin’s work shows a distinct 
feeling of justified entitlement for the State of Israel. Phrases such as ‘never again,’ or 
‘our right as a people,’ or ‘God’s gift to the Jews,’ despite text that suggests that the Jews 
were cast out of Israel by God for their own lack of devotion, all points to an unconscious 
play of entitlement into early decision-making and perception-developing actions. His 
environment reinforced that perception and it is later demonstrated readily in Begin’s 
political activities prior to and during the Camp David accords. His sense of entitlement, 
coupled with the demonization of his opposition, limited fair action to the Zionists, and 
cheating became a justifiable means to an end. 
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Theme three: Loyalty and Betrayal 
Table 8 
Theme Three Loyalty/ Betrayal 
Sadat. His grandmother made it clear to the young Sadat, that first Egypt was the 
cradle of all civilization to which he owed not only his corporeal life but also his spiritual 
life, and second that the people of his village  served as the life-blood that coursed 
through his veins. He quotes his grandmother, reiterating that it was her teachings that 
established the moral compass that he followed throughout his life; “Nothing is as 
significant as being a child of this land. Land is immortal as it harbors the mysteries of 
creation,” (Sadat, 1978, p. 2). 
Truly a collective, high context culture, the influences on Sadat centered on 
giving one’s self to the greater good of his people as well as expecting that reciprocity 
from others. The people and the land were inseparable and operated as a collective unit, 
one nurturing the other.  
“…When farmers went out to work in a land of unlimited richness extending as it 
seemed into infinity… I recognized an invisible bond of love and friendship with 
everything around me,” (Sadat, 1978, p. 6) 
This ideology did not appear to be localized to immediate neighbors nor to Arabs 
as a whole. What was clear in Sadat’s biography and subsequent readings was a universal 
assumption of equal values between many peoples and cultures; “There can be hope only 
Category             Purpose  Use Value                  Predisposition 
 
Loyalty/Betrayal Patriotism  One for All  In-Group Identity 
Self-Sacrifice  Coalitions  Out-Group Hatred      Altruism 
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for a society which acts as one big family, not as many separate ones,” (Sadat letters 
from, Hurwitz and Medad, 2011). From his early cognitive stages it is clear that Sadat’s 
life was formed around the collective and manifest in such things as his description of 
collective agricultural endeavors, trade with other villages and a need for universal 
understanding. He was encouraged to understand other cultures and religions as is seen in 
his attendance at both Koranic, Catholic and secular schools. His grandmother wished her 
grandson to have a broad understanding of the world and the people in it. 
His heroes were men that demonstrated the ultimate sacrifice in pursuit of an 
ideal. They all showed an allegiance, not to themselves, but to the people that looked to 
them for moral guidance or affirmation. Human beings, neurologically, imitate those 
individuals that come close to demonstrating their own ideal type as well as those can be 
emulated to achieve or demonstrate worthiness for leadership (Churchland, 2011). Sadat 
focused on peace, understanding, self-sacrifice and an altruism that drove him to protect 
those he perceived to be less able to protect themselves. He constantly spoke to ‘his’ 
people, that he wished to be regarded in the same way as his hero Zahran who defiantly 
opposed the British occupiers to his death, and was so impressed with Gandhi that he 
virtually hijacked his persona for a period of time. While he did develop a fierce loyalty 
to the people around him, and acted as a father to them later on in his career, he was not 
exclusionary of others outside his primary group. 
Sadat was primed to be an example of this theme of Loyalty and Betrayal 
primarily by his grandmother, but also by his father, who edited his young son’s use-
values more by example than word. The village knew his father as ‘effendi,’ or 
“…headman, something all young Egyptian boys aspired to be,” (Cohen, 2007; Sadat, 
334 
 
1978b, p. 7). Later in his life, and as will be described later in this chapter, Sadat 
developed a bit of tunnel vision with regards to his expectations of others within the 
context of this major theme. He expected reciprocity and found those who did not offer it, 
such as Begin’s refusal to offer reciprocal grand peace overtures on Sadat’s first visit to 
Israel, untrustworthy and ‘distasteful.’ This was later supported by Carter during the 
preparation for the Genva conference prior to the Camp David meetings. 
“The Israelis (Begin) were not honoring the commitment Dyan had given me 
(Carter). Whenever there was some success with the Arabs (other leaders, Syria, 
Jordan, Saudi) Begin would proclaim the establishment of another group of 
settlements or make provocative statements,” (Carter, 1982, p. 304) 
Sadat placed a significant amount of social capital into telling the truth and the 
demonstrations or worthiness of trust. While the structure of diglossic Arabic might 
speak against to this assumption, B. Cohen (1957) and R. Cohen (2007) point out that the 
tendency toward exaggeration in order to make a guest feel welcome, is usually limited to 
only one portion of “street” Arabic and infrequently finds its way into formal or 
diplomatic Arab speakers. In Sadat’s eyes, you were a product of God’s land, and you 
must show it the reverence as demanded of God’s gift. If you invested in the nurturance 
of the land and its people, you regarded highly. However, if you desecrated or simply 
possessed the land, taking away the privilege of nurturance from God’s rightful 
caretakers, you were considered not altruistic as much as an outsider. 
The Land and Coexistence: In his own words, Sadat delineates two important 
social interactions. One is the relationship of humankind to the land evidenced when he 
said, “I recognized that I was a part of something much greater than myself; the land!” 
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(Sadat, 1978, p. 3). The other is the interrelationships between those that care for the 
land, humankind not simply within the context of his native Egypt, but all land; “When 
farmers went out to work in a land of unlimited richness extending as it seemed into 
infinity…there is an attachment to God…!” (Sadat, 1978, p. 3). 
Around these two themes as the foundation of his use-value assignment of loyalty 
and betrayal, are you loyal to God in his gift and are you loyal to each other, not simply 
as God’s caretakers, but as a mechanism of survival and collectivity, also part of God’s 
plan. Social interaction is almost a rationalism and also seen in the ideology of Islam and 
Arabic history after the 6
th
 century. God has said everything and planned everything that 
could be said, so man’s oration is simply a repeat of God’s already spoken words. It is 
not to be questioned. 
Sadat goes to great lengths to describe the moral duty to nurturing the land as a 
reflection of God’s commitment to humankind. In that regard, you would not betray the 
land as you would not betray God. The land provides everything necessary for life and 
incurs an obligation, a loyalty to its maintenance. It is a personification of God on earth, 
an “attachment to God.” Loyalty to one’s village, or specifically to its residents, is 
important both as a spiritual obligation but also as to secure the dedicated labor of the 
collective in order to maintain and nurture the land. Should one stray outside of those 
obligations, to relinquish his obligation in pursuit of personal gain, he not only betrays his 
earthly partners, but betrays God. 
It is clear in Sadat’s descriptions of collective labor, of men working together in 
the fields without regard for personal gain, only the benefit of the village as a whole is a 
reflection of this moral compass in describing this theme of loyalty and betrayal. He 
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always speaks in the collective, rarely as an individual unless it is as a leader of God’s 
mandate. To that end, he appears to be the self-appointed father of his people, something 
later reflected in words used while he was president. 
Sadat described the British as the antithesis to everything he had been taught. 
They were not loyal to any of the Arab people. They did not regard the land as sacred, but 
profane and as a thing to be sold to the highest bidder. He made this quite clear when 
describing the betrayal of the British selling the land to the Jewish Land Company in 
pursuit of Eretz Israel. He was equally as critical of his own people, who traded away 
navigational rights of the Nile to the British ‘aliens.’  
“Even before I saw the British I had learned to hate them. They were aggressors 
that whipped and killed our people,” (Sadat, 1978, p. 9). 
Sadat’s loyalty then was limited to particular people or groups, unless they were 
practicing caretakers of the land which he regarded as sacred and a reflection of God’s 
trust in humankind. From an early age then, he makes it clear relative to his later 
observations that the Jews were not bad people to be hated, only those that took away 
land merely for profit and occupation. 
Carter. Carter’s early socializers, particularly his father Earl, stressed honesty and 
loyalty as the foundation for his moral philosophy. His mother Lillian stated many times 
that Earl, “would be quick to whip for lying” (Carter, 1982, p. 26). Lying was viewed as a 
betrayal to the listener, to the speaker and to God. The volunteerism of Carter’s mother in 
providing healthcare to the black residents of Plains, the philanthropy of his father to 
anyone in financial difficulty, black or white, demonstrated a loyalty to his ‘villagers’ as 
well as an expectation of reciprocal altruism much in the same way as shown by Sadat. 
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Although giving of one’s self was considered acts of Christian charity, it went far beyond 
conceptual in Carter’s world. His father put him into the fields alongside poor black farm 
workers. This not only taught the young Carter, ‘a love for the land and all of its gifts,’ 
(Carter, 2001) but also taught him how to rely on others and become part of a functional 
team.  
“It is good to realize that if love and peace can prevail on earth, and if we can 
teach our children to honor nature's gifts, the joys and beauties of the outdoors 
will be here forever,” (Carter Inaugural address, 1977). 
More important though, as Carter describes it in his writings, he was able to listen 
to unsolicited comments about his parents from the viewpoint of men that were 
considered disposable and valueless in the ultra-segregationist south. He heard how the 
acts of philanthropy by his parents and the volunteerism of his mother, were highly 
valued in the black community. He learned how much the acts of his parents were 
appreciated by these people, but important too was the use-value attachment given his 
parents by the black communities. Earl was seen as fair, a good man, someone who cared 
and not afraid to get in the face of the white establishment nor the church. The parties he 
threw for the black workers on the fourth of July were legendary as was his allowing 
them to gather about the window of the house to listen to the fights on the radio (Bourne, 
1997). Clearly, Carter had a stencil of moral philosophy that guided him through his life 
and policy making years.  
All of the primary editing of his use-value mechanism was constantly reaffirmed 
by other socializers, his black care-giver Rachael Clark, his teacher Julia Coleman and 
later by Admiral Rickover. His teacher, to whom he described as a second mother 
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insinuating the importance of her input, taught him the concept of agape love through his 
reading of 1
st
 Corinthians, a selflessness and altruistic form of self-sacrifice. 
Parenthetically, he regarded Rachael Clark in the same light, a second mother who taught 
him the value of the land and respect for those who worked it as stated by Carter’s 
biographer Peter Bourne (1997), “Rachael taught Jimmy that a man’s responsibility is to 
nurture the land…” (p. 30). Indeed, Carter’s sense of altruism and self-giving were made 
clear to him from every environmental input.  
His witnessing of the how his black friends were generally abused in terms of 
rights to education, rights to health care, rights to housing and general elements of quality 
of life, instilled in Carter a sense of betrayal of humankind by those in power. When he 
was eight years old, Carter had saved enough money to buy five tenant houses, hence 
joining the landlord class in Americus. According to Peter Bourne, Carter’s biographer, 
as young Cater went to see his new purchases: 
“It was about this time that two of his black friends opened a gate and then stood 
back, and let Jimmy pass through. He thought it must be a trick they were playing, 
but this symbolic action signaled a powerful social change. ‘The constant struggle 
in our small group had been resolved, but a precious sense of equality had gone 
out of our personal relationship, Carter writes, ‘and things were never again the 
same between us.’” (Wright, 2014, p.15). 
Here, Carter’s sense of empathy for the symbolism of inequality is acute and 
something that haunts him throughout the rest of his life. So much so, that his foreign 
policy advisor, William Quandt (1986a), wrote, “perhaps the dark skin of Anwar Sadat, 
the son of a northern Egyptian and a Sudanese mother, triggered suppressed feelings that 
339 
 
brought out an instant friendship toward the dark skinned president,” (Quandt, 1986b, p. 
259). Carter stated more explicitly, “I felt protective of Sadat,” (Carter, 1982, p. 300). 
His giving of self, his relationship with those he regarded as friends is seen in his 
later return to Plains and insisting on living in the projects as opposed to the Carter family 
farm. Altruism, loyalty to mankind and self-sacrifice are overtly demonstrated in Carter’s 
life and in his political actions. His acute sense of human rights is founded upon these 
early socializers and stood as a primary cause of dispute between Carter and Begin at 
Camp David. Compare the descriptions of Carter’s ‘friend and brother’ Sadat to those of 
his first impressions of Begin. Note the use of descriptors for each actor described. 
Sadat: …he was “A shining light; A man that could change history; A man I 
would come to admire more than any other leader; Shy, ill at ease; A complexion 
much darker than I expected; It soon became apparent that he was charming, 
frank and a very strong and courageous leader and would not shrink from tough 
positions; There was an easy and a natural friendship between us. We trusted each 
other.” (Carter, 1982, p. 259-300) 
Carter‘s first impression of Begin came while watching an interview with the 
Prime Minister on the TV show, ‘Issues and Answers.’ His observation was that Begin 
was, “frightening to watch his adamant position… I could not believe what I was hearing, 
the answers of this tenor!” Resulting description in later interactions are described by 
Carter as; 
“The Israelis (Begin) were not honoring the commitment Dyan had given me.  
Whenever there was some success with the Arabs (other leaders, Syria, Jordan, 
Saudi) Begin would proclaim the establishment of another group of settlements or 
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make provocative statements…This behavior was not only irritating, but seriously 
endangered the prospects for peace…..and Sadat’s reputation,” (Carter, 1982, p. 
304). 
“The onus is on Begin. He either becomes more flexible or he is the “Killer of 
peace,” (Carter private diary, 5/11/78, p. 313).  
Specifically note the descriptors ascribed to Sadat, a shining light, shy, leader, 
friendship, to name a few as opposed to Begin, provocative, irritating, frightening, 
endangering, killer of peace. Together, a clear picture is formed of carter’s opinions of 
each of his counterparts, but also is reflective of earlier moral priming. 
The Land and Coexistence: From his earliest memory, Carter had his attention 
focused on the land and coexistence with everyone similar or dissimilar to him from all 
of his primary socializers and as well, his observation of how human rights were 
bestowed only on selective parts of the population. Particularly as it effected education 
and integrated social interactions. While Plains was his editing social environment, the 
feelings engendered by its exposure was universalized as is demonstrated in his later 
writings and those of autobiographers and political analysts.  
His writing repeatedly referred to the disparities in resources to the black 
population, their lack of equal access to the land (“God’s earth”), and the inability for his 
black close friends to get a good education therefore condemning them to a life of 
poverty and insecurity. Carter worked tirelessly in the fields with his father’s workers and 
had the same reputation in that he would never ask anyone of them to do anything he 
would not do himself. The future president rewarded hard work with friendship and 
loyalty.  
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“In his early years, Jimmy’s playmates were the children of the black farmhands. 
His closest friend was A.D. “Knock” Davis. As young children they were treated 
equally by the adults of both races and subjected to the same discipline. They also 
visited each other’s homes. However, Miss Lillian (Carter’s mother) differed from 
other white mothers in allowing Knock and the other black children to eat with 
Jimmy in their kitchen. AS they grew older, the minuet of social segregation 
began to separate them. They continued to hunt and fish together, but when Earl 
(Carter’s father) built the tennis court, Knock was not invited to play. It was 
school that definitely set them on ,” different paths. (Bourne, 1997, p. 25). 
A major theme that emerges from the editing of Carter’s use-value mechanism, 
from seeing the abuses of a white majority on people he considered his family and 
friends, from seeing the segregation of resources toward the minority population such as 
an equal access to education and healthcare emerge as a universal regard for equal rights 
relative to basic freedoms. Human rights showed to be the hallmark of Carter’s moral 
compass and served to guide not only his life decisions, but his political path as well. 
The actions of his parents, equal treatment for everyone through altruism and 
volunteerism taught Carter the tenants of a mechanical type of solidarity. Co-existence, 
particularly in a time of post-war reconstruction, the time of the great depression, was 
necessary for everyone’s survival; there was no room morally or practically for the 
exclusion of people that help to both rebuild and prepare. His ‘binding’ moral foundation 
can be summarized when he says, ““You only have to have two loves in your life: for God, and 
for the person in front of you at any particular time.” (Carter, 2015, p. 96). 
Carter showed to be colorblind in his equal treatment of his early friends and 
caretakers and those eventually encountered during his professional years and today. He 
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and others equated Carter’s behavior with Christian values and although he was a devout 
Baptist, his exposure to his young friends and caregivers and the observation of parents 
philanthropy, altruism and volunteerism speak more to the exercise of those caregiver’s 
values than it does to formal religious dogma. 
“The measure of a society is found in how they treat their weakest and most 
helpless citizens. As Americans, we are blessed with circumstances that protect 
our human rights and our religious freedom…” (Carter, 2015, p. 159). 
Finally, Carter’s observation of his father’s actions pointed to a realization that 
authority and hierarchies are not necessarily insurmountable obstacles to human rights 
equality in the segregationist south. While taught to respect authority overall he did 
witness by the actions of his father that sometimes it is necessary to respectfully 
circumvent authority or outwardly challenge it in pursuit of equal rights and coexistence. 
His father Earl’s subversion of segregationist ideals and practices as well as his direct 
challenge to church prohibitions, and Carter’s often direct inclusion in those acts further 
highlighted his later moral philosophy and decision-making calculus. 
Begin. Begin’s demonstration of this major theme is shown at two levels. His 
attribution of human rights is clearly reserved for the Jews that adhered to the tenants of 
revisionist Zionism justified by his inherent victimhood that pervades and defines his 
moral capacities. 
“What you have just heard about the Jewish people's inherent rights to the Land 
of Israel may seem academic to you, theoretical, even moot. But not to my 
generation. To my generation of Jews these eternal bonds are indisputable and 
incontrovertible truths, as old as recorded time. They touch upon the very core of 
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our national being. Ours is an almost biblical generation of suffering and courage. 
Ours is the generation of Destruction and Redemption. Ours is the generation that 
rose up from the bottomless pit of Hell. We were a helpless people, Mr. President. 
We were bled white, not once, not twice, but century after century, over and over 
again. We lost a third of our people in one generation - mine. One-and-a-half 
million of them were children - ours. No one came to our rescue. We were 
tertiated, Mr. President. ... Tertiated, not decimated. The origin of the word 
'decimation' is one in 10. When a Roman legion was found guilty of 
insubordination one in 10 was put to the sword. In our case it was one in three - 
tertiated! ... Sir, I take an oath before you in the name of the Jewish people - this 
will never ever happen again,” (Ambassador Yehuda Avner's account of a 
meeting with U.S. President Jimmy Carter, July 1977). 
There was a distinction made between Jews and non-Jews however. Jews 
following the assimilation or autonomy models were viewed as simple obstacles to the 
Zionist goal of an independent State of Israel. While the occasion of their death by 
actions of organizations such as Irgun were acknowledged, there was no mourning or 
regret on the parts of the Revisionists. Nowhere in Begin’s writings is a reference to 
remorse ever expressed. In each writing, they were never referred to as traitors or 
demonized, just described as ‘old diaspora Jews,’ ‘confused’ or ‘misled.’ 
This was not true of other ‘non-Jews.’ They were demonized or simply given no 
recognition relative to being sentient human beings. During his early years of being 
exposed to the ideology of a radical Zionist father and radical Zionist mentor seen in 
Jabotinski, Begin developed his in-group loyalty and out-group prejudices, where 
344 
 
allegiances to the revisionist Zionist dogma where the Palestinian Arabs were not even 
afforded the acknowledgment of a presence in their own ancestral home by the 
Revisionists, even moderates like Herzl or Ben-Gurion.  
"We cannot give any compensation for Palestine, neither to the Palestinians nor to 
other Arabs. Therefore, a voluntary agreement is inconceivable. All colonization, 
even the most restricted, must continue in defiance of the will of the native 
population. Therefore, it can continue and develop only under the shield of force 
which comprises an Iron Wall which the local population can never break 
through. This is our Arab policy. To formulate it any other way would be 
hypocrisy,” (Brenner and Einstein, 2015, p. 169). 
In order to justify these prejudices, Begin took on the mantel of Jewish 
victimology. Taught by his mentors, and later devastated by the death of his family 
during the Holocaust, he used these emotionally based patterns to justify his treatment of 
the Palestinian Jews and such terrorist acts like the bombing of the King David Hotel or 
the Sabra and Shatila massacre led by Ariel Sharon. Clearly the Palestinians and 
Lebanese involved in that massacre were never even given recognition by Begin or his 
administration.  
“We were granted the right to exist by the God of our fathers at the glimmer of 
the dawn of human civilization nearly 4,000 years ago. For that right, which has 
been sanctified in Jewish blood from generation to generation, we have paid a 
price unexampled in the annals of the nations,” (Begin speech to the Knesset, 
1977). 
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Begin looked at the British government as invaders during the mandate period. He 
took violent action against British soldiers by bombings and the public execution of two 
British officers in retribution. He came into direct conflict with Ben-Gurion’s group and 
accused them of collusion with the British. The violent methodology of Begin diplomacy 
was given to him by his father who outwardly admired a militaristic Polish General Józef 
Klemens Pilsudski (Jedrzejewicz; 1990). Indeed, his quest for vengeance at the expense 
of innocent civilians, was founded in the influences of his early socializers and the 
political environment of his younger times indeed demonstrated what the young boy was 
being told.  
He was witness to many shows of anti-Semitism. He therefore took on the mantle 
of victimhood, and carried that weight for ‘his’ people, specifically Revisionist Jews. 
Overall, this points to a personal isolationism where Begin placed himself in a type of 
messianic complex where he would lead the Jews out of the desert and back to their 
biblical home. 
“In the name of Jerusalem. If I forget the extermination of the Jews, may my right 
hand wither, may my tongue stick to my palate if I cease to think of you, if I do 
not keep the extermination of the Jews in memory even at my happiest hour,” 
(Begin speech to the Knesset, 1977). 
Begin demonstrated a bifurcated attitude toward human rights, loyalty, altruism, 
and betrayal, one that in Carter’s world would have distinguished him as an ultra-
segregationist and in Sadat’s as an alien. Within his group, human rights were expected 
and fought for, but limited to the specific members identified with the Revisionist group. 
Outside of that group, betrayal in particular was perceived as an acceptable means to a 
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desired end. This stressed by his father and by his mentor in their words and in their 
actions; clearly an ‘us versus them’ mentality. His betrayal appears to be fueled by the 
hatred that emerged from his victimology.  
…”Indeed we were given our right to exist by the God of Abraham, Isaac and 
Jacob. We have paid a price for that right, higher perhaps more than any other 
nation,” (Begin letter to Sadat, 3/10/1978). 
These themes describe Begin as loyal to a particular group where Carter and 
Sadat were more universalized in their consideration of human rights. They were not 
specific to who deserved to be provided rights and consideration, and indeed showed an 
equal consideration to all groups, unless they were ones that showed a betrayal to their 
intentions, or to people in general. Writings show that each president tried repeatedly to 
be fair and loyal not only to their groups, but to their principals of moral judgement in 
their decision-making calculus. Their use of betrayal as a means to an end was never 
manifest in regular behavior as it was in Begin through his speeches and through his 
ideology and politics. 
The Land and Coexistence: The primary distinction of loyalty and betrayal that 
paints a different picture for Begin, Carter and Sadat is their consideration of the land. 
Carter and Sadat regarded the land as a reverent and tangible thing to which they were 
appointed as caretakers by God as positioned by their primary socializers. The land 
occupied positions as both a tangible object, but with intangible qualities that both men 
attributed to God. They gained this insight through socializers and observation. The land 
was to be worked as an avenue that God uses to feed his children, and therefore 
respected.  
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SADAT. “I learned something that stayed with me the rest of my life; that 
wherever I go, wherever I happen to be, I shall always know where I am. I can never lose 
my way because I know that I have living roots there, deep down in the soil of my 
village, in that land in which I grew, like the trees and the plants.” (Sadat, 1978a. P. 8) 
CARTER. None of us can afford to relax our vigilance, and we certainly cannot 
afford to rely on government alone to be vigilant for us. Each of us has a responsibility to 
the environment that nurtures all of us,” (Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation 
Act Remarks on Signing H.R. 39 Into Law. December 2, 1980). 
Begin. “Israel will not transfer Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District to any 
foreign sovereign authority, [because] of the historic right of our nation to this land, [and] 
the needs of our national security, which demand a capability to defend our State and the 
lives of our citizens,” (Shlaim, 2014, p. 356). 
Begin. “Let us not make restrictions for the sake of so-called order. Quickly, 
quickly! Our nation has no time! Bring in hundreds of thousands. If there will not be 
enough houses, we’ll find tents or even the skies, the blue skies of our land, as a roof,” 
(Begin’s broadcast to the nation, May 15, 1948). 
Begin’s primary socializers focused only on a particular area and exclusively as a 
tangible asset. Again, here we see the universalism of Carter and Sadat contrasting the 
focused obsession of Begin and the Revisionists on Eretz Israel. We can observe through 
their own words the Szalay (1965) structural model of communications and perception 
that distinguish the difficulties of communicating between actors, one using the values 
attached to tangible objects and the other basing use-value on intangible perception; 
something he refers to as communication ‘noise.’ 
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 To the supporters of the Revisionist Zionist ideology, Begin’s socializers and 
eventually Begin himself awarded every consideration for social capital found in the 
previous themes to those he considered in-group members. To others that waxed toward 
moderate positions of non-violence against any occupier of Eretz Israel, whether resident 
Palestinian or British, assimilation or autonomous existence, Begin cast them out both 
figuratively and ideologically. They were demonized and made less than human (sic. 
Jew), making it easier from an emotional perspective to deprive them of any 
consideration. This is seen in the language of Ze’ev Jabotinsky, Begin’s mentor and 
stated hero: 
“We Jews, thank God, have nothing to do with the East. . . . The Islamic soul 
must be broomed out of Eretz-Yisrael. . . . [Muslims are] yelling rabble dressed 
up in gaudy, savage rags,” (Masalha, 2000, p. 57). 
This position, and amplification of the ideological principals of his primary 
socializers, yields coexistence with any outgroup member improbable. It also makes any 
form of negotiation between the parties least likely to yield a positive outcome. The 
position of the land is key here. In Sadat and Carter’s writings, here communication with 
each other, we can see the visceral importance of it to both men without reading very far. 
Begin, from the time he was a child, through his ideological editing and even in his 
education, identified the land as a product to be acquired, not nurtured, not loved, and 
simply acquired by justification through revisionist history and biblical mythology. 
“…it is Hebrew arms which decide the boundaries of the Hebrew State. So it is 
now in this battle; so it will be in the future. Our God-given country is a unity, an 
integral historical and geographical whole. The attempt to dissect it is not only a 
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crime but a blasphemy and an abortion. Whoever does not recognize our natural 
right to our entire homeland, does not recognize our right to any part of it. And we 
shall never forego this natural right,” (Begin’s speech to the nation. May 15, 
1948). 
The bifurcation of consideration of earlier themes is founded upon Begin’s 
perception of the perceived social capital seen in the land, and the in-group/outgroup 
perceptions that define friends and foes regardless of additional inputs from the social 
environment, the proverbial ‘second chance.’ He has established a kind of player caste 
system of Revisionist Jews and everybody else.  
In short, Begin’s loyalty was primarily focused on his ideology gained through 
early socialization by his father, hi mentor Ze’ev Jabotinsky and his own observations of 
anti-Semitism in Poland, and to those identified as supporters of revisionist Zionism. Any 
deviation from the core principles of revisionism to Begin, even as a pre-adult, defined a 
betrayal of his trust, the Jews and Eretz Israel. His greatest perception of betrayal 
centered in the acquisition of the land defined as Eretz Israel. There was to no 
coexistence between the revisionists, resident Arabs or non-revisionists. He sought a 
homogenous Zionist society and anyone not in support of that were considered outsiders 
and an existential threat. 
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Theme Four: Authority/ Subversion 
Table 8 
Authority and Subversion 
Sadat. Sadat’s Perception of a use-value hierarchy came from his grandmother 
who stood at the top of the list of important influences in is life. Because of time spent 
with her in his formative years or those years Kohlberg (1981) and Gilligan (1982) would 
have equated with the significant period in his moral development, she figured 
prominently over his father. His grandmother, an illiterate woman, established her 
grandson’s perceptions of a set of legitimate rules of behavior, a cultural blueprint that he 
would follow his whole life. 
 In essence, and in parallel with our discussion, Sadat’s grandmother was the 
primary editor of his innate moral first edition. Legitimate authority rested in the 
hierarchy of first the family and then to the village and generally to others of perceived 
legitimacy such as the government, the clerics, etc. 
“They believed that superiority belonged only to the rich, and to hereditary 
distinctions of birth., but we in the village too no notice of such things. A man of 
integrity was the ideal, whatever his poverty. In the village we recognized and 
shunned whatever as disgraceful. We belong to one another, indeed we are 
Category             Purpose  Use Value                  Predisposition 
 
Authority/  Leadership  Legitimate-  Respect Traditions 
Subversion      Authority 
Followership  Recognition  Cultural legitimacy 
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ultimately bound together by bonds of fraternity, cooperation and love…” (Sadat, 
1978, p. 8). 
 However, the qualifier of legitimacy rested not only in the primary kinship of 
family and village, but also within the context of Islamic guidelines and tradition. This is 
apparent on her insistence on sending him to a Koranic school (Sadat, 1978). However, 
she also realized the importance of secular existence and education by also sending him 
to a Coptic school and at one point public schools before his military education. Being in 
these different environments taught Sadat several important lessons; the wisdom of the 
head of the family and the pervasiveness and function of legitimate authority found 
within and outside of formal organizational hierarchies. His grandmother’s early 
guidance and socialization defined for Sadat, the social roles and role expectations of a 
(legitimate) leader, and those that were either destined, ascribed or placed to follow.  
The antithesis to his grandmother’s teaching was the depiction of the British 
occupiers and the Arab politicians that sympathized with them, although the Arabs were 
judged and prioritized within different criteria as being misled as opposed to the British 
occupiers. The British tried to confiscate Egyptian land and travel rights on the Nile. 
They abused the villagers and poisoned Arab leaders. She taught Sadat through her 
stories, her songs and her discipline of the abuse of power and authority as well what 
constituted ‘legitimate’ authority by linking themes of village solidarity to leadership.  
“At a tender age I learned that there were (evil) forces called the British and they 
were alien to us and evil because they poisoned our people.” (Sadat, 1978, p. 5) 
“Even before I saw the British I had learned to hate them. They were aggressors 
that whipped and killed our people” (Sadat, 1978. p. 15) 
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Sadat’s father was known in the village as the ‘headman,’ the ‘effendi.’ Sadat 
observed how the other villagers respected him for his education and for his military 
service and position. He instilled in his young son the importance of legitimacy, 
authority, honor and leadership, which simply exemplified what he had already learned 
from his grandmother’s stories. Sadat aspired to be like his father, a respected leader and 
to that end began through his writings to almost take on a ‘father complex,’ (Moaz & 
Astorino, 1992) as opposed to Begin’s oft reported ‘messianic’ complex described by 
Perlmutter, (1987) in Begin’s autobiography. 
“Begin styled himself as an Israeli leader, a Messiah sent to restore Eretz Israel,” 
Perlmutter, 1987, p. 24) 
 Sadat, in comparison to Begin, wished to be a leader for his country, “his 
people,” which maintained an environment of happiness, cooperation and contentment 
where Begin the maximalist wanted to lead ‘the Jews’ back to the Promised Land. Sadat, 
indeed, culminated in being a conglomerate composed of his grandmother’s wisdom, his 
father’s leadership and respect, and his hero Zahran’s honor and bravery.  
“I recognized an invisible bond of love and friendship with everything around 
me,” (Sadat, 1978, p. 3) 
“He held his head high on the way to the scaffold. He was proud that he had stood 
up against the aggressors and killed one of them: I WISH I WAS ZAHRAN” 
(Sadat, 1978, p.5). 
Finally, similar to observations by Carter’s mother and father, Carter, similar to 
Sadat, wanted to be liked by everyone. Sadat, similarly equated being liked and accepted 
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with volunteerism and selflessness. Begin did not demonstrate such concerns, only blind 
loyalty and obedience, to him and his ideology.  
“She made us memorize first Corinthians,” (Carter, 1997, p.49). Carter’s eighth 
grade teacher, Julia Coleman, required young Carter to memorize the bible phrase that 
defines Agape love, “which,” he later said, “served as the foundation of my personal and 
political ideology,” (Carter, 1997, p. 51). 
Friends and Foes: The recurring theme in Sadat’s writing is the universalism of 
inclusion relative to who deserves and what constitutes legitimacy of authority and a 
recognized place in the hierarchy of humankind. Through his early teachings by his 
grandmother and his father, Sadat does not exclude anyone from the possibility of 
leadership and authority, unless they have abrogated the primary social contract of human 
rights and recognition. It appears from his writing that as long as one gave equal 
consideration to others with regards to leadership and authority there did not appear to be 
a determination of those in the ‘in-group’ and those in the ‘out-group.’ 
On the other hand, as is the case of first the British and later as we will see with 
Begin, if Sadat perceived a deceitfulness in someone’s desire to achieve what he reduces 
to taking a resource away from its rightful or perceived owner, than that person was not 
necessarily considered to be a member of a recognized out-group, but more simply 
ostracized from the normal functioning of his social environment as a whole. He 
responded quickly and predictably with disdain and distrust to anyone using what could 
be considered by Habermas as the employment of strategic communication, the non-
emotional avenue of goal achievement. It was simple to detect this attitude in simple 
descriptions of the perpetrators such as the British who were described since his 
354 
 
childhood as ‘aliens’ or some form of comedic persona, ugly, deceitful and doomed to 
failure (Sadat, 1978a). 
In his descriptions of friend and foe themes, there was a clear delineation of each 
group by his use of language that persisted throughout his life. For example, as we will 
see later, President Carter was always referred to as a dear friend or brother where Begin 
was commonly depicted as a liar and obstacle to peace. This goes beyond the notion of 
simple political posturing as those themes can be directly traced back to early 
socialization by his Grandmother and the at hand social environment, something Sadat 
later passed on to his son, and recognized in and by his friend Carter: 
“At the funeral, Sadat’s son Gamal left his military post to run and ‘embrace’ 
Carter. He wept on his shoulder (like a father). “I felt as though he were my own 
son,” (Carter, 1982, p. 271). 
 “Sadat was “A shining light…A man that could change history”…”A man I 
would come to admire more than any other leader,” (Carter, 1997, p. 282) 
 “There was an easy and a NATURAL friendship between us. We TRUSTED 
each other. We began to learn about each other’s families, early life, home towns, 
private plans and ambitions. We were tying ourselves together for a lifetime,” 
(Carter, 1997, p. 284). 
The first impression gained by Carter while preparing for his first encounter with 
Begin depicts a perception of Begin being belligerent, and later as an obstacle to peace. 
He wrote in his diary “I could not believe what I was hearing” “Answers of this tenor 
show NO prospect of peace…”It was frightening to watch his adamant position,” (Carter, 
1977, p. 153). 
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In speaking specifically to our topic of Camp David disputants, it is more than 
circumstantial that the man Sadat liked, Jimmy Carter, had a very similar if not parallel 
early socialization that is also reflected in a semantic and lexiconic thematic organization 
reminiscent of emotion-based communicative rationality (Habermas, 1984; Harman, 
2000) described earlier. Sadat describes Carter as: “My brother Jimmy, I will do 
whatever you think is best.” (Carter, 1997, p. 248). Sadat, like Carter perceived their 
Israeli counterpart stating: “Begin was aggressively negative!” (Bourne, 1997, p.428). 
The man he did not like by any stretch of the imagination was Begin, who 
employed the strategic, non-emotional semantic structure that sought to achieve a goal at 
whatever cost. At every level the linguistic organization between Sadat and Begin were at 
opposite ends of the emotional and cultural scale while Carter and Sadat occupied nearly 
the same positions.  
Carter demonstrated a similar universalism relative to legitimacy and authority as 
did Sadat. It appeared that as long as the rights of the individual were considered 
paramount by any interlocutor that Carter, like Sadat would give consideration to their 
legitimacy. We see this in Carter at a very young age and throughout his adulthood as we 
did in Sadat. Clearly, the similarities in the early editing of their moral machinery cannot 
be discounted or minimized. 
Begin. Begin’s early socializers, specifically his father Dov and Vladimir (Ze’ev) 
Jabotinsky, accomplished two important perceptions for the young man. First, that there 
were two groups, those revisionist Zionists that supported the ideology of Eretz Israel and 
then, everyone else. Clearly an in-group/out-group labeling that defined the second lesson 
for young Begin; that those within his own group are the only ones deserving of any form 
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of legitimate recognition as leaders, as dedicated foot soldiers, as participants in the 
ultimate goal of returning to the Promised Land. It has been suggested by Perlmutter 
(19870 and others that Begin’s primary motivator was power and control. However, the 
thematic content of his history shows a willingness to concede power and control to 
anyone aspiring to the same goal of Eretz Israel, whatever the cost. Clearly this is a good 
demonstration of the many being never superseded by the good of the one. 
Begin is not concerned with methodology of achieving Eretz Israel, only the goal; 
that the goal justifies the means. He shows through his speeches, media and biographical 
content that the primary theme of human rights, something key to the moral character of 
Sadat and Carter, are reserved only to his revisionist loyalists and that they must be 
willing to ‘break all rules’ in achieving the goal of Eretz Israel. In summarizing the words 
of his mentor Jabotinsky:  
“There is no choice: the Arabs must make room for the Jews of Eretz Israel. If it 
was possible to transfer the Baltic peoples, it is also possible to move the 
Palestinian Arabs,” (Masalha, 2000, p. 57). 
If one person or a group of people, such as moderate Zionists under David Ben-
Gurion or the British or the Americans, appear to stand in the way of the goal of Israeli 
independence or the establishment of the Israeli State prior to 1948, they were labeled as 
“obstructionists,” “anti-Semitic,” “Jew haters,” or even as Nazis (Masalha, 2000). Begin 
weaved the notion of Jewish Victimology into his methods of land acquisition, justifying 
his need of violent actions deemed terroristic by other Jewish founders something that 
was ingrained in him as a child in his father and mentor’s admiration for the nationalist 
and militaristic polish general Pilsudski. His was a bunker mentality that was quick to 
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point to the ‘imminent and existential threat’ posed by Arab residents in Palestine or later 
relative to the mandatory withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai. The common 
themes of legitimacy by historic precedence were pervasive in Begin’s words, but were 
reserved to his ideological partners only. 
Friends and Foes: From the earliest teachings from his father following the 
Haskalah, Begin learned that there were the Jews and the non-Jews. Amongst the Jews 
was a subgroup almost considered by Begin as a separate and opposing counterculture(s) 
that wished either an autonomous sub-state within their current diaspora location such as 
Begin’s Poland, or those that wished to assimilate within their resident diaspora culture, 
thus hybridizing Jewish culture.  
“When he reminisces about his childhood he uses romantic hues and tones 
(describing his early environment), alternating with the bitterness of a Jew living 
in the world of the Goyim,” (Perlmutter, 1987, p. 429)  
These stood in direct opposition to Begin’s perception of a separate and 
autonomous State of Israel, an entitlement outlined in the religious teachings since he was 
a child, i.e., the position of the revisionist Zionists. He was taught through both direct 
teaching and the observation of his father, that a radical pursuit of the biblical entitlement 
was all that mattered. His father often said that ‘we must kill the diaspora or the diaspora 
will kill you,” (Perlmutter, 1987). It could be inferred that Begin’s ardent support of 
military diplomacy and dominance had its seeds in the radicalism of his father who also 
took great effort to idolize the militaristic and aggressive Polish general Pilsudski as well 
as his mentor Jabotinsky who influenced the young Begin from his early days in the 
youth group Betar. 
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Begin’s rather radical position was fueled by his social environment in post WWI 
Poland and for a brief time in Russia. He was raised in an air of Jewish suspicion, high 
anti-Semitism and Polish nationalism that would serve to shape his ideological 
framework. While Jews were regarded as (semi) citizens of Poland and generally thrived 
in definable Jewish communities, they were a distinct group that existed and operated 
within the larger Polish population. Jews were increasingly regarded as ‘ghosts’ by their 
Polish counterparts, and the suspicions were centered on a fear of subterfuge and 
nationalism.  
Some have projected that the fear was more primal than that in an Aristotelian 
sense in that Poles suspected an infusion of Jewish genetic material into what they 
considered a cultural and genetic purity. In short, the Poles were afraid that the Jews 
would begin to take their women. Poles were afraid of the Jews, who had established 
schools and clubs and a viable social network apart from general Polish society. They 
were afraid they would virtually take their country away from its rightful, legitimate 
owners, discarding Polish history and culture through infiltration and eventual overthrow.  
Begin’s remembrances made clear a distinction between living within the Polish 
‘Jewish world,’ and the “land of the Goyim.” To his fellow Jews, all rights to the people. 
To the Goyim, the systematic and violent erosion of power to minimize the existential 
threat of extermination or assimilation by whatever means possible. His writings showed 
clear separation between the ‘us’ and the ‘them,’ a theme that was ever-present 
throughout his life and political career. All can be traced to his early childhood and the 
developmental editing of his innate moral perceptions.  
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Recurrent patterns of behavior are seen in Begin such as belligerence at the 
suggestion of compromise, unemotional provocation of the opposition as a strategy 
repeatedly seen in his later encounters with both Sadat and Carter and a blatant disregard 
for the land and human rights of the Palestinians who had historical ownership of the land 
of Eretz Israel by his relentless construction and expansion of Israeli settlements. Indeed, 
from an early age, the disregard or elimination of Jewish opposition by the denial of 
rights or even the ascription of human presence was both taught to Begin and observed 
through his time in Poland as a child. The social environment did nothing to mitigate 
these lessons, only to support their veracity. 
Carter. From his earliest recollection, Jimmy Carter learned two major themes 
relative to Authority and subversion. First, he was constantly told by his father to respect 
and follow (legitimate) authority. This was not limited simply to organizational or 
political power. It extended to those socially and culturally recognized organizations and 
persons as being in a power position such as one’s parents, elders or church members. 
There was an inherent reference to hierarchy in Earl Carter’s teachings to his son Jimmy. 
However, the use-value attached to the notion of ‘legitimate’ was more observational on 
young Carter’s part as he saw his father ‘buck the system’ when he perceived an unjust 
demand by established authority, such as when the church demanded that no movies be 
seen on Sunday. Earl considered being with his family more important than such a 
demand and promptly and without hesitation went against the rule while defending his 
position to the church authority. Earl always stood at the head of the familial hierarchy in 
young Jimmy’s eyes.  
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We can also see that Earl provided care and services through philanthropy and 
volunteerism to the population in the segregationist south discarded by the white 
population, specifically the black residents; an eerie parallel to Begin’s ‘non-Jews.’ As 
with Begin and his perceived oppositions, the southern black population of those times 
were regarded as not deserving the basic necessities of living such as a livable wage, 
health care or education; a practical translation and metaphor for human rights. Carter’s 
father assumed a mantle of responsibility for providing these things to his greatest ability. 
Human rights then, was a significant editing factor of Carter’s inherent moral philosophy. 
However, Carter often observed a stern measure of authority, a qualifier of 
legitimacy exercised by his father and no doubt by others in his social environment. One 
of the primary elements of legitimacy was telling the truth. Everything in Carter’s world 
depended upon one’s ability to trust another to do what they said was true. This is both an 
emotional consideration as described by Habermas in his Communicative discourse, but 
also directly applicable to Haidt’s Foundational Theory in that the survival of the group 
hinges upon its ability to predict behaviors and outcomes of its constituency by both 
leaders and followers (Haidt, 2012). 
This leads into what Carter perceived as a (legitimate) leader as defined by his 
social interactions and his teachers, i.e., parents, teachers and caretakers. He was taught 
that a leader tells the truth, but at the same time is willing to be selfless in light of those 
not receiving the resources necessary for a decent quality of life, i.e., human rights. He 
saw a unity of suffering in the segregationist south, but a disparity in that suffering based 
on race and economic positioning. 
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Carter, while in school and under the mentorship of his teacher Julia Coleman, 
learned specific characteristics that should be embodied in a legitimate leader and more 
importantly, how they should relate to followers. As demonstrated in 1
st
 Corinthians and 
his reading of War and Peace, a leader must provide for its followers, and as well seek to 
build a community instead of a self-aggrandizing monument to their own 
accomplishments. Leadership sought to maximize the capacities of its followers, and that 
this kind of success must be hardly fought for and won to assure the continuance of the 
community. He learned that leaders must clearly articulate their positions, something 
similar to Begin’s lessons of oratory learned at his own father’s knee. Ms. Coleman 
taught the young Carter that two specific elements, compassion and ability to fully 
commit to the acquisition of knowledge was key to leadership success, Re., ‘readers 
make leaders.’ 
Ironically, young Carter learned to hate authority. He did not disrespect or seek to 
undermine its function though. Instead, he sought legitimate methods in which to both 
circumvent it and to change it in a particular fashion. Namely, to assure its equal 
application and to make certain it was not abused as he had seen in his southern Georgia 
by repressive whites. IN his writings, a subtheme arose that painted a picture of Carter’s 
perception of (legitimate) authority.  
Specifically, in witnessing its unequal application to the Black population and as a 
mechanism to establish white superiority ‘legitimately’ and at the same time separate out 
the black from the white population similar to the group mentality of Begin, Carter came 
to see most authority as non-legitimate as it was not egalitarian in nature. He saw it as a 
roadblock to human rights for all and something that while generally accepted as a 
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societal element, needed to be constantly monitored and circumvented to assure its 
primary purpose. Later, it can be seen by his political actions and specifically his methods 
at Camp David, why Carter was seen as “wildly unconventional” by both his political 
supporters and detractors, a reflection of his father and his observations of actors in his 
socializing environment. 
Friends and Foes. Like Sadat, Carter had a more universalistic perception of the 
application of human rights, leadership and the expectations of the leader within the 
context of legitimate authority. He makes constant reference to the unequal application of 
the law (referring to the segregationist south), abuse of power and necessity of basic 
human considerations. His tone takes on that of a father-leader much along the same 
design as Sadat who more freely refers to ‘his people,’ as a leadership metaphor. Carter’s 
semantics are more overseeing, as a father would watch his children, commenting but not 
at once interventional as was his own father Earl. 
In his early autobiographies, Carter makes disparaging reference to rights abusers, 
but attaches them to observations taken while he was accompanying his mother on her 
nursing rounds, or his father during business meetings and more importantly as it relates 
to his group of mostly black friends, particularly his best friend ‘Knock.” Great attention 
was paid to the closeness of the two boys eating around his mother Lillian’s dinner table, 
being inseparable while at play and work, going on adventures together and talking about 
their individual desires and life paths.  
One could feel the sadness and dismay that could be interpreted as outright anger 
the day the two boys went to school and were separated because of the color of their skin. 
Carter had a stark realization that ‘their lives would never be the same again. 
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Interestingly, following this writing, Knock’s name never reemerges in Carter’s many 
childhood discussions. It was clear that based on a human rights theme, Carter’s 
subtheme of friend and foe was clearly and definitively defined. 
“It was about this time that two of his black friends opened a gate and then stood 
back, and let Jimmy pass through. He thought it must be a trick they were playing, 
but this symbolic action signaled a powerful social change. ‘The constant struggle 
in our small group had been resolved, but a precious sense of equality had gone 
out of our personal relationship, Carter writes, ‘and things were never again the 
same between us.’” (Wright, 2014, p.15). 
Like Sadat’s father and as opposed to Begin’s, Carter’s father was seen as a 
community leader and in that position endowed with certain responsibilities that had 
earlier been defined by Earl himself; honesty, hard work, selflessness in the face of 
opposition, equal opportunities for a good life, freedoms to observe and practice what the 
individual regards as important such as politics and religion and as important, an ability 
to freely challenge authority should it stray outside of the parameters of legitimate action. 
This was reinforced by his teacher’s later lessons of agape love (1st Corinthians) an 
articulate expression of truths.  
Finally, by observation and later in Ms. Coleman’s classroom, Carter learned the 
important relationship between the governing and the governed, all revolving around the 
equal provision of human rights that were in fact validated in Baptist dogma similar to 
Sadat’s Koran relative to the forgiveness of transgressions against authority if the action 
was centered around the provision of human rights; a direct reference to Earl’s support 
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for his mother Lillian’s provision of health care for the black population in the ultra-
segregationist south. 
Theme five: Sanctity and Degradation 
Table 10 
Sanctity/Degradation 
Sadat. As a major theme in Sadat’s moral cognition, we must conclude that the 
editing of its innate capacities are found primarily through social interactional experience 
and observation. These capacities are intangible and, according to Haidt, Churchland and 
others, not generally part of the social discussion. In addition, as described by Aquino 
and Reed (2002) the evaluation of intangible social elements is a more emotional one, as 
the assignment of use-values are more open to individual interpretation with it 
concomitant moral filters. Tangible evaluations are more calculative and not so based in 
emotional calculi as the social ascriptions of value are more concrete and arrived at 
collectively.  
Rather, they are an interactional capacity that serves as a good manifestation of 
the operationalization of the concept of use-value. This theme generally describes the part 
of cognition that assures not only physical survival in its distaste for harmful foods and 
activities, but in terms of acceptable social interactions between members in a collective 
effort to move the social group forward as opposed to staying the same or declining. 
Often, the guiding principles are rooted in religion or religious practice where a defined 
Category             Purpose  Use Value                  Predisposition 
 
Sanctity/             Disgust  Immorality  Demonization 
Degradation                Contamination  Sacred/Profane Elimination 
 
365 
 
consequence of bad behaviors is evident in an omniscient deity short on tolerance for 
disobedience or insubordination. 
Sadat’s grandmother taught him religious tolerance or simply to objectively view 
the practices of others as more than an ethnocentric. She sent him to Koranic school to 
learn Islam, but also sent him to the Coptic Christian School so that he might experience 
and learn of other practices. Sadat, in his autobiography made mention of how much he 
had learned of life and of people at the knee of the Christian practitioner at the school. In 
addition, he also attended a secular and a military school. This goes along with his 
grandmother’s insistence on a love of learning, and as a reflection of her early influences 
on his father and grandfather both being literate in the small Egyptian village.  
At an early age, these moral editors had great influence on the young future 
president. While he learned what constituted love of self and self as a gift of God, this 
was often confounded in defining the importance of the land. Here too, God was invoked 
as a justification for the occupation and maintenance of the land. It is here a slight 
bifurcation between those who cared for the land and those that did not, specifically 
conquerors and occupiers, was made. The tone of the Sadat writings became more 
ominous and critical as opposed to speaking of resident Egyptians endowed with the 
caretaking function for God. Indeed, those who sought the land outside of God’s will 
were considered in the within the realm of degradation while the others occupied a 
greater position of sanctity. In each of his religious and social teachings, there was an 
evident confluence of the tangible land reference and the intangible religious dogma. The 
apex was the notion that everything tangible stood as a gift from God, and all value and 
attention was premised on that assertion. 
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“Wherever I go, wherever I happen to be, I shall always know where I really am. I 
can never lose my way because I know I have living roots there, deep sown in the 
soil of my village, in that land out of which I grew, like the trees and the plants,” 
(Sadat, 1978, p. 6). 
Contrast this linguistic style to Begin’s description of his childhood town and the 
school he attended. 
“At the end of the street was a big terrible house where we learned the foreigner’s 
language and a hatred for Israel,” (Perlmutter, 1987. P. 35). 
Although he had a blending of Muslim, Coptic Christian and secular influences, 
Sadat became a devout Muslim. He was considered the first truly Muslim president of 
Egypt, invoking Sharia into the legislative process and ironically persecuting the Coptic 
Christians later in his political career. But the influences of early socialization and editing 
remained in his views of what constituted important relationships to the land and to each 
other in terms of what has greater value than something else. 
There is also an impressive irony in how Sadat described or manifest his disgust 
or approval of any given topic. For some time, Coptic Egyptian was the general pre-
Islamic language of Egypt. Over time, it became a legislative language and one of 
recording poetry and stories, it remained entangled in the demotic origins of the spoken 
language and retained the flowing, emotionally morphology of ancient Egyptian.  
In order to express consternation or disgust through invectives, similar to Modern 
Hebrew, Coptic had to borrow words and phrases from Greek, along with the semantic 
structures that expressed them. Around the 7
th
 century Caliph Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan 
decreed that Arabic replace and remnants of Greek or Coptic and serve as the sole 
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administrative language of Egypt. However, the influences of that linguistic history 
remains as a good explanation of how Sadat railed against the Modern Hebrew structures 
and adhered to the more emollient diglossic Arabic whose roots were religious 
influences. 
Land and Occupiers. There is a clear theoretical parallel occurring in this theme 
of Sanctity and Degradation as promoted by Haidt and Kesebir (2010) and others. It is 
similar to the Durkheimian (1982) concept of sacred and profane. The central theme as 
interpreted establishes an inherent use-value to each category, sanctity and sacred are 
God-based; degradation and profane are on the secular plane, and read as being lesser 
then God as a human, in comparison less desirable. However, this binary configuration 
provides a context within how Sadat, and as we will see below, Carter, perceives the land 
and his attachment to it, his responsibility toward it in terms of a covenant with God and 
finally how those who do not abide these perceptions are considered not simply as an 
outsider, but as a profane, occupier, someone who has committed apostasy who should be 
removed or prevented having access to this resource. 
“…Rachael taught Jimmy that a “Man’s responsibility is to nurture the land,” 
(Bourne, 1987. p. 30). 
In Sadat’s early socialization by his grandmother it was made clear by her that 
everything originated from the land. The Nile Delta was the cradle of humankind. Every 
reference made to God, originated or was paired with a mention to the land. His 
grandmother told him that one could not be separated from the land as we were all a part 
of the land, and served as its caretakers, repaying God for granting us life. In short, the 
land was an organic part of every human, not only the Egyptians. 
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The opposite side of the sacred references, was the presence of occupiers who 
demonstrated no more regard for the land and by extension the navigation rights to the 
Nile, than they would buying a new pair of boots. Sadat had heard of the British since he 
was a small boy, from his grandmother, through stories and by the villagers. They were 
demonized as cartoon aliens, murderers of the villagers (“His people”) and those with no 
regard for the sanctity of the land. From his earliest recollections, occupiers in the form 
of the British were bad, and standing up to them for the principles handed down by God 
by such heroes as Zahran, stemmed their greed for control and possession of land that 
never belonged to them. The British were the antithesis, the profane, to the villagers’ 
thesis, or the sacred. 
Carter. Like Sadat, Carter’s primary moral editors were his parents, with input 
from the people in his social environment, black friends and co-workers who were denied 
basic human rights in the ultra-segrationist south, and his teacher Julia Coleman. Here 
Carter learned and observed what he came to recognize as basically good and bad, or in 
the current theme, sacred and profane or sanctity and degrading. As explained by Haidt 
and Kesebir (2010), the original demonstration of the Sanctity/Degradation theme 
revolved around the primal regard for integrity of the body, eating bad food which might 
compromise its long-term survival, etc 
As humans evolved into more social creatures, so did this theme to include the 
elements of religion and the liking or disliking of more intangible social facts (Casebeer 
and Churchland, 2003; Evans-Pritchard, 1965) such as governance, religion, nobility and 
morality. Taken in that frame, Carter often noted that within the context of human rights, 
what he perceived as acceptable was equal access to basic resources such as healthcare 
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and education, where the denial of these essential elements was unacceptable and 
deserving of selfless volunteerism to secure those things for people who were doing 
without. Throughout his life and political career, within the context of his understanding 
the moral relationship between the governed and the governors learned through his 
understanding of the book War and Peace required reading by his teacher Julia Coleman, 
Carter was always compelled to commit to what he perceived as being right or moral, 
trying to correct those things he found profane or distasteful. 
This was reinforced by the teachings of his Baptist church, but more important by 
those he considered at the top of his moral hierarchy, his father Earl who he saw and 
participated in the philanthropic giving of food and money to wanting black friends and 
workers, his mother Lillian who provided countless hours of delivering healthcare to 
black families in plains and its surrounding areas, and by his teacher Julia Coleman who 
showed him the importance of selfless giving through her having him read 1
st
 Corinthians 
that outlined the importance of Agape love. Ms. Coleman taught Carter to be proud of 
who he had become and to express his goodness through speaking clearly, hard work and 
dedication. These things the young president saw as good while the opposite he came to 
know as distasteful and frowned upon not necessarily by society at large, but by those he 
observed and determined to ‘moral and virtuous.’ To this we can conclude that Carter 
was culturally colorblind and saw moral behavior in the form of equal access to social 
capital as a right as opposed to a privilege.  
Common to this theme, the land stood as an oft used metaphor for sanctity and 
degradation; those who nurtured it, and those who took or abused it from those that did. 
In his mind, Carter appeared to divide the world into those deserving certain capitals 
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through ‘sacred’ or actions preferred in the eyes of God, as opposed to those who sought 
possession through sanctimony. His father Earl had taught his son the value of land, both 
from a moral and a business perspective. Since his land was the source of the family’s 
income, it stands to reason that his father’s frame would be in terms of production. Later, 
he would give Carter a parcel of land to own, and to work in the same manner that he had 
successfully done for his family. It came with a moral provision however in that the land 
stands as something to be respected and treated with the thought that it could make or 
break you, as all things “come to judgement.” 
His black caretaker Rachael Clark, added a religious context to the 
conservatorship of the land in the eyes of God. She told Carter that it was in fact, a gift 
from God and it was his responsibility to ‘love’ the land and to nurture it as it would him 
as a sign of approval from the almighty. Carter never forgot this lesson and it is seen 
thematically throughout his dealings inside Camp David. Land stood as a metaphor for 
the larger social contract between humankind and God and with that context, perhaps 
metaphorically as a delineator between good and evil, there were two groups, one that 
deserved the land, and those that did not. 
…”we must never forget that as vast and dark and forbidding as the forests may 
seem, they are very fragile; and as wide and as boundless as the oceans may seem, 
they're quite vulnerable. For all that the Earth has given us, we owe it our respect 
and, more importantly, our understanding. We're the stewards of an irreplaceable 
environment. That's an awesome task as well as a precious gift,” (Carter 
comments on the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Law.  
December 2, 1980). 
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The granting of the land showed a certain sacredness, a reward for moral behavior 
that pervaded not only his life, but his political ideologies. In his father’s words, “the land 
was God’s gift to humankind from which all things came,” (Carter, 1982, p. 59). There is 
a certain irony that will be explored below, that Carter originally supported the notion 
espoused by a local Plains Baptist minister, that the Jews would return to Palestine. In a 
twist of moral use-value relative to this and other themes, we will see how his position 
changed after meeting Begin, someone he regarded as more strategic and profane than 
deserving of consideration relative to taking others land who he regarded as more 
deserving. A frame seen within the frame of Sadat’s consideration. He centered 
apparently on Begin as a prime source of, “The plight of those Palestinians living under 
Israeli rule,” (Carter, 1982, p. 274) and “To deny them these rights was an indefensible,” 
(p. 277). Finally, Carter concludes, “The onus is on Begin. He either becomes more 
flexible or he is the “Killer of peace,” (Carter diary, 5/11/1978). 
Land and Occupiers. Carter’s father established a thematic thread in his son’s 
cognitive development between the land as a gift from God from which everything comes 
and the sanctity of those that worked or nurtured it, setting a comparative stage with those 
who do not have an intimate connection to the land. This frame is eerily similar to the 
message given to Sadat by his grandmother that the land was a gift from God from which 
everything is born. Everyone who worked the fields, such as the black workers who 
worked for his father Earl, possessed a certain reference of identity and reverence in 
Carter’s writings 
The frugality and fiscal conservatism that later availed itself in Carter’s policies 
can be traced back to his father’s teachings where again, the lessons of conservatism, 
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fiscal and otherwise, were tied to the metaphorical  nurturance and productivity of the 
land (Carter, 2001) he both observed and was taught as small boy in  a rural town. While 
this was probably not uncommon in rural settings, the string of inputs to dual process 
cognition, and the more than obvious association between land-premised symbolism and 
the use-value attached to other social facts is inescapable. 
In establishing the group identity of this sacred relationship, Carter described a 
“unity of suffering” among white and black farmers and field workers (Carter, 2001); 
clearly a delineation of group identity and perception that remained colorblind but 
referent of social capital, i.e., us versus them. Occasionally there was a reference to the 
human rights elements related to this group. It appeared that in Carter’s perception, 
prejudice by outsiders served as a source of strength that fed the engine of production and 
nurturance that is reflected by the land’s productivity through those that worked it. In 
several instances, Carter refers to the demonization of his associative group by northern 
businessmen who mocked their language as being lazy and descriptive of a southern 
gullibility to less than fortuitous deal-making reflective of usury; clearly this could be 
referent of the Habermasian (1984) construct of communicative versus strategic 
rationality and a demonstration of Szalay’s (1981) cultural noise in transmission but from 
a non-emotional strategic source. 
The land was again, a metaphor that served to define a group closer to God. In all 
future discussions of politics, military and the governed, there is a tone in Carter’s writing 
reflective of the unity of suffering explicated by Carter in his early life. He recognized 
himself as being part of that group of sufferers, working in the fields next to the black 
agricultural workers, witnessing their own suffering and the separation from his best 
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friend ‘Knok,’ on their first day of school together clearly establishing an emotional tag 
that predisposed him to react negatively to any form of discrimination or non-moral 
behaviors. In that regard, how could Carter, as a mediator, be neutral upon perceiving 
such behaviors directed toward his friend and espoused brother, Anwar Sadat? 
These perceptions were supported by discussions inside the confines of the black 
families with whom young Carter was friends, his mother’s patients and his father’s 
workers. The identity of the group was defined by his father, a successful white 
businessman who treated many in the minority population of the segregationist south 
with dignity and respect outside of his own volunteerism and philanthropy. Treatment 
other than that observed by Carter of his father would be regarded as deviant and 
anathema to his moral and cognitive development. 
In his writings, the tone of Carter’s literary voice changes as he moves toward 
descriptions of those outside the group of land-workers, specifically businessmen and 
politicians. Always seeking to circumvent authority in an acceptable way, realizing that 
to make his way in the world he must figure out how to fit in, Carter found a voice that 
structurally reflected a certain contempt for those he did not consider the human welfare 
of one of those land-workers defined by his father and his own observations. 
“The intimidation of Blacks (including Carter’s friends) was ‘necessary to keep 
the (political) system stable,” (Bourne, 1987, p. 23). 
Words that sounded more strategically based as opposed to communicatively 
constructed described those outside of the ‘land-group.’ We see words for those outsiders 
as respected, efficient, powerful, obstacle, determined and precise as opposed to those he 
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apparently favored being described as, honorable, hard-working, and compassionate or as 
his best friend.  
“We've preserved the unparalleled beauty of areas like the Misty Fiords and 
Admiralty Island National Monuments in southeast Alaska. And we've ensured 
that Alaska's Eskimos and Indians and Aleuts can continue their traditional way 
of life. And we've given the State of Alaska, finally, the opportunity to choose the 
land which will be theirs through eternity,” (Carter, 1980, Alaska National 
Interest Lands Conservation Act Remarks on Signing H.R. 39 into Law). 
These terms are prescient as we will see when Carter describes Sadat as his 
brother or dear friend and Begin described as cordial or an obstacle to peace. His 
description of those he considered children of the land were almost familial in tone, while 
those outside the group almost oppositional. 
Begin. From the time he was a child, Begin perceived the presence of two 
primary groups, Jews and the Goyim (non-Jews). It is conceivable that to Begin’s moral 
and cognitive library the former would be perceived as preferred, or sacred and the latter 
not preferred, or profane in accordance with our current theme or sanctity and 
degradation. The teaching of his father, his mentor Jabotinsky and the observations of 
rampant post-WWI anti-Semitism reinforced this binary social hierarchical classification. 
Through his own writings and the observation of his biographers (Perlmutter, 1986) the 
binary separation of groups evolved use-value moral themes premised on an ‘us versus 
them” formula.  
“wherever the Jews reside, they cannot be assimilated, they cannot be readily 
digested by the nation,” (Perlmutter, 1987, p. 29). 
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A brief review of biographical materials show a distinct separation that guided 
both his moral, cognitive and political development. This theme of in-group identity that 
was showered with social capital is pervasive in all of his writings, his speeches and 
personal letters between members both within and outside of his intimate group to 
include his wife. Resultant behaviors can be seen in demonstrations of his own personal 
supportive battles for and against certain associative groups, or policies that favored his 
in-group constituency as opposed to the distancing by neglect of others, or the overt 
demonization of anyone he perceived as a threat either existential or otherwise. 
A primary sub—theme that drives Begin is his perception of his own master 
identity as a victim. He regards this identity both as an individual who lost his parents to 
the holocaust as a representative of the larger Jewish population from both the diaspora 
and its suffered anti-Semitism and historical populations of Jews throughout biblical 
times.  However, it is clear that he carries the banner of victimhood, in his perception, 
higher than anyone else almost depicting himself as the leader of all suffering and past 
suffering Jews, clearly a messianic complex; others’ plight s are secondary to his own but 
serves as a common thread of justification for unacceptable actions of violence. It is this 
victimology that drives him in his personal and political paths and provides justification 
if not legitimation, of action that others perceive as non-moral particularly those regarded 
as either Goyim or not supportive of revisionist Zionist goals. 
“No one could even take me to the cemetery since the generation of the Holocaust 
were not so lucky even enough to have been buried” (Perlmutter, 1987,p. 25). 
His regard for the land cannot be regarded as sacred, but more as a profane 
method of providing a boundary between his group’s constituency, i.e., revisionists, and 
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everyone else. Part of his victimology, and one clearly described in the writings, is first 
his lack of a real place he could call home as the Poland he was born and raised in was 
gone. He therefore, had no attachment to his ‘land,’ as might others in more stable 
conditions, something he envied in the Goyim. To that end, his family, his wife and 
children, aside from not having a permanent place to reside, and they did frequently move 
in an effort to avoid political retributions resultant of Begin’s violent actions through 
Irgun, had no great collection of possessions, no real symbols of his past. Everything he 
might have cherished was gone or destroyed through the actions of, by his account, the 
Goyim. 
As can be seen repeatedly through history, those who have suffered great loss of 
personal objects and possessions, often begin an overt accumulation of tangible things 
symbolic of their return to some level of normalcy. We might assert, that one of the 
greatest demonstrations of Begin’s accumulation of things was his absolute and 
remorseless goal of not simply acquiring enough land to serve as a Jewish nation State, 
but all of Ertz Israel as described in revisionist doctrine to include parts of other already 
established and historically governed States. To Begin, people who already lived there 
and had established a historic cultural society were mere obstacles to either be moved or 
eliminated in pursuit of his goal of Eretz Israel. 
Land and Occupiers. Begin divided the world into two groups, those that 
deserved to live in the State of Israel, and those that did not. Those considered not to be 
‘entitled’ to the land of Israel were considered occupiers of the Jews’ Promised Land, 
“…The return to Zion of most of the Jews from the West, the East, the North and the 
South is our aspiration, and it shall continue to serve as a beacon of light for our guidance 
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(Begin’s New Year speech at the grave of Ze’ev Jabotinsky, 1979). The right to live on 
the land was not one that Sadat and Carter would recognize, that as a caretaker to God’s 
gift. Indeed, Begin’s position, and that of his revisionist compatriots was more one of 
entitlement to the land to do with as they pleased. The essence of modern Hebrew and 
Talmudic interrogation more than supports the notion that those who possessed the land, 
resultant of the covenant with God, were entitled to do with it as they pleased, as the 
Torah implores its own interrogation. The subtheme for Carter and Sadat was nurturance, 
where for Begin it was acquisition and possession by what they interpreted as divine 
right. 
From his earliest years, Begin’s father described the Jews’ entitlement to the Eretz 
Israel both in terms of God’s covenant with the Jews, but also as a legal right to 
possession as Rome had never declared it an acquired conquest. While this has been 
successfully litigated in academic research regarding the true ownership of Palestine, the 
legal entitlement of the property has embedded itself into revisionist teachings and 
dogma.  
"the Jewish people have unchallengeable, eternal, historic right to the Land of 
Israel [including the West Bank and Gaza Strip], the inheritance of their 
forefathers," and pledged to build rural and urban exclusive Jewish colonies in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip." (Shlaim, 2014, p. 354-355). 
When Begin heard of Zionism and of Palestine, he heard of the indigenous 
population of Arabs that lived there. From his father to Jabotinsky, but tacitly by Theodor 
Herzl who simply did not recognize any Arab presence in his writings, Begin saw Arabs 
as occupiers in a land destined to be returned to its rightful owners in the form of Eretz 
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Israel. He saw the purchase of the land through the Jewish Land Company, ‘legally’ 
buying land from its Arab ‘owners,’ which in itself was a contradiction in ideological 
terms, as both an investment in his own future and that of the revisionist Zionists. This 
became apparent when he maintained that Herzl’s original settlers did not go far enough 
in ‘eliminating the obstacles to the legitimate ‘owners’ of Eretz Israel (Perlmutter, 1987). 
"The deterrent power, or in Jabotinsky's language ‘The Iron Wall,’ was intended 
to convince the Arabs that they would not be able to get rid of the sovereign 
Jewish presence in the Land of Israeli, even if they would not bring themselves to 
recognize the justice of the Jewish people's claim to the homeland." (Shlaim, 
2014, p. 354). 
The tenor of the language used by Begin in his writings and in his speeches were 
unlike descriptions of the land offered to Carter and Sadat as something sacred, a 
covenant with God, a responsibility to nurture nor as a visceral part of their identity. 
Begin’s semantics were like that primarily as a real estate dealer purchasing a parcel for 
residence. The land was always a tangible thing to be possessed as opposed to nurtured. 
While there descriptions by Begin, Dayan and others that referred to the production of 
crops from that land used in an attempt at self-sufficiency, there was no emotional tags 
placed within any descriptions. 
The land, to Begin, appeared to stand as a symbol signifying the emergence from 
the master identity of victim. Victims possessed nothing and throughout Jewish history 
through the Holocaust, the Jews lost everything. The land now stood as a symbol of not 
only possession, but of emergence of a new social capital, a new power that stood in 
contrast to an oppressed past. From the land, from the ‘bases’ of the State of Israel could 
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come an expression of power, both economically, as the land had value, and militarily as 
was the firebrand of Jabotinsky. These manifestations were reflections of stories and 
indoctrination of the young prime minister both at the knees of his primary socializers, 
but continuously through the observation of Jewish oppression. But, it was at the expense 
of what has been shown to be the rightful owners of Palestine, the Arab inhabitants who 
had been there for two millennia. 
The other, although no less important attachment to the land by Begin, was as a 
buffer between those he perceived as an existential threat, the resident Palestinian 
population. The more land he could acquire through either land sales or conquest, the 
more distant were his perceived enemies. In essence, begin wanted to reproduce the 
isolated, but separate communities of his childhood. He is explicit in his separation of 
Jewish and Goyim communities, where the Jews were described as being so successful in 
their trades, that they were perceived as threat s to local communities of the diaspora. 
Indeed, this perceived threats led to the three types of Zionist responses described earlier. 
Only the revisionists wanted to leave their resident countries and form their own, separate 
and distant state. The notion of heavy military arms in Israel served as a metaphor for 
borders, borders that were pushed out farther from Samaria and Judea by the exercise of 
military and acquisitional power. Whomever stood in the way of pushing those borders 
out were deemed enemies of Israel, Arab sympathizers or worse simply eliminated under 
the legitimacy of biblical interpretations.  
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Chapter 6: Phase Three 
Themes and Perceptions between Disputants 
The following chapter offers a look into how the early socio-cultural editors of 
each percipient impacts their interactions with their counterparts. These perceptions are 
framed with the context of the behavioral predispositions that were developed through the 
interaction of innate cognitive machinery that provided basis for the valuation of 
symbolic interaction within a conflict environment, and the percipient’s experiential 
history. It gives insight into the primary research questions, which actors liked or disliked 
each other, why they did or did not and how that affected their interaction during the 
Camp David Accords. Finally, it provides the basis for the application of the research 
findings to the broad field of conflicts and their resolution. 
Carter on Sadat 
The major themes that emerged in Carter’s description of and interaction with 
Anwar al-Sadat evoked the emotion of true caring and bonding between the two men. In 
Carter’s autobiographies, he repeatedly refers to Sadat as his brother, his wonderful 
friend, his comrade and partner (specifically referring to the Camp David Accords). He 
identifies him as strong, bold and a man of peace, which becomes significant when 
comparing Carter’s initial impressions of Menachem Begin. He said Sadat was, 
“A shining light…a man that could change history…A man I would come to 
admire more than any other leader”  (Bourne, 1997, p. 252). 
Compare this to Begin whom Carter described as “an insurmountable obstacle to 
further progress,” (Bourne, 1997, p. 257) during the early days of the Camp David 
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Accords. Prior to that, Carter had found Begin’s histrionics during television interviews, 
“frightening.” 
Carter iterated that Sadat was a man who could change the world but attached that 
sentiment to the legitimacy of position and the intense commitment to human rights that 
he had demonstrated through his international efforts for peace with Israel. This is a clear 
association of predisposed behaviors premised on major themes identified above. 
A wonderful aside occurred at the funeral of the assassinated Sadat where upon 
Carter’s arrival, Sadat’s son Gamal broke out of a military formation and embraced the 
American president whom he regarded as a second father and Carter cared for him as he 
would his own son. When describing a first meeting at the Carter home in Plains with 
Sadat and his wife Jihan, Carter made specific that the feelings the four had for each 
other were that of a family, open, loving and sharing. He wrote that the two wives saw 
the attachment between their husbands and quickly found the same feelings. Very 
interesting is the fact that like their husbands, both women were products of similar 
socio-cultural environments emotive of similar emotional patterns (Carter, 2007; 2010). 
Carter told his wife after the Sadats had returned to Egypt that their stay, ‘was my best 
day as President. There were no difference between us” (Carter, 2010, p. 156). 
What is interesting is Carter’s continuous mention of Sadat’s childhood, his 
attachment to the land as God’s source of all things “good” and his dedication to his 
people and the repeated description of his friend as a strong leader, although deeply 
religious and shy; lessons of leadership and humility Sadat learned at the knee of his 
grandmother and for Carter at the knee of his father Earl. On more than one occasion, 
382 
 
Carter speaks to Sadat’s childhood hero, Zahran who stood in proud defiance of the 
British occupation. 
It almost seems to serve as a basis from which Carter appears to emotionally 
premise his assessment of Begin in later works and reviews. He clearly establishes what 
appears to be a coalition, a team founded on the principles of us versus them; him and 
Sadat versus Begin and his entourage. On more than one occasion, Carter demonstrates, 
as did Sadat on Carter, the need to protect and to support, again an iteration of the major 
theme of harm and care. Sadat said to Carter, “I will try and protect you,” knowing that, 
“…he (Carter) would back me in all things,” (Bourne, 1997, p. 328). 
The influence of early editing of Carter’s use-value, or moral development is 
clearly displayed in his descriptive associations with themes identified in earlier sections 
of this research. His writing describing Sadat, could almost be a description of himself. In 
terms of human rights, a theme described in theme two and three, fairness/cheating and 
loyalty/betrayal, Carter was demonstrating what Charles Cooley labeled the looking glass 
self in that he appeared to be gauging the veracity of his own commitment to human 
rights through the actions and interaction of Sadat.  
Carter also evokes an image of needing to protect his friend, and this easily falls 
within the context of the theme of moral cognition we labeled as harm and care. 
Remember, this foundation evolved from a mother’s need to protect her child, becoming 
more universally applied to the weak or defenseless as society developed into more 
complex forms. He identifies outside sources within the Arab community as well as in 
the more radical Zionist community that would seek to do him harm.  
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“I feel protective of Sadat. President Sadat would need all the protection we could 
offer,” (Carter Diary entry 12/17/77). 
The Carter biographer Peter Bourne writes, “Carter felt that Sadat was being 
betrayed by his own, re., other Arab leaders. This also added to the vision of Zahran, 
standing alone ad staying strong,” (Carter Diary entry 12/17/77, p. 301). In each case, 
Sadat is described as the most identifiable peacemaker, leader and selfless father figure in 
pursuit of securing the rights of his people, as well as other Arabs residing outside of 
Egypt. This is an associative reference to the theme of legitimate authority described 
above.  
In referring to Sadat’s speaking, both privately and publically, Carter uses 
descriptors such as ‘soft-spoken’ or ‘deliberate,’ and also recognizes the importance of 
storytelling in Sadat’s learning and the way in which he conducts business. Carter does 
not referent the Arabic tradition of embellishment, but recognizes it as a cultural 
phenomenon, and again, appears to not only accept its validity, but protects its 
importance as a tool for communication and politics. 
In reviewing Carter’s perception of Sadat while watching his speeches and during 
private conversations between the two presidents, Carter addresses what could be 
described as Habermasian dichotomy of strategic and communicative rationality. He 
speaks to the great amount of passion in his speeches, his deliberate emotional emphasis 
both perceived and emoted during private conversations. In short, Carter considers his 
friend as an impassioned leader that truly cares for the rights and welfare of not only his 
own constituency from the ‘village,’ but for everyone who wishes to live in peace and 
harmony (Bourne, 1997; Carter, 2010). 
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Significantly, Carter speaks to Sadat’s honesty. One of the greatest influences on 
young Carter was the imperative of telling the truth. He learned this at the hand of his 
father who would, according to his mother, “whip faster for lying than anything else” 
(Carter, 1982). Truth was the foundation from which all other experiences were judged 
and placed within the use-value hierarchy. Carter has been regularly described as an 
honest man, a man who stuck to his word and a leader whose word you could rely. In 
other’s description of Carter, the more prominent feature of his character was one of 
telling the truth and looking down upon and never again trusting those that did not. Most 
of his moral cognition was seen through the lens of truth telling and it is within this scope 
of legitimacy he had placed his “trusted friend Sadat” (Bourne, 1997; Carter, 1982). 
There is a clear consonance between Carter’s early moral editors, the themes this 
interaction evoked, and those of Anwar Sadat. Both were from a mechanical solidarity 
community, Carter from the little rural town of Plains and Sadat from the small village of 
Mit Abu al-Kum. Both men had a visceral connection to their childhood homes that 
broadened to include the ‘land’ that was peacefully and legitimately resided upon by its 
legitimate residents. 
Both men adopted the role of leader of their people, wishing to not simply lead 
them from political maneuvering, but to secure their human rights, the right to happiness 
and way of life another reflection of their moral development traceable to similar if not in 
many ways identical to experiential histories. Both men were culturally relativistic, 
having had exposure to different groups of cultural practitioners and taking important 
lessons away that would shape their political decisions. 
385 
 
Both men had seen a non-legitimate use of power and authority that discriminated 
against those both men considered close to them. Sadat had suffered and defied the 
British occupation and reveled in the people that fought in proud defiance until he was of 
an age to also defy those he considered occupiers and men who poisoned his people. In 
addition, and in direct attachment to his beloved land, Sadat saw some of his own people 
give away rights to the Nile and surrounding property. He associated himself with his 
heroes who showed not only defiance against his British oppressors, but others around 
the world who stood up for human rights such as Gandhi. His greatest hero was Zahran, 
who was emblematic of Sadat’s need to be moral, and his disdain for non-legitimate 
authority. 
“…he held his head high on the way to the scaffold. He was proud that he had 
stood up against the aggressors and killed one of them. I wish I was Zahran,” 
(Sadat, 1978, p. 5). 
In reviewing our discussion of emotion-based pattern recognition, that ‘thing’ 
which triggers parts of the dual cognition process and stands as a primary cause of 
predispositional behaviors, the very first meeting when Carter sees Sadat for the first time 
is emblematic of this concept. Remember, Carter saw the oppression of blacks in the 
ultra-segregationist south. He was separated from his best friend Knock while attending 
school, and the action of his friends when he assumed a power position of land-owner at 
a young age (Bourne, 1997). He learned at a young age, which groups were in a power 
position and which were not, which were denied human rights and which benefited from 
that oppression.  
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His proud defiance of these inequities came from Carter’s parents. His mother 
provided healthcare to the rural blacks, unheard of in such times, but whose pressure was 
ignored. His father Earl, not only provided his mother the funds necessary to continue 
and expand her nursing practice, but provided free housing to his black help, money for 
other black families who had fallen on hard times, and a defiant action toward the local 
Baptist church in ignoring what he considered an intrusion on his personal rights. Here, 
although perhaps in a more passive way, Carter learned the meaning of right and wrong, 
how to safely circumvent what he considered non-legitimate authority and the value of 
human rights (Bourne, 1997; Carter, 2001). 
Pursuing that line of reasoning, Carter tells us, “His (Sadat’s) complexion was 
much darker than I had expected” (Carter, 1982, p. 54). Immediately we can see an 
association between Carter’s childhood editors; the oppression of blacks and the 
mistreatment by authoritarian whites; the separation from his long-time childhood friend 
Knock on their first day of school; a remembrance of his father’s philanthropy and 
challenge to authority also demonstrated by his mother, the feeling of volunteerism and 
duty to bring equality to those he felt cheated of things necessary for life; the abrogating 
of religious responsibility to Blacks and the legitimation of non-legitimate actions by 
whites through the ‘forgiveness of Lillian’s actions to Black residents as an act of 
‘Christian charity.’ Indeed, seeing Sadat for the first time, all of the triggers of the major 
themes through emotion-based pattern recognition must have availed themselves bringing 
the two men immediately into an emotional coalition, reflected when Carter describes he 
and Sadat during the early days of Camp David as being “of one mind,” (Bourne, 1997).  
This also remains important in Carter’s later descriptions of Begin. 
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Sadat on Carter 
What is striking in these findings are the clear parallels between how these two 
men described each other. Linguistically, the descriptors are quite similar, the tone and 
semantic structures are easily recognizable and the manifestation of use-value definitions 
through major themes described above is clear. Sadat also refers to Carter as his ‘most 
trusted friend,’ ‘his brother Jimmy’, ‘his partner’ as well as a man who wishes the same 
thing for his people as he does, peace and prosperity.  
As Carter, Sadat’s words described a trusted coalition of similar minds, one that 
was perceived as honest, truthful and strong. Repeatedly he told Carter, ‘I will protect 
you,’ evoking the theme of harm/care or ‘I will do whatever you think is necessary,’ 
evoking a second level legitimacy of authority between two presidents, but primarily 
between two friends. His tone toward Carter was soft, not simply as a common linguistic 
descriptor of diglossic Arabic as emollient, but truly gentle and replete with words 
indicative of kindness and gentle emotion. It was evident that when Sadat spoke of Carter 
his language indicated a certain calm and a comfort with the object.  
“I find that I am dealing with a man that understands what I want, a man impelled 
by the power of religious faith and lofty values-a farmer like me,” (Sadat, 1978, p. 
302). 
Both men were so comfortable with each other that there never an expressed 
hesitation of asking the other for help both in terms of the Camp David Accords and on 
broader more universal issues inherent to international relations. Letters between the two 
men as described in Carter’s diary, also showed a penchant for considering each other’s 
opinions in some more personal matters as well. 
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“I felt a strange rapport with that man that has been almost unequaled in my life. I 
invited Anwar to go upstairs with me, to a place in the White House where very 
few people visit, to the second floor where the families live. He went up with me. 
Our little daughter Amy was asleep, and I woke her up and said, "Amy, I want 
you to meet a new friend." And President Sadat met my daughter,” (Carter, 1998). 
On several occasions, Sadat also made reference to some of the parallels he knew 
of concerning Carter’s similar experiential history, a childhood in a rural area where the 
nurturing of the land is recognized as a significant value, both as prescribed in religious 
doctrine, but personally as well., “I must put on record that President Carter is true to 
himself and true to others. It is because he is so honest with himself that he can be honest 
with others; a man impelled by religious faith and lofty values- a farmer like me” (Sadat, 
1978, p. 302). This is significant in that it demonstrates an influence on Sadat by his 
grandmother’s teaching, but also from his exposure to both Koranic and Coptic schools, 
that afforded Sadat a certain relativism within the frame of sacred and profane. He 
considered Carter, as Carter did Sadat, a ‘deeply religious man,’ each by specific 
reference, which proved to be a primary determinant of personal use-value for both men 
on the theme of sacred and profane, but also in terms of theme of legitimate authority. 
The correspondence of use-value development is undeniable in these two men. 
Their experience under the direction of primary socializers has shaped contextually their 
perceptions of the five major themes. They are both driven by truth and trust, selflessness 
and a sense of authentic leadership that promises to make those led the best they can be. 
As concerns others, both men have a well-developed sense of harm and care, fairness and 
cheating that is manifest in their visceral concern with human rights beyond their sense 
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in-group identity. In one instance, indicative of Sadat’s regard for Carter at Camp David, 
he said to Carter in private, “I will protect you” (Hurwitz, 2011 p. 345) and “you are my 
partner” (Quandt, 1986a, p. 287). 
Carter on Begin 
Before he was president, Carter had visited Israel and spoke with the then Prime 
Minister Golda Meir. He and his wife were taken to the various Holy cities and shrines 
and, coupled with his early indoctrination of Israeli entitlement by his childhood Baptist 
minister, concluded that in fact, Israel had a right to its holdings in Palestine.  
“My affinity for Israel arose after my 1973 visit with Golda Meir…”The small 
size of Israel and its number of (surrounding) enemies aroused in me a sense of 
responsibility to defend Israel,” (Carter, 1982, p. 274). 
By his own admission, prior to becoming president, he had never really challenged such a 
notion but all this began to take on a different tone in the course of his being briefed by 
his advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski (Carter, 1982). The hinge pin of his reconsideration was 
personified in his introduction to Menachem Begin.  
His first introduction to Begin came in the form of watching a recording of a news 
show called ‘Issues and Answers,’ where Begin was being interviewed. Carter describes 
a visceral reaction to Begin’s intensity and ‘frightening rhetoric,’ (Carter, 1982, p. 288).  
He found this first exposure to the new Prime Minister, disturbing. The content of the 
interview centered on the Israeli’s presumed entitlement to the land in Palestine, justified 
by biblical interpretations for which, parenthetically no archeological evidence 
supporting the Jews being driven out of Egypt. Researchers have deemed this a 
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combination of misinterpretation and biblical myth. But Carter’s penchant for human 
rights, Harm and Care was immediately triggered on reflection. 
“The plight of those Palestinians living under Israeli rule. Deprivation of 
Palestinian Rights…To deny them these rights was an indefensible position,” 
(Carter, 1982, p. 277). 
Carter found Begin vitriolic and ideological and describes and immediate dislike 
for a man that ‘disregarded the rights of resident Palestinians;’ a seeming unconscious 
reference to his earlier witnessing of discrimination against his childhood friends and 
moral editors, centering on the themes of legitimacy, harm and care, fairness and 
cheating. On more than one occasion in his description of Begin’s speeches Carter would 
exclaim, “I could not believe what I was hearing! The tenor of his language was 
frightening!” (Carter, 1982, p. 274). 
These initial feelings were brought into clearer focus for Carter following his 
having his staff gather background information on Begin. Here, he read about the bloody 
massacre of Der Yassin and Begins actions with Irgun leading to the King David Hotel 
bombing that took so many innocent lives in Begin’s fight with the British (Carter, 2010; 
Wright, 2015). To Carter, these were regarded as terrorist acts, triggering emotions that 
spanned all five moral and cognitive themes. There can be no doubt that in the process of 
Carter’s establishing use-values related to Begin and their eventual associations, that 
these historic events formed predispositional behaviors resultant of the dual cognitive 
processes.  
It is interesting to interrogate the language that Carter uses to describe Begin 
following their first meeting, “intelligent, good debating skills, and a definite legal 
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structure to his speeches that was precise and unyielding” (Carter, 1982, p. 357-359). He 
reflects back and wonders out loud if he had already determined that Begin did not 
represent a prospect for peace in the Middle East, an interesting self-analysis that 
supports this study’s abductive findings. In their first meetings, Carter reflects that where 
he wished for a certain level of informality that is indicative of a southern rural 
communicative pattern, Begin showed a strong penchant in both words and demeanor 
towards thorough and methodical actions and words, referent to Habermas’ strategic 
rationality. Symbolically, where Carter dressed informally in jeans and a sport shirt and 
Sadat dressed in jogging suits while at Camp David, Begin insisted on always wearing 
formal attire, a suite and tie. 
In comparison to Carter’s description of his first meeting with Sadat whom he 
seemingly immediately formed a personal bond with, Begin is described more as one 
would describe a business associate, cold, impersonal, precise and without any hint of 
emotional attachment. Sadat is described as warm, shy, one deserving of protection and 
friendship where Begin is seen as ‘businesslike, cold, detached, dedicated and congenial’ 
(Carter, 1982). Carter did find Begin highly religious, but later separated it from Sadat’s 
moral guidepost and more toward a justification for non-legitimate actions, i.e., the 
undermining of human rights and land acquisition, a man of destiny, but at any cost 
where Sadat was considered a moral leader invoking more of a caring father than a 
violent autocrat. 
Carter described Begin’s language as one that often had strategic multiple 
meanings. Early in his writings, Carter was reticent to pronounce Begin as being a liar 
and prone to serial betrayal during the Camp David Accords, but there was clearly an 
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influence from his father’s early lessons of truth and the consequences of not abiding 
truthful practices in life and in business, “I was to discover that his good words had 
multiple meanings,” (Carter, 1982, p. 300). 
Later, detaching the man from the language, Carter saw Begin’s strategic use of 
language as an ‘impediment to peace,’ and eventually merged that observation into a 
moral judgement. He came to ‘doubt his sincerity; recognize his power driven agenda; 
and see his use of lies as a way of achieving a goal at any cost, regardless of who was 
hurt’ (Carter, 1982). His greatest concern, was that Begin’s penchant for precision in 
communicating any aspect of politics or life in general, would become an impediment to 
free flowing talk, keeping in mind Carter’ earlier comment concerning he and Sadat’s 
ability to say anything to each other.  
Obliquely, Begin’s precision was held in comparison to the more preferred 
structure of Sadat’s communicative style who’s imprecision, a remnant of memory based 
story-telling structures, allowed for negotiations and productive debate. Carter asserted 
that Sadat used words to tell stories, to outline general structures toward peace based on 
his experience; quite a soft description of a communicative style. Begin, on the other 
hand, “used words as weapons” (Carter, 1982, p. 274). 
The most logical conclusion is that Carter had already reached certain 
unconscious, although he often articulated what he was thinking emotionally, conclusions 
regarding Begin before and during the Camp David mediation. Often, his later writings 
following the event, bore out these assumptions of predispositional behaviors that biased 
the Accords overall. Most of the major themes that describe moral cognition and 
decision-making are demonstrated in Carter’s description of Begin, as they are 
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concerning Sadat. However, the stark contrasts between Carter’s feelings about the two 
men are what makes our observations so fascinating, coupled with a clear path to their 
respective experiential past. 
Sadat on Begin 
From his first investigation into the new Prime Minister of Israel, Sadat was 
suspicious of Begin. He refers to the psychological barrier between Israel and Egypt 
(Israel always placed first in this metaphor) and often in his writings ties that directly to 
the ‘suspicious nature’ in Begin. He uses descriptors such as ‘fanatical” and “extremist” 
in describing his counterpart from their first meeting in Jerusalem where the intent was to 
being discussions for a comprehensive peace between the two men.  He had grave doubts 
as to whether or not Begin truly desired peace. In that regard, he made clear to the Israeli 
Knesset on his historic speech that he would never practice ethical deception as it was 
against everything he stood for. Truth was his banner. He made this statement to calm the 
suspicion that his visit was a masked prelude to war. Understandable in light of the 
common perception of victimhood found in many Jewish biographers of the time.  
Sadat makes clear that he was viscerally offended by Begin’s opening remarks, 
both at the Knesset and the presidential dinner later on in Washington. He was very bitter 
over his apparent absence of feeling for the plight of Palestinians and those subject to 
Israeli oppression in the occupied territories. He makes repeated mention of human rights 
violations and the need for the world to care for the people of “Palestine;” a clear 
reference to earlier major themes. He comments on the lack of empathy he perceives in 
Begin, except for those he considers ‘his people.’  
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“My main concern in this connection, is whether Israel really and truly wants 
peace….But does the Israeli administration today, particularly under Begin, as 
leader of the fanatical Likud bloc, want peace? Can an extremist like Begin really 
want peace?” (Sadat, 1978, p. 306). 
Sadat knew through both experience and political interaction that it was well 
known among Israeli politicians that the Prime minister had not the time nor the interest 
in learning of Arab history or traditions. Perlmutter (1987) references this several times in 
Begin’s biographical notes and Wright defines it as a point of moral departure between 
the two men.  This serves as a clear manifestation of Begin’s obsession with Hadar and 
Jewish superiority. It is a repeated theme and reflective of his disregard for out-group 
perceived human rights. It could serve as the root cause of his and of others’ denial of 
even the presence of the historic Arab presence in Palestine, now determined by 
revisionists as Begin’s Eretz Israel. 
This stands in stark contrast to Sadat’s diligence at understanding his 
counterpart’s culture at many levels both as a young student, and as president. It also 
contrasts Sadat’s universalism of humankind and his desire for a comprehensive peace 
clearly showing himself the maximalist to Begin’s minimalist perception of reality both 
environmental and political. In many of his speeches, Sadat links the terms 
“understanding” and “human rights,” often in the same sentence. Sadat’s outward 
response to Begin’s cultural exclusionism and acute ethnocentrism was one of abject 
resentment and chronic irritation. However, if we explore the impact this might have had 
on his capacity for moral construct and use-value, we can see how this could easily taint 
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any future consideration by Sadat of Begin as a person with whom he could effectively 
make progress toward peace between Egypt and Israel.  
It is here that Sadat made the determination that Begin was not only insincere in 
his outward proclamation for peace, but as an “obstacle” to any hope of any form of 
comprehensive agreement between their two countries. This sentiment was shared with 
his friend Jimmy Carter, who in his own writings nearly parroted Sadat’s response to the 
statement, and adopted the label describing Begin as being an ‘obstacle’ to Peace and 
immovable  (Carter, 1986; Wright, 2014). 
Sadat was driven by the engine of peace and truth. His language asserts no less 
importantly his regard for legitimacy in terms of leadership and followership. While 
giving monumental credit for President Carter’s dedication to that same moral capital, he 
bears no hesitation in remarking about its absence in Begin’s actions and words. He did 
not trust him initially due to the dissonance between diglossic Arabic and Modern 
Hebrew, something Laitin (2001) would assert is a simple problem of language 
equivalency. However, we see a clear delineation between the Habermasian position of 
communicative and strategic linguistic interaction, which is demonstrated clearly in 
Sadat’s writing and speeches and Begin’s numerous interviews.  
These are the same references made by Carter in his descriptions before meeting 
Begin, he thought his words were ‘frightening,’ and ‘disturbing.’ Sadat listened too many 
of Begin’s interviews and became quite disturbed when Begin was asked about the 
occupied territories following the Six-Day War. Begin answered that “they were not 
occupied, they were liberated” (Wright, 2014, p. 177), again a demonstration of Begin’s 
disregard for what had and still is in many circles, considered the rightful and legal Arab 
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residents of those territories. Sadat was also struck by reading Begin’s books, White 
Nights (1979), a recalling of his imprisonment in Soviet labor camps and Revolt (1978), 
detailing the violent exploits of Irgun.  
In these books, although Sadat does not elude to them in his own writings, Begin 
is constantly referring to the Jews as defenselessness, the need to hate, Jews that the 
world sought to eliminate through massacre. He spoke to the necessity of the sword to 
promote progress as opposed to peace.  
“The State of Israel has arisen, but we must remember that our country is not yet 
liberated. The battle continues, and you see now that the words of your Irgun 
fighters were not vain words: it is Hebrew arms which decide the boundaries of 
the Hebrew State. So it is now in this battle; so it will be in the future. Our God-
given country is a unity, an integral historical and geographical whole. The 
attempt to dissect it is not only a crime but a blasphemy and an abortion. Whoever 
does not recognize our natural right to our entire homeland, does not recognize 
our right to any part of it,” (Begin, 1948). 
Reading this, there is an evident presumption of Sadat that he would be at 
minimum skeptical of Begin’s true intentions in pursuing peace, as Begin’s perception of 
peace was truly dissonant to Sadat’s, the former as a strategy to achieve acquisition and 
dominance in the shadow of Hadar, the latter to pursue the absence of violence and 
human rights. 
Pursuant to that perception, and given that much communicative action is non-
verbal but performance based (Amara & Spolsky, 1986), particularly as regards Arabic, 
Sadat’s feelings of distrust and fanaticism were legitimated in his eyes when a reciprocal 
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equivalent of his peace gesture and going to Jerusalem to speak to the Knesset was not 
offered by Begin. In Sadat’s eyes, two things had occurred, a demonstration on the part of 
Begin that peace was not important to him, but more importantly since Sadat, in his mind, 
was representing the entire Arab world, he had lost face not achieving this reciprocity as 
is requisite of a high context culture. 
Losing face went to the core of his moral library and brought back images of 
earlier times when he witnessed disgrace at the hands of British. An argument could be 
made as well that his remembrance of Zahran, such an important part of his moral 
development and use-value, took on a significant position in his dual cognition process 
when establishing a perception of who Begin really was. Loss of face, indeed activated 
many moral triggers and experiential modifiers.  
In Sadat’s mind, Begin rigidly took a position of Hadar (Jewish majesty) that 
created an unjustified superiority over human rights for Jews, at the expense of non-Jews, 
playing directly all five of the major themes earlier identified, harm and care, fairness and 
cheating, loyalty and betrayal, authority and subversion and finally, Sanctity and 
degradation. Even David Ben-Gurion, regarded as Israel’s founder and first Prime 
Minster considered Begin a racist, and willing to kill every Arab in pursuit of control of 
all of Eretz Israel (Perlmutter, 1987). Hanna Arendt and Albert Einstein considered Begin 
Hitlerian and a terrorist Chieftain, practicing the very methods that created the perception 
of victimhood in Begin (Wood and O’Brien, 1986). These are the lenses through which 
Sadat perceived Begin and goes long toward explaining their almost complete lack of 
interaction during Camp David. 
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Begin on Sadat 
Begin demonstrated a profound sense of superiority over Anwar Sadat that went 
beyond the confines of Hadar. His writing and both his personal letters and public 
pronouncements showed a distinct tendency of abandoning his usual legalistic 
interrogation style and religious metaphors of Israeli legitimacy and resorting to more 
simplistic and derisive semantics resembling how an adult would speak to a child.  
“Understand, almost without reference, a few against the many, weak against the 
strong, that we stood in this test, one day after the proclamation of independence, 
to choke and destroy the birth and to call an end to the last hope of the Jewish 
nation in the century of destruction and of redemption,” (Begin speech to the 
Knesset, November 20, 1977). 
Begin did not regard Sadat as being a very intelligent man, a perception he gained 
through verbal interaction as opposed to political bickering and debate at which both he 
and Sadat were skilled according to outside observers (Perlmutter, 1987). Clearly, this 
could be attributed to the dissonance in the morphological roots of each language coupled 
both to language equivalency and symbolic use value discussed earlier.  
“He was not a very cultured or sophisticated man, a sincere man but superficially 
intellectual. He would have flashes of great ideas and then tum around and do 
something stupid. I believe he suffered from inferiority complexes and 
desperately wanted to be a hero,” (Perlmutter, 1987, p. 256). 
Begin refused to become informed about Arab culture, aspirations or traditions 
which certainly contributed significantly to his misperception of not only Sadat, but of 
Arabs in general (Wright, 2014). He had no basis on which to base his evaluations of 
399 
 
both personal and public actions on the part of his Arab counterpart. Ethnocentrism could 
then be regarded as a significant contributor to not only cultural dissonance as described 
by Avruch and others, but of misunderstandings so prevalent in language based 
interactions.  
From his earliest recollections, Begin considered Arabs the enemy and an 
existential threat not only to himself, but to his goal of establishing Eretz Israel. He often 
regarded himself as a loner, as did all of the subjects of this study (Wright, 2014), but 
Begin frequently referred to his own goals and motivations to the exclusion of other Jews 
who certainly had the same goal of an independent Israeli State. This was done so often 
that we can see him occasionally inserting himself into Jewish folklore of conquest 
substituting himself as the hero.  
He learned that Arabs in Palestine were of no consideration and an obstacle at the 
knee of his father and through his interactions with Jabotinsky and other revisionist 
Zionists. Having been a devout reader of the works of Theodor Herzl, Begin early viewed 
the presence of Arabs in Palestine as inconsequential, not seeing them as legitimate 
residents much less at being humanly present at all; he had absolutely no regard for their 
self-determination or human rights while he was fighting for those same rights for his 
group.  
“We must expropriate gently the private property on the state assigned to us. We 
shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring 
employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it employment in our 
country. The property owners will come over to our side. Both the process of 
expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discretely and 
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circumspectly. Let the owners of the immoveable property believe that they are 
cheating us, selling us things for more than they are worth. But we are not going 
to sell them anything back,” (Herzl in, Morris, 2001, pp. 21-26). 
It is this early influence where Begin began to take on the persona of what Haidt 
would consider ‘conservative’ in his consideration of human interaction, his decision-
making calculus giving sway to each major theme, the moral foundations, of twenty 
percent. Haidt (2007) regarded the last three foundations focusing on group functioning 
as ‘binding’ foundations. In contrast, we can demonstrate that Carter and Sadat focused 
principally on what Moral Foundation Theory labels as ‘individual’ themes focusing 
more on harm and care and the rights of the individual; something he terms ‘liberal.’ 
Throughout his speeches, prior to, during and following the Camp David Accords, 
Begin would refer to Arabs in three derisive frames; as an ever-resent existential threat, 
as aggressors and as conquered or ‘losers’. Conversely, he would, in the same speech, 
refer to Israelis, often substituting “I” for “Israeli or Israelis,” first as victims, referring to 
Jewish history but particularly as a vivid reference to the Holocaust, and then with 
reference to the 1967 and 1973 wars as ‘victors.’ It seemed many times Begin was 
incapable of containing the visceral contempt he had for Arabs that had been assigned 
such as use-value from his early years. 
"the Jewish people have unchallengeable, eternal, historic right to the Land of 
Israel [including the West Bank and Gaza Strip], the inheritance of their 
forefathers," and pledged to build rural and urban exclusive Jewish colonies in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip." (Shlaim, 2014, p. 354-355). 
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In a demonstration of both superiority and of perceived disrespect on the part of 
Arab listeners, he would not often refer to Sadat by name, but simply say, ‘your 
president.’ This serves as a devaluation of his political counterpart, a classic debate tactic 
so familiar to both Begin and Carter. Sadly, it also causes a loss of face for Sadat in the 
eyes of the Egyptian people, but also in the eyes of the general Arab population who 
already saw the Egyptian president as a betrayer of the Arab world for even being in the 
same room with their arch enemy, Israel. 
We could speculate, that much of this strong dismissal of Sadat came following 
Begin’s visit to Cairo as a follow-up to Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem where peace was 
proposed to the Knesset. Perlmutter (1987) described Begin as “symbolist,” particularly 
as regards Begin’s own perception of his public persona. He desperately wanted to be 
seen as a legitimate leader, and a messiah leading his people to the Promised Land. This 
was also apparent to Carter as described in his writings following Camp David: 
“Begin too looked at himself as a man of destiny, he cast himself in a biblical role 
(messianic).  
He considered himself charged with the destiny of God’s ‘chosen people,’ 
(Carter, 1982, p. 330). 
When Sadat visited Jerusalem there was great celebration and public display. 
Sadat wrote that this display made him feel that indeed, the Israeli people loved him and 
that peace was within his grasp. He wrote of his first visit to see Begin in what Begin 
regarded as Israel’s capital city repeatedly in his autobiography and during his speeches. 
When Begin visited Cairo to meet with Sadat, a follow-up to the Jerusalem visit, there 
was not the pomp and circumstance afforded the Egyptian president. This irritated Begin 
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as he equated that kind of symbolism as a recognition of his leadership and of State 
legitimacy for Israel (Perlmutter, 1987). It is possible, referring back to our major themes, 
that Begin felt a sense of professional and personal betrayal at the hands of Sadat. 
However, we must also remember that Sadat was already in the throes of feeling that 
same betrayal when Begin did not reciprocate with a grand gesture for a comprehensive 
peace plan. Indeed, the themes of fairness and cheating, loyalty and betrayal, authority 
and subversion, in the eyes of Begin, had been violated. 
Begin on Carter 
Similar to his sentiment for Sadat, it can be said that Begin did not regard 
President Carter in very high regard. There is an immediate feeling expressed through 
Begin’s words that Carter was perceived by him as an outsider, and an obstacle to Eretz 
Israel. Prior to the Camp David Accords began, and again during its process, begin 
confided in Moshe Dyan, that believed Carter to be a “champion of their arch enemy, the 
PLO” (Wright, 2014). As was true of his earlier exclamations, Begin asserted that there 
was no room for a foreign presence, sic Arab, in or near Israel. Here he is specifically 
referring to the Palestinians who had resided in the country far longer than the Jews, both 
historically and presently.  
In that regard, Begin tried to bully Carter into agreeing to his peace plan that was 
doomed to failure before it was even presented to Sadat again taking the role of the 
victim: 
“I am not exaggerating when I say we sometimes had to fight with our bare hands 
and sometimes with homemade arms that didn’t always work. We lost one 
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percent of our population in that war, 6,000 people. The bloodshed has gone on 
permanently. My grandchild was bombed in Jerusalem,” Wright, 2014, p. 32). 
 Carter viewed Begin’s plan as a peace for the victors, a title that played directly 
into his and Sadat’s irritation of Begin’s presumed superiority. There were no 
concessions and stood as the ideological proclamation of Eretz Israel. From here 
developed Carter’s perceived ‘frosty’ attitude toward Begin while he tried to address the 
three pillars of the peace talks, Israeli security, Palestinian statehood and Arab 
sovereignty. 
Knowing that Carter already regarded Begin as a verbal terrorist whose words had 
‘frightened and disturbed’ him prior to their first face to face meeting, Begin indeed took 
a mostly personal defensive position regarding the American president (Perlmutter, 1987; 
Wright, 2014). After their first meeting, begin regarded carter as a ‘southern gentleman 
and a shrewd politician strained by a touch of self-righteousness (Perlmutter, 1987; 
Wright, 2014); clearly a derisive perception of someone everyone else regarded as a 
purveyor of a comprehensive peace, including Sadat.  
In private Begin frequently referred to the American president as a misguided 
American who had no knowledge of Jewish suffering while knowing this to be not true as 
in other iterations was amazed at Carter’s knowledge of the bible following several 
discussions with Carter. The question was, is Begin simply engaging political theater, or 
was this a visceral response to his perception of Carter of being pro-Palestinian and 
therefore falling into his demonized category of Goyim at one point calling him a 
“Fanatical Baptist preacher” (Wright, 2014). 
404 
 
The personal and ideological dissonance between the two men was apparent in the 
writings and speeches of each. Parenthetically, the nature of their often vitriolic 
relationship, despite politically correct appearances, can be seen in their positioning 
during photo sessions and live television. They were rarely close to each other, or made 
eye contact. Begin’s face often showed derision every time Carter spoke of both Sadat 
and the Accords. Where Carter spoke of ‘my friend president Sadat,’ he often referred to 
begin merely as the ‘Prime Minister’ or in the third person, a tactic again used by Begin 
when referring to Sadat, begin being the consummate debater. 
Phase Four: Outside Perceptions of Disputants 
This phase of the analysis focuses on the perceptions of outside observers 
concerning the three subjects of the study, Carter, Sadat and Begin. Of particular interest 
is whether or not the same themes emerge from the literature that describes the men’s 
interactions before and during the Camp David Accords. Data was taken from four 
primary sources; biographies (both authorized and unauthorized), media reports to 
include interviews with each of the three men, descriptive works concerning the Accords 
or individual perceptions of the men and finally, the extensive notes of the months 
leading up to and during the Accords that are the official record submitted by Carter’s 
foreign affairs advisor, Dr. William Quandt. While not included in this research report, I 
must note that Dr. Quandt was more than helpful in providing this material totaling 
thousands of pages of text. His assistance in helping me follow the filing system of the 
text was more than instructive and appreciated. I must also note that I opted for copies 
that did not include notes he had made in the margins following the Accords for fear of 
tainting my perceptions. 
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Sadat. Observers frequently describe Anwar Sadat as a warm, genuine leader 
who serves as the personification of peace. While they offer comprehensive dissertations 
on his military background and his defiance of the British occupation, they are more 
often focused on his earlier years as an influence on his adult decision-making. All 
recognize the influence of his grandmother and the ideation of his father as the 
consummate and fair father to his village, but also are fascinated by Sadat’s obsession 
and adoption of the personalities of what we have referred to as his heroes like Zahran 
and Ghandi. These two men manifest two major themes that shaped outsiders’ 
perceptions of Sadat.  
Zahran stood emblematic of subversion toward non-legitimate authority (theme 
three) and the pride engendered by defiance of that non-legitimate authority in pursuit of 
fair treatment.   Ghandi was an icon of peace and non-violence, referring our two major 
themes (and moral foundation) of harm and care, fairness and cheating. Both were 
defiant, both were proud, coupled with his perception of his father, they were an 
aggregate that composed the ideal leader in Sadat’s eyes. Clearly, this image stood as the 
source of use-value in comparison to other world leaders, not only for Sadat personally, 
but when outside observers placed him against those same world leaders. 
Observers described Sadat as the man whose inner-child never left the village, 
something Sadat often referred to when he felt either insecure or protective of any group 
of people (Sadat, 1978). Insecure in terms of knowing always where he was, being a child 
of the village, those emotional patterns availing themselves whenever Sadat needed 
emotional strength. When thinking of others, he thought of his aggregate effendi, the 
village ‘headman’ who everyone looked to for strength and guidance. He several times 
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mixed metaphors, referring to this protection of the Egyptian people, but also imposed 
that same sentiment on the Palestinian people during the Camp David Accords. 
Sadat was described by various authors as a fair man who wished to achieve a 
comprehensive peace with Israel. He was perceived as someone who would indeed 
compromise in order to achieve a larger good, flexible and focused primarily on equal 
rights and fair treatment for everyone, Arabs and Israelis. He was cast as a devout 
Muslim, but not fanatical in trying to impose sharia law into the political process. He was 
tolerant of other religions and cultures and knowledgeable of their nuances his 
grandmother being recognized for encouraging and providing a comprehensive education 
both religious and secular. They made reference to his love of reading and knowing other 
cultures, sometimes casting him as ‘culturally sensitive’ in his international activities, a 
case being the Knesset speech where his symbolism was clearly tailored to Talmudic 
influences, something recognized sincerely by the Israeli people at large.  
A number of authors and reporters were quite aware of his attachment to the land, 
in terms of the legitimacy of occupation and ownership and how this would shape the 
Camp David mediations. While acknowledging the long history of Egypt’s possession of 
contested property in the Sinai, their focus was more on the visceral attachment, the 
sacred symbolism of Sadat and the Egyptian land. This is a constant theme in the Accord 
documents provided by Quandt. The perception of legitimacy in terms of ownership and 
legitimate occupation was so powerful to the diplomats dealing with Sadat, that 
communiques were shaped to first acknowledge its importance, but also to never call into 
question the legitimacy of his claims, which would have been viewed as a powerful 
affront to Sadat not only personally, but as a challenge to Arab history and Islam itself. It 
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became very apparent that the entire mediation at Camp David would not revolve around 
the land proper, but the symbolism and recognition of its occupational history and 
legitimacy to a man who felt he was the heart and soul of the Egyptian people and, by 
presumed proxy, the rest of the Arab world. 
In revisiting the notes and themes of the media accounts and descriptions of 
Sadat, it became clear that their assessment of the man, their perception of the kind of 
man he was, was quite in line with Carter’s personal assessment of his friend. It was 
inevitable that the same authors would draw comparisons between the two leaders and 
reach a conclusion that their friendship was simply a product of two men being very 
similar in history and temperament whose goals were parallel before and during the 
Accords.  
Carter. Writers most often used the descriptors, truthful, ethical, honest, 
religious, altruistic and selfless when describing Carter. Summaries often spoke to the 
perceived obsession he had for the innate goodness of humankind, a reflection of his 
religious dedication. More telling was his manifestations of truthfulness, gained from his 
father, the preoccupation for human rights gained through the observation and actions of 
his parents and friends during his childhood in the segregationist south and his image of 
dedication in pursuit of a goal’s conclusion.  
On reviewing notes and comments gleaned from the material describing Carter in 
both biographies and media materials, one is immediately struck by the political 
partisanship that is vividly apparent, particularly in American writers. It was incumbent 
for the validity of this research to try and filter out those pieces that were blatantly bias in 
favor of or biased against the former president. The most moderate materials were found 
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mostly in Pre-Camp David writings and reports. Specifically prior to the face to face 
meetings between the three principle subjects. Carter, Sadat and Begin. Following this 
meeting, and the widely perceived friendship between Carter and Sadat and the overt 
animosity that often broke down into public vitriol, the process of discovering more 
moderate or neutral descriptions between the disputants became more difficult. 
Subsequently, many of the sources used were from out of the American press and 
focused primarily in Europe and Canada who appeared to take more of a role of 
commentator as opposed to the American position of political analysts. 
Throughout the materials describing Jimmy Carter there were recurrent themes 
relative to his personal motivations and also his perceived role as an international 
mediator. Most writers agreed that it was ultimately not his process that concluded in an 
agreement between Egypt and Israel, but ultimately his position as President of the 
United States. This was premised upon both a cynical econometric presumption by the 
scribes of Sadat and Begin indirectly seeking financial and military aid from the United 
States, occasionally referencing the threat of Egypt going back to Russia as a primary 
trade partner of thee Accords were not successful, and the environmental fallacy that 
Carter sought personal aggrandizement with the success of a peace treaty between the 
two disputants. While interesting, from a political perspective, these assumptions are 
secondary our purpose in these research findings, but nonetheless worth mention. 
Most observers attributed these themes to his logic of being an engineer and his 
religious indoctrination, a rather strong but understandable adjective. Clearly, Carter 
demonstrates the primary themes reflecting the innate moral foundations and dual process 
of decision-making outlined by Haidt and Kesebir (2010) and Greene (2010). What is 
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also interesting is how Carter’s predispositions of his faith in humankind and his 
conviction that any conflict was tractable framed within the honesty of human needs 
reflects the Allport  (1954) discussion of Contact Theory, as well as that theory’s 
weakness given the relationship between the three men.  
While the relationship between Sadat and Carter was widely perceived as genuine 
to the point of bias, and here we shall not dwell on the qualifiers seen in Carter’s foreign 
policy discussions relative to Israel pre and post Camp David, it is of interest that one 
writer (Princen, 1992) noted Carter’s apprehension with the appearance of collusion with 
his friend Sadat in an effort to pressure Begin into concessions. What we see are Carter’s 
feelings for his dear friend being overridden by his predispositions for truth and an equal 
concern for human rights, harm and care; fairness and cheating. This supports the 
presumption that many behaviors are impacted by certain evolved innate capacities. Even 
though Sadat was his dear and trusted friend, well opposite of his relationship and 
perception of Begin as an obstacle to everything Carter hoped to achieve, his predilection 
for truth (loyalty/betrayal) took precedence over a conscious perception of collusion. 
Begin. Biographical and media descriptions of Menachem Begin typically 
headlined five themes; detached, fanatically religious, which given his own description of 
Carter as a ‘fanatical Baptist preacher’ serves as an irony at some level, legalistic, 
contentious, and manipulative. He was described as a bit of an enigma, expounding his 
desire for a comprehensive peace, but pursuing that peace on what others observed as ‘his 
own terms;’ no land for peace and no Palestinian autonomy. It was observed that he 
constantly reiterated his desire for peace, but even on his first meeting with Carter in July 
of 1977, when asked for assurances that there would be no more settlements in the West 
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Bank, Carter could not get a direct answer. Instead, on his return to Israel, recognized 
some of those existing settlements as permanent. From that scrutiny, other themes began 
to emerge describing Begin such as untrustworthy, liar and obstacle to peace and fanatic. 
Clearly, this plays on Carter’s and everyone’s innate thematic sense of loyalty/betrayal, 
fairness and cheating. Following this first visit, there is a distinct change in the linguistic 
tone or semantic structure of the media reports concerning Begin; specifically from being 
relatively neutral to one of caution in reporting, i.e., taking him directly at his word. The 
reporting takes on a more wait and see attitude, hearing what Begin says, but waiting to 
see what he will do. This is exemplified by Carter’s comment in his book “Keeping 
Faith,” that “I (Carter) was to discover that his (Begin’s) good words had multiple 
meanings,” (Carter, 1982, p. 300). These observations directly contrast those relating to 
Carter or Sadat where truth and honesty serve as the key plank in both political and 
private descriptions.  
More historical images of Begin began to appear in the press describing his 
radicalization under the tutelage of Jabotinsky, discussions of the King David Hotel and 
the hanging of the British Officers. In later descriptions, several mentions are made of 
Begin’s participation in Irgun and his emotional dismissal of the massacre of 135 
villagers at Deir Yassin April 9, 1948.  
Reporters were repulsed as Begin gave a perception of both superiority and 
dismissiveness of so many innocent lives at the hands of the declared terrorist 
organization he had led. The thematic content of many reporters changed now assigning 
labels of ‘terrorist’ and fanatic with regularity to Begin constructing an image of some 
who was driven to a goal without regard to human rights or the value of Arab lives. A 
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significant doubt began to emerge during reporting of the Accords that indeed, Begin had 
an agenda that only included his goals at the expense of anyone that stood in his way; 
from a peacemaker to a monster. Even his Jewish critiques took a decidedly negative turn 
toward his personal description and to his motives, both public and hidden. 
An interesting observation availed itself on the one hand parenthetical to this 
discussion, but important in terms of supporting earlier theoretical assertions. Namely, 
that according to Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007) two groups of 
individuals emerge dependent upon the distributional focus of behavior determining 
capacities, re., individual and binding, as described earlier Haidt then contrasts liberal and 
conservative, the former utilizing primarily binding foundations while incorporating 
individual foundations, harm/care and fairness/cheating themes into their dual-process 
decision-making calculus while liberals utilize only individual foundations in theirs. Here 
the researchers are applying MFT to political behaviors although relevant in our current 
discussion of political theater. 
It was observed that several descriptive accounts of Begin appeared more positive 
in semantic structure than others who virtually demonized the man for his historically 
terrorist actions and the present actions at Camp David, re, building new Israeli 
settlements in the Sinai while negotiating post 1973 borders and Israeli withdrawal from 
historically Egyptian land. While the others were less critical and focused more on his 
religious motivations as justification for his action and his determination in leading his 
people back to the Promised Land. These foci were evolving in the outside observers as 
Begin continued to betray the spirit of the Accords through the deceptions that resulted in 
yet additional settlements in Egyptian land. The observation of the observers in this 
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research then, repeatedly sees a leaning toward predispositional biases on human writers 
as they become more aware of their subjects’ history and action, these playing directly on 
their own emotional based pattern recognition machinery that determines their own use-
value nexus. 
Observed Disputant Interactions. This section of the findings are abstracted 
from the writings and commentaries of men who were actually present during the 
negotiations at Camp David. The materials under review are a compendium of official 
notes from the United States Department of State, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry and the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry with the addition of available notes from the meetings of the 
Knesset when available. Many if the comments and opinions expressed herein were cross 
referenced with media materials that might corroborate the statement(s). Note that those 
notes were primarily from Camp David attendees that were at times repetitious in their 
content, although it was noted that the tone of the language used was superficially 
different and specific to audiences.  
The authors of the primary information sources for this phase of the study, 
excluding autobiographical material from the primary subject’s under study, have also 
written numerous books on the subject and granted several interviews following the 
Camp David Accords. It should be noted that during the entire period of the Accords, the 
press was purposively omitted from access to anyone attending the meetings. The 
function of that rule, was to minimize the impact of public opinion on the mediation 
process. Specifically, it was felt by Carter and his group that if Sadat and Begin were 
made aware of public opinion concerning their decisions and interactions at Camp David, 
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that it might impact the course of the mediation by having them play to public pressure 
than to the facts at hand.  
It should be reiterated here, that given the dissonance in culture and language 
within the Camp David process, and how these two major behavioral determinants 
impact decision-making antecedents as described above, that the potential for 
misinterpretation of important mediation processes and elements by the media, who 
would then report their cultural and use-value specific perceptions to their respective 
audiences could be a source of mediation failure. Misunderstandings incite more 
misunderstandings which often lead to failures in communication and eventually the 
breakdown of resolution processes (Augsburger, 1992; Avruch, 1998). Omitting the press 
and its potential for fanning those flames of misunderstanding and conflict could be 
viewed as strategically sound. 
 From the first day at Camp David, observers noted a distinct difference in 
behavior between our three principles. President Carter, his wife Rosalyn and their 
advisors had previously arrived at the Camp in preparation for the proceedings with the 
Egyptians and Israeli participants. Sadat arrived by helicopter where he immediately 
exited and began shouting to the President, “We can do this,” with a palpable exuberance 
commented on by William Quandt (1986a), Carter’s foreign policy advisor, and Larry 
Wright (2014) who had interviewed other attendees. There was no doubt in anyone’s 
mind that these two men, these two families, the Carters and the Sadats, were already 
very close friends. 
Sadat walked over to Carter and “warmly embraced him,” moving to Rosalyn and 
giving her another warm hug and kissed each cheek in a typical Arab greeting. Everyone 
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noticed what has been referred to as a genuine smile between the three, as dear friends 
who had been separated and were just now reuniting (Perlmutter, 1987; Dyan, 1981; 
Wright, 2014). Reviewing videotapes of this first meeting one can notice a relaxed Carter 
and a seemingly genuine association between him and an equally relaxed Sadat (video 
archive, 1978).  
They maintain eye contact indicative (Turiel, 2006) of two men who are 
interested in each other and comfortable with direct eye contact showing a level of trust 
equated with friendship (Shweder, et al, 1987). Their language on first meeting was easy 
and at times, according to observers, emotional not simply reflective of the task that lay 
ahead and recognizing the inevitable confrontation expected with the Israelis, but of 
simply being in the presence of a friend again. 
Begin’s arrival was nothing less described by observers than by regular protocol. 
Observers made special notice of the fact that unlike Sadat, Begin and Carter engaged a 
‘visibly awkward’ embrace that spoke to something more than simply an ‘unfriendly’ 
association (Wright, 2014). To Quandt, it was likened to a photo opportunity between 
two adversaries preparing for a forced summit. To Moshe Dyan (1981), it gave a feeling 
that one got before a great battle between two adversaries.  
Begin’s kiss to each of Mrs. Carter’s cheeks was thought by Perlmutter (1987) to 
be more of a requirement and optic, and one that showed appropriate courtesy, but with 
little feeling. Indeed, reviewing numerous newsreels of Begin’s arrival one gets the 
impression of somebody ‘going through the motions.’ There was little eye contact as with 
Sadat, to the contrary the two men often avoided eye contact as two opponents preparing 
for battle might do as has been observed in primatology research.  
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Clearly, these two men were both uncomfortable with each other and showed 
little emotional attachment. These observations are also reflected in media reports 
following the Accords specifically mentioning the apparent bond between Sadat and 
Carter and the unbridled contempt both held for Begin (Aderet, 2013). Later, Carter 
(1982) would describe Begin as the ‘most notorious terrorist in the region.’ 
The photographic evidence depicting the Egyptian president and the Israeli prime 
minister clearly showed little verbal signs of acceptance, but more political faces that 
demonstrated more of a subsurface contempt than anything else. It seemed that there was 
a deep distrust between Begin and Sadat, and their public pronouncements when each 
was present during which the public at large got to see the men who could be very well 
deciding the fate of the middle east, was nothing less than “sterile,” (Wright, 2014). 
Media content was replete with themes like contemptuous, dislike, mutual distrust, and 
even hatred. It appeared that Carter’s strong desire to reach a peaceful settlement between 
the two men was driven by his innate and overwhelming perception of equal human 
rights learned early in his childhood. 
It was known among the Camp David participants, that Begin was the only 
principle that could walk away from the talks and suffer little political fallout, but at the 
same time suffer a loss of personal face and social capital that could weaken both his 
political and personal positions, although certainly not to the degree of his Egyptian and 
American counterparts. Begin’s motivation was his strong belief in religious legitimating 
of his actions, a victimhood that demanded retribution against anyone that stood in his 
way, and a malignant narcissism that placed him superior to anyone else. His would be a 
loss first to himself and then to his God (Mahmood, 1985; Perlmutter, 1987; Safty, 1991). 
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Carter had invested significant amounts of political and social capital into the 
Accords and without an agreement, was nearly assured defeat in the next election. Sadat 
had alienated the rest of the Arab world in merely speaking to Israel perceived as ‘selling 
out’ by other Arab countries, much less pursuing a unilateral settlement. Not only his 
political career, but his very life hung in the balance. 
As described by Camp David observers, Carter was undeterred in his feeling that 
if he could just get Sadat and Begin into the same room, get them to see each other as 
people with similar concerns, needs and fears, to basically overcome the psychological 
barriers outlined earlier by Sadat (1978), that peace would be at hand. This is clearly a 
reiteration of Allport’s contact Theory, but one that would also demonstrate with 
certainty the power of innate cognitive capacities that can override conscious cognition 
and give way to bias behaviors on the parts of all the Camp David disputants (Amir, 
1998). 
However, it became clear to observers that the visible friendship between Carter 
and Sadat, was soon perceived as an obstacle to the Israeli delegation. Participants like 
Moshe Dyan (1981) and Ezer Weizman (1981) described in later interviews that a 
significant part of their perceived animosity between Carter and Begin, was their 
perceptions of collusion and manipulation between Carter and Sadat against Begin. Their 
perception was that the Accords had been concluded in Cairo, even before they had 
reached Camp David. Indeed, the neutrality of Carter as a mediator came into frequent 
question by the Israelis and by all other observers. It was commented later that the limited 
success of the Accords was more due to Carter’s position as U.S. President with its 
requisite resources as opposed to Carter personal style.  
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The primary theme that was readily seen was the perceived collusion between 
Sadat and Carter to ‘end-run’ Begin and pressure him in such a way that if their demands 
were not met and the Camp David Meetings were not successful, the full weight of 
failure would be on Begin’s shoulders (Wright, 2014). Words used by observers 
included, ‘coalition, partnership, alliance and merger,’ words that Carter never sought to 
object to nor change his behavior toward their principle meanings. Sadat and Carter were 
seen as a duality that had often plotted against the Israeli delegation, specifically against 
Begin. 
A significant observation by observers was the tone of conversations held 
between Begin and Sadat, lending direct evidence to our assertion that the semantics and 
delivery of a message between two percipients, will directly impact the way in which 
they relate to each other. Further, we have asserted that the language used by the speaker, 
Re., universal grammar, is a direct reflection of cultural and environmental editing in 
assigning language equivalency and symbolic use-value thus constructing behavioral 
antecedents based on perception and definitions. 
People noted that on a first chance encounter, where it was known both men had 
come to Camp David with his own agenda, Begin and Sadat could calmly be in each 
other’s’ presence only for a short period of time. Sadat spoke in his well-known slow, 
story-telling delivery, inquiring about relatively banal topics to open up a discussion, the 
weather, the accommodations, his counterpart’s health, etc. It was noted that on one 
occasion, Sadat endeavored to tell a story, relating the events at Camp David to some 
historical childhood tale told to him by his grandmother. 
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Begin was notably and increasingly irritated and wanting to directly address the 
issues he had come to resolve (Perlmutter, 1987; Quandt, 1986b; Safty, 1991; Wright, 
2014), his speech probative about issues and answers, the pace of his questioning 
increasing along with his volume, and the frequenting of his two favorite topics, that he 
would never give up land citing the existential threat of Arab aggression and the fact that 
Israel had humiliated Egypt in previous wars and had no intention of giving in to 
American or Egyptian demands formulated between himself and his good friend Carter. 
Aside from the observation of verbal aggression on the part of Begin, several 
themes emerge concerning Begin and Sadat. First, the nature of the two men’s speech, 
one calmer and emollient as described, the other aggressive and focused on issues and 
positions as opposed to cultural and social topics used in Arabic as a prelude to talking 
business (Abu-Nimir, 1996; Amara, 1986). Remember, Begin made no attempt, it has 
been observed, to even begin to understand Arabic culture or traditions, particularly as 
regards how to speak to one another in a personal or business setting (Wright, 2014). His 
style was direct and legalistic that directly clashed with traditional Arabic morphology 
and use-value systems. 
Second, Begin, in true debate fashion, sought to immediately dismiss and 
disqualify Sadat’s verbal interactions as hyperbole, exaggeration often referring to 
“Sadat’s lies” and therefore dismissing them, and the by default the speaker as 
untrustworthy and unnecessary; a direct affront to Sadat’s personal identity and 
perception of Begin’s presence. Begin’s semantic style was one of gathering facts that 
might impact future negotiation sessions at the summit. This was not Sadat’s goal, and 
those witnessing those discussions, although few in number, made mention of the look on 
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Sadat’s face in light of Begin’s verbal attacks (Carter, 1982; Mahmood, 1985; Safty, 
1991). 
Third, and significant, is Begin’s attempt to label and therefore minimize the 
importance of his listener Sadat. References to past losses that struck at the heart of Sadat 
personally, politically and historically were driven home (Weizman, 1981). Begin labeled 
Arabs universally as an existential threat to the State of Israel, painting them as 
aggressive and without humanity, totally neglecting the actions he himself had been 
accused at the King David and Deir Yassin massacres (Carter, 1982; 2007).  
This serves as a tremendous loss of face to Sadat personally and culturally. Begin 
has effectively demonized all Arabs, reducing them to someone who did not deserve any 
consideration of human rights, thus carrying on the experiential traditions of his mentor 
Jabotinsky who viewed Arabs as an obstacle to a goal of Eretz Israel cementing in 
Begin’s mind the invisibility of human rights as regards Arabs overall and his outright 
subversion of a process aimed at providing those rights, a significant demonstration of 
our five major themes. Observers would report that Sadat was visibly shaken during these 
encounters, shaken as being the prelude to future anger and threats of leaving the accords 
altogether and the result of Carter refusing to have the two men in the same room during 
negotiations (Carter, 1982). 
Finally, discussions between the two men exemplified the contrast in 
communicative styles described by Habermas, communicative versus strategic 
rationalities and was derivatively mentioned by observers as a ‘debate of the deaf’ 
(Perlmutter, 1987).  Clearly, Sadat’s culturally defined communication morphology 
speaks to the former, more emotionally based rationality where Begin stood as the 
420 
 
hallmark of strategic, non-emotional interrogation. Observers were witnessing the 
linguistic dissonance that not only represents certain problems of language equivalency 
based in cultural differences (Sapir, 1936) and environmental perceptions, but a 
manifestation of different emotional patterns that spoke to the major individual and 
binding themes described above. 
Evidence to this effect comes in a contrast between Sadat’s interaction with the 
ethnocentric Begin, and a member of his Israeli Entourage, Ezer Weizman. Weizman had 
in earlier years developed and commanded the Israeli air force that had devastated the 
Egyptian army in 1967. It would seem that Sadat would have harbored a deep seated 
hatred for the man who had caused such a national loss of face to his ‘village.’  
However, while at Camp David, Sadat was on one of his regular walks while 
Weizman was riding his bicycle around the grounds. When seeing Sadat, whom we 
would assume to be his nemesis, Weizman got off his bike, went over to Sadat and the 
two men “warmly embraced each other saying at once, ‘it’s good to see you again.’” At 
once confusing to an outsider as it was to Dyan (1981) and Quandt (1986a) who 
witnessed the event, within the context of our discussion of behavioral antecedents and 
use-value, it becomes quite clear why the men liked each other; that a growing friendship 
between a man that had devastated the army and emotion of an entire nation and the 
Egyptian president that had a reputation for contentiousness with most Israelis somehow 
overcame a rabid nationalism like that shown by Begin, who as we have seen demanded 
unquestioned loyalty from his members. The question is, why this friendship developed 
in the first place. 
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Weizman was considered part of the ‘Mayflower’ generation of Israeli settlers. 
His uncle later served as Israel’s first president. His mother taught her children Arabic as 
Weizman was growing up in a mixed city, an Israel/Palestine of open borders before 
underlying suspicion and hostilities had broken out into violence. Arabs and Jews 
coexisted, worked together and in the case of Weizman, learned to communicate and 
understand the culture of the other. His father was a German agronomist, working, 
studying and appreciating the land and as well instilling that respect into his son 
(Weizman, 1981).  
Weizman recalls that when violence did erupt following the end of the British 
Mandate in 1948, he just could not understand ‘what had gotten into his Arab neighbors’ 
(Charney, 1989; Wright, 2014). In an interview that revisited the 1967 Six Day War 
(Charney, 1989), Weizman recalled seeing the eyes of Egyptians get tears when they 
remembered. He said that he understood why they felt this way and he could feel their 
sorrow and humiliation.  
Weizman understood because he knew and understood the foundations of a high-
context culture. Many of his experiences were rooted in Arab culture, learning though 
observation in that open environment and probably as well by interactions with friends in 
early Israel much in the same fashion that president Carter had witnessed similar 
experiences in his young years. He knew their language and their culture, quite apart 
from his Prime minister’s refusal to take the time to try and understand anything 
concerning Arab tradition (Aronoff, 2014).  
It is of no surprise, therefore, that Sadat and Weizman developed even so much as 
a ‘functional’ friendship considering their military pasts. But consider, Weizman had a 
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working knowledge of Arab culture and language making use-values and equivalency at 
some level compatible with Sadat, who also had a working knowledge of Jewish history 
and Hebrew (Amara & Spolsky, 1986) beyond its historic integration (Amara & Spolsky, 
1986). Weizman’s father, like Sadat’s grandmother and Carter’s father, had given him an 
appreciation of the land and its importance. While we can only speculate that these 
discussions might have been chiefly academic given his father’s position, we may also 
integrate the assumptions of how father’s speak to their sons, integrating fact with stories 
and measured affection, again similar to the learning environment of Sadat and his 
grandmother. 
While different in specifics, the stories of Weizm and of Sadat relative to their 
experiences and social editors of their innate cognitive machinery is at its core similar. 
Coupled to our discussion of emotion-based pattern recognition and the differences seen 
in strategic and communicative rationalities, it is easier to see and to understand why 
these two men appreciated each other. This is reinforced during one of Sadat’s emotional 
outbursts to Carter when he reiterated that Begin was intractable and an obstacle to peace 
and he ‘would rather deal with Weizman!’ (Quandt, 1986a).  
Clearly, the importance of experiential history as an editor of the cognitive 
systems that establish behavioral antecedents, from bias to hatred, are at work and can be 
seen in many of the preferences between not only the principle subjects of this study, but 
between other participants on both sides, those relationships as well in background, 
resting upon similar experiential histories. It is then nearly incontestable, from an 
abductive sense, that there are influential forces within and outside of the behaviors of 
individuals that influence their symbolic and practical interactions. 
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These similarities and differences also allow us to understand the tone seen in 
media reports and observer writings relative to the topic they are broadcasting. In the 
Jewish press, Sadat was often demonized often with the same rhetoric used by Begin who 
was often made the hero. Arab reporting took the opposite view, castigating the proposals 
and statements of Begin while lionizing everything about Sadat. Perhaps he was finally 
hearing the poetry and songs about him that he had desired upon hearing the love and 
respect of the people directed at his hero Zahran; “I wanted to be Zahran!” (Sadat, 1978).  
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Chapter Seven: Discussion and Conclusions 
Introduction 
This chapter will highlight the discussion of the research findings outlined in 
chapter five within the frame of the research questions, are there innate cognitive 
processes that might predispose a mediator towards certain predictable behaviors and/or 
biases during the course of a mediation.  A subsequent question would be to assess to 
what degree, and in which direction these behavioral dispositions might tend to go, i.e., in 
favor of innately formed preferences, or in opposition to them. The findings suggest that 
manifest behaviors are reflective of innate preferences in support of the earlier work done 
by Greene and others. However, to quantify the degree to which this occurs would 
require further research beyond the scope of this methodology.  
The findings give rise to the conclusion that innate human systems of cognition 
and performance do in fact predispose an actor toward predictable behaviors relative to 
one’s preference or abhorrence of an individual or situation and can therefore be 
universalized across the field of conflict resolution and further that these mechanisms are 
appreciably impacted by earlier socio-cultural experience. Answers to the research 
questions are presented in four sections, each addressing the data as applied. To review, 
these questions are: 
1. Is there an observable difference in situational responses between conflict 
stakeholders that can be attributed to differences in their socio-cultural 
history? 
2. Are these differences in situational responses a result of individual perceptions 
whose value is grounded in socio-cultural experiences? 
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3. Are these perceptions a result of the interplay between evolved cognitive 
mechanisms and the socio-cultural experiences unique to the individual? 
4. Is the result of this interplay manifest in particular situational preferences 
important to social interactions and therefore to mediation events? 
The difficulty prior to this study has been that the underlying reasons for the 
power and the origin of actor dissonance had yet to be investigated. The tower of 
diplomatic Babble had yet to be directly addressed in terms of its causality except 
superficially. In short, the notion of basic human perceptions through a cognitive lens had 
little been examined beyond the scope of observable actions, particularly with regards to 
the social sciences. It has been the purpose of this research to address this basic human 
characteristic using three historically dissonant actors as a demonstrable medium of this 
study’s guiding purpose. 
Discussion of Research Findings 
It has been the prevailing wisdom throughout the field of mediation that cultural 
dissonance plays an important role in the determination of mediation outcome. Various 
reasons have been put forward by notable researchers that posit the primary causes of 
mediation failure to rest in the arms of misunderstanding generally premised in either an 
ignorance of tradition and normative systems in addition to or as a result of what Laitin 
would refer to as language non-equivalence.  
Therefore, it has appeared a logical progression on the part of researchers to 
attempt to reduce misunderstanding to a point where all players are acting from the same 
script, perhaps offer a set of symbolic representations that all can agree upon, referred to 
loosely as a “language of diplomacy,” manifest in an exclusive “diplomatic culture” 
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(Burton, 1969; Dik, 1989). The recognition of this “language” supports the position that 
humans communicate symbolically, but also signals an underlying problem of 
environmental fallacies. It assumes that the same ‘diplomats’ will always be party to a 
conflict resolution process and each will hold equal value to the semiotics of constructed 
language morphology. Some attribute the power of misunderstanding to how much value 
is placed on the mediator, the mediation process, the stage of the conflict or interpretive 
challenges founded in different languages and their translations. Each of these speak to 
the importance of symbolic interaction. 
However, as potent a social factor as cultural dissonance and language 
inequivalence have shown themselves to be, they have been regarded simply as that; a 
social fact, something external to the actor that is coercive and causes them to act in 
certain ways, both independently and as an interactive social entity. This study 
demonstrates that cultural dissonance the primary determinant of linguistic morphology 
and equivalence, while acknowledged as an external set of events comprising both 
tangible and intangible artifacts, has its roots of coercion within a set of cognitive 
systems innate to all human actors. In what might appear on its surface to be a circuitous 
logic, the specificity of the agent’s culture serves as an editor of those evolved, 
genetically based innate systems giving value, and thus interactive hierarchies, to other 
social facts external to the agent but as well to all internal cognition.  
We posit that it is the impact of early socio-cultural editing through the childhood 
socialization of the actor that predisposes them to predictable behaviors to certain 
unconsciously recognized patterns later in life. This will have a direct impact on the field 
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of mediation in terms of the perceived neutrality of the mediator by disputants in addition 
to the predictable actions of the mediator. 
For many years, researchers in the field of mediation placed a great amount of 
trust in Allport’s (1954) concept of bringing disputants together in a safe environment, 
getting to work on mutually dependent tasks and becoming familiar with each other as 
people sharing common sets of needs. This position was supported and encouraged in 
many ADR texts, and is reflected in other methods such as the work in restorative justice 
underlying such notable attempts at stabilizing conflict groups as seen in the iconic South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commissions.  In each field of conflict resolution there 
is an assumption, albeit a naïve one, that at their core humans are basically good and wish 
to live in some sort of egalitarian peace and second that simple understanding can offer a 
solution to the most complex disputes. The state of our dystopic world would appear to 
contradict such liberal fantasy. 
This assumption has been successfully and repeatedly challenged in 
anthropological and primatology studies (D’Andrade, 1995) as well as recent cognitive 
studies in the cause of conflict, more specifically war and terrorism (van Creveld, 2008; 
Shaw, 2015). That is not to say that we actively seek conflict as a species, but more that 
we have been prepared to react to perceived threats quickly by evolution and that this 
phenomenon is amplified and made efficiently more destructive by post-modern 
technologies.  
It becomes that much more urgent then to understand why humans first perceive 
and then respond in the ways that they do to not only conflict but to each other and how 
this is specific to particular cultural elements that act on some kind of internal systems of 
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decision-making, and whether or not this information can be utilized in the field of 
mediation to show a higher success rate. This research has stood to shed new light on a 
concept that has existed since the beginning of humans interacting. We can begin then, to 
give substance to our research questions.  
Question One: Are there socio-cultural inputs that act upon innate cognitive 
systems? 
This section discusses the combination of two research questions that inquire as to 
the presence of innate decision-making systems and their interaction with inputs from the 
early socio-cultural environments of the percipients. It explores the presence and 
importance of the human system of dual-process decision-making facilitated by evolved 
neurological systems. Specifically, it asks how this might be acted upon or even modified 
by the socio-cultural elements the actor is exposed to early and throughout their lifetime.  
This research has shown that while we can recognize and appreciate the hopeful 
enthusiasm attributing an innate goodness to humankind, we must also dismiss it as 
overtly sanguine. Humankind has evolved through difficult environmental challenges, 
and sometimes even more difficult trials that preceded social cooperation in achieving a 
life-defining goals both as a group and as an individual. A brief review of developmental 
anthropology, and cognitive research shows that humans have evolved certain innate 
capacities for action that are of significant relevance necessary to their survival. In short, 
survival is at the top of the innate hierarchy, followed by one’s children and family and 
ending with the participatory survival of the social group. 
Significant to our study, we have found that many of the innate systems that 
manifest these outward capacities such as the genetically unfolding machinery for 
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language and cognition shown to be present and active through fMRI data, stand not as a 
tabula rasa to be programmed through environmental stimuli, and certainly not as the 
rationalist would have humans as a completely pre-programmed organism that has very 
few cognitive menu items to choose from in responding to those very environmental 
stimuli. In essence, our brains are a combination of both, a set of basic predispositions 
that can be edited, not eliminated, but edited through environmental inputs, i.e., by ‘social 
facts.’ 
 Sometimes called ‘moral foundations,’ they are a kind of ideal type, developed 
through humankind’s lifetime, to which sensory inputs are compared, or assigned a ‘use-
value’ resulting in a hierarchical library of experiences, subsequently being utilized in a 
dual process of  cognitive decision-making, both conscious, unconscious and in 
combination. We retain actions that appear to favor our goals, and discard or modify 
those that are perceived to be less than effective. 
We also know, that these innate mechanisms include and are integral to our ability 
to communicate directly and abstractly through language.  Language comes in various 
forms and here we do not refer to dialects, but goal-oriented formats. Habermas tells us, 
and Cook and Newson (1996) have shown support for this position through data collected 
from fMRI research, that typical conversations stimulate various centers of the brain, 
most notably, the centers controlling our emotions. Thus, speaking to a friend or casual 
conversations are based in what Habermas refers to as ‘communicative rationality.’  
Conversely, if we have an overwhelming goal in mind, we often revert to 
‘strategic rationality,’ where emotional centers are not stimulated as much as the 
calculative centers of the brain. So, if I am negotiating a price on a car or the settlement 
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of a piece of property, I am more likely engaging an econometric decision-making 
process devoid of most emotion in an attempt to get the best deal. It has been shown by 
Haidt and Kesebir (2010) and others, that this is often associated with politicians and 
other such professionals, where ‘liberals’ concerned with human welfare most often 
engage the former.  
There are too, according to cognitive research, specific mechanisms in the brain 
that govern the activation of these communicative and strategic centers and are highly 
dependent upon the use-value mechanisms described earlier that are within the agents’ 
library of experiences. Finally, two individuals that are engaging different communicative 
morphologies will often suffer higher levels of irritation and conflict (Walton, 2005; 
Wynn, 2008). This would certainly lend evidence to our discussion of misunderstanding 
or a misreading of symbols on the level of language as a representation of innate 
behavioral predispositions. However, this same use-value mechanism, edited through 
socialization in socio-cultural frames has direct impact on both how the individual 
perceives his environment, as well as the interactions between other members, both 
within the confines of his or her resident social system, or with others recognized as 
being outside that system, the proverbial ‘outgroup,’ taking the concepts of Boaz and 
Sapir to a higher level of explanation. 
This research has made clear that the vastly different socializers of these three 
men, two similar one not, served to shape a cognitive machinery shown present through 
studies in cognitive and neurological sciences that directly impacted the way they 
perceived the world and most importantly, how they should interact with it. It also shows 
the necessity of understanding how that cognitive dual process decision-making 
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mechanism can be effected by education and understanding. Knowing the way in which 
those socio-cultural inputs are applied through different kinds of semantic and semiotic 
structures will allow us to develop assessment tools that will assist in the mediation 
processes that will prove long lasting and more effective. Understanding will no longer 
be an abstract concept, but one built upon the science of the mind. 
Question Two: Do evolved innate processes impact mediation outcomes? 
It has been established that genetically defined cognitive programming is edited 
by the socio-cultural environment in which the percipient exists, lending to the 
establishment of a use-value hierarchy manifest as preferences in behavior. The question 
centers upon whether or not this evolving hierarchy is a predictor of behavior within the 
context of a mediation event. This research has shown that indeed the hierarchy of use-
value established through the interplay between evolved cognition and environmental 
stimuli appears to be the source of deep biases when a percipient ‘sees,’ consciously or 
unconsciously, a pattern reflective of earlier experience.  
It is no wonder that Carter and Sadat doubted Begin’s trustworthiness based on 
experiential recognition. It does not appear in their writings that their prejudices were 
apparent to them relative to their own unique experiential histories. They reacted to 
Begin’s pursuit to achieve what they perceived to be a non-legitimate goal. Begin had no 
experiential investment in the Egyptian land under question in terms of historic 
interaction beyond biblical presumption. Sadat in the other hand  why should he have it at 
all? He was not, in the perception of Sadat and Carter, concerned with its nurturance or 
well-being (Harm/Care). The innate use-value elements in Carter and Sadat were 
emotionally and historically the same. The land was a part of their emotional and 
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ideological, intangible, substance where Begin’s perceptions of the land were in direct 
contrast to the other two men, theirs was one of sacred foundation, and his was one of 
possession. Here again is a demonstration of Begin utilizing both binding and individual 
foundations, where Carter and Sadat used only the first two similar to Haidt’s (2008) 
discussion of political affiliations. In addition, the language used by Begin was indicative 
more of binding foundational influence than individualist. He demonstrated that his 
loyalty lay with his perceived supporters, that there was no purpose to nurture or care for 
the land beyond its monetary and strategic worth his only attachment was ideological and 
that too according to some observers, could change with the tide. 
Lying at the heart of the discussion of land and one’s investment in its nurturance 
are the principles’ perception of human rights of the people attached to it. This is found 
as the premise of the second major theme, fairness and cheating. Historically, Carter had 
seen the abuses prevalent in the ultra-segregationist South of the 1930’s. His pattern 
recognition associated these inequities with Black Americans who were his friends and 
socializers making the witnessing of human rights violations, particularly of dark skinned 
people that much more poignant for him. His current and notable work in Africa could 
also be said to support that pattern. These early observations that directly impacted 
Carter’s evolved systems played themselves out again upon first meeting Sadat, a man of 
very dark skin, being associated with friends and family, fighting for the oppressed and 
standing up to authority he deemed non-legitimate in its action. These were reinforced in 
Carter’s observation and perception of Begin. The bond between Carter and Sadat was 
inevitable and in play before the two men ever met face to face. 
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Sadat had seen the human rights violations of the occupying British on his village. 
Later he fought, as did his personal heroes, to rid his land of the occupiers, who again, 
had no investment in it as did his neighbors and later a pattern associated with Begin. 
Sadat often declared that he would always force out the occupiers who had nothing to do 
with his land and who ‘poisoned’ his people referring to the story of Zahran. Both men, 
Carter and Sadat, universalized their perception of human rights to everyone oppressed 
and adopted it as the main plank in their foreign policies. 
Outside his group of revisionists, Begin showed little if any concern for the 
human rights of others. He was the watchman of revisionist Zionists and would fight to 
acquire what he deemed as their entitlement and to keep out anyone that sought to take it 
away or disagree with his principles. Many writers observed that Begin, as well as many 
of his predecessors like Theodor Herzl, did not even recognize the existence of the 
resident Arab population in Palestine and later in the Sinai, the land they believed was 
biblically theirs or possessed through conquest. If not ignored, the resident Arabs were 
demonized, making it easier for Israeli military forces to remove or simply to kill them if 
they fought for what they believed to be rightfully theirs, seeing the Jews as occupiers as 
they previously had the British. He labeled them as an existential threat if anywhere near 
the Israeli settlements, often invoking Jewish victimhood from the Holocaust or diaspora 
to justify what otherwise would be considered human rights violations by the U.N. who 
once referred to Begin as a racist.  
This is in contrast to Carter and Sadat whose perception of human rights was 
universal. Their language was inclusive and was historically linked to their observations 
as children. Begin’s language was exclusive of anyone outside of his group, contrasting 
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the very premise of the use-value mechanisms and primary descriptive themes of his 
counterparts. Where Sadat and Carter used their language as a descriptor for their inner 
foundations, emotionally based communication, Begin used language as a weapon, one 
that was directly probative to gather facts, and one that claimed a victimhood in an effort 
to touch the emotional triggers of those he considered opponents. Speeches and writings 
made by Begin to members within his group, is not used as a bargaining tool as it is when 
he is playing for additional resources or strategies, but more as a rallying call to arms in 
an effort to crystalize an opposition group to whom he perceived as anyone not falling in 
line with his march toward Israeli possession. 
It is perfectly clear that the personal histories of all three men weighed heavily on 
how they perceived their world, and how they chose to interact with elements within it. 
There are clear indications that the way they felt about the world, and particularly in this 
case about each other, bore strong ties to their personal histories. Recurrent themes are 
seen among and between the three men, each reflecting an experiential history that gave 
value to elements within their current social environment. Carter and Sadat had both been 
children of the land and a childhood where they definitely identify a place where they 
grew up and their social histories were formed. Their primary socializers were their 
families who focused on fairness, nurturance of others as a leader and care for the very 
land that gave and sustained their lives. 
Begin grew up in a world of conflict. He was a child of the diaspora and taught by 
his father and a radical Zionist that their only true home was Eretz Israel and anyone that 
stood in the way of achieving the goal of settling there was an enemy of all Jews. Begin 
could not point to a place and call it home. Early on he had perceived a world of Jews and 
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of the Goyim that he was taught controlled them, killed them and victimized them. Begin 
did not have the emotional capacity for nurturance and rarely was shown as kind or 
gentle as opposed to radical and violent. His moral compass pointed toward 
exclusionism, disgust of out-group members and the demonization of others that stood in 
his way. The only legitimate authority was his, and others would never, could never be 
recognized and therefore should be also seen as an obstacle. 
Question Three: Is there an observable difference in situational responses between 
conflict stakeholders that can be attributed to differences in their socio-cultural 
history?   
This qualitative study has shown a significant manifestation of behavioral 
predispositions that support our notion that there are internal human processes that 
significantly impact whether or not individuals will get along or not, and how this can 
impact the mediation process. Specifically, we examined three men engaged in what has 
been referred to as a geo-political breakthrough for the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Camp 
David Accords. The primary subjects under study were its key players, President Jimmy 
Carter of the United States, President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin from Israel. They were chosen specifically for the culturally diverse 
environments they came from in order to test our underlying presumptions. 
It would be expected that cultural dissonance would almost predestine the 
dynamics between the three principles given historic media and academic accounts. They 
had never met each other, and in fact Carter had never met an Arab before Sadat. His 
only experience in the Middle East was a trip to meet Golda Meir, more as a religious 
pilgrimage than political mission and he expressed quite a positive report on his trip and 
the hospitality experienced in Israel. At one point he was convinced that Israel needed his 
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help to realize its dream of legitimate Statehood, something he had also learned during 
the Sunday school classes at Plains when he was a boy. 
Sadat and Begin had also never met each other, although the cultural conflict 
between the Arabs and Jews was extraordinary and admittedly must have had been the 
primary contributor to what Sadat referred to as the “psychological barrier’ between 
Arabs and Jews that prevented constructive peace negotiations. Even before their first 
meeting, Carter was ‘disturbed’ by what he had learned of Begin and found his rhetoric in 
a media news show horrifying. On the other hand, he found the background on Sadat 
quite the opposite and expressed positive feelings of being able to ‘get something done’ 
after being briefed by his foreign relations team. Between all three, before they were ever 
in the same room together, the feelings expressed in their own writings was reciprocated 
three ways.  
The research shows that the themes of Harm/Care and Fairness/Cheating were 
prevalent in Sadat and Carter’s writing and outside reports, where Loyalty/Betrayal, 
Authority/Subversion and Sanctity/Degradation were most prevalent in Begin’s. We 
should note that in line with Moral Foundations Theory (Graham, et al, 2011) and the 
decision-making calculus implied there, that Begin did exhibit the first two individualistic 
themes, but only as they related to those he deemed inside his identified group of 
revisionists. Conversely he demonstrated that he could withdraw that concern should they 
prove disloyal or perceived to be without the appropriate amount of conviction. Figure 
three shows the association between major themes, their evolved purpose, and associated 
use-values and how they are behaviorally manifested. 
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Their own words describe a dislike between Carter and Begin as well as between 
Sadat and Begin to the point of open contempt. Begin was not fond of any one of the 
other two and appeared to hold both in equal derision on a personal level although it 
becomes readily apparent that Begin almost instinctively confounds politics and personal 
feelings, something Haidt would declare as a direct reflection of innate predispositions 
and Greene (2007) would conclude was a reflection of dual process cognition. 
 Sadat and Carter on the other hand, seemed to reflect a strong liking for each 
other before they ever met. This would give rise to our first interest in answering the 
question as to why? Why did one like the other, and one not like either? Was it purely 
due to a reading of personal histories that triggered old prejudices and even if that were 
true, what caused these feelings to manifest themselves, and could that impact any future 
meetings between the three? The old proverb of judging a book by its cover seems 
appropriate here. The task of the research was investigate what might prove to be 
unconscious use-value triggers that underscores these feelings and resultant decisions of 
interaction. 
The writings of the three subjects under study clearly showed their initial personal 
appraisals of each other reflected in their recollections and reports. Themes coming out of 
the collection of personal autobiographies and diaries support our initial impressions that 
there were, in fact, predispositions on the part of the men before their first meetings that 
were only made more apparent following initial personal contact. These same themes are 
supported by other observers in biographies and observations of advisors and assistants 
giving a level of validity to these findings. Upon the first face to face meeting of each 
subject, these same themes are repeated indicating a true dislike and distrust between 
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Sadat and Begin, and Carter and Begin, and a true deep friendship and trust between 
Sadat and Carter. These behaviors did not change during the Accords, but perhaps might 
have softened a bit over time (Perlmutter, 1987). 
Outside observers were quick to point out these associations and speculate upon 
how those relationships might either support or doom the up and coming Camp David 
mediations. They made clear the dislike between Begin and the other two subjects and 
relished in commenting on how close Carter and Sadat had become. That speculation 
grew into what was frequently referred to as a coalition of forces, Carter and Sadat versus 
Begin. Begin and his entourage were never remiss in utilizing this perception by the 
media in their pressuring certain points during the mediation, again, Begin playing on his 
role as victim in trying to sway Carter into submitting to his plan making clear that he 
understood the relationship between Carter and Sadat, taking the role of victim or odd 
man out. 
Question Four: Are these differences in situational responses a result of individual 
perceptions whose value is grounded in socio-cultural experiences? 
Trying to explain how these coalitions and conflicts formed is a matter of 
revisiting the original material on cognitive functioning and use-value assignment seen in 
our major themes taken from MFT; harm/care, Fairness/ Cheating; Loyalty/Betrayal; 
Authority/Subversion and Sanctity/Degradation. How these relate to each of the subjects 
is important based on our additional knowledge of emotion-based pattern recognition; the 
way in which the brain identifies threat and non-threat, the hierarchy of use-value 
experiences and how these are integrated into a dual process of decision-making. 
Revisiting the subject matter concerning Carter, Sadat and Begin we see two 
overwhelming themes to which the use-value metrics of our major categories can be 
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directly applied or associated; the land and human rights. Ancillary to these but no less 
important is how these are expressed through language. The underlying probative 
question here is how these two sub-themes relate to our primary use-value calculus 
above. The short answer is that perception on the land by each subject and their concern 
for human rights is a direct reflection on the five use-value themes. It is important then to 
understand how these use-values, within a frame of symbolic interaction (Charmaz, 
2014) impacted how the subjects regarded each other and how this is tied to the brain’s 
pattern recognition function. Finally, are those use-values that we have shown directly 
impacting social interaction, perceived by outside observers as they might be by the 
actors themselves? 
Carter and Sadat had a direct personal association with the land. When they were 
young it provided their very livelihoods for them and their families through agriculture. 
Because of that, the land stood as a standard for many other aspects of their lives, who 
they associated with, where they lived, the environmental stimuli indicative of an 
agricultural society, Re., mechanical solidarity, and the language that was used to 
describe all of these elements. The land, its use and occupation were a visceral part of 
who they were, driven home by the lessons learned and observed by their childhood 
primary socializers.  
Their use-value of people, could be directly associated with the level of personal 
investment one had in the land or a representation of it. This personal investment can be 
translated as nurturance, of the land to produce food, or of people to provide a good and 
productive member of society. Here I do not speak specifically of land that Sadat and 
Carter may have owned personally, but more how that initial feeling taught to them by 
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their father and grandmother respectively, extended to anyone demonstrating a perceived 
investment through work, family or history. In a sense, these connections were both 
tangible and intangible and became a major part of the experiential, unconscious calculus 
in their decision-making processes. It might be acceptable to say, as Haidt extended the 
inclusion of his moral foundations as determinants of political affiliations, that this innate 
valuation of people mirrored the emotion and experience associated with Carter and 
Sadat’s experiences and patterns associated with the land.  
It is also demonstrated through their own and others’ writing, that when Carter 
and Sadat describe the land, the language used is soft and often gives way to 
anthropomorphizing, giving a gender identity of she. We often hear Carter and Sadat 
refer to Egypt as she and attributing descriptions as the ‘mother’ of humankind, or 
offering ‘her’ resources to keep her ‘children’ alive and safe. This is seen repeatedly in 
their writing and in their speeches to international audiences. Rarely, does either Carter or 
Sadat refer to the land as “it” or simply as a geographical point on a map. On reflection, 
both men appear to apply the same use-value processes to the land as they would to a 
human being.  
One can identify elements of both themes of Harm/Care and Fairness/Cheating in 
how they describe the land; Carter being told by his father and his Black caregiver 
Rachael Clark that the it should be respected and cared for, nurtured as it provides those 
things that nurture us. Sadat was told by his grandmother that all things come from the 
land and that humankind is its caregiver, looking after it for God. The language used by 
both socializers reflected use-values of kindness and proportionality, altruism and 
reciprocity. These things are later seen in both their predispositions for empathy, justice 
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and human rights. There seems to be almost a direct transfer of emotions and value 
between the land that provides for the people, and for the people that provide for the land. 
Repeatedly in both Sadat and Carter there is the ascription of human qualities mentioning 
the ‘land’ specifically or in a general sense when they speak of caring for the ‘earth.’ 
These qualities appears to underlie the vehement dissociation between Begin and the two 
other actors. 
Begin views the land from the aspect of a tangible thing upon which to place 
settlers; a legitimation of a presumed biblical right of ownership, a symbolic but 
primarily geographical holding on a map. While Begin will only refer to the West Bank 
as Samaria and Judea, the biblical reference, it is never referred to with any emotional 
qualities. The land is referred to more as a corporate point of order on some ideological 
agenda. It is simply a piece of property that was deeded by God to the Jews and should be 
surrendered by its Arab residents by default. There is no indication of dispositions found 
in the major themes of harm/care nor fairness/cheating. He does not speak of nurturing or 
caring for the land even though the primary source of support was agricultural.  
Certainly there was no equality attached to its use or stewardship. This was a 
contractual arrangement between begin and his revisionists, and God. It was his and he 
would do whatever it took to possess it. . The same labeling occurs when he refers to 
possession of the Sinai following the Six Day War. He won it, it’s his and he will not 
give ‘it’ back to its rightful owners as declared by the UN resolution 242. Again, no 
emotion, no reciprocity, no kindness or gentleness indicative of the first two themes. 
Instead, a coldness that reflects strategic rationality, a corporate deal. 
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Here we see a direct contrast between the decision-making elements of Begin and 
his counterparts. He sees the land as a tangible place to occupy, a resource that is 
necessary for his social group that will provide the resources for their survival, although 
there is a confounding of actual and political survival. The use-value here is more of 
monetary and strategic positioning as opposed to Carter and Sadat whose value lay 
primarily in emotional experiences. The binding foundations are prominent in the Begin’s 
decision-making that create policy and his actions at Camp David. Sadat and Carter on 
the other hand, focus more on the intangible elements of the land, its human qualities and 
how that will nurture her people. Where Begin is talking unemotionally about a house, 
Carter and Sadat are protecting the mother that protects her children.  
That is not to say that Begin was not passionate during his oratory concerning the 
land in question. He was trained and regarded as being quite the debater. Quite the 
contrary. What is at issue is the way in which he uses his language to establish his claims. 
His semantics are strategic and utilize the necessary tools in order to achieve his goal of 
occupation; something he demonstrated many times. The establishment of Israeli 
settlements in the Sinai and the West Bank during the Camp David talks had the impact 
of creating even more distrust among opposite sides, but serving as a legitimation of their 
earlier impressions of Begin. This played directly towards Sadat and Carter’s sense of 
Loyalty and Betrayal, the third theme. As far as Begin was concerned however, his sense 
of loyalty and betrayal only played toward his supporters, not to the mediation parties. 
Conclusion 
This grounded theory study has sought to discover an explanation for or the 
reasons behind what Bercovitch considers the ‘mediocre’ results of mediations. It 
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reviewed the prevailing theories in the conflict resolution literature where the primary 
themes centered upon cultural dissonance and mediator bias. It also reviewed what some 
researchers historically regarded as solutions to these issues in the form of Contact 
Theory (Allport, 1954). Here, great faith was placed in humankind’s ability to cooperate 
if a human understanding of disputants’ motivations might be collectively examined and 
if disputants could “get to know each other as people”. The preliminary review of this 
literature failed to provide an explanation however, as to first, why cultural dissonance is 
such a powerful social fact impacting the success rates of mediations and second, why 
contact theory is so sanguine in its expectations, but historically insipid in its results. 
It became apparent from reading historic and contemporary research findings that 
an explanation providing more depth of understanding was necessary if mediation was to 
see an increase in successes and sustainability. While this research did not intentionally 
set out to disprove any existing theories, it did provide a new lens through which to 
review earlier results of other research concentrations like cultural dissonance and human 
factors. In order to answer the question of mediation performance, and in concert with 
existing research in culture and conflict, it was necessary to identify a conflict that could 
provide a diversity of socio-cultural backgrounds for the study subjects, and one in which 
disputants were in direct contact with each other during mediation proceedings.  
 In pursuit of a new explanation, the pragmatism of symbolic grounded theory 
(Charmaz, 2014) employing the probative tools of content analysis was utilized to 
identify a dispute that would provide all of the elements necessary to first formulate 
research questions, and then to search for themes that could lead to an answer to the 
overriding question of why mediations are not more successful. The Camp David 
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Accords that sought a peace between Israel and Egypt in 1978 mediated by President 
Jimmy Carter provided that opportunity. Literature was assembled that gave accounts not 
only of the proceedings themselves, but of the three principles identified to examine, 
President Carter, Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin. 
In the early stages of gathering data themes began to emerge leading to an 
abductive moment (Pierce, 1931-35) and a common observation. From their first 
meeting, Carter and Sadat appeared to genuinely like each other where neither cared for 
Begin. Conversely, Begin appeared not like either Carter or Sadat and would later 
complain of their ‘alliance’ in attempting to pressure Israel into various capitulations on 
mediation points. This perception was later shown to be the same for outside observers 
who were direct parties to the mediation, or reporters of the proceedings gathering 
secondary information from other participants. These early discoveries led to the 
overriding research question; if a mediator likes one disputant over another will this be 
manifest in actual bias on the part of the mediator toward one or the others disputants and 
will that bias be perceived by those disputants. 
This led to the second research question; what are the influences that stand as a 
causal element to a mediator liking, or preferring one disputant over another? Taking a 
cue from earlier research it seemed that similarity in cultural histories stood as the top 
explanation. But that research did not offer an explanation as to why this was so. Pierce 
(1965) and then more recently Corbin and Strauss (2014) observed that during any kind 
of research, the researcher is influenced by his or her previous knowledge, particularly as 
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might relate to the topic under investigation. These influences and experiences give rise 
to questions based on recognizable patterns being seen in the analysis. 
My research experience lies in two significant areas, social science and 
neuroscience. The patterns that I recognize dealt with how the brain processes 
information that it gathers from its environment through its sensory net. So, cultural 
dissonance became not simply an external social fact that acted upon the subject, but an 
element of a decision-making calculus that was shown by Greene (2007) to be a dual 
process of conscious and unconscious processes. In addition, none of the cultural 
experiences of the subject were ever ‘forgotten.’ Rather, they were placed in a library of 
life-experience to be recalled based on the brains recognized patterns similarity and 
inserted into the decision-making apparatus. My next inquiry relative to how cultural 
dissonance impacts disputants’ attitudes toward each other, both during contact and by 
insinuation, centered on how these experiences, as in any econometric formulae, were 
prioritized to influence a decision outcome. 
These questions led me to the work of Jon Haidt (2012) in developing Moral 
Foundations Theory; the conclusion that human beings have a set of primitive responses 
to external stimuli that guides them in their interactive decisions. The five foundations 
were applicable and availed themselves as primary themes in examining the behaviors of 
the study subjects. A codicil to the theory that was discovered in additional neuroscience 
studies was that these primitive responses were regarded only as first editions, and could 
be modified with the input of other sensory data, i.e., the individual could learn to 
unconsciously prioritize the information. 
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Working with the tools of content analysis and the symbolic interaction frame of 
constructivist grounded theory, I was led to investigate how these priorities might be 
expressed. The notion that language served as humankind’s greatest symbol stood as an 
obvious, though abductive, focus given we think and communicate in language. Knowing 
that language is also culturally specific and a key in the earlier concepts of cultural 
dissonance through, weakly explained, misunderstandings between disputants, data that 
showed the mechanism of language construction was investigated showing a distinct 
difference between the way people communicate in situationally specific instances. Using 
Habermas’ communicative and strategic rationalities the difference between emotion and 
non-emotionally-based communication became a very relevant variable in assessing the 
likes and dislikes of mediators and disputants by the manner in which they express their 
thoughts, the purpose of that expression and the semantic construction of the messages 
they transmit. 
Combining MFT, Chomsky’s universal grammar (1970; 1972) and cognitive 
science, it became (abductively) apparent that the brain, through recognized and 
patterned experiences placed what this research defines as “use-value” on the symbols 
that constitute thought and language. The research determined that this use-value, like the 
MFT themes that could represent an evolved ‘ideal type,’ can be influenced by socio-
cultural definitions acquired during early socialization. This notion of use-value, when 
placed within the calculus of dual-process decision-making within the brains pattern 
recognition machinery and expressed through value-weighted symbolism in language 
would stand as a testable hypothesis for a) why a mediator might prefer one disputant 
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over another and b) why the mediator might be (unconsciously) compelled to show 
manifest bias. 
Proceeding under these preliminary findings, the concept was applied to Carter, 
Sadat and Begin within the context of the Camp David mediation. The notion of a use-
value that lends itself to decision-making, culturally influenced and expressed through 
identifiable linguistic constructs proved itself to be a viable explanation and answer to the 
research questions. In every instance, the socio-cultural history of each man made itself 
apparent in their interactions and their decisions. The best explanation, superficially 
identified without explanation by Bush (2005) and others was that individuals coming 
from similar cultural backgrounds are more likely to agree upon both tangible and 
intangible aspects of disputes leading to higher mediation success rates than those coming 
from different cultural environments. This research has not only supported that 
conclusion, but has now gone to provide a best explanation for why this is true. 
Future Research 
This constructivist grounded theory study (Charmaz, 2014) has provided testable 
explanations for why cultural dissonance stands as a significant influence over the 
success rates of mediation processes. While evidence was gathered using the tools of 
content analysis in interrogating the words and perceptions of the subjects under 
examination and outside observers to provide validity to the perceptions of the primary 
percipients, these conclusions can be tested using traditional methods of inquiry such as 
data gained through observation or interview, the concept of use-value linked to 
Habermasian language construction as a reflection of inner decision-making processes 
can be also tested using modern technology. In the course of this research it became 
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apparent that by examining responses using fMRI data and translating those into 
probative instruments to be given to potential mediators, it will be effective in providing 
more appropriate ‘matches’ of mediators to disputes within the assumption of mediator 
neutrality. 
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Appendix A: The Balfour Declaration 
The Balfour Declaration (it its entirety) 
Foreign Office 
November 2nd, 1917 
Dear Lord Rothschild, 
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the 
following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been 
submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. 
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national 
home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the 
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." 
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist 
Federation. 
Yours sincerely, 
Arthur James Balfour 
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Appendix B: British Mandate of 1920 
British White Paper on Palestine 1939 
In the statement on Palestine, issued on 9 November, 1938, His Majesty's Government 
announced their intention to invite representatives of the Arabs of Palestine, of certain 
neighboring countries and of the Jewish Agency to confer with them in London regarding 
future policy. It was their sincere hope that, as a result of full, free and frank discussions, 
some understanding might be reached. Conferences recently took place with Arab and 
Jewish delegations, lasting for a period of several weeks, and served the purpose of a 
complete exchange of views between British Ministers and the Arab and Jewish 
representatives. In the light of the discussions as well as of the situation in Palestine and 
of the Reports of the Royal Commission and the Partition Commission, certain proposals 
were formulated by His Majesty's Government and were laid before the Arab and Jewish 
Delegations as the basis of an agreed settlement. Neither the Arab nor the Jewish 
delegation felt able to accept these proposals, and the conferences therefore did not result 
in an agreement. Accordingly His Majesty's Government are free to formulate their own 
policy, and after careful consideration they have decided to adhere generally to the 
proposals which were finally submitted to and discussed with the Arab and Jewish 
delegations.  
The Mandate for Palestine, the terms of which were confirmed by the Council of the 
League of Nations in 1922, has governed the policy of successive British Governments 
for nearly 20 years. It embodies the Balfour Declaration and imposes on the Mandatory 
four main obligations. These obligations are set out in Article 2, 6 and 13 of the Mandate. 
There is no dispute regarding the interpretation of one of these obligations, that touching 
the protection of and access to the Holy Places and religious building or sites. The other 
three main obligations are generally as follows:  
To place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will 
secure the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish People. To 
facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and to encourage, in cooperation 
with the Jewish Agency, close settlement by Jews on the Land.  
To safeguard the civil and religious rights of all inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of 
race and religion, and, whilst facilitating Jewish immigration and settlement, to ensure 
that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced.  
To place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will 
secure the development of self-governing institutions.  
The Royal Commission and previous commissions of Enquiry have drawn attention to 
the ambiguity of certain expressions in the Mandate, such as the expression `a national 
home for the Jewish people', and they have found in this ambiguity and the resulting 
uncertainty as to the objectives of policy a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility 
between Arabs and Jews. His Majesty's Government are convinced that in the interests of 
the peace and well-being of the whole people of Palestine a clear definition of policy and 
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objectives is essential. The proposal of partition recommended by the Royal Commission 
would have afforded such clarity, but the establishment of self-supporting independent 
Arab and Jewish States within Palestine has been found to be impracticable. It has 
therefore been necessary for His Majesty's Government to devise an alternative policy 
which will, consistent with their obligations to Arabs and Jews, meet the needs of the 
situation in Palestine. Their views and proposals are set forth below under three heads, 
Section I, "The Constitution", and Section II. Immigration and Section III. Land.  
Section I. "The Constitution" 
It has been urged that the expression "a national home for the Jewish people" offered a 
prospect that Palestine might in due course become a Jewish State or Commonwealth. 
His Majesty's Government do not wish to contest the view, which was expressed by the 
Royal Commission, that the Zionist leaders at the time of the issue of the Balfour 
Declaration recognized that an ultimate Jewish State was not precluded by the terms of 
the Declaration. But, with the Royal Commission, His Majesty's Government believe that 
the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not 
have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of 
the Arab population of the country. That Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish 
State might be held to be implied in the passage from the Command Paper of 1922 which 
reads as follows  
"Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to 
create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that `Palestine is to 
become as Jewish as England is English.' His Majesty's Government regard any such 
expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time 
contemplated the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language 
or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the 
(Balfour) Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be 
converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded IN 
PALESTINE."  
But this statement has not removed doubts, and His Majesty's Government therefore now 
declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a 
Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs 
under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab 
people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a 
Jewish State against their will.  
The nature of the Jewish National Home in Palestine was further described in the 
Command Paper of 1922 as follows  
"During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a 
community now numbering 80,000, of whom about one fourth are farmers or workers 
upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the 
direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organization for 
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the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for 
the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular 
language, and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and 
displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country 
population, its political, religious and social organizations, its own language, its own 
customs, its own life, has in fact `national' characteristics. When it is asked what is meant 
by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it 
is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, 
but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of 
Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a center in which the Jewish 
people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and pride. But in 
order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide 
a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it 
should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason 
why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be 
internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient 
historic connection."  
His Majesty's Government adhere to this interpretation of the (Balfour) Declaration of 
1917 and regard it as an authoritative and comprehensive description of the character of 
the Jewish National Home in Palestine. It envisaged the further development of the 
existing Jewish community with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world. 
Evidence that His Majesty's Government have been carrying out their obligation in this 
respect is to be found in the facts that, since the statement of 1922 was published, more 
than 300,000 Jews have immigrated to Palestine, and that the population of the National 
Home has risen to some 450,000, or approaching a third of the entire population of the 
country. Nor has the Jewish community failed to take full advantage of the opportunities 
given to it. The growth of the Jewish National Home and its achievements in many fields 
are a remarkable constructive effort which must command the admiration of the world 
and must be, in particular, a source of pride to the Jewish people.  
In the recent discussions the Arab delegations have repeated the contention that Palestine 
was included within the area in which Sir Henry McMahon, on behalf of the British 
Government, in October, 1915, undertook to recognize and support Arab independence. 
The validity of this claim, based on the terms of the correspondence which passed 
between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca, was thoroughly and carefully 
investigated by the British and Arab representatives during the recent conferences in 
London. Their report, which has been published, states that both the Arab and the British 
representatives endeavored to understand the point of view of the other party but that they 
were unable to reach agreement upon an interpretation of the correspondence. There is no 
need to summarize here the arguments presented by each side. His Majesty's Government 
regret the misunderstandings which have arisen as regards some of the phrases used. For 
their part they can only adhere, for the reasons given by their representatives in the 
Report, to the view that the whole of Palestine west of Jordan was excluded from Sir 
Henry McMahon's pledge, and they therefore cannot agree that the McMahon 
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correspondence forms a just basis for the claim that Palestine should be converted into an 
Arab State.  
His Majesty's Government are charged as the Mandatory authority "to secure the 
development of self-governing institutions" in Palestine. Apart from this specific 
obligation, they would regard it as contrary to the whole spirit of the Mandate system that 
the population of Palestine should remain forever under Mandatory tutelage. It is proper 
that the people of the country should as early as possible enjoy the rights of self-
government which are exercised by the people of neighboring countries. His Majesty's 
Government are unable at present to foresee the exact constitutional forms which 
government in Palestine will eventually take, but their objective is self-government, and 
they desire to see established ultimately an independent Palestine State. It should be a 
State in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in 
government in such a way that the essential interests of each are shared.  
The establishment of an independent State and the complete relinquishment of 
Mandatory control in Palestine would require such relations between the Arabs and the 
Jews as would make good government possible. Moreover, the growth of self-governing 
institutions in Palestine, as in other countries, must be an evolutionary process. A 
transitional period will be required before independence is achieved, throughout which 
ultimate responsibility for the Government of the country will be retained by His 
Majesty's Government as the Mandatory authority, while the people of the country are 
taking an increasing share in the Government, and understanding and cooperation 
amongst them are growing. It will be the constant endeavour of His Majesty's 
Government to promote good relations between the Arabs and the Jews.  
In the light of these considerations His Majesty's Government make the following 
declaration of their intentions regarding the future government of Palestine:  
The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within 10 years of an 
independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will 
provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in 
the future. The proposal for the establishment of the independent State would involve 
consultation with the Council of the League of Nations with a view to the termination of 
the Mandate.  
The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share government in such 
a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.  
The establishment of the independent State will be preceded by a transitional period 
throughout which His Majesty's Government will retain responsibility for the country. 
During the transitional period the people of Palestine will be given an increasing part in 
the government of their country. Both sections of the population will have an opportunity 
to participate in the machinery of government, and the process will be carried on whether 
or not they both avail themselves of it.  
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As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored in Palestine steps will be 
taken to carry out this policy of giving the people of Palestine an increasing part in the 
government of their country, the objective being to place Palestinians in charge of all the 
Departments of Government, with the assistance of British advisers and subject to the 
control of the High Commissioner. Arab and Jewish representatives will be invited to 
serve as heads of Departments approximately in proportion to their respective 
populations. The number of Palestinians in charge of Departments will be increased as 
circumstances permit until all heads of Departments are Palestinians, exercising the 
administrative and advisory functions which are presently performed by British officials. 
When that stage is reached consideration will be given to the question of converting the 
Executive Council into a Council of Ministers with a consequential change in the status 
and functions of the Palestinian heads of Departments.  
His Majesty's Government make no proposals at this stage regarding the establishment of 
an elective legislature. Nevertheless they would regard this as an appropriate 
constitutional development, and, should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself 
in favour of such a development, they will be prepared, provided that local conditions 
permit, to establish the necessary machinery.  
At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appropriate body 
representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government will be set up 
to review the working of the constitutional arrangements during the transitional period 
and to consider and make recommendations regarding the constitution of the independent 
Palestine State.  
His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that in the treaty contemplated by 
sub-paragraph (6) adequate provision has been made for:  
the security of, and freedom of access to the Holy Places, and protection of the interests 
and property of the various religious bodies.  
the protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with the 
obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews and for the special 
position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home.  
such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded as necessary by His 
Majesty's Government in the light of the circumstances then existing. His Majesty's 
Government will also require to be satisfied that the interests of certain foreign countries 
in Palestine, for the preservation of which they are at present responsible, are adequately 
safeguarded.  
His Majesty's Government will do everything in their power to create conditions which 
will enable the independent Palestine State to come into being within 10 years. If, at the 
end of 10 years, it appears to His Majesty's Government that, contrary to their hope, 
circumstances require the postponement of the establishment of the independent State, 
they will consult with representatives of the people of Palestine, the Council of the 
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League of Nations and the neighboring Arab States before deciding on such a 
postponement. If His Majesty's Government come to the conclusion that postponement is 
unavoidable, they will invite the co-operation of these parties in framing plans for the 
future with a view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date.  
During the transitional period steps will be taken to increase the powers and 
responsibilities of municipal corporations and local councils.  
Section II. Immigration 
Under Article 6 of the Mandate, the Administration of Palestine, "while ensuring that the 
rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced," is required to 
"facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions." Beyond this, the extent to 
which Jewish immigration into Palestine is to be permitted is nowhere defined in the 
Mandate. But in the Command Paper of 1922 it was laid down that for the fulfilment of 
the policy of establishing a Jewish National Home:  
"it is necessary that the Jewish commun ity in Palestine should be able to increase its 
numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed 
whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. 
It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of 
Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present 
population of their employment."  
In practice, from that date onwards until recent times, the economic absorptive capacity 
of the country has been treated as the sole limiting factor, and in the letter which Mr. 
Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister, sent to Dr. Weizmann in February 1931 it was 
laid down as a matter of policy that economic absorptive capacity was the sole criterion. 
This interpretation has been supported by resolutions of the Permanent Mandates 
Commissioner. But His Majesty's Government do not read either the Statement of Policy 
of 1922 or the letter of 1931 as implying that the Mandate requires them, for all time and 
in all circumstances, to facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine subject only to 
consideration of the country's economic absorptive capacity. Nor do they find anything in 
the Mandate or in subsequent Statements of Policy to support the view that the 
establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine cannot be effected unless 
immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely. If immigration has an adverse effect on 
the economic position in the country, it should clearly be restricted; and equally, if it has 
a seriously damaging effect on the political position in the country, that is a factor that 
should not be ignored. Although it is not difficult to contend that the large number of 
Jewish immigrants who have been admitted so far have been absrobed economically, the 
fear of the Arabs that this influx will continue indefinitely until the Jewish population is 
in a position to dominate them has produced consequences which are extremely grave for 
Jews and Arabs alike and for the peace and prosperity of Palestine. The lamentable 
disturbances of the past three years are only the latest and most sustained manifestation of 
this intense Arab apprehension. The methods employed by Arab terrorists against fellow 
Arabs and Jews alike must receive unqualified condemnation. But it cannot be denied 
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that fear of indefinite Jewish immigration is widespread amongst the Arab population and 
that this fear has made possible disturbances which have given a serious setback to 
economic progress, depleted the Palestine exchequer, rendered life and property insecure, 
and produced a bitterness between the Arab and Jewish populations which is deplorable 
between citizens of the same country. If in these circumstances immigration is continued 
up to the economic absorptive capacity of the country, regardless of all other 
considerations, a fatal enmity between the two peoples will be perpetuated, and the 
situation in Palestine may become a permanent source of friction amongst all peoples in 
the Near and Middle East. His Majesty's Government cannot take the view that either 
their obligations under the Mandate, or considerations of common sense and justice, 
require that they should ignore these circumstances in framing immigration policy.  
In the view of the Royal Commission the association of the policy of the Balfour 
Declaration with the Mandate system implied the belief that Arab hostility to the former 
would sooner or later be overcome. It has been the hope of British Governments ever 
since the Balfour Declaration was issued that in time the Arab population, recognizing 
the advantages to be derived from Jewish settlement and development in Palestine, would 
become reconciled to the further growth of the Jewish National Home. This hope has not 
been fulfilled. The alternatives before His Majesty's Government are either (i) to seek to 
expand the Jewish National Home indefinitely by immigration, against the strongly 
expressed will of the Arab people of the country; or (ii) to permit further expansion of the 
Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it. 
The former policy means rule by force. Apart from other considerations, such a policy 
seems to His Majesty's Government to be contrary to the whole spirit of Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to their specific obligations to the Arabs in 
the Palestine Mandate. Moreover, the relations between the Arabs and the Jews in 
Palestine must be based sooner or later on mutual tolerance and goodwill; the peace, 
security and progress of the Jewish National Home itself requires this. Therefore His 
Majesty's Government, after earnest consideration, and taking into account the extent to 
which the growth of the Jewish National Home has been facilitated over the last twenty 
years, have decided that the time has come to adopt in principle the second of the 
alternatives referred to above.  
It has been urged that all further Jewish immigration into Palestine should be stopped 
forthwith. His Majesty's Government cannot accept such a proposal. It would damage the 
whole of the financial and economic system of Palestine and thus effect adversely the 
interests of Arabs and Jews alike. Moreover, in the view of His Majesty's Government, 
abruptly to stop further immigration would be unjust to the Jewish National Home. But, 
above all, His Majesty's Government are conscious of the present unhappy plight of large 
numbers of Jews who seek refuge from certain European countries, and they believe that 
Palestine can and should make a further contribution to the solution of this pressing world 
problem. In all these circumstances, they believe that they will be acting consistently with 
their Mandatory obligations to both Arabs and Jews, and in the manner best calculated to 
serve the interests of the whole people of Palestine, by adopting the following proposals 
regarding immigration:  
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Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if economic 
absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one 
third of the total population of the country. Taking into account the expected natural 
increase of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants 
now in the country, this would allow of the admission, as from the beginning of April this 
year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. These immigrants would, 
subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, be admitted as follows:  
For each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed on 
the understanding that a shortage one year may be added to the quotas for subsequent 
years, within the five year period, if economic absorptive capacity permits.  
In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 
refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate 
provision for their maintenance is ensured, special consideration being given to refugee 
children and dependents.  
The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity will be retained, 
and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for deciding the limits 
of economic capacity. Before each periodic decision is taken, Jewish and Arab 
representatives will be consulted.  
After the period of five years, no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the 
Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.  
His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration, and further 
preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants 
who, despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be 
deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas.  
His Majesty's Government are satisfied that, when the immigration over five years which 
is now contemplated has taken place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will 
they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National 
Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population.  
Section III. Land 
The Administration of Palestine is required, under Article 6 of the 
Mandate, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections 
of the population are not prejudiced," to encourage "close settlement by 
Jews on the land," and no restriction has been imposed hitherto on the 
transfer of land from Arabs to Jews. The Reports of several expert 
Commissions have indicated that, owing to the natural growth of the 
Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, 
there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land, 
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whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if 
Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a 
considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created. In these 
circumstances, the High Commissioner will be given general powers to 
prohibit and regulate transfers of land. These powers will date from the 
publication of this statement of policy and the High Commissioner will 
retain them throughout the transitional period.  
The policy of the Government will be directed towards the development of the land and 
the improvement, where possible, of methods of cultivation. In the light of such 
development it will be open to the High Commissioner, should he be satisfied that the 
"rights and position" of the Arab population will be duly preserved, to review and modify 
any orders passed relating to the prohibition or restriction of the transfer of land.  
In framing these proposals His Majesty's Government have sincerely endeavored to act in 
strict accordance with their obligations under the Mandate to both the Arabs and the 
Jews. The vagueness of the phrases employed in some instances to describe these 
obligations has led to controversy and has made the task of interpretation difficult. His 
Majesty's Government cannot hope to satisfy the partisans of one party or the other in 
such controversy as the Mandate has aroused. Their purpose is to be just as between the 
two people in Palestine whose destinies in that country have been affected by the great 
events of recent years, and who, since they live side by side, must learn to practice 
mutual tolerance, goodwill and cooperation. In looking to the future, His Majesty's 
Government are not blind to the fact that some events of the past make the task of 
creating these relations difficult; but they are encouraged by the knowledge that as many 
times and in many places in Palestine during recent years the Arab and Jewish inhabitants 
have lived in friendship together. Each community has much to contribute to the welfare 
of their common land, and each must earnestly desire peace in which to assist in 
increasing the well-being of the whole people of the country. The responsibility which 
falls on them, no less than upon His Majesty's Government, to cooperate together to 
ensure peace is all the more solemn because their country is revered by many millions of 
Moslems, Jews and Christians throughout the world who pray for peace in Palestine and 
for the happiness of her people 
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Resolution 242 (1967) 
of 22 November 1967 
The Security Council, 
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, 
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to 
work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, 
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the 
United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the 
Charter, 
1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the 
following principles: 
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 
2. Affirms further the necessity 
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; 
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State 
in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the 
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Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to 
promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in 
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the 
efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible. 
Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting 
 
